JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing of the notice of demand (Annexure 1) dated 15-9-90 issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishangarh (Ajmer) under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, for recovery of the amount of Rs. 99,028.61 p. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner had submitted the tender in response of a tender-inviting-notice for excavation of RMC Chain 320-350. Vide letter dated 22-5-79 (Annexure-4), petitioner was informed by the Executive Engineer, Somkamla Amba Canal-respondent No. 3-to withdraw the condition subject to which he had submitted the tender. Petitioner was informed vide a telegram dated 31-8-79 (not a part of the record) that his tender had been accepted and he may contact the Authority concerned for executing the agreement and thereafter starting the work as the work was to be completed up to 31-1-1980. Similarly, he was informed vide letter dated 1-9-79 (Annexure-5). As petitioner did not commence the work, therefore, in view of para (f) of the tender-inviting-notice, he was asked, vide letter dated 9-10-1979 (Annexure-6) to immediately start the work, failing which proceeding would be initiated against him for recovery of damages etc. Petitioner was informed, vide letter dated 6-3-80 (Annexure-8), that his additional condition had been accepted. Petitioner was proceeded with under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act"), as vide letter dated 10-11-81 (Annexure-11) petitioner was informed that as the work had not been started/completed by the petitioner, he was liable to compensate the Department with interest and in case the said amount of compensation was not paid, the amount would be recovered as a recovery of land revenue under the provisions of the Act or the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952 (for short, "the Act, 1952"). Accordingly, the demand was sent to the District Collector, Banswara, for realisation of the aforesaid amount. Petitioner was issued notice by the District Collector against which he preferred objections which were rejected by the Collector vide order dated 23-7-86 (Annexure 12). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority wherein the interim order had been granted, but the said appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 8-6-87 (Annexure-13). Petitioner was issued notice by the District Collector against which he preferred objections which were rejected by the Collector vide order dated 23-7-86 (Annexure 12). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority wherein the interim order had been granted, but the said appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 8-6-87 (Annexure-13). Thus, the impugned notice, contained in Annexure-1, has been issued as a consequential order of the proceedings taken by the Collector, vide order dated 23-7-86 (Annexure-12). Hence this petition. 3. Mr. Mridul has submitted that petitioner cannot be fastened with any liability as there was no concluded contract between the parties and reference to clause 11 of the Terms and Conditions of the tender-inviting-notice was made which provides that the contractor, whose tender is accepted, will execute an agreement within a period of seven days from the date of acceptance and he would start the work within fifteen days. Thus, as the petitioner had not executed any agreement, the question of liability could not arise and the impugned notice is without jurisdiction and, therefore, nullity and the same can be challenged at any time, whenever it is enforced. In support of his contention, Mr. Mridul has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Syed Qamarali, 1967 Serv LR 228 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "We, therefore, hold that the order of dismissal, having been made in breach of a mandatory provision of the Rules, subject to which only the power of punishment...... could be exercised, is totally invalid. The order of dismissal had, therefore, no legal existence and it was not necessary for the respondents to have the order set aside by a Court. The defence of limitation which was based only on the contention that the order had to be set aside by a Court before it became invalid, must, therefore, be rejected." 4. Similarly, in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1373 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in absence of express agreement, the Authority cannot have any jurisdiction to initiate action or proceed with in contractual matter with public undertaking. That was a case where the matter was referred to the Arbitrator in absence of an arbitration clause in the agreement. 5. That was a case where the matter was referred to the Arbitrator in absence of an arbitration clause in the agreement. 5. Further, reliance has been placed on the judgment in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 , wherein the Supreme Court, after placing reliance on large number of its earlier judgments and of the English Courts, particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke, (1976) 5 SCC 496 ; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ; Barraclough v. Brown, 1897 AC 615 ; Doe d. Rochaster (P.) v. Bridges, 109 ER 1001 ; Ledgard v. Bull, (1886) 11 App Cases 648 ; Borton v. Finchan, (1921) 2 KB 291 ; and Chandrika Misir v. Bhiya Lal, (1973) 2 SCC 474 ; held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity; when a special statute gave a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the Common Law Court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner, "performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." 6. It has further been urged that the impugned amount cannot be recovered under the Acts of 1956 or 1952 for the reason that realisation of such an amount does not fall within the ambit of the provisions of Section 256 of the Act, 1956. Impugned notice of demand could not have been issued under Section 230 of the Act, 1952 and thus, being without jurisdiction, the notice is liable to be quashed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. H. N. Calla, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has submitted that once petitioner's tender had been accepted and he was informed to execute the agreement and start the work but he failed, respondents were entitled to recover the damages/compensation from him. More so, petitioner had raised the objections against the notice of the District Collector, made the submissions, the matter was adjudicated upon and a final order was passed on 23-7-86. Once the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Acts of 1956 and 1952, it is not open for him to agitate that the proceedings are without jurisdiction. More so, petitioner had preferred the appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, which stood dismissed in default in 1987. Once the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Acts of 1956 and 1952, it is not open for him to agitate that the proceedings are without jurisdiction. More so, petitioner had preferred the appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, which stood dismissed in default in 1987. Impugned notice (Annexure-1) is merely a consequential order which cannot be challenged without challenging the main orders and the writ petition has been filed on 22-11-90 at a very belated stage. Petitioner ought to have filed application for restoration of the appeal and in case he was aggrieved by any order, he could have approached the Board of Revenue by filing a revision and by not doing so and resorting to writ jurisdiction which tent amounts to abuse of process of the Court. In support of his contention that once a party submitted itself to the jurisdiction, it cannot challenge the same. Mr. Calla has placed reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Raman Lal v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1954 SC 1350 , wherein it was held as under:- "Be that as it may, it appears to us to be well settled that when the defendant appears not only to protest jurisdiction but he also pleads to the merit, such an appearance amounts to voluntary submission on his part and his protesting the jurisdiction in such a case when he also pleads to the merit, does not detract from the principle of submission in any way. Thus, in the instant case, when the petitioner himself has defended by entering appearance, producing the evidence and examining the evidence produced by other side, he took the chance of winning the case on merits and in such a case the plea of having jurisdiction cannot be challenged." 8. On the basis of the above, Mr. Calla pleaded for rejection of the petition. 9. I have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.The instant case deals with a contractual obligations between the parties. A party cannot be permitted to dispute the contractual obligations by invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. On the basis of the above, Mr. Calla pleaded for rejection of the petition. 9. I have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.The instant case deals with a contractual obligations between the parties. A party cannot be permitted to dispute the contractual obligations by invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1076 , the Apex Court considered a catena of judgments, particularly, Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 ; Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1980 SC 738 ; and Divisional Forest Officer v. Vishwanath Tea Company Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1368 , and arrived at the conclusion that where the contract entered into between the State and the persons agreed is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. Similar view has been taken in State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pathraj Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) 3 SCC 552 ; and Noida Enterprenuers Association v. U.P. Financial Corporation, (1994) 2 SCC 108 . 10. However, in Indore Development Authority v. Smt. Sadhna Agarwal, (1995) 3 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court affirmed and approved the view taken by the Apex Court in Bareilly Development Authority, AIR 1989 SC 1076 (supra), but it furthere observed that the High Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may satisfy itself on the materials on record that the State has not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Graphic Industries Company, (1994) 5 SCC 398 . A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Graphic Industries Company, (1994) 5 SCC 398 . In the said judgment the Apex Court referred to its earlier judgment, particularly, in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212 ; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752 ; Dwarka Das Marfatia v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 and observed that even in contractual matters public authorities have to act fairly and if the State or its instrumentalities have failed to do so, then writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be resorted to because acting unfairly would amount to flagrant violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. In Raunaq International Ltd v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 393 , the Apex Court held that before interfering in contractual matters, the writ Court must satisfy itself that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition or "the transaction is entered into mala fide." In absence of either of the said requirements, writ jurisdiction should not be exercised.In view of the above, it can be safely held that generally the contractual matters cannot be assailed in writ jurisdiction since it is a public law remedy and is not available in public field for the reason that the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract. 12. The contentions raised by Mr. Mridul have to be tested on the touch-stone of the terms and conditions mentioned in the tender-inviting-notice for the reason that it is an admitted case of the parties that petitioner never executed the agreement after acceptance of his tender and in absence of any agreement whether petitioner can be fastened with any liability, is to be examined in the light of the terms and conditions of the tender-inviting-notice (Annex. R. 2). Translation of Clause 11 of the said notice reads as under:- "The successful tenderer shall execute an agreement (condition of contractor's agreement) within a period of seven days from the date of acceptance of the tender and shall start work within fifteen days therefore (thereafter?). R. 2). Translation of Clause 11 of the said notice reads as under:- "The successful tenderer shall execute an agreement (condition of contractor's agreement) within a period of seven days from the date of acceptance of the tender and shall start work within fifteen days therefore (thereafter?). If the successful tenderer does not execute the agreement within seven days or does not start the work within fifteen days thereafter, he shall be proceeded against in view of Clauses (2) and (3) of the Tender Form "C"." (Emphasis added) 13. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner cannot escape the liability merely because he had never executed the agreement or there has been no concluded contract between the parties. The tender-inviting-notice itself imposes a condition for liability in case tenderer does not execute the agreement. Clauses (2) and (3) of the tender form "C" prescribes for forfeiture of the security in case it is deposited and in case it is not deposited, for recovery to the extent of ten per cent. of the estimated cost of the work. (Annexure R.4). Therefore, there is no force in the submission made by Mr. Mridul that in absence of concluded contract between the parties, the recovery order is void ab initio and petitioner can ignore it or challenge it any time in writ jurisdiction or in a suit whenever it is enforced against him. 14. So far as recovery is concerned, the Act of 1952 is a self-contained Code. A person, who is served with a notice, can file objections under Section 8 of the Act protesting the recovery on two grounds, i.e. (i) that the amount is not recoverable under the Act; or (ii) that the recovery is barred by any law in force. After deciding the objections under Section 8, the order becomes executable. The interest of the person aggrieved is protected only to the extent that the recovery proceedings shall not proceed till the objections are decided. 15. Section 13 provides for the modes of execution. According to the said provisions, the recovery can be made under the provisions of the Act, 1956. Section 30 provides for an unusual remdey to the defaulter as it provides that a defaulter may bring a suit to have a certificate cancelled or modified and for any further consequential relief, to which he may be entitled. According to the said provisions, the recovery can be made under the provisions of the Act, 1956. Section 30 provides for an unusual remdey to the defaulter as it provides that a defaulter may bring a suit to have a certificate cancelled or modified and for any further consequential relief, to which he may be entitled. The limitation for filing the suit is provided as six months from the date of service upon the defaulter of the notice under Section 6 or from petitioner's denying liability under Section 6 or from the date of protest lodged by the defaulter under Section 15 or from the date of decision of an appeal filed by him under Section 23-A. It also contains a proviso with non-obstante clause that the defaulter may "in a suit instituted under the section, prove that nothing was due from him on account of public demand or that the amount due was less than the amount stated in the certificate. Section 23 provides for an appeal against an order made by the Collector under Section 8 or Sections 19 or 19-A to the Revenue Appellate Authority which may be presented within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. Section 23-B provides for remedy of revision before the Board of Revenue against any order made under the Act by any officer subordinate to the Board. Section 23-C further provides for a remedy of review by the officer who made the order or the Board of Revenue on account of mistake or error either in the making of the certificate or in the course of any proceeding under the Act. Section 23-D further empowers the Authority, including the Appellate or Revisional Authority to grant interim order against execution of the order impugned before them. 16. The aforesaid scheme makes it clear that if any person is aggrieved against the order of recovery, he has a hierarchy of Authorities to redress his grievance. To simplify the matter further and remove the ambiguity, Section 14 of the Act provides for imposition of interest, cost and charges recoverable in case of default. Section 15 provides for payment under protest. Thus, it is clear from the Scheme of the Act that it lays down a full-fledged procedure for redressing the grievances of an aggrieved party. To simplify the matter further and remove the ambiguity, Section 14 of the Act provides for imposition of interest, cost and charges recoverable in case of default. Section 15 provides for payment under protest. Thus, it is clear from the Scheme of the Act that it lays down a full-fledged procedure for redressing the grievances of an aggrieved party. Petitioner filed the objections against the said recovery (Annexure-3) denying the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act. But once his objections had been rejected vide impugned order dated 23-7-86 (Annexure-12), petitioner ought to have resorted to the remedy of suit and in case he had chosen to file an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, which had been dismissed in default, he ought to have either filed an application for restoration or gone in revision before the Board of Revenue; but by no stretch of imagination it can be held that petitioner can maintain the writ petition only against a consequential order at such a belated stage. 17. It is settled proposition of law that a party aggrieved by the order must exhaust the remedy provided under the statute itself. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 , observed as under:- "Such writs, as are referred to in Article 226, are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate Tribunal or Bodies or Officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of principles of natural justice, or refuse for exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of record and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned. . . . Thus, we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permit provided what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeal and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. . . . Thus, we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permit provided what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeal and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances for the correctness of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had." 18. Similar view has been reiterated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330 ; R. Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472 ; and Shivgovinda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 . 19. In C.A. Ibraham v. I.T.O., AIR 1961 SC 609 ; and H.B. Gandhi v. M/s. Gopinath & Sons, 1992 Suppl (2) SCC 312 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the Statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 20. In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78 , the Court had gone to the extent that in view of the express provisions of appeal against an order provided under the Statute, the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded and such an issue must be considered by the Court even if it is not raised by the parties. Interpreting the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Privy Council observed as under:- "Jurisdiction to question the assessment otherwise than by use of machinery expressly provided by the Act would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising by virtue of the assessment." A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in K.S. Venkataraman & Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 , considered the said judgment in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. (supra) and held that the writ Court can entertain the petition provided the order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, or the provisions of the Act/Rules is under challenge. 21. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) and held that the writ Court can entertain the petition provided the order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, or the provisions of the Act/Rules is under challenge. 21. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to extent the ratio of its earlier judgment in State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , wherein the Court had held that prerogative writ can be issued to correct the error of the Court or Tribunal below even if an appeal is provided under the Statute under certain circumstances, i.e. the order is without jurisdiction, of principles of natural justice have not been followed, and held that in case of assessment under the Taxing Statute, the principle laid down by the Privacy Council in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd., AIR 1947 SC 78 (supra) would be applicable for the reason that "the use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test." The Court further held as under:- "The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by the Statute only must be availed of." 22. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on large number of foreign judgments, particularly New Water Works Co. v. Hawkes Ford, (1859) 6 CBNS 336 ; Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 , and Attorney General of Trinidad & Taboco v. Gordon Grant & Co., 1935 App Cases 532 ; and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1949 PC 105 , wherein it had consistently been emphasised that the remedy provided by the statute must be followed and writ should not generally be entertained unless the statutory remedies are exhausted. 23. 23. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 24. The petition cannot be held to be maintainable as merely the petitioner has challenged the consequential order being without jurisdiction. More so, the order dated 23-7-86 could not have been challenged at such a belated stage. Petitioner has also not placed the relevant documents before the Court. The order dated 9-10- 79 (Annexure-6) makes reference to the letters dated 31-8.79 and 4-10-79. It gives their details including letters number. The said letters might have thrown light on the validity of the order but the same have not been filed by the petitioner. Petitioner had submitted the tender knowing the terms and conditions of the tender-inviting-notice with his eyes open. He is supposed to be aware of the condition that in case his tender is accepted and he fails to execute the agreement, he would be liable for compensation as per the terms and conditions incorporated therein. Petitioner cannot be permitted to succeed on mere technical considerations even if the order is without jurisdiction. 25. In Dal Singh v. King Emperor of India, 1917 PC 25 , the Privy Council held that in case the authority/Court has done substantial justice, the appellate Court may not interfere even if the order was without jurisdiction or suffers from some kind of illegality. In Sree Jain Swetambar Terpanthi Vid(s) v. Phundan Singh, (1999) 8 SCC 377 ; and similarly in Land Acquisition Officer, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Hon'ble the Apex Court held as under:- "...... When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done......." 26. In Mohammed Swaleh v. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut, AIR 1988 SC 94 , the Apex Court has observed as under:- "It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lies from the decision of the prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set-aside by the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set-aside by the District Judge. On that ground, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same should not be set-aside. But the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, justice has been done. though. as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had the point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting-aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, then no exception can be taken. As mentioned herein above, justice has been done, and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set-aside, no objection can be taken." (Emphasis added) 27. Thus, it is evident that in appropriate cases, the writ Court may not give any indulgence even if the order is without jurisdiction. 28. In view of the above, I reach the following inescapable conclusions:- (1) Petitioner has submitted his tender with his eyes open knowing fully the consequences of non-compliance of the terms and conditions incorporated in the tender-inviting-notice; (2) Clause 11 of the said notice specifically provided for liability in case the successful tenderer does not execute the agreement or starts work within the period prescribed therein; (3) Petitioner failed to execute the agreement and start work, therefore, he was liable to compensate as per the provisions applicable therein and the recovery cannot be held to be void ab initio; (4) Petitioner filed the petition under Section 8 of the Act, 1952, denying the applicability of the provisions of the Act for recovery. As his objection were regarding non-application of the Act, it cannot be held that he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authorities under the Act. As his objection were regarding non-application of the Act, it cannot be held that he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authorities under the Act. (Vide State of Tiripura v. The Province of East Bengal, AIR 1951 SC 23 ); (5) Petitioner preferred the appeal against the said order passed under the Act before the Revenue Appellate Authority which stood dismissed in default. Petitioner ought to have resorted to the remedy before the Appellate Forum and satisfy the said Authority that the provisions of the Act were not applicable, but he did not pursue the appeal for the reasons best known to him, the appellate or revisional Authority could also examine the issue of applicability of the Acts 1952 and 1956; (6) In case petitioner was of the view that the provisions of the Act are not attracted, the Act of 1952 itself provides for a remedy of filing suit within the stipulated period. Petitioner did not resort to the remedy provided by the said provision. Thus, he deprived himself of the opportunity of redressing his grievances before the Appropriate Forum. In fact, provisions of Section 30 of the Act providing for filing of the suit in such a case make the whole difference for the reason that it provides for a period of limitation to challenge the order passed under the Act and takes away the effect of the judgments referred to above on behalf of the petitioner, that the order can be challenged even at a belated stage whenever it is enforced against the party aggrieved; and (7) As the Statute itself provides for remedy of appeal, revision or filing a civil suit, the writ petition cannot be entertained. More so, the consequential order cannot be challenged without challenging the main orders; 29. Thus, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the instant writ petition amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs, which is quantified to the tune of Rs. two thousand. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.Petition dismissed. *******