JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—The present Civil Revision is filed by the petitioner-landlady against the judgment and order passed by Rent Controller (I), Sirmaur District at Nahan on April 29, 1996 in Rent Petition No. 18/2 of 1992 and confirmed by the Appellate Authority-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan on August 18, 1997 in Rent Appeal No. 4-N of 1996. 2. A Rent Petition was filed by the petitioner-landlady against the respondent-tenant in the Court of Rent Controller (I), Sirmaur District at Nahan under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter called the Act). The case of the petitioner was that she was the owner of a non-residential shop bearing Municipal No. 3528, situated at Ward No. 13 of Nahan town, which was let out to the tenant in September, 1985 for a monthly rent of Rs. 550. The respondent was running a dairy products business in the suit shop. He was, however, habitual defaulter in payment of rent. He was in arrears of rent since April, 1990. Even at earlier occasion, he paid rent only after an order of eviction was passed by Court against him. According to the petitioner the respondent had not paid rent and he was, therefore, liable to be evicted. Moreover, without the prior permission of the landlady, the respondent-tenant had sub-let the suit shop by inducting his brother-in-law Harbans Singh, as a sub-tenant. On that ground also, he was liable to eviction. A prayer was, therefore, made by the petitioner to the Rent Controller to pass an order of ejectment against the respondent by awarding possession of the suit shop to her. 3. The respondent contested the petition, inter alia, contending that the petitioner was not entitled to possession of the suit shop. Though the respondent was ready and willing to pay rent and also made an offer to pay rent, the petitioner refused to accept it. The respondent was, therefore, not liable to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent. Regarding sub-letting, the respondent contended that he never left Nahan town nor did he part with exclusive possession in favour of Harbans Singh. He stated that Harbans Singh was none else than his brother-in-law, who was in good terms with him and was carrying on his independent business of carriage and sale of milk and suit shop was never sub-let to him. He stated that Harbans Singh was none else than his brother-in-law, who was in good terms with him and was carrying on his independent business of carriage and sale of milk and suit shop was never sub-let to him. Even on that allegation, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to possession. 4. It may be stated that during the pendency of proceedings, arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 11,000 alongwith interest had already been deposited in the Court and the ground of arrears of rent, thus, did not survive. The parties were at issue on sub-letting alone. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed one issue, namely, "whether the respondent has sub-let the premises in question to one Harbans Singh? If so to what relief the petitioner was entitled?" After considering the evidence on record, the Rent Controller held that it was not proved by the petitioner that the respondent had parted with exclusive possession in favour of Harbans Singh, thereby creating sub-tenancy in favour of the latter. Since sub-letting was not proved, the petitioner-landlady was not entitled to possession and the respondent was not liable to be evicted. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. 6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan. The appellate authority, once again, considered the evidence on record and in paragraph 15, a finding of fact was recorded that the petitioner was not able to establish that the respondent had parted with exclusive possession of the suit shop to Harbans Singh, and hence, it was not a case of sub-letting. 7. The said order passed by the appellate authority is challenged in the present revision. The petition was admitted on July 10, 1998. Today, it is called out for final hearing. 8. I have heard Shri K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate with Shri Neeraj Gupta, Counsel for the respondent. 9. It may be necessary to state at this stage that with the revision petition, two applications were also filed by the petitioner being CMPs No. 82 and 83 of 1998. 10. 8. I have heard Shri K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate with Shri Neeraj Gupta, Counsel for the respondent. 9. It may be necessary to state at this stage that with the revision petition, two applications were also filed by the petitioner being CMPs No. 82 and 83 of 1998. 10. CMP No. 83 of 1998 is filed by the landlady under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), praying therein that in the interest of justice, the petitioner may be allowed to withdraw the petition with permission to file fresh petition on the same cause of action. It was, inter alia stated in the application that ejectment proceedings were initiated by the petitioner only against Balbir Singh, though it was the case of the petitioner from the beginning that Balbir Singh had, without the prior permission of the petitioner-landlady, sub-let the suit shop to Harbans Singh. Harbans Singh was, therefore, necessary party to the proceedings, but he was not joined and hence the petition was liable to be dismissed due to "formal defect". The case was, therefore, covered by Rule 1(2) of Order 23 of the Code. 11. CMP No. 82 of 1998 is filed by the petitioner under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. In the said application, a prayer is made by the petitioner that in the interest of justice, the application may be allowed and Harbans Singh, son of Tek Singh may be ordered to be impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the revision petition. This was in the alternative, if the Court is of the opinion that CMP No. 83 of 1998 does not deserve to be granted. 12. On merits, Mr. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no doubt, both the Courts have recorded a finding that there was no sub-letting but he submitted that in the light of the above two civil applications, the matter may be decided in accordance with law by granting CMP No. 83 of 1998 or CMP No. 82 of 1998. 13. Mr. Gupta, on the other hand, contested the matter. He submitted that neither of the CMPs is maintainable at law nor the petitioner has any case on merits. 13. Mr. Gupta, on the other hand, contested the matter. He submitted that neither of the CMPs is maintainable at law nor the petitioner has any case on merits. The learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner-landlady has filed CMP No. 83 of 1998 and CMP No. 82 of 1998 only with a view to obviate and avoid a finding of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 14. Regarding CMP No. 83 of 1998, it was also submitted that a sub-tenant cannot be said to be necessary party to a petition under the Act. His presence was not necessary for the purpose of determination of Us in the matter. Clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code has no application to the present case. In the alternative, the counsel contended that even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that Harbans Singh can be said to be necessary party, the petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground that necessary party was not joined by the petitioner. Such a defect cannot be said to be a formal defect. Hence, in that case also, CMP No. 83 of 1998 cannot be allowed. When both the authorities had decided against the petitioner, she cannot be granted a second inning by permitting her to withdraw the main matter and by virtually destroying finding of fact recorded by the authorities. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that CMP No. 83 of 1998 is ill-conceived and deserves to be dismissed. He also referred to Shankarrao v. Kisanlal, AIR 1950 MB 19 and Prem Chandv. Gian Chand, (1979) 2 RCR 175. 15. Regarding CMP No. 82 of 1998, it was submitted that even if it is assumed that Harbans Singh could be said to be a proper party, when the proceedings were initiated by the petitioner-landlady herself, and she had not joined Harbans Singh as party-respondent I in the main matter and proceeded with the said petition, which ! 15. Regarding CMP No. 82 of 1998, it was submitted that even if it is assumed that Harbans Singh could be said to be a proper party, when the proceedings were initiated by the petitioner-landlady herself, and she had not joined Harbans Singh as party-respondent I in the main matter and proceeded with the said petition, which ! resulted in dismissal of the petition and the said order was confirmed [ by the Appellate Authority, now it is not open to her to raise the contention that though proceedings were initiated by her and though she could have joined Harbans Singh as party-respondent, as she had failed to do so, she may be permitted now in the revision to bring him on record as party-respondent. In this connection, my attention was also invited by the learned Counsel to Rule 13 of Order 1 of the Code which states that all objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest and in cases where issues are settled, at or before settlement of issues unless the ground of objection had subsequently arisen. If such objection is not taken at the earliest, it shall be deemed to have been waived. 16. On merits, the learned Counsel submitted that both the authorities on appreciation of evidence on record, reached a conclusion that no exclusive possession had been given by Balbir Singh to Harbans Singh. Harbans Singh was a near relative of Balbir Singh and the case was not of sub-letting. Such a finding, according to the learned Counsel, is a finding of fact not liable to be disturbed in exercising revisional jurisdiction. He, therefore, submitted that revision petition is liable to be dismissed on merits. 17. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out a case to interfere with the orders passed by the authorities below. 18. So far as application CMP No. 83 of 1998 is concerned, in my view, it cannot be said that Harbans Singh, 30 called subtenant, was a necessary party to the proceedings. The distinction between a necessary party and a proper party is well-established. 18. So far as application CMP No. 83 of 1998 is concerned, in my view, it cannot be said that Harbans Singh, 30 called subtenant, was a necessary party to the proceedings. The distinction between a necessary party and a proper party is well-established. In the case of Udit Narain Singh Malapaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue and another (AIR 1963 SC 786), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while making distinction between necessary and proper party observed: "To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceedings. The law on the subject is well settled: It is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings." 19. It is thus clear that a necessary party is one, without whose presence no order can be made effectively, whereas a proper party is one, without whose presence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. The ratio laid down in Udit Narain has been reiterated in several subsequent cases (See also South Asia Ind. Put Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 346. At the most, Harbans Singh can be said to be a proper party to the proceedings. In the absence of Harbans Singh, therefore, the petition cannot fail. 20. Rule 1 of Order 23 allows a Court to permit the plaintiff to withdraw a suit filed by him at any time. It, however, makes clear that if the plaintiff withdraws a suit without the permission of the Court as specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, he shall be precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 23, however, enables a court to grant such permission if it is satisfied that : (i) a suit is liable to fail by reason of some formal defect; or (ii) there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit in respect of subject matter of such suit or part of the claim. 21. 21. The case of the petitioner in CMP No. 83 of 1998 is that Harbans Singh, to whom suit shop was sub-let by Balbir Singh was a necessary party to the petition. In absence of Harbans Singh, the suit was liable to fail by reason of "formal defect". The application, therefore, deserves to be allowed by permitting Harbans Singh to be joined as party respondent. In the alternative, it was urged by the counsel that clause (b) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23 is of wide amplitude and its scope is not restricted to the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The said provision, hence, deserves to be interpreted liberally and the Court may permit the plaintiff to withdaw the suit on "sufficient grounds" allowing her to file fresh suit for the same cause of action. It was, therefore, prayed that a permission under Order 23 Rule 1(3) may be granted to the petitioner. 22. I may also refer to Rule 13 of Order 1 which states that if an objection as to non-joinder or mis-joinder has not been taken at the earlier stage, it will not be allowed at a belated stage. In the instant case, a belated objection has been raised by the petitioner, who herself had not joined the so-called sub-tenant as party-respondent. The petition was dismissed on merits as also the appeal. It is in my opinion, now not to open to the petitioner to raise such objection and seek a prayer to join Harbans Singh as party respondent. 23. It is also important to keep in mind legal position after the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) by which proviso to Rule 9 was inserted. Rule 9, which was in the original Code of 1908 prior to amendment,, provided that no suit shall be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties. The proviso to said Rule, however, (as inserted by the Amendment of 1976) declares that nothing in the said Rule (Rule 9) would apply to non-joinder of necessary party. It is, therefore, now obligatory on the part of the plaintiff, after the amendment in the code in 1976 to join all necessary parties to the suit. 24. The proviso to said Rule, however, (as inserted by the Amendment of 1976) declares that nothing in the said Rule (Rule 9) would apply to non-joinder of necessary party. It is, therefore, now obligatory on the part of the plaintiff, after the amendment in the code in 1976 to join all necessary parties to the suit. 24. So far as "sufficient grounds” under Order 23 Rule 1(3)(b) are concerned, in my view, there are no sufficient grounds to grant the prayer of the petitioner to withdraw original petition by granting liberty to file fresh petition for the same cause of action. 25. From the discussion hereinabove, it is clear that it was the petitioner who had approached the Rent Controller by joining only Balbir Singh as the sole respondent, though in the original petition in para 16, her case was that the tenant had without prior permission of the landlady, sublet the suit shop to Harbans Singh. Thus, inspite of allegation by the landlady, she did not join Harbans Singh and made Balbir Singh as the sole respondent. Moreover, Harbans Singh cannot be said to be a "necessary party" to the petition filed by the landlady. Finally, when after considering the entire evidence on record, both the authorities decided the matter against the petitioner on merits and no finding against respondent-tenant or Harbans Singh has been recorded, it cannot be said that in the revision petition, presence of Harbans Singh is necessary. CMP No. 83 of 2000, hence, deserves to be rejected. 26. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is well founded that if Harbans Singh can be said to be a "necessary” party to the petition and if on account of nonjoinder of necessary party, the petition was liable to be dismissed, the said defect would not fall within the ambit and scope of clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 23, as the said defect cannot be said to be of a formal nature. 27. In this regard, my attention was invited by the learned Counsel to a decision of this Court in Smt Savitri Devi v. Hira Lal, ILR 1977 HP 310. 27. In this regard, my attention was invited by the learned Counsel to a decision of this Court in Smt Savitri Devi v. Hira Lal, ILR 1977 HP 310. It was held by this court that omission to implead a necessary party, cannot be said to be a defect of formal nature and when necessary party is not joined, the suit is liable to be dismissed and the provisions of Rule 1(3) of Order 23 cannot be invoked. A similar view was taken in Surinder Kumar v. Ujaggar Singh, (1980) 2 RCR 543 Punjab and Haryana. The first contention of Mr. Sood, therefore, has no force and is liable to be rejected. 28. In the instant case, neither the provisions of clause (a) of Rule 1(3) of Order 23 nor clause (b) thereof is attracted. Hence, CMP No. 82 of 1998 also, deserves to be rejected and the same is therefore, rejected. 29. On merits, both the authorities have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the respondent tenant had not sub-let-the suit shop to Harbans Singh. This is a finding of fact pure and simple which cannot be disturbed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 24(5) of the Act. 30. Recently, in Civil Revision No. 87 of 1988, decided on June 9-23, 2000, I had an occasion to consider ambit and scope of revisional powers of this Court. After referring to relevant decisions on the point, I had held that concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 24(5) of the Act. 31. Since none of the grounds put forward by Mr. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is well founded, the revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.