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2000 DIGILAW 196 (ORI)

MADHUR SARANGI v. S. S. MISHRA

2000-04-03

B.P.DAS

body2000
JUDGMENT : B.P. Das, J. - This is an application u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (shortly 'Code of Criminal Procedure') with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the Petitioner in I.C.C. Case No. 124 of 1996 pending before the Sub-Divisional judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar. 2. The case of the opposite party-complainant is.: On 14.10.1993 the complainant was posted as the Peskier-cum-Personal Assistant to the Judicial Member of the Disciplinary Proceeding Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, (hereinafter called 'the Tribunal). Sometime in April, 1995, when the Judicial Member,.Shri S.K. Panda, was on leave, the accused-petitioner, Smt. Madhur Sarangi, called the opposite party to her chamber and asked him to put up some case records before her. It is pertinent to mention here that the Petitioner, who is the accused in the aforesaid I.C.C. Case, is a member of the Indian Administrative Service and was posted as Member of the Tribunal. It is alleged that the opposite party refused to give those case records to her in the absence of the Presiding Officer, Le., Judicial Member, at which the Petitioner threatened him and said that she is an I.A.S. Officer and she can do much harm to the complainant. It is further alleged that as the opposite party refused to part with the records, the Petitioner on being annoyed wrote a letter to the Additional Secretary to the Government in the Home Department for transfer of the opposite party. Though the Petitioner was not a Member of Administration, yet she designated herself as the Member of Administration. By virtue of that letter, the opposite party was transferred to the cooperation Department and was relieved from the post. It is also alleged that on 20.7.1994, Shri M. Papanna joined as the Judicial Member of the Tribunal and when he could know about the transfer of the opposite party and was convinced that the opposite party was transferred illegally, he passed an order not to relieve the opposite party. The Judicial Member also wrote a D.O. letter to the Home Department but the Home Department ignored that letter. Then the opposite party approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal which passed an order cancelling his transfer and re-posted him in his previous post. Subsequently, as the opposite.party did not get any salary, he was forced to file another case in the Orissa Administrative Tribunal and ultimately his salary was released on 22.12.1994. Then the opposite party approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal which passed an order cancelling his transfer and re-posted him in his previous post. Subsequently, as the opposite.party did not get any salary, he was forced to file another case in the Orissa Administrative Tribunal and ultimately his salary was released on 22.12.1994. It is further revealed from the complaint petition that the State of Orissa filed an SLP before the apex Court challenging the order of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal cancelling the order of transfer and the notice in the said SLP was issued to the opposite party wherein the D.O. letter of the Petitioner dated 2.7.1994 addressed to Shri M. Rajamani, I.A.S., Addl. Secretary to Government in Home Department, was annexed. The said D.O. letter contained certain defamatory statements against the opposite party which came to the knowledge of the opposite party only on receipt of the notice in the aforesaid SLP It is further alleged that though the opposite party sought for permission from the General Administration Department to file a complaint case against the Petitioner, no permission was accorded for which the opposite party filed the complaint petition with a prayer to take cognizance of the offence u/s 500, I.P.C. 3. Statement of the opposite party-complainant was recorded u/s 200, Code of Criminal Procedure and the learned S.D.J.M. by order dated 23.12.1996 took cognizance against the accused-petitioner of the offence u/s 500, I.P.C. while taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate took certain documents into consideration, one of which being the D.O. letter dated 2.7.1994 which was enclosed to the complaint petition. In para 4 of the order dated 23.12.1996, the learned Magistrate has observed as follows: At the time of service of notice from the Hon'ble Supreme Court, along with other papers, a copy of D.O. letter of the accused dt. 2.7.94 addressed to Sri M. Rajamani, IAS, Addl. Secretary to Government; Home Department was also made available to the complainant. In that D.O. letter the accused imputing his conduct, character, honesty and integrity, mentioned as follows: Recently it was brought to my notice that Shri Mishra has not paid the Batta claims of one of the witnesses who had come to adduce evidence in a Tribunal case during the Camp Court of the Member (Judicial). Moreover, the accused made the Addl. Moreover, the accused made the Addl. Secretary believe that the complainant has misappropriated the Government money in a number of cases stating in the following manner: This means that Sri Mishra has misappropriated the amount which is something deplorable however small the amount may be. It is now not clear in how many instances Shri Mishra would have done the same thing. Moreover, in that letter she falsely characterized the complainant as an undisciplined element and his behavior was spoiling the atmosphere of the office of SPT, Orissa. In addition to that, accused falsely mentioned in the D.O. that once the complainant had threatened and abused one Deputy Secretary. Due to the action and activity of the accused, the complainant suffered much, went with severe mental agony and his reputation as well as prestige in the estimation of the other was lowered down. So, the complainant through his advocate served on accused and Ors. such as, Secretary to Government, Home Department etc. a notice u/s 80, CPC dtd. 2.11.95 calling upon her to pay damages for having defamed the complainant in the above manner. Moreover, the complainant made an application on 30.12.95 to the Special Secretary, G.A. Department to accord sanction for launching prosecution against the accused for defaming him, but the G.A. Department being prevailed upon by the accused turned a deaf ear to it. In spite of that again the complainant sent a reminder on 4.4.96 to the Special Secretary, but it was of no use. In Para 7 it has been observed as follows: On perusal of the materials on record, there is sufficient ground to believe that the complainant has been subjected to harassment, loss, suffering and criticism at the hand of the accused from time to time which dragged the complainant to knock at the door of Orissa Administrative Tribunal. At last he- got justice from Apex Court of India. From the materials on record, further it appears to this Court that the accused in writing the D.O. Letter in question, intended the same to be read by the complainant and Ors. which was intended to cause alarm or which was made having reason to believe that such imputation will cause harm to the complainant, for which the complainant was defamed and his reputation as well as Prestige in the estimation of others has been lowered down? which was intended to cause alarm or which was made having reason to believe that such imputation will cause harm to the complainant, for which the complainant was defamed and his reputation as well as Prestige in the estimation of others has been lowered down? The complainant in fact wanted to launch prosecution against the accused. He served notice u/s 80, CPC and prayed the Special Secretary, G.A. Department to accord sanction to prosecute the accused at once. But his prayer was not taken into account. As it appears, the complainant is working as a peskier while the accused is an I.A.S. Officer. Probably the complainant was not in a position to fight with the accused in the administrative side, for which he has knocked the door of this Court to render justice. The learned Magistrate has also dealt with the question whether the accused-petitioner is entitled to get the protection u/s 197, Code of Criminal Procedure or not. While dealing with the question, the learned Magistrate came to the finding that the accused was working as a mere Member of the Tribunal and had no administrative authority when she wrote the D.O. letter in question. The learned Magistrate held that the accused posed her to be the Member, Administration, intending to cause harm to the complainant though she had no administrative power in her hand at the time of writing the D.O. letter. As such, this Court is of the opinion that the accused at the time of committing the offence had not acted nor purported to act in discharge of her official duty. 4. Now the questions that fall for consideration are: (1) Whether the D.O. letter so relied upon is actually defamatory? (2) Whether any offence has been made out u/s 500, I.P.C.; and' (3) Whether the aforesaid D.O. letter was issued in the due discharge of official duty of the accused, and if So?, whether she is entitled to get the protection u/s 197, Code of Criminal Procedure? 5. The plea of the accused-petitioner in the aforesaid complaint case is that she was a Member of the Tribunal, which constituted of two members - one drawn from the Orissa Superior Judicial Service and the other from the Indian Administrative Service. 5. The plea of the accused-petitioner in the aforesaid complaint case is that she was a Member of the Tribunal, which constituted of two members - one drawn from the Orissa Superior Judicial Service and the other from the Indian Administrative Service. On 31.5.1994 when shri S.K. Panda, Judicial Member, retired from service, the post remained vacant, till 20.7.1994, when shri M. Papanna, O.S.J.S., joined the Tribunal, who was described by the Government as Member (Judicial). The opposite party was posted as Senior Assistant in the aforesaid Tribunal and assigned to act as Personal Assistant to Member (Judicial). During the period when the post of Member (Judicial) remained vacant consequent upon retirement of Shri S.K. Panda, there were allegations against the opposite party of remaining absent from his duty without any permission or leave and there were also allegations of non-payment of batter allowance to witnesses though the opposite party had drawn advance for that purpose. The Secretary of the Tribunal had called for an explanation from the opposite party in regard to these matters by letters dated 27.4.1994 and 29.4.1994, Annexure-I and II to the present petition. It is also a fact that there were allegations against the opposite party for non-payment of batter allowance and such allegations were made before the Member of the Tribunal, by one K.L. Dash, a retired Inspector of Police, Vigilance of V.S.S. Nagar, Bhubaneswar, and another Prafulla Ch. Pattnaik, a retired Inspector of Police, of Gandhinagar, Berhampur, annexed to this application as Annexure-III (A) and III (B) respectively. That apart, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Director-cum-Additional Secretary to Government in public Enterprises Department also addressed a letter to the Member of the Tribunal on 16.6.1994 indicating therein certain activities of the opposite party, which were objectionable in nature and which included his unauthorized visiting of the Public Enterprises Department and threatening the staff of that office including the Joint Director-cum-Deputy Secretary, (Annexure-IV to' this petition). In this letter the Director-cum-Additional Secretary requested the Member of the Tribunal to direct the opposite party to refrain from such undisciplined activities. In this letter the Director-cum-Additional Secretary requested the Member of the Tribunal to direct the opposite party to refrain from such undisciplined activities. The Petitioner further states that at that point of time as the Member (Judicial) had not joined, after receiving the letter in Annexure-IV, and when the Secretary of the Tribunal expressed his helplessness in maintaining discipline and decorum in the office, the Petitioner had on other alternative but to write the D.O. letter in question to Shri M. Rajamani, Addl. Secretary, Home Department, requesting him for transfer of the opposite party from the Tribunal, vide Annexure-v. According to the Petitioner, the allegations against the opposite party were serious in nature and in ordinary course, he could have been proceeded against departmentally and placed under suspension, but the Petitioner only suggested for his transfer in order to bring indiscipline in the Tribunal to an end. Accordingly, the opposite party was transferred and was relieved from the Tribunal on 19.7.1994. The opposite party challenged the order of his transfer before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal and the said Tribunal cancelled the order of transfer before issuance of notice to the opposite parties therein at the stage of admission. The State Government preferred an SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution of India before the Apex Court which was dismissed after a long lapse of time being anfractuous. As per the Counsel for the Petitioner, the opposite party was nourishing a grudge against the Petitioner as she had suggested his transfer from the Tribunal. The complaint petition was filed against the Petitioner basing upon the D.O. letter dated 2.7.1994 and the learned Magistrate after recording the statement of the opposite party complainant u/s 200, Code of Criminal Procedure took cognizance of the offence u/s 500, I.P.C. against the accused-petitioner. 6. In order to examine whether the D.O. letter issued by the Petitioner constituted on offence u/s 500, I.P.C., it is necessary to reproduce the letter issued by the Petitioner hereunder: Shri S.S. Mishra, Sr. Assistant is working as Peshkar (P.A) in the Tribunal for the last 8 moths. His official conduct is far from satisfactory. There are several instances of his indiscipline and misconduct during his tenure in this office. Recently, Addl. Secretary, Public Enterprises Deptt. Assistant is working as Peshkar (P.A) in the Tribunal for the last 8 moths. His official conduct is far from satisfactory. There are several instances of his indiscipline and misconduct during his tenure in this office. Recently, Addl. Secretary, Public Enterprises Deptt. reported to me that Shri Mishra had gone to that Department in connection with payment of some of he is arrear claims (Shri Mishra was earlier working as Sr. Assistant in P.E. Deptt.) and threatened and abused the Deputy Secretary. He returned to this office and presented a petition to the Secretary of the Tribunal seeking permission to assault the Deputy Secretary, P.E. Deptt.) and threatened and abused the Deputy Secretary. He returned to this office and presented a petition to the secretary of the Tribunal seeking permission to assault the Deputy Secretary, P.E. Department because, according to him, the payment of his old claims was being delayed by the latter. This is a glaring example of the generally unruly and insubordinate behavior of Shri Mishara. Added to this, are complaints now being received about Shri Mishra's integrity. Recently, it was brought to my notice that shri mishra has not paid the 'Batta' claims of one of the witnesses who had come to adduce evidence in a Tribunal case during the Camp Court of the Member (Judicial). The position was checked in the Office and it was found that Shri Mishra had presented a voucher on his return in support of the 'Batta' amount having been paid by him. This means that Shri Mishara misappropriated the amount which is something deplorable however small the amount may be. It is now not clear in how many instances Shri Mishra would have done the same thing. The explanation of Shri Mishra has already been called for Shri Mishra's undisciplined behavior is likely to spoil the atmosphere of this Office. and now, with reports regarding his doubtful integrity, it has become all the more necessary that he is shifted from here since his misdemeanor would bring down the presetting of this office in the public esteem. A suitable substitute may be posted in his place. I do hope you take immediate action on this. Section 500, I.P.C. provides for punishment for defamation and reads as follows: Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. A suitable substitute may be posted in his place. I do hope you take immediate action on this. Section 500, I.P.C. provides for punishment for defamation and reads as follows: Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Section 499, I.P.C. defines the offence 'defamation" and the same runs as follows: Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or, publishes any imputation concerning any Person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation I-It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2- It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3- An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4-No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person, or lower the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that persons, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. The allegation of the opposite party is that the letter which was written by the Petitioner lowered (he prestige of the opposite party directly in the estimation of his colleagues, and imputed his honesty, integrity, as well as moral and intellectual character thereby degrading him in the eyes of others. The allegation of the opposite party is that the letter which was written by the Petitioner lowered (he prestige of the opposite party directly in the estimation of his colleagues, and imputed his honesty, integrity, as well as moral and intellectual character thereby degrading him in the eyes of others. It is an admitted fact that the aforesaid letter was issued as a confidential D.O. letter and it is also admitted that at the relevant time the Petitioner was the only member available in the Tribunal as the post of Member Judicial) was lying vacant and it is also admitted that the aforesaid D.O. letter came to the knowledge of the opposite party only when he received the notice form the apex Court wherein the State Government annexed the same to the SLP In my considered opinion, the letter in question is the outcome of the complaint made by two witnesses, i.e., Annexures-III(A) and III(B), and another letter vide Annexure-IV of the Director-cum-Additional Secretary to Govt. in public Enterprises Department wherein certain serious allegations were made against the opposite party. Except the Secretary, the senior officer available in the Tribunal was the Member (Administration) and accordingly the said letter was issued by the Member (Administration). The factual aspects which have been indicated above clearly indicate that the Petitioner had taken steps to curb the indiscipline in her office and taken a lenient view proposing only the transfer of the opposite party instead of taking any stringent action against him. The last part of the letter may be an inference drawn by the Petitioner herself, but the same is outcome of the complaints made by two witnesses and the Additional Secretary of the Department of Public Enterprises. Since it is a D.O. letter and not meant for the public, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be said that the intention of the Petitioner was to harm the reputation of the opposite party. The Petitioner undoubtedly issued the aforesaid letter in Annexure- v. being a Member of the Tribunal basing upon the allegations made by certain witnesses and Officials. That apart, in the complaint petition there is no allegation of ill-will or motive against the opposite party, moreover the letter so issued is a confidential communication inter se between two departments of the Government. That apart, in the complaint petition there is no allegation of ill-will or motive against the opposite party, moreover the letter so issued is a confidential communication inter se between two departments of the Government. Neither the general public nor any other person not even the opposite party had any access to the same. The opposite party only came to know regarding the contents of the letter when the said letter was annexed to the SLP filed by the State, for which the Petitioner cannot be held responsible. 7. Second Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. provides as follows: Public conduct of public servants-It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. The letter in Annexure- v. being a confidential one and an outcome of the contents of the documents, Annexure I to IV, the same could not have been made public because of the apex Court issued the notice in the SLP by registered post. Hence,- there is last chance of the prestige of the opposite party being lowered in the estimation of others by what the Petitioner had written in the letter in question. In my view, the Petitioner had taken great care and caution to issue the letter in highly confidential mariner and there is inference of good faith. In this type of cases, if the contents of the letter are not presumed to have been written in good faith, it would not be possible on the part of the officers to discharge their official duty. I fan officer is to face prosecution every time, he/she makes allegations against his/her subordinates basing on reports, then it would be impossible for him/her. to discharge the official functions. In the instant case, Annexure- V can only be construed to mean that the Petitioner had reported the facts gathered on the basis of the allegations made by certain officials and outsiders in due discharge of her official functions. This can be construed to have been done in good faith. In this view of the matter, it can safely be concluded that the Second Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. squarely applies and there is no defamation as alleged. 8. This can be construed to have been done in good faith. In this view of the matter, it can safely be concluded that the Second Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. squarely applies and there is no defamation as alleged. 8. Eighth Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. provides: Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person-It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. The aforesaid exception also applies to the facts and circumstances of the case as the disputed letter in Annexure-V addressed to the Additional Secretary to Government in Home Department suggesting transfer of the opposite party is a letter to a person having lawful authority over the opposite party. That apart, in my view, the letter in Annexure- v. was issued in good faith and for public good; as there were serious allegations against the opposite party. For this reason, the Petitioner is also entitled to get the benefit of the Ninth Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. 9. Now let us see whether the learned Magistrate is correct in issuing process against the Petitioner on the face of the protection provided u/s 197 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, which is quoted below for better appreciation: 197. For this reason, the Petitioner is also entitled to get the benefit of the Ninth Exception to Section 499, I.P.C. 9. Now let us see whether the learned Magistrate is correct in issuing process against the Petitioner on the face of the protection provided u/s 197 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, which is quoted below for better appreciation: 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants-( 1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in Clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under Clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, Clause (b) will apply as if for the expression 'State Government' occurring therein, the expression 'Central Government' were substituted. The learned Magistrate while dealing with the aforesaid provision in Para 9 have found as follows: Accused as per the Government Notification relied upon by the complainant was working as a mere Member of the Disciplinary Proceeding Tribunal. She had no administrative authority when she wrote the D.O. letter in question. But as it appears from the D.O. letter, she posed herself to be the Member, Administration and probably she posed herself to be the Member, Administration intending to cause harm to the complainant though she had no administrative power in her hand at the time of writing the D.O. letter. But as it appears from the D.O. letter, she posed herself to be the Member, Administration and probably she posed herself to be the Member, Administration intending to cause harm to the complainant though she had no administrative power in her hand at the time of writing the D.O. letter. As such, this Court is of the opinion that the accused at the time of committing the offence had not acted not purported to act in discharge of her official duty This view is totally fallacious. I fail to understand from which materials the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the Petitioner posed herself to be Member, Administration, and there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that the Petitioner has exceeded in her limit so that protection of Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be extended to her. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subharao 1993 (1) Cri 1124. The aforesaid decision relied upon its earlier decision in P. Arulswami Vs. The State of Madras wherein it was held as follows: It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution u/s 197(1) of, the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either duty or in excess of its that the protection is claimable. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either duty or in excess of its that the protection is claimable. In the case at hand, the Petitioner while discharging her duty as a Member and while the other Member had not joined, issued the letter in Annexure- v. in order to bring discipline in her officer and to curb the unruly conduct of the opposite party. This action of the Petitioner cannot be said to be mollified and I have no hesitation to hold that the aforesaid letter was issued while discharging her official duty as Member of the Tribunal. She is entitled to get the protection of Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure The finding of the learned Magistrate on this aspect is totally erroneous and cognizance has been taken in a slipshod manner. 10. Lastly, an objection was raised by the Counsel for the opposite party that this Court should not look at the documents so annexed by the Petitioner to this application as the same were not before the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance of the matter. The decision of the apex Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. Pandey Ajay Bhushan and Others was pressed into service and the relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below: This being the position it would be unreasonable to hold that accused even though might have really acted in discharge of his official duty for which the complaints have been lodged yet he will have to wait till the stage under Sub-section (4), Section 246 of the Code reaches or at least till he will be able to bring in relevant materials while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. On the other hand it would be logical to hold that the matter being one dealing with the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance, the accused would be entitled to produce the relevant and material documents which can be admitted into evidence without formal proof, for the limited consideration of the Court whether the necessary ingredients to attract Section 197 of the Code have been established or not. The question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal 'proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary materials which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority.' This being the view of the apex Court, the objection raised by the opposite party does not hold good. In my opinion, the entire proceeding was vitiated as no cognizance of the offence could have been taken against the accused without complying with the provisions of Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure and from the aforesaid discussions, it is clear that the Petitioner acted in good faith and she would come within the Exceptions 2, 8 and 9 to Section 499, I.P.C. and would not be liable. for the offence punishable u/s 500, I.P.C. Lastly let me deal with the question raised by the opposite party as to whether it would be proper for this Court to interfere u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure at the threshold, i.e., at the stage of taking cognizance. Law is well settled in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others. In the instant case, this Court is justified in exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, because in my view, this criminal proceeding is attended with motive for wreaking vengeance on the Petitioner. 11. The criminal proceeding in I.C.C. Case No. 124 of 1996 pending before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar, is accordingly quashed and this Criminal Misc. Case is allowed. Final Result : Allowed