P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is a retired District and Sessions Judge has filed this writ petition to direct the respondents to fix the pension at Rs. 1,340/- instead of Rs. 1,114/-, (as fixed in G. O. Ms. No. 77, G. A. D. , dated 22-2-1993) by granting service benefits in accordance with the judgment of this Court in W. P. No. 5306 of 1981 dated 25-4-1985 and the consequential order passed by the government in G. O. Rt. No. 1593, Home (Courts-C) Department dated 18-7-1988. The petitioner has also questioned G. O. Ms. No. 207, G. A. D. (SCF) dated 10-4-1994 ordering recovery of a sum of Rs. 84,023/- with interest at 12% per annum drawn by the petitioner on 9-8-1989 towards arrears of pay. The said amount was directed to be recovered from the D. C. R. G. and relief on pension payable to the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was selected as District munsif by direct recruitment in the selections held in the year 1973 against an open competition vacancy. He was at serial no. 159 in the seniority list notified by the high Court on 15-1-1979. The petitioner assumed charge as District Munsif after training on 19-3-1974. He was promoted as sub-Judge on 7-4-1983 and further promoted (appointed by transfer) as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II with effect from 1-5-1989. In the year 1981, the petitioner filed W. P. No. 5306 of 1981 claiming the status of Scheduled Tribe and questioning the order of the Government dated 9-12-1980 rejecting his claim to be treated as a Scheduled Tribe candidate. After joining service, the petitioner came forward with representations that he came to know in the year 1978 that he belongs to a hill tribe known as konda dora which is notified as a Scheduled Tribe. A learned single Judge of this Court accepted the petitioner s contention, declared him as a scheduled Tribe and directed the government to make necessary alterations in the relevant records showing him as konda dora and to extend him all the benefits that a Scheduled Tribe candidate was entitled to in service from 28-3-1978. i. e. , the date on which the Tahsildar issued a certificate that he belongs to Scheduled tribe. In order to give effect to the judgment dated 25-4-1985, the Government issued g. O. Ms. i. e. , the date on which the Tahsildar issued a certificate that he belongs to Scheduled tribe. In order to give effect to the judgment dated 25-4-1985, the Government issued g. O. Ms. No. 1593, Home (Courts-C) department, dated 18-7-1988 giving him a place in the seniority list of District munsifs at Serial No. 9 which was the place originally assigned to one sri T. V. Rajagopalarao an S. T. candidate who had left the Judicial Service after his promotion as District Judge. The High court issued proceedings on 10-4-1989 assigning to the petitioner the first S. T. vacancy which was earlier given to Sri rajagopalarao in the cadre of District munsifs. As already noted, the petitioner was promoted as Sub-Judge on 7-4-1983. By the same proceedings, he was assigned the rank in the category of Sub-Judges in between Sri M. Gunneswararao and sri C. Narsimhulu who were promoted as sub-Judges on 23-1-1978 and 3-5-1978 respectively on the footing that he must be deemed to have been promoted with effect from 3-5-1978 which is the date on which his junior Sri Narsimhulu was promoted as sub-Judge. The High Court felt that such notional promotion and assignment of seniority as District Judge was in accordance with the judgment of the High court which directed the service benefits to be given to the petitioner with effect from 28-3-1978. In G. O. Ms. No. 1593 dated 18-7-1988, relied upon by the petitioner, it was observed that the ranking given to sri Rajagopalarao should be given to the petitioner "for the purpose of giving notional promotion, if any, to the latter with effect from 28-3-1978". The petitioner did not question the seniority assigned to him in the rank of Sub-Judges and the notional promotion given with effect from 28-3-1978. The petitioner made a representation on 1-6-1989 to the High Court to issue proceedings sanctioning difference of pay from 28-3-1978 equal to the pay drawn by sri T. V. Rajagopalarao as Sub-Judge and as district Judge. This was followed up by another representation dated 30-6-1989. The petitioner was to retire on 30-9-1989 while he was working as Additional District and sessions Judge in Krishna District. This was followed up by another representation dated 30-6-1989. The petitioner was to retire on 30-9-1989 while he was working as Additional District and sessions Judge in Krishna District. He fixed up his own pay unilaterally based on the pay drawn by Sri Rajagopalarao as Sub- judge and District Judge, recast the leave account, arrived at the arrears of pay and allowances due to him as Sub-Judge and district Judge at Rs. 84,023/-, sent the bill to the Treasury Office in his purported capacity as Drawing Officer and drew the same from the Treasury Office. He retired from service a month later. The entries in service Register regarding pay fixation were also made by him suo motu. When the service Register was sent to the High Court for the purpose of pension fixation, this was detected and the High Court in its order dated 28-4-1990 held that although the petitioner would not get any monetary benefit by virtue of notional promotion with effect from 5-5-1978, he out stepped his powers by drawing a sum of Rs. 84,023/- towards arrears of pay and allowances. The petitioner was directed to remit the amount to the Government and intimate the same to the High Court. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed by the Government in g. O. Ms. No. 207 dated 10-4-1994 directing recovery of excess drawn pay and allowances from his D. C. R. G. The pension of the petitioner was fixed at Rs. 1,114/- per month based on the last pay drawn by him as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II ignoring the pay fixation unilaterally done by him. The petitioner, aggrieved by the action of the High Court and the government, has filed the present writ petition. ( 3 ) FIRST of all, we fail to understand how the petitioner could claim promotional benefits on par with Sri T. V. Rajagopala Rao who was selected against a Scheduled Tribe vacancy. The petitioner admittedly did not make his application for the post of District munsif as a S. T. candidate. ( 3 ) FIRST of all, we fail to understand how the petitioner could claim promotional benefits on par with Sri T. V. Rajagopala Rao who was selected against a Scheduled Tribe vacancy. The petitioner admittedly did not make his application for the post of District munsif as a S. T. candidate. Long after the recruitment as District Munsif, the petitioner claims to have known his social status as S. T. in the year 1978 and obtained a certificate on 28-3-1978 from the Tahsildar and started making representations to the Government and Public Service commission to change his caste as konda dora and recognize him as S. T. On the rejection of the request by the Government in September, 1980, W. P. No. 5306 of 1981 was filed. As already stated, the writ petition was allowed on 5-4-1985 declaring that the petitioner is entitled to have all the benefits as a ST candidate from 28-3-1978 onwards. By that time, the petitioner was promoted as Sub-Judge. There was no direction in the judgment that the petitioner should be treated to have been recruited against the S. T. vacancy as a District munsif. In fact, such a direction could hot have been given for the simple reason that the petitioner did not claim at the time of or prior to the recruitment that he was a ST candidate. Though the petitioner has contended that he should be at 8th or 33rd rank in the list of District Munsifs by treating him as ST candidate, the learned judge who disposed of the writ petition did not grant any such relief. What is required to be done according to the judgment is that the petitioner should be accorded such benefits in service which he may be entitled to as a ST candidate. It does not mean that his position in the seniority list of District munsif should be upgraded and he should be notionally treated to have been recruited against ST vacancy. In the year 1973, although he never applied for the post of district Munsif as ST candidate and he was never considered for appointment against such vacancy, it is clear from the judgment that whatever benefits are to be given to the petitioner as a ST candidate, that should be given only from 28-3-1978, but not earlier. In the year 1973, although he never applied for the post of district Munsif as ST candidate and he was never considered for appointment against such vacancy, it is clear from the judgment that whatever benefits are to be given to the petitioner as a ST candidate, that should be given only from 28-3-1978, but not earlier. Service benefits in this context may mean promotion as Sub-Judge on the basis of seniority subject to fitness as claimed by the petitioner in one of his representations or it may mean concessions if any, given to a ST officer. On a patent misunderstanding of the judgment of this Court in W. P. No. 5306 of 1981, the Government passed an order in g. O. No. 1583 dated 18-7-1988 that the rank given to Sri Rajagopala Rao in the seniority list of District Munsifs be given to the petitioner and notional promotion be given to him on that basis after 28-3-1978. Unfortunately, the High Court in its proceedings No. 2081/90-B2 dated 12-7-1990 accepted the order of the Government and assigned first ST vacancy in the seniority list of District Munsifs selected in the year 1973 to the petitioner. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, we cannot give effect to such illegal orders based on a misunderstanding of the judgment of this court in W. P. No. 5306 of 1981. The orders passed by the Government and the consequential order issued by the High court, are contrary to the judgment of this court in W. P. No. 5306 of 1981. The petitioner cannot seek a direction under article 226 which will have the effect of perpetuating this illegality. But for the misunderstanding of the order, the petitioner would not have been entitled even to notional promotion with effect from 3-5-1978, which was given to the petitioner purportedly to implement the judgment. We reiterate that the judgment in w. P. No. 5306 of 1981 does not put the clock back as far as recruitment and seniority as district Munsif is concerned and it does not have the effect of upgrading the seniority position of the petitioner. Thus, even the notional promotion as Sub-Judge which the petitioner got from 5-5-1978 with the corresponding benefit of higher pay fixation on his actual promotion, was an unintended and unwarranted benefit. Thus, even the notional promotion as Sub-Judge which the petitioner got from 5-5-1978 with the corresponding benefit of higher pay fixation on his actual promotion, was an unintended and unwarranted benefit. The petitioner wanted to seek the benefit of promotion on par with Rajagopala Rao in the cadre of sub-Judges and District Judges and he drew the arrears of pay with effect from 28-3-1978 accordingly. All this was done suo motu on unwarranted assumptions. ( 4 ) THE next aspect which clearly disentitles the petitioner to the arrears of pay and allowances, is the absence of order of a competent authority promoting the petitioner as Sub-Judge and District Judge, gr. II from the dates earlier to the dates he was promoted as Sub-Judge and District gr. II. The District Munsifs are appointed by transfer as Sub-Judges by the High Court and the appointment of District Judges, gr. II by promotion of Sub-Judges has to be done by the Governor. If the petitioner had any grievance as regards his non-promotion or belated promotion, his only remedy was to question the same, but not to draw the arrears of salary by unilaterally giving a date of promotion on his own and drawing pay and allowances on the basis of his supposed entitlement. Just before retirement, the petitioner took the extraordinary step of conferring to himself the benefits which the High Court and the governor of the State should have conferred and misused his powers as drawing Officer and drew the arrears of pay and allowances to the tune of rs. 84,000/- and odd. He made the entries in the Service Register suo motu on his own interpretation of the High Court s order and the Government s order without reference to any order passed by the competent authority. The recovery of pay and allowances illegally drawn by the petitioner on the eve of his retirement is, in our view, amply justified and rightly set at naught the arbitrary and unilateral action of the petitioner in giving to himself the promotion from a particular date and fixing his own pay and re-casting his leave account on the premise that he must be deemed to have been promoted and served as District Judge much earlier to the date on which he was promoted by the competent authority. To say the least, the action of the petitioner is something unprecedented in service history. To say the least, the action of the petitioner is something unprecedented in service history. The High Court and the government could not but rise to the occasion and withdraw the illegal bounty which the petitioner got for himself. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner was denied promotion as District Judge, Gr. II, even according to the proceedings issued by the High Court giving him notional promotion with effect from 3-5-1978 and placing him in the cadre of Sub-Judge between Mr. Gunneswara Rao and mr. Narasimhulu who were promoted on 3-5-1978. He submits that Sri Narasimhulu was promoted as D. J. in 1983 and therefore the petitioner should have got his promotion as District Judge atleast in 1983. We cannot uphold this contention for more than one reason. The first answer is that the question of denial of promotion at the right time cannot be decided by the petitioner unilaterally. If he has any grievance in this regard, he must have agitated it by filing a representation to the High Court within a reasonable time and to file a writ petition, when there was no favourable response. Even in the representation submitted just before his retirement, the petitioner pleaded for giving him promotional benefits on par with Sri Rajagopala Rao which as already commented, is based on the mis-construction of the judgment of this Court. The specific contention noted above was not in the representation submitted in the month of June, 1989. Secondly, it must be noted that unlike the promotion (appointment by transfer) to the category of sub-Judge where seniority cum fitness is the criterion as far as SC and ST candidates are concerned, for the purpose of promotion as District Judge, merit and ability is the prime consideration. Thus, the petitioner could not have proceeded on the premise that the promotion as D. J. at the time when Sri Narsimhulu was promoted, was inevitable. The issue of promotion cannot be brought in collaterally in order to justify his action in giving to himself the monetary benefits. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that before ordering recovery of the disputed amount, the principlprinciples of natural justice require that the petitioner should be put on notice and should have been asked to submit his representation. True, such course of action should have been followed. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that before ordering recovery of the disputed amount, the principlprinciples of natural justice require that the petitioner should be put on notice and should have been asked to submit his representation. True, such course of action should have been followed. But, it must be borne in mind that where the principles of natural justice are violated, the Court would normally give liberty to the appropriate authority to reconsider the matter after giving notice to the affected person. It would be wholly inappropriate and improper to choose that course at this point of time. Whatever points the petitioner wanted to urge, have been urged before this court and remitting the matter to the High court or Government to comply with the principles of natural justice would at this stage be an infructuous exercise. That apart, the undisputed and indisputable fact is that the petitioner fixed his own pay suo motu and drew the arrears as a Drawing Officer by unilaterally advancing the dates of promotion. There is nothing which the petitioner could say in reply to the notice as the facts speak for themselves. No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner by reason of non-observance of principles of natural justice. The observations of the Supreme Court in d. R. A. R. M. E. Institution vs. Edl. Appellate tribunal, are apposite:"even before us when we granted learned Counsel an opportunity to give any prima facie or plausible explanations on record to defend her actions, nothing could be placed before us. Giving of opportunity or an enquiry of course is a check and balance concept that no one s right be taken away without giving him/her opportunity or without enquiry in a given case or where the statute requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegations and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations? When she admitted, she did not join M. Phil. course, she did not report back to her duty which is against her condition of leave and contrary to her affidavit which is the charge, what enquiry was to be made? What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations? When she admitted, she did not join M. Phil. course, she did not report back to her duty which is against her condition of leave and contrary to her affidavit which is the charge, what enquiry was to be made? in a case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and inspite of opportunity no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would not be a fit case to interfere with the termination order. " ( 7 ) MORE or less, same situation obtains here. We are therefore unable to agree that the impugned order should be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. ( 8 ) THEN remains the question whether and to what extent the recovery should be effected. The A. P. Pension Code which is a compendium of executive instructions issued by the Government from time to time contains certain provisions in this regard. The relevant rules are:"71. Recovery from Pensionary arrears - consent necessary:- For recovery of outstanding amounts from the pensionary arrears consent of the pensioner should be obtained in writing and sent to audit with the pension papers. 71. 1. No such consent is necessary for recovering Government dues from the d. C. R. G. 77. No Demand Certificate:- It is necessary that the pension papers should be accompanied by a "no demand Certificate". In order to issue this certificate immediately on retirement, the head of the Office/ department should verify all the dues well in advance of the date of retirement and ascertain the outstandings including the outstandings of loans of which the accounts are maintained by the accountant General such as, House building Advance, Motor Car advance, Motor Cycle Advance etc. , so that these dues are indicated in the no Demand Certificate. 81. Government dues or dues of the local bodies recoverable without consent:-Government dues or dues of the local bodies can be recovered from the D. C. R. G. payable under A. P. L. P. RS. of 1961 irrespective of any consent from the employee concerned. For purpose of recovery of private dues from the D. C. R. G. however, the previous consent of the employee of his survivors/legal heirs would be required. of 1961 irrespective of any consent from the employee concerned. For purpose of recovery of private dues from the D. C. R. G. however, the previous consent of the employee of his survivors/legal heirs would be required. ( 9 ) THE excess pay and allowances illegally drawn by the petitioner without proper authority can be legitimately considered to be government dues . In fact in Rule 68, the over payment of pay and allowances is specified as one of the items of Government dues. The term government dues ought not to be given unduly restricted meaning so as to exclude the pay and allowances drawn unilaterally by the officer concerned without any authority. The D. C. R. G. is said to be rs. 5c,000/ -. To this extent, the excess pay and allowances could be adjusted. There is no provision for recovery of the disputed amount from pension or relief on pension. Hence, the recovery should be restricted only to the extent of DCRG sanctioned to the petitioner. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of Division bench of this Court in Janakiramaiah vs. Govt. of A. P. in support of his contention that no amount can be withheld even from DCRG. That was a case in which DGRG due to the government servant was sought to be adjusted against the amount claimed to be the amount embezzled by the Government servant. It was not an ascertained sum and no enquiry was made. It was in that context the learned Judges observed that neither any proceedings were initiated under rule 9 of A. P. Revised Pension Rules nor any enquiry held by framing a charge against the petitioner. The ratio of that decision does not in our view come to the aid of the petitioner as the fact situation here is quite different. ( 11 ) THE other decision in relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner in Union of india vs. Hingorani does not also come to the aid of the petitioner. That was a case where the damages on account of unauthorized use and occupation of the government s flat was sought to be recovered through the commuted pension payable to the respondent employee. Relying on Section 11 of the Pensions Act, the Supreme Court held that the commuted pension is money due on account of pension . That was a case where the damages on account of unauthorized use and occupation of the government s flat was sought to be recovered through the commuted pension payable to the respondent employee. Relying on Section 11 of the Pensions Act, the Supreme Court held that the commuted pension is money due on account of pension . The retirement gratuity does not stand on the same footing as pension or commuted pension. Moreover, what was sought to be recovered from commuted pension, was the amount alleged to be due towards damages. In the instant case, the amount recovered from DCRG is a definite and ascertained amount which the petitioner drew from the Government treasury on his own calculations of pay without any authority or sanction. Such excess drawn salary, as already discussed, falls within the purview of government dues liable to be recovered from Gratuity. ( 12 ) WE are informed that by way of implementation of the impugned orders of the Government, the DCRG has already been adjusted against the excess salary drawn by the petitioner. If so, no further amount shall be liable to be recovered from the petitioner. The amount adjusted against the relief on pension due to the petitioner should be refunded to him. That means, the entire relief on pension should be released to the petitioner without any deduction. Taking an over all view, we do not consider it a fit case where interest should be recovered, more so when no specific provision has been brought to our notice authorizing the Government to calculate the interest on the Government dues. We further direct that the petitioner s pay as sub-Judge should be refixed from the date of his notional promotion i. e. , 3-5-1978, if not already done and consequentially the pay as Dt. Judge on his promotion with effect from 1-5-1989 should also be refixed. This direction is being given for the reason that the logical corollary of giving notional promotion with effect from an anterior date would be to give him the benefit of proforma fixation of pay. It is not clear whether the pension of Rs. 1,114/- sanctioned to the petitioner has been arrived at after giving the benefit of higher fixation of pay as a sequel to his notional promotion from 3-5-1978. The 3rd respondent should look into this aspect and send up proposals for re-fixation of pension, if necessary. It is not clear whether the pension of Rs. 1,114/- sanctioned to the petitioner has been arrived at after giving the benefit of higher fixation of pay as a sequel to his notional promotion from 3-5-1978. The 3rd respondent should look into this aspect and send up proposals for re-fixation of pension, if necessary. Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to release the relief on pension without any deduction, as already observed supra. ( 13 ) THE writ petition is thus partly allowed and disposed of with the directions given above. No costs.