Judgment Shivaraj V. Patil, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Since in all writ petitions, common questions of law arise for consideration based on similar set of facts, they are being disposed of by this common order. I shall narrate the facts in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2785/1994 to the extent they are considered relevant and necessary for the disposal of these writ petitions. 2. Thepetitioner is a Regional Rural Bank created under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. The respondent No. 1 as Judge, Labour Court (Central), Jaipur and the respondent No. 2 at present is working as a Messenger with the petitioner-Bank. He filed an application before the respondent No. 1 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’) claiming a sum Rs. 21,791.90 for the period between October 30, 1981 to April 30, 1987 claiming that that much amount has been paid less to him although he was entitled for the said amount i.e. by claiming regular pay scale for the aforesaid period. After receipt of the statement of petitioner-Bank filed a detailed reply resisting and opposing the claim made by the respondent No. 2 under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 3. Therespondent No. 1 after recording evidence and considering the material placed before him passed the order dated November 22, 1993 allowing the application of the respondent No. 2 and gave direction to the petitioner-Bank to pay the amount claimed by the respondent No. 2. The petitioner-Bank has challenged the said order of the respondent No. 1 in this writ petition. The respondent No. 2 has also filed reply to the writ petition justifying and supporting the order passed by the respondent No. 1. 4. The petitioner-Bank has challenged the said order of the respondent No. 1 in this writ petition. The respondent No. 2 has also filed reply to the writ petition justifying and supporting the order passed by the respondent No. 1. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-Bank urged: (1) that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to deal with and pass the order on the application filed U/Section 33-C(2) of the Act as there was no earlier adjudication as to the entitlement of the amount claimed by the respondent No. 2, (2) there was no sanctioned post of Messenger during the relevant period when the services of respondent No. 2 was taken as a part-time Messenger on the fixed daily wages; there was a prohibition for appointment to Class IV post during the relevant period; there was no material of evidence placed before the respondent No. 2 to hold that respondent No. 2 was entitled for the amount claimed on the basis of equal pay for equal work’; in the absence of evidence as to the nature of work and the quantum of work, the respondent No. 1 was not justified in allowing the application made by the respondent No. 2. 5. Per contra, the learned Counsel representing respondent No. 2 argued in support and justification of the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 1. He straightway submitted that the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and even they need not be considered, having regard to the award passed by the National Industrial Tribunal for Regional Rural Banks at Hyderabad. He submitted that the controversy that is raised by the petitioner is frilly covered by the said award that a part time Sweeper-cum-Messenger serving in a Rural Regional Bank was entitled for the wages as regular Messenger, as is evident on the discussions made on point No. 13 at page 437 of the award. Learned Counsel also drew my attention to Paras 4.4 13, 4.425, 4.426 and 4.427. On the basis of the same, he submitted that the impugned award passed by the respondent No. 1, which is under challenge in the writ petition, is frilly justified as it is consistent with the said award. Learned Counsel also drew my attention to Paras 4.4 13, 4.425, 4.426 and 4.427. On the basis of the same, he submitted that the impugned award passed by the respondent No. 1, which is under challenge in the writ petition, is frilly justified as it is consistent with the said award. Reacting to the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed U/Section 33-C(2), he submitted that in view of the award of National Industrial Tribunal, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 2 was not entitled for the amount. There was already adjudication as to entitlement and if that be so, the respondent No. 1 could entertain the application and pass the order. He also added that there was no bar to receive the application filed U/Section 33-C(2). At any rate on the date when the respondent No. 1 passed the order, the award of the National Industrial Tribunal aforementioned had come into existence. Learned Counsel for the parties cited few decisions in support of the respective submissions. I think it is not necessary to refer to them on the settled principles of law and also in the view I propose to take having regard to the award of the National Industrial Tribunal. I specifically asked the learned Counsel for the petitioner as to whether the petitioner-Bank is covered by the said National Industrial Tribunal award. The reply was in affirmative. Learned Counsel found himself uncomfortable in denying that the controversy raised in this writ petition is examined and resolved by the National Industrial Tribunal as is clear from paragraph 4.35 8 at point No. 13. Similarly, as to the relief granted by the respondent No. 1 also it was difficult for the learned Counsel for the petitioner to pursue any further as in identical situation the relief was granted in paragraph 4.427, but he only added that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 in this regard needs to be clarified. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 although asserted that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 is in consonance with para 4.427 of the National Industrial Tribunal award, submitted that the respondent No. 2 has no objection to clarify again in terms of the aforementioned paragraph 4.427. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 although asserted that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 is in consonance with para 4.427 of the National Industrial Tribunal award, submitted that the respondent No. 2 has no objection to clarify again in terms of the aforementioned paragraph 4.427. In view of what is stated above, I find no merit in the writ petitions. They are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed but with no order as to costs. 6. I make it clear that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 relating to the relief granted to the respondent No. 2, it shall be read consistent with paragraph 4.427 of the National Industrial Tribunal for all purposes. 7. I am informed that the respondent No. 2 in writ petition No. 3 106/1994 has died and his wife has been given appointment on compassionate ground by the petitioner-Bank as a good gesture on the part of the petitioner-Bank. Since the writ petitions are being dismissed, the disposal of this writ petition need not be deferred for want of bringing the LRs on record. The legal heirs of the respondent No. 2 shall be entitled to the amount payable by virtue of the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1