ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order dated 23-1-1999 passed by IIIrd Additional District Judge, Rewa, in Civil Suit No. 2-A of 1999. 2. The appellants have been restrained from making constructions or interfering with the possession of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 over the land in dispute. It may be made clear at the outset that the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 arc the plaintiffs, and there are other defendants besides both the appellants-defendants in the suit, but they have not been made parties to this appeal as no relief was claimed against the rest of the defendants, in this appeal. 3. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the daughters of Ram Swayambar Mishra, who was the owner of southern portion of land bearing Khasra No. 1567, area 2.16 acres and Khasra No. 1586, area 0.65 acres, situate at village Lalgaon, Tahsil Sirmour, District Rewa. It was claimed by the plaintiffs that after death of their father Ram Swayambar Mishra, they succeeded to his property alongwilh their brother Shiv Prasad Mishra, who was arrayed as defendant No. 3 in the suit. It was staled in the plaint, inter alia, that the aforesaid properly was being cultivated by the defendant No. 3, Shiv Prasad Mishra for and on their behalf. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 staled that on or about 28-12-98 the respondent No. 1 alongwith her husband saw that Kashi Nath Gupta, the father of the appellants, was getting the land measured near Khasra No. 1586. Thereupon, they came to know that Kashi Nath Gupta appears to have purchased the land for the appellants by a registered sale-deed from the defendant No. 3. Thereafter, they obtained the certified copy of registered sale-deed dated 26-8-97, apparently, executed by the defendant No. 3 in respect of 4400 sq. ft. of land cut of Khasra No. 1587, in favour of the appellants. On questioning him, the defendant No. 3 stated that he had not sold the land contiguous to the road. It was also stated in the plaint that the defendant No. 3 sold them that his signatures on the sale-deed were obtained after deceiving him. It was also stated by him that the consideration was less than what should have been given to him. It was also stated in the plaint that the defendant No. 3 sold them that his signatures on the sale-deed were obtained after deceiving him. It was also stated by him that the consideration was less than what should have been given to him. The location of the plot was also changed. However, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 claimed that they being owners of the suit-property, the appellants have no right or title to the suit-land. It was also asserted in Paragraph 6 of the plaint that the appellants are likely to take forcible possession of the suit-land described in Paragraph 3 of the plaint and they will make constructions of the suit-property. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration and permanent injunction. So far as the declaration was concerned, it was claimed that the sale-deed dated 26-8-97 was not binding on the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as they were owners of southern portion of land, Khasra Nos. 1586 and 1587. 4. It was further claimed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in their plaint that the appellants be restrained by a decree of permanent injunction, from doing anything on Khasra Nos. 1586 and 1587 so that their possession over the suit-land be not interfered with. Besides, on these allegations, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 alongwith the plaint. 5. The aforesaid application was resisted by the appellants, inter alia, on the ground that pursuant to the sale-deed dated 26-8-97, the appellants were placed in possession of specific portion of the land described in the sale-deed. The consideration of Rs. 88,000/- was paid to the defendant No. 3, Shiv Prasad Mishra. Thereafter, having obtained possession of the land in dispute, they began to make construction over the suit- land by bringing the building materials on the site. Accordingly, they had constructed nine shops as per the map. The only roof had to be constructed at the time of filing of the reply by them to the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was asserted that it was the defendant No. 3 who sold the land and in this suit, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was asserted that it was the defendant No. 3 who sold the land and in this suit, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were never in possession of the suit-land. It was stated that there was a partition between the various share-holders at the spot, so far as Khasra No. 1587 was concerned and there was no claim made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The father of the appellants had seen the spot and had taken possession at the spot after execution of sale-deed dated 26-8-97. 6. The Trial Judge has granted temporary injunction and in this appeal it has been contended that the Trial Judge mainly relied on the principle that the appellants were not entitled to exclusive possession of the land as the suit-land belonged to the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the defendant No. 3, Shiv Prasad Mishra. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that there is no prohibition in law that one of the co-owners can sell his share to the suit-properly and for this purpose he referred to Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act; and contended that the sale-deed dated 24-S-97 could not be assailed on the ground that it was invalid. All that could be said is that it would not be binding to the extent of shares of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Once this legal position is accepted, then the question of grant of temporary injunc- tion would depend upon the facts of the case. It was contended that the appellants were already placed in possession and they had already constructed the shops as found by the Trial Judge in Paragraph 10 of his order. The Court-below, therefore, should not have granted temporary injunction because the appellants were already in possession of the suit-land and had made constructions thereon. The Trial Court should have held that there was neither a prima facie case nor any irreparable injury could be caused to the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, if the constructions which were being made by the appellants, were completed. It was also emphasized that there was no balance of convenience in favour of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 1, 2 and 3, if the constructions which were being made by the appellants, were completed. It was also emphasized that there was no balance of convenience in favour of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The learned counsel for the appellants further stated that the appellants are prepared to give an undertaking that in the event of the success of the suit they shall vacate the suit-land and deliver possession of the suit-property in the condition as it was prior to constructions made by the appellants thereon; and they shall do so at their own expenses. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, on the other hand, contended that the map attached to the sale-deed dated 26-8-97 is not accurate. He emphasized the fact that the boundary, as stated in the sale-deed, as well as in the map, did not describe the northern part of the plot in the manner which tallied with the map filed by the appellants. It was stated that the land sold was part of Khasra No. 1587 and southern side of that plot showed that it was contiguous to Kyonti-Katre road whereas this is clear from the map and description of the boundaries in the sale-deed. However, the map filed by the appellants themselves showing the construction, showed that the road was still further in the North and between them there was a portion of Khasra No. 1586. On that basis, it was sought to be contended that the sale-deed was inaccurate. The boundary on northern side did no show the location of the plot purchased by the appellants and, therefore, the possession obtained by the appellants and the construction made thereon as per map filed by themselves is on some other piece of land which was not sold to them, and therefore, the impugned order of injunction should be upheld as it was rightly granted to the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It was further argued that it cannot be disputed that an owner can transfer his share by executing a sale-deed in view of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, but by such a transfer the owner gets only right to the share of the one of the co-owners. He does not have any right to any specific property. It was contended, relying on a decision of this Court in Babulal Vs. He does not have any right to any specific property. It was contended, relying on a decision of this Court in Babulal Vs. Tulsiram, reported in 1978 MPLJ-SN 37, that mode of enjoyment could not have been changed by the sale-deed. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in H.V.S. Malikayala Rao Vs. M. Narsimhas-wami and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC 470 . 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are admittedly the sisters of the defendant No. 3, Shiv Prasad Mishra. None of them are living in the village where the property is situate. There is no allegation in the plaint in any way, that the plaintiffs have claimed any profit out of the usufruct of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 1586 and 1587 aforesaid, from their brother Shiv Prasad Mishra. Apparently, Shiv Prasad Mishra was an ostensible owner of the land as he was cultivating it and was exercising his rights of possession. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, admittedly, were not seen to exercise by themselves their right of possession over the suit-land. 10. Under these circumstances, if the appellants purchased the land, in dispute, after paying consideration of Rs. 88,000/- to the defendant No. 3, it cannot be said, at this juncture, that they had acted in a malafide manner with full knowledge of their rights. It would be a matter of evidence whether they were bonafide purchaser for value or not when the evidenced led at time of trial. On the other hand, the allegations in Paragraph 5 of the plaint regarding the fact that the defendant No. 3, Shiv Prasad Mishra was deceived by the appellants, shows that there is collusion between the appellant and the defendant No. 3. However, this fact is also of not much importance because the equity in favour of the appellants has to be determined. The question that the sale-deed did not describe the plot accurately is also of no consequence as it is still to be determined by evidence what plot was sold. 11. The facts remains that the Trial Court in Paragraph 4 of its order has found that appellants had made certain construction on disputed portion. The question that the sale-deed did not describe the plot accurately is also of no consequence as it is still to be determined by evidence what plot was sold. 11. The facts remains that the Trial Court in Paragraph 4 of its order has found that appellants had made certain construction on disputed portion. It, however, negatived the claim of the appellants that they had no legal right to exclusive possession and, therefore, it cannot be protected. Looking to aforesaid finding recorded by the Court-below, it can be safely held that the appellants were placed in possession pursuant to the sale-deed executed by defendant No. 3 and had made certain constructions. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 did not live in the village and, therefore, they may not be in actual physical possession. It may be that they may have right to possess the land as co-owners of the defendant No. 3. It is also possible that defendant No. 3 may have sold the suit-property to the appellants in derogation of rights of appellants. But, the sale was for consideration and apparently, the appellants were in possession. It would not, therefore, be proper to restrain them from exercising the right of ownership which apparently, vested in them by virtue of the sale-deed, in question, particularly when they are prepared to give an undertaking to the effect that they shall remove the super structure if the rights or respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are upheld and it was declared that the sale-deed dated 26-8-1997 is not binding upon them and they were owners of the portion of land as claimed by them. 12. For all these reasons, this Court sets aside the order impugned dated 23-1-1999 and vacates the temporary injunction granted by the Trial Court subject to the condition that the appellants shall give an undertaking before the Trial Court that they shall remove the super-structures or any other construction made on the suit-land restoring it to its original condition in the event the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 succeed in establishing their rights either as owner or co-owners of the suit-land. It is made clear that till the appellants do not give a joint undertaking as indicated above, supported by their affidavits, the order of the Trial Court shall remain operative. 1 to 3 succeed in establishing their rights either as owner or co-owners of the suit-land. It is made clear that till the appellants do not give a joint undertaking as indicated above, supported by their affidavits, the order of the Trial Court shall remain operative. The Trial Court, at the time of acceptance of the undertaking, shall indicate in its order that the order of grant of temporary injunction passed by it on 23-1-1999 stood vacated pursuant to the order passed by this Court, to remove any sort of misgivings upon the order of this Court. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed subject to the aforesaid directions. No costs. 13. Misc. Appeal allowed.