JUDGMENT - N.J. PANDYA, A.C.J.:---By filing these petitions, the petitioners had challenged the continuation of pending prosecution under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and the other related offences punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. So far as the Writ Petition No. 1642 of 1999 is concerned, there is history which may be referred to at this stage. These very petitioners had earlier filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 124 of 1999 in this Court. When that petition was heard finally, by an order dated 27th July, 1999, a Division Bench of this Court had directed the trial Court to hear the parties as to the framing of charges. The reason was obvious. If no charge could be framed, the matter would have ended at the trial Court itself. 2. The said application was heard and decided against the petitioners. The learned Special Judge who passed the order on discharge application did so on 1st September, 1999 and dismissed the application. One of the contentions in the said discharge application was also based on the right of the petitioners/accused to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 3. The learned trial Judge had to enter into merits of the case while considering the request for discharge. It was specifically kept open by the Division Bench of this Court when it had disposed of the earlier Criminal Writ Petition No. 124 of 1999. The trial Court, therefore, had expressed its opinion on merits of the matter also. Needless to say, this was confined only to consider whether the charge was framed or not. It had also dealt with the aforesaid contention of a right to speedy trial and had held against the petitioners on that count also. 4. Raising that issue again by way of this writ petition, the petitioners had pointed out that there is an inordinate delay between filing of the complaint and hearing of the discharge application. When the charges are yet to be framed, this inordinate delay, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioners, clearly violates the right of the petitioners to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, because, the F.I.R. was lodged on 24th January, 1986, charge-sheet was submitted on 13th June, 1989 and till 1st September, 1999, though the discharge application was rejected, no charge was framed. 5. 5. With regard to the right to speedy trial, while admitting the matter, the learned Judges had dealt with that aspect in paragraph 9 of the admission order. Speaking for the Bench, Justice A.V. Savant had referred to the earlier decision to which he was a party. It was in the matter of (I.P. Shankaran v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bombay and others)1, 1999(5) Bom.C.R. 670 . Referring to the Supreme Court judgment of (Rajdeo Sharma v. The State of Bihar)2, reported in 1999(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)1 , in the earlier decision of Shankaran's case, it was held that Rajdeo Sharma case would not apply to the corruption cases and this, according to the said Shankaran's case, would be the decision keeping in mind the "Common Cause judgment" and other related judicial pronouncements. 6. In this regard, a reference was made to (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak)3, 1992(1) S.C.C. 225 , (“Common Cause” a Registered Society through its Director v. Union of India)4, 1996(4) Bom.C.R. 519 and (“Common Cause” A Registered Society, Through its Director v. Union of India)5, 1997(1) Bom.C.R. 636 . Latter two judgments specifically excluded the offences falling under the Prevention of Corruption Act and other economic offences. It may also be noted that the Special Leave Petition Criminal No. 1676 of 1999 filed by the petitioners of that case against the decision of the Division Bench in Shankaran's case was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 13th May, 1999. 7. It was, thereafter, urged that, as per the decision in (Santosh De v. Archna Guha)6, 1994 Supp. (3) S.C.C. 375, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Shan Karan's case cannot be held to be a good law. It was further urged that, at any rate, having regard to the view expressed in the majority decision in the second case of (Rajdeo Sharma v. The State of Bihar)7, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)184 , it was clear that the contention in respect of the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India could also be raised by a public servant who was facing the charges of offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 8. At the time of admission, the case was sought to be argued, also, on merits. This was accepted in view of the dismissal of the application for discharge by the trial Court. 8. At the time of admission, the case was sought to be argued, also, on merits. This was accepted in view of the dismissal of the application for discharge by the trial Court. While admitting the matter, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, in paragraph 12 of their admission order, by not expressing any opinion with regard to the contention raised on merits of the prosecution case, felt that, on the first question of the alleged violation of the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, there is an arguable case in the light of Rajdeo Sharma case (II) and, therefore, Rule came to be issued on 25th November, 1999. 9. It is this rule which is now being heard. It is, therefore, obvious that the issuance of Rule is confined only to the said contention of the right to a speedy trial and its denial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the 2nd matter, i.e. Writ Petition No. 1742 of 1999 also, the point remains the same. There is however only one material difference between the two, i.e. after filing of the petition, during its pendency, with regard to the case dealt with under Writ Petition No. 1642 of 1999, charges were framed after its admission. 11. First we will deal with the submission made on behalf of the petitioners with regard to the applicability of Article 21 of the Constitution of India where from the right to a speedy trial is flowing to the accused of the corruption cases or other economic offences. At the bar, various authorities were cited tracing out the history in respect of the aforesaid right through judicial pronouncements with regard to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The first one to be considered is a decision in the case of (State of U.P. v. Kapil Deo Shukla)8, reported in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. page 494. In this case, the accused had been kept in suspense of a trial under sections 408 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code for more than 20 years. This is all bearing on economic offence because it involves misappropriation with criminal intention. The F.I.R. in that case was lodged on 9th August, 1946. Before the City Magistrate Court, proceedings were started in the year 1949. This is all bearing on economic offence because it involves misappropriation with criminal intention. The F.I.R. in that case was lodged on 9th August, 1946. Before the City Magistrate Court, proceedings were started in the year 1949. In this background, on 24th July, 1967 as also on 16th March, 1967, the High Court at Allahabad had quashed the criminal case against the accused. 12. The entire period for which the trial protracted was taken into consideration in issue. The Supreme Court for the reasons stated in the aforesaid decision refused to interfere. Referring to earlier decisions, going back as far as in 1955, in paragraph 14, it has been noted at page 498 of the report that the accused cannot be made to keep their lives under indefinite suspense. Justice is said to be not one-sided and there being many facets, the Court has to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. For this and other several reasons, appeal filed by the State was dismissed. 13. The 2nd decision in the case of (State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal and others)9, reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. page 641 has been cited. This case relates to an offence punishable under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the trial protracting for a period of 20 years. The High Court quashed the proceedings and the Supreme Court refused to interfere in it. The Supreme Court observed that the accused persons themselves of that case were to be partly blamed for the delay, because, on several occasions, revision applications have been filed at their instance in the High Court and in the District Court. It was noticed that the last such an attempt had concluded in the year 1973 and the record was returned to the trial Court in the year 1974. Inspite of this, only four witnesses were examined, and the last one was examined in the month of April, 1979. Though, most of the witnesses were of the Government Officials, the prosecution was unable to call them for concluding its evidence as their addresses were not known. In this background, it was held that there was an abuse of process of law and, therefore, the prosecution must be quashed. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, the Supreme Court recorded its reasons for non-interference. 14. In this background, it was held that there was an abuse of process of law and, therefore, the prosecution must be quashed. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, the Supreme Court recorded its reasons for non-interference. 14. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. page 289 (S. Guin and others v. Grindlays Bank Ltd.)10, has been cited. Strictly speaking, this matter does not involve either economic offences or offences, punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It does indicate that it concerns with the speedy trial. The original accused had approached the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court for setting aside the acquittal order passed by the trial Court. Before the trial Court, the matter had commenced in the year 1978 and appeal in the High Court against the order of acquittal had remained pending for six years. Criminal Appeal filed before the Supreme Court was in the year 1985. It was disposed of on 11th December, 1985. Referring to the earlier decision, reported in (S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker)11, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1032. Their Lordships went to the extent of laying down that in view of inordinate delay and nature of offence involved, retrial should not have been ordered even though acquittal was improper. The offence involved was the alleged obstruction caused by the accused to the bank officials from entering the bank premises and discharging their duties. Apparently, the accused was an employee of the bank of which officers were so obstructed. 15. Next decision is of the Full Bench of Patna High Court given in the case of (Madheshward Hari Singh and another v. State of Bihar)12, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Patna 324. The matter was in respect of economic offences, in the sense, that there were allegations of misappropriation and forgery for which criminal conspiracy was alleged. Charges under sections 467, 409 read with section 120-B were levelled against the accused. It was noted that the investigation and trial had dragged down for 20 years and that the delay was not due to default of the accused. There being no exceptional reason for the delay, it was held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated. The learned Judges of the Full Bench were also of the view that the right to speedy trial is available in all criminal prosecution irrespective of the nature of the offence involved. There being no exceptional reason for the delay, it was held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated. The learned Judges of the Full Bench were also of the view that the right to speedy trial is available in all criminal prosecution irrespective of the nature of the offence involved. In paragraphs 52 and 45, after referring to various Supreme Court judgments, the learned Judges have also laid down outer time limit for concluding investigation and speedy trial except for the cases involving capital punishment and the outer time limit fixed by the learned Judges is of 7 years for concluding investigation and original trial. 16. The next judgment is of the Bombay High Court dealing with offences under sections 409, 420 etc. of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by Auditor who had later retired. However after framing of charge on 18th April, 1979 on the basis of a complaint filed on 21st March, 1974, though the case was fixed for evidence, not a single witness was examined. By going through the record, the learned Single Judge of this Court found that though the list of witnesses was given and certain documents were submitted in 1985, nothing was done for a period of 10 years. This case was reported in 1988(4) Bom.C.R. 435 (Narayan Sambhaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra)13. Thereafter, we have the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and others v. R.S. Nayak and another, reported in 1992(1) S.C.C. page 225, which, for the present, we will not discuss as that will have to be referred to later on in connection with the present case itself . Further, we have the decision of this Court in the case of (Miss Smita Ambalal Patel v. Asstt. Directorof Enforcement, Enforcement Directorate and others)14, reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. 961, again that of a learned Single Judge, where he found that no headway was made by the prosecution even to commence trial though more than 15 years had elapsed since filing of the F.I.R. and more than 12 years had elapsed since filing of the charge-sheet. The charges thereunder were framed for offences punishable under section 120-B read with sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and also under section 8, sub-section (3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The charges thereunder were framed for offences punishable under section 120-B read with sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and also under section 8, sub-section (3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Two more cases of the Bombay High Court, which are unreported, are also cited on behalf of the petitioners. They are respectively in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1504 of 1991 and Criminal Writ Petition No. 353 of 1993, and they need not be gone into, because, on merits, the learned Judges found that the prosecution case was not sustainable. It deals with the matter under sections 120-B, 406, 409, 477-A and section 5(i)(c), (d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The amount involved was Rs. 66,008.11ps. The complaint for the same was lodged on 24th April, 1982. After obtaining sanction, on or about 5th March, 1993, ultimately, the matter had come before the Court by way of criminal case making out a ground that 11 years have passed for making investigation. The said petition was filed before the Division Bench of this Court. Speaking through Justice Pendse on 24th September, 1993, the Bench was pleased to allow the petition and quash the proceedings. The learned Judges have, however, clearly excepted the due injury. To summarize the cases referred to so far, the cases involving embezzlement, misappropriation, misuse of office, perjury with or without charges under Prevention of Corruption Act are all ended in favour of the petitioner/accused when there has been inordinate delay. In the background of Shankaran's case decided by the Division Bench the last of the aforesaid cases viz. Writ Petition No. 353 of 1993 by a Division Bench, was under the Prevention of Corruption Act and so was that of a learned Single Judge referred to earlier reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. page 961. 17. It is therefore to be noted that while dealing with the writ petition under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the fact that there are charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act has not in anyway come in the way of passing of the order by any of the courts including the Bombay High Court. In fairness to the learned Judges who decided the Shankaran's case, it is to be stated that none of the aforesaid cases were before the Court. In fairness to the learned Judges who decided the Shankaran's case, it is to be stated that none of the aforesaid cases were before the Court. Shankaran's case was decided on the basis of Rajdeo Sharma case (I), Antulay's case as also what is known as "Common Cause case". As noted above, the aforesaid Bombay judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were not before the Bench that dealt with Shankaran's case. However, as could be seen from the opening part of this judgment as also the order passed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench in this very matter by issuing Rule, two decisions in Rajdeo Sharma case, if facts are taken note of, clearly indicate that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a matter arising out of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Rajdeo Sharma case (I) reported in 1998(7) S.C. page 1 fixed two years time limit in respect of the cases involving punishment not exceeding 7 years, and 3 years time limit for the offences punishable for imprisonment exceeding 7 years. It would, therefore, necessarily mean that the cases arising out of the Prevention of Corruption Act are also to be dealt with, with reference to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If right to speedy trial is found to be violated, the accused will certainly get benefit of the same. 18. Rajdeo Sharma case (II) reported in Judgment Today 1999(7) S.C. 317 is only the clarificatory judgment. Neither on behalf of the prosecution who sought clarification on that count nor on earlier occasion while opposing the plea of Rajdeo Sharma case, anyone said that the cases arising out of the Prevention of Corruption Act are exempted from operation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 19. In our opinion, such an action could never be envisaged by series of judgments when a right to speedy trial referable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been found, as flowing from it, as a part of right to life, it should uniformly apply to all criminal trials subject, of course, to the very healthy and loudable guidelines set out in Antulay's case as also Rajdeo Sharma case (II). 20. To summarise these guidelines, they clearly indicate that, if the accused are at fault in delaying the trial, they cannot claim benefit of passage of time. 20. To summarise these guidelines, they clearly indicate that, if the accused are at fault in delaying the trial, they cannot claim benefit of passage of time. As against that, if the prosecution is lax or indifferent with its trial, then the accused cannot be allowed to suffer irrespective of the nature of the offence subject to the special provision as to rule of evidence where burden may be on the accused under the criminal jurisprudence. The accused is to be dealt with under rules. Viewed from that angle, mere levy of charge of filing of complaint resulting into the charge-sheet, after investigation, cannot be held as enough to prevent the accused from claiming benefit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 21. In the light of this matter, the submission made on behalf of the State that the prayer of the petitioners be dealt with under Shankaran's decision, in our opinion, cannot be accepted. On the contrary, we are in agreement with the view expressed on behalf of the petitioners that, as per Rajdeo Sharma cases and other related judgments of the Supreme Court as also judgments referred to earlier. Shankaran's case cannot be said to be a good law. 22. Now we turn to the matter at hand. In this regard, it is very strongly urged on behalf of the prosecution that, in a city like Mumbai where a centimeter of a space is valuable, a large scale, conspiracy leading to conjuring up non existant F.S.I., cannot be viewed lightly. We entirely agree with the prosecution. 23. However, that by itself, would not mean that the prosecution can take any time or as much time as it wants without respecting right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If there be any genuine difficulty in the path of the prosecution, certainly, it can be looked into and given the due weightage. 24. For this reason, it was urged before us that for quite sometime there was only one Judge in the City Sessions Court to deal with the C.B.I. cases. By very nature, these cases involving conspiracy, perjury, fabrication of evidence, etc. have to be invested in a clever and conspicious manner which would take its own time to unearth its task at first place, and involve to long drawn exercise to prove the same in a Court of law. By very nature, these cases involving conspiracy, perjury, fabrication of evidence, etc. have to be invested in a clever and conspicious manner which would take its own time to unearth its task at first place, and involve to long drawn exercise to prove the same in a Court of law. The prosecution therefore has to have sufficient time to complete its task. 25. On top of that, if there is paucity of personnel which would include a Judge to decide the case of the prosecutor, on behalf of the State, obviously, the time if required will have further to be extended because it is not in anybody's hand to provide either more number of Judges or prosecutors overnight. Even otherwise, out of the sanctioned strength of 60 Judges in the City Civil Court, there are presently only 49 Judges in the said Court and that has added to the paucity of Judges being available inadequate numbers to deal with the pending cases. 26. Even if that is possible, there would be number of other reasons including that of non availability of Advocates or witnesses which again would lead to delay in completing the trial. 27. The petitioners have produced copies of the Roznama showing who have been responsible for the delay. It is the Presiding Judge who had, at all time, adjourned the matters from day one to other for a period of 3 to 4 months. In our opinion, if there is only one Judge or at the most two Judges dealing with so many cases, if they do not adjourn the matters in this manner, it would be impossible for them to proceed with each of the cases for whole day. They have to adjourn the matters and repeat the exercise almost every day to manage the Board effectively and postpone those cases where immediate trial is not possible for a sufficient long time and deal with those cases on hand when the trial can commence. 28. This being a proper method for managing the Court or exercise is expressed to be handling the task of the docket management, the learned Judge cannot be faulted for the same. 29. The aforesaid judgments, particularly, Rajdeo Sharma case (II), clearly makes a distinction between the date of framing of charge and lodging of charge-sheet only. 28. This being a proper method for managing the Court or exercise is expressed to be handling the task of the docket management, the learned Judge cannot be faulted for the same. 29. The aforesaid judgments, particularly, Rajdeo Sharma case (II), clearly makes a distinction between the date of framing of charge and lodging of charge-sheet only. The period of 2 years or 3 years, as set out in the case of Rajdeo Sharma (I), would apply on and after framing of the charge. In the case before us this is the position only in respect of the Writ Petition No. 1642 of 1999. In the other cases, charges are yet to be framed. Charges having been framed in the same matters by the trial Court during the pendency of the petition, obviously, the period of 2 years or 3 years, as the case may be, has just begun to run against the prosecution. There is, therefore, no question of holding that the petitioners need not face the trial and it should be quashed. 30. In the mean time, if charges are not framed, obviously, such orders cannot be passed. The cause for the delay are far too many. It must be said that they are beyond enumeration. 31. While therefore admitting the fact that the benefit of speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India is available to the accused for the offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, may or may not be, or for the other related offences, each cases has to be viewed from its factual conspectus and decision will have to be given by the trial Court whether this benefit be granted to the accused or not. 32. In the light of this, while accepting the proposition putforth by the defence that the cases under Prevention of Corruption Act are also covered under Article 21 of the Constitution of India so far as granting of benefit thereof is concerned, it cannot be done in respect of the petitioners for the reasons stated above. 33. The cases of each of the petitioners, therefore, shall have to be dealt with in the light of the discussions made in this judgment; as also in the light of the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in Anutulay's case, Common Cause case and also in Rajdeo Sharma's (II) case. 33. The cases of each of the petitioners, therefore, shall have to be dealt with in the light of the discussions made in this judgment; as also in the light of the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in Anutulay's case, Common Cause case and also in Rajdeo Sharma's (II) case. We further specify that, because of the pendency of these matters before us, in the cases where even if the prosecution could have proceeded to examine witnesses either due to oral directions, or, due to understanding between the parties, if a matter has not progressed, that period will have to be deducted from the time, limit fixed in the case of Rajdeo Sharma (II). The time limit is of two years and three years respectively, as set out therein. 34. We also hold that the Shankaran's case is not a good law. So far as the petitions are concerned, they are rejected. Rule in both petitions is discharged accordingly. 35. Certified copy be expedited. Petitions rejected. -----