JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This appeal is filed against an order of acquittal recorded by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, dated February 5, 1997 in case No. 394/1 of 1993. 2. The respondents-accused were charged for committing offences punishable under Sections 324, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (the Code for short). The case of the prosecution was that on July 30, 1993 at about 4.30 p.m. at village Berth in, PW 1 Ram Swarup was in his quarter. On hearing noise, he came out of the quarter and saw that accused No. 1 (Santosh Kumari) and accused No. 3 (Nikka Ram) had caught hold his wife (PW 2 Pushpa Devi) and were beating her. Pushpa Devi was crying. It was his further case that accused No. 3 Nikka Ram was having a knife in his hand and Pushpa Devi was bleeding. According to the complainant, accused No. 2, Mast Ram also came there. The complainant tried to rescue his wife but accused Nos. 1 and 2 also assaulted him and gave him beating. Meanwhile, PW 3 Bansi Ram, PW 8 Prem Singh and other persons reached at the spot and rescued the complainant and his wife. The matter was then reported to the police by the complainant. Medical examination was conducted. After usual investigation, the charge was framed against, the accused and they were asked to face the trial. 3. The case of the accused was of total denial. According to them, they were falsely implicated in the incident. In their further statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, they denied of having committed any offence. In reply to the last question, it was stated by all of them that they would lead defence evidence. No defence evidence, however, was led by them. 4. At the trial, ten witnesses came to be examined by the prosecution, including PW 1 Ram Swarup, complainant, husband of Pushpa Devi and PW 2 Pushpa Devi, injured. According to the learned Magistrate, it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution that in furtherance of common intention accused persons caused simple hurt to Pushpa Devi, wife of the complainant as well as to the complainant with a knife and no offence was, therefore, committed by them. The said order has been challenged by the State in the present appeal. 5. I have heard Mr. The said order has been challenged by the State in the present appeal. 5. I have heard Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Mr. M.S. Chandel, learned Advocate for the respondents-accused. 6. Mr. Chauhan for the appellant-State contended that the learned Magistrate has committed an error of fact and of law in acquitting the accused for the offences with which they were charged. According to him, from the evidence on record, it was clearly established that PW 2 was injured. Injuries caused to her were duly established from her evidence on oath corroborated by medical evidence as also from the evidence of other eye witnesses. Learned Magistrate, urged Mr. Chauhan, has committed" an error of law in describing PWs 1 and 2 as "interested" witnesses. The counsel submitted that when both of them were present and both were injured, it was natural and expected of them to give evidence. They cannot be termed as "interested" witnesses. On the basis of their testimony, hence, conviction ought to have been recorded by the learned Magistrate. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if it is assumed that PW 1 and PW 2 could be termed as "interested" witnesses, there is no law that no conviction can be based on the testimony of interested witnesses. It was stated that in the instant case, all material witnesses were examined by the prosecution and though it was not necessary to prove motive by the prosecution when direct evidence is available, it has come on record that accused No. 2 was serving as peon where PW2 Pushpa Devi was working as a Pharmacist at Primary Health Centre, Berth in and some complaints were made to the higher authorities by PW 2 against accused No. 2 and enraged by that, he caused injuries to PW 2 and PW1. The counsel submitted that undue importance was given by the learned Magistrate to minor contradictions and omissions here and there. Such contradictions and omissions are natural when prosecution witnesses are giving evidence after a considerable long period. In the light of limitations of human memory, no undue attachment should be given to such omissions and contradictions. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the order of acquittal deserves to be set aside and the respondent-accused are liable to be convicted. 7. Mr. In the light of limitations of human memory, no undue attachment should be given to such omissions and contradictions. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the order of acquittal deserves to be set aside and the respondent-accused are liable to be convicted. 7. Mr. Chandel, learned Counsel for defence, on the other hand, supported the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate. According to him, apart from the fact that no motive has been attributed by the prosecution for the alleged assault, there was no earthly reason for the accused to attack PW 2 or PW 1. It was also submitted that though accused No. 2 had stated that he sustained injuries, he was not sent for medical examination. No blood stains were found on the knife and the weapon was not sent to Chemical Analyst. Even regarding incident in question, there were contradictory versions. The counsel argued that looking to the evidence as a whole, no specific role was attributed either to accused No. 2 or to accused No. 3 in beating or causing injuries to PW 2. Moreover, though PW 1 Ram Swarup, husband of PW 2 Pushpa Devi claims to be an eye witness, who has filed First Information Report and who has also given evidence on oath in the Court, there are material contradictions in the FIR and in his sworn testimony before the Court. Looking to the evidence of other witnesses, who have said to have seen the incident, either they did not name accused Nos. 2 and 3 or no role was said to have been played by them. If on all these grounds, the learned Magistrate did not think it fit to convict the accused, it cannot be said that by giving benefit of doubt, any illegality was committed by him which requires interference by this Court. Mr. Chandel, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. Having considered rival contentions of the parties, in my opinion, no case has been made by the State against the final order passed and conclusion reached by the learned Magistrate and the appeal against acquittal deserves to be dismissed. 9. The incident took place on July 30, 1993 at about 4.30 p.m. The First Information Report was recorded at about 11.00 p.m. at Tallai Police Station, situated at about 20 Kms. from the place of occurrence. 9. The incident took place on July 30, 1993 at about 4.30 p.m. The First Information Report was recorded at about 11.00 p.m. at Tallai Police Station, situated at about 20 Kms. from the place of occurrence. PW 1 Ram Swarup, husband of PW 2 Pushpa Devi was an eye witness to the incident. He has mentioned in the FIR as well as in his substantive evidence in the Court that at the time of incident he was in his quarter and on hearing noise, he came out of his house. In the FIR, he had stated that when he came out of his house, he saw that his wife PW 2 Pushpa Devi was caught hold of by accused No. 1, Rani (Santosh Kumari was also known as Rani) and accused No. 3 Nikka Ram, and she was shouting. He has further stated in the complaint that there was a knife in the hand of accused No. 3 Nikka Ram, and his wife was bleeding. As the complainant proceeded to relieve his wife from the clutches of the accused persons, he was also beaten. Thereafter, the complainant as well as his wife both were relieved by Prem Singh and others. 10. In the substantive evidence of PW 1 Ram Swarup, however, there is a different version. In the Court, PW 1 did not attribute knife in the hand of any of the accused persons and he merely states that the knife, which was produced by PW 4 Sheela Sharma, was the same and he identified the weapon in the Court. No doubt, he reiterated that the accused persons were beating his wife and she was bleeding. 11. Thus, looking to the evidence of PW 1 Ram Swarup in the Court and in the First Information Report, there appears to be material contradiction/omission with regard to the incident and holding of weapon by the accused. 12. PW 2 Pushpa Devi (injured) has stated in her deposition that she was beaten by accused No. 1 Santosh Kumari and stated that two blows were administered on her face by accused No. 1 Santosh Kumari. When her husband tried to rescue her, he was also beaten by the accused. 12. PW 2 Pushpa Devi (injured) has stated in her deposition that she was beaten by accused No. 1 Santosh Kumari and stated that two blows were administered on her face by accused No. 1 Santosh Kumari. When her husband tried to rescue her, he was also beaten by the accused. PW 3 Bansi Ram has stated in his evidence that he had gone to the Primary Health Centre for getting his daughter checked on the day of incident at about 4.30 p.m. When he was inside the Centre and about to get OPD slip, he heard noise and came out. He saw that accused No. l and PW 2 Pushpa Devi were fighting with each other. He further stated that PW2 Pushpa Devi was lying on the ground, accused No. 1 was having a knife in one hand and by another hand she had caught hold of PW 2 from her hair. PW 3 immediately snatched away the knife from accused No. 1 and handed over to PW 4 Sheela Sharma. PW 4 confirms that fact. PW 3 Bansi Ram in his cross-examination specifically admitted that he had not seen accused No. 1 administering any blow to PW 2 Pushpa Devi. 13. PW 8 Prem Singh deposed that on the day of incident he had gone to Primary Health Centre for treatment. On hearing noise he came out of the dressing room of the Centre and found that accused No. 1 had caught hold of PW 2 Pushpa Devi from her hair and threw her on the ground. Remaining two accused caught hold of husband of PW 2 Pushpa Devi (PW 1 Ram Swarup) and they were beating him. He then asserted that accused No. 1 inflicted a blow of knife on the face of PW 2 Pushpa Devi. 14. Reading the evidence of PW 3 Bansi Ram, however, it is clear that when he came out, accused No. 1 had raised her hand, with a view to administer a knife blow on PW 2 Pushpa Devi, but he snatched away the knife from the hand of accused No. 1 and hence, accused No. 1, could not administer knife blow on the person of PW 2 Pushpa Devi. It is, therefore, clear that after PW 3 Bansi Ram came out of Primary Health Centre, no blow was administered on the face of PW 2 Pushpa Devi. It is, therefore, clear that after PW 3 Bansi Ram came out of Primary Health Centre, no blow was administered on the face of PW 2 Pushpa Devi. The knife, which was in the hand of accused No. 1 Santosh Kumari, was snatched by PW 3 Bansi Ram and was handed over to PW 4 Sheela Sharma. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that either PW 3 or PW 4 or PW 8 had seen actual giving of knife blow by accused No. 1 on person of PW 2 Pushpa ,Devi. 15. So far as the case of PW 1 Ram Swarup, is concerned, there is material contradictions what he stated in First Information Report, and in evidence in the Court. If in the light of these circumstances, the learned Magistrate was not satisfied and extended the benefit of doubt to the accused, it cannot be said that no such view could have been taken by him. 16. Before I part with the matter, however, I consider it appropriate to say few words on the settled legal position which every judicial officer should keep in mind while -appreciating evidence of eye witnesses in criminal cases since in recent past, I have come across quite few cases of such type wherein injured eye witnesses were branded as interested and their evidence was, therefore, not believed. 17. The learned Magistrate, while dealing with the evidence qf PW 1 Ram Swarup and PW 2 Pushpa Devi observed that the complainant was the husband of PW 2 Pushpa Devi. According to the learned Magistrate, both of them were thus interested witnesses and, hence, only on their evidence, conviction cannot be recorded. Observed the learned Magistrate : "It is to be noted that PW-2 is the wife of the complainant and being related with the complainant, PW-2 along with the complainant can be safely held to be interested in the success of the present case and accordingly the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 qua the occurrence cannot be relied upon unless the same is corroborated by the statements of some independent witnesses” 18. Similarly, comenting upon the sworn testimony of PW 8 Prem Singh, the learned Magistrate stated that though "PW 8 had fully supported the version of PW 1 and PW 2 qua the occurrence but it is to be noted that PW 8 is working as a peon in P.H.C. Berth in, where PW 2 is also working as Pharmacist and therefore being working under PW 2, PW 8 can be safely held to be under the influence of PW 2 and as such he cannot be termed as independent eye witness of the occurrence and consequently his statement qua the occurrence along with the statements of PW 1 and PW 2 cannot be relied upon when the same does not find corroboration from three other alleged independent eye witnesses of the occurrence, i.e., PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5." 19. By making the above observations, in my considered opinion, the learned Magistrate has not expressed the legal position correctly. Now, the concept of "interested" witness is well known to criminal law. A witness can be said to be "interested", if he deposes in a particular manner in a court of law with a view to get the accused convicted by any means. It has nothing to do with relation of the witness with the deceased or injured. The sole object of such witness lies in the successful result in the case by hook or crook. He is thus not an impartial witness. 20. In my view, the legal position on this point is also well settled. Before about five decades in Dalip Singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364, four persons were convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death. For convicting them, the Sessions Court relied upon evidence of two women eye witnesses. The High Court, however, was not prepared to believe the said eye witnesses "all the way", partly because it was of the opinion that part of the story narrated by them was doubtful and seemed to have been introduced at the instance of the police and partly because it considered that when the fate of a number of persons to be hanged on the testimony of two women, "ordinary prudence" required corroboration. 21. 21. When the matter reached the Apex Court, disapproving the observations and commenting upon the approach of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed : “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwarv. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, 59. We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel." (Emphasis supplied) The Court then proceeded to observe : “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a. grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." (Emphasis supplied) 22. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." (Emphasis supplied) 22. In leading decision of Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202, dealing with the appreciation of evidence of partisan witnesses, the Court stated : "There is no doubt that when a Criminal Court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not evidence strikes the Court as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, Criminal Courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct." (Emphasis supplied) 23. In Mst Dalbir Kaur and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 472, it was argued for the defence that witnesses of the prosecution were only relatives of the deceased and thus they were "interested" witnesses. The Honble Supreme Court, however, did not subscribe to the said view. It was observed that the incident took place at mid night inside the house of the deceased and at that time, obviously only relatives could be present. The Court further observed : "Moreover a close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. It was observed that the incident took place at mid night inside the house of the deceased and at that time, obviously only relatives could be present. The Court further observed : "Moreover a close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The term "interested" postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing that the accused person is somehow or the other convicted either because he had some animus with the accused or for some other reason." (Emphasis supplied) 24. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614, an accused was charged for an offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. Out of three eye witnesses, two were turned hostile. Thus, there was evidence of only one eye witness, who was widow of the deceased. The Sessions Court as well as High Court convicted the accused. The convict approached the Supreme Court. 25. It was strenuously argued by him that it was not safe to base conviction on the sole testimony of widow of the deceased as she was "highly interested witness." 26. Repelling the contention, confirming the conviction and referring to earlier decisions on the point, the court stated : "As to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the witness was the widow of the deceased and was, therefore, highly interested and her statement be discarded, we may observe that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The term interested postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some animus or for some other reason. (Emphasis supplied) 27. In my judgment, therefore, witnesses, who are relatives of the deceased or injured cannot ipso facto be described as "interested" witnesses. On the contrary, they are natural witnesses. The term "interested" postulates that the person has some animus against the accused and his sole object is to get the accused convicted somehow or the other because of such animosity. Where such element is not present, the witnesses, who are relatives of the deceased or injured cannot be termed as "interested". Their evidence, therefore, has to be tested on the touch stone of probability like any other witness. Where such element is not present, the witnesses, who are relatives of the deceased or injured cannot be termed as "interested". Their evidence, therefore, has to be tested on the touch stone of probability like any other witness. If the court is not fully satisfied from the testimony of such witnesses, it may, in a given case, carefully scrutinise evidence of such witnesses and may, in that case, attempt to seek corroboration from other evidence before recording conviction. But the bald statement that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be relied upon is not in accordance with law and cannot be approved. 28. The learned Magistrate, therefore, in my view, was not right in describing PW 1, PW 2 and PW 8 as "interested" witnesses. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, since there were omissions and material contradictions, the learned Magistrate has not committed an error in not relying upon their testimony and in acquitting the accused. It also cannot be said that no reasonable man would have come to the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Magistrate. Hence, the final conclusion reached by the learned Magistrate does not require interference. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the State deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds furnished by the accused stand discharged. Appeal dismissed.