JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ,—This appeal is filed by the State against an order of acquittal recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur on December 12, 1996, in Case No. 158-1 of 1995. 2. The respondents were the original accused. They were charged for committing offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 323 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code ("Code", for short). 3. The case of the prosecution was that on February 3, 1995 at about 11.00 a.m. at the place known as Jangla, under Police Station Sadar Bilaspur, all the accused persons after forming an unlawful assembly committed criminal trespass and intimidated complainant Sunita Devi and her mother-in-law Ram Jani and also caused injuries to them by beating. According to the prosecution, complainant Sunita Devi had made fencing on her land by placing bushes. The house of the accused was situated near the house of the complainant. On the day in question, according to the prosecution, Sunita Devi was proceeding, along with her mother-in-law Ram Jani towards the land allotted to them. There they noticed that the accused had already removed the fencing. It was alleged by the prosecution that without any rhyme or reason, all the accused turned towards complainant and her mother-in-law, snatched away "Salnga" from the complainant and her mother-in-law and started beating both of them. Stones were also pelted by the accused which had caused injuries to complainant Sunita Devi as well as her mother-in-law Ram Jani, Both were medically examined and injuries were proved. The incident was said to have been witnessed by one Ram Jani, wife of Balmukand. The matter was then reported to police; FIR was registered at Police Station, Sadar Bilaspur; usual investigation was made; site plan was prepared; Dupatas and broken pieces of bangles were taken in possession by the police authorities. After completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court. 4. The accused denied of having committed any offence. Their case was of denial and false implication. In their further statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, they stated that they were implicated falsely. In answer to question No. 10, however, all of them have stated that their way was blocked by the complainant party. A direction was issued by the Panchayat to remove the obstruction. In their further statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, they stated that they were implicated falsely. In answer to question No. 10, however, all of them have stated that their way was blocked by the complainant party. A direction was issued by the Panchayat to remove the obstruction. When they started removing bushes placed in the way, the complainant party attacked the accused and injuries were caused to the complainant party. 5. At the trial six witnesses were examined by the prosecution. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties, the learned Magistrate held that it was not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons, after forming unlawful assembly and in furtherance of common object, committed criminal trespass and intimidated Sunita Devi and her mother-in-law Ram Jani and also caused injuries to them. He, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the offences with which they were charged. The said order of acquittal is challenged by the State in the present appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. Vivek Thakur, learned Asstt. Advocate General, for the appellant and Mr. Dinesh Sharma, along with Mr. Y. Paul, learned Counsel for the accused. 7. It was contended by Mr. Thakur, learned Asstt. Advocate General, that an error of fact and of law has been committed by the learned Magistrate in acquitting the accused. It was submitted that two prosecution witnesses, namely, PW 1 complainant Sunita Devi and PW 3, Ram Jani were injured. Their evidence was duly corroborated by medical evidence. They, therefore, ought to have been believed by the trial court and the accused ought to have been convicted. It was further submitted that their evidence was natural and candid. They had stated full and true facts, including the fact that accused were injured and a cross case was filed against the complainant party. The trial Magistrate was, therefore, wrong in observing that the injuries caused to the accused had not been explained and the prosecution had not stated correct facts. The learned Magistrate has erred in observing that evidence of PW 2 Ram Jani was not reliable as she could not be said to be an eye witness, as claimed by her. It was submitted by Mr. Thakur that PW 2 Ram Jani had never claimed that she was an eye witness. The learned Magistrate has erred in observing that evidence of PW 2 Ram Jani was not reliable as she could not be said to be an eye witness, as claimed by her. It was submitted by Mr. Thakur that PW 2 Ram Jani had never claimed that she was an eye witness. Her case from the beginning was that when she came to the place of occurrence, the accused had left the place and the entire incident was narrated to her by PW 1 Sunita Devi and PW 3 Ram Jani. It was also stated that by examining PW 5 Krishan Dayal, recovery of blood stained clothes was proved which also went to show that both the prosecution witnesses PW 1 Jamuna Devi and PW 3 Ram Jani were injured and that the articles taken into possession were blood stained. Non recovery and non production of "Salnga" cannot adversely affect the prosecution case if from other evidence on record injuries caused to PW 1 and PW 3 were established and proved that they were caused by accused. PW 1 and PW 3 cannot be said to be interested witnesses inasmuch as their case was that they were injured by accused. Testimony of such injured witnesses can be tested on the touchstone of probability and it cannot be concluded that they were interested in getting accused convicted by hook or crook. Finally, it was submitted that in an answer to question No. 10 in the further statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it was suggested that the incident did take place and injuries were caused to PW 1 and PW 3 by the accused in exercise of right to get obstruction in right of way removed. It was submitted that the accused could not have taken law in their hands and appropriate proceedings could have been initiated by them. The action of forming of unlawful assembly and causing injuries to PW 1 and PW 3 was contrary to law and they ought to have been dealt with accordingly. 8. It was, therefore, submitted that the order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside by recording conviction and by imposing appropriate sentence on all the accused. 9. Mr. Dinesh Kumar with Mr. 8. It was, therefore, submitted that the order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside by recording conviction and by imposing appropriate sentence on all the accused. 9. Mr. Dinesh Kumar with Mr. Y. Paul, on the other hand, submitted that in acquitting the accused neither an error of fact nor an error of law was committed by the learned Magistrate. Looking to the evidence of prosecution witnesses as a whole, the learned Magistrate was not satisfied that the prosecution had proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused had committed the offences and such a finding cannot be said to be arbitrary, unlawful or otherwise unreasonable. It was submitted that presence of the accused at the spot of offence was natural as, according to the prosecution itself, the house of the accused was situated near the house of the complainant. Again, an important fact which ought to be taken into account was that there was no unlawful assembly nor common object of such unlawful assembly was to cause injuries to complainant side as in that case, the accused would have armed with weapons. If, as p6r the case of the prosecution, five persons formed an unlawful assembly, common object of which was to cause injuries to the complainant party, they would never have come without any weapon. In the instant case, none of the accused was having any arm with him. Injuries said to have been caused to PW 1 as well as PW 3 were caused by "Salnga" possessed by PW 1 and PW 3 respectively. Moreover, no "Salnga" was produced as Mudamal. The counsel submitted that it was also not correct to contend that medical evidence supported the case of the prosecution and injuries sustained by PW 1 and PW 3. It was positive case of PW 1 and PW 3 that injuries were caused to them by "Salnga". The medical evidence shows that the injuries to PW 1 and PW 3 were not possible by Danda but were possible by a stone. It was stated that "Salnga" was like Danda i.e. blunt and hard substance. PW 4 Dr. S.D. Barwal, Medical Officer, Bilaspur, had stated that neither injuries 1 to 4, sustained by PW 1, nor an injury sustained by PW 3, were possible by Danda. In these circumstances, the medical evidence also does not support the prosecution. It was stated that "Salnga" was like Danda i.e. blunt and hard substance. PW 4 Dr. S.D. Barwal, Medical Officer, Bilaspur, had stated that neither injuries 1 to 4, sustained by PW 1, nor an injury sustained by PW 3, were possible by Danda. In these circumstances, the medical evidence also does not support the prosecution. It was also urged that the prosecution witnesses were suppressing some facts from the court. PW 1 and PW 3, no doubt, admitted in their depositions that injuries were caused to accused and a cross case was also filed against complainant party but they had stated that they did not know as to how such injuries were caused to accused. It was not the allegation of the prosecution witnesses that the injuries sustained by accused were self-inflicted. If it is so, the counsel contended, it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution witnesses to state as to how those injuries were caused. When that fact was not stated and the learned Magistrate, extended benefit of doubt to the accused, it could not be said that by coming to such conclusion he acted illegally or unlawfully. Moreover, from the prosecution evidence it has come on record that certain labourers were very much present. They were, however, not examined. Further, it was the case of the prosecution witnesses that children of the accused also pelted stones but they were not made accused. No complaint appears to have been made to the police against them. Some disputes were going between the parties and, in these circumstances, the accused were falsely implicated. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, an acquittal was recorded by the court which does not require interference. According to the learned Counsel, even if two views are possible, ordinarily by setting aside an order of acquittal, this court would not record a finding of guilt against the respondents. He,, therefore, prayed that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, in my opinion, it cannot be said that by recording a finding of acquittal any illegality has been committed by the learned Magistrate. So far as injuries to PW 1 Sunita Devi and PW 3 Ram Jani are concerned, it cannot be disputed that the injuries were sustained by them. From the evidence of PW 4, Dr. So far as injuries to PW 1 Sunita Devi and PW 3 Ram Jani are concerned, it cannot be disputed that the injuries were sustained by them. From the evidence of PW 4, Dr. S.D. Barwal also, it is established that on the person of PW 1, there were four injuries and on the person of PW 3, there was one injury. But, in my opinion, learned Counsel for the defence is right in contending that in cross examination, Dr. Barwal had specifically admitted that injuries 1 to 4 on the person of PW 1 could not be caused by Danda blow. Similarly, an injury on the person of PW 3 Ram Jani was also not the result of Danda blow. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the defence and not disputed by the learned Assistant Advocate General, that "Salnga" is like a Danda a blunt and hard substance. It was, therefore, urged if an injury could not be possible by Danda, it could not be possible by Salnga also. Salnga, said to have been used for commission of offence, was not produced in the Court. It has come in evidence that it was recovered by police but for reasons best known to prosecution, the said weapon was not produced as a Mundamal article. In this state of affairs, it was very much doubtful whether injuries sustained by two prosecution witnesses could have been caused by a weapon. To that extent, therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the defence deserves to be upheld. 11. Again it was in evidence that accused persons also sustained injuries. True it is that the factum of receiving injuries by accused was not suppressed by PW 1 as well as PW 3. They both have stated in their substantive evidence that accused had sustained injuries. It was also admitted by them that cross case was filed. But then the prosecution witnesses were totally silent as to how such injuries were caused. Non explanation of injuries to accused is, indeed, one of the circumstances which will have to be borne in mind by the court while dealing with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. 12. In this connection my attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the parties to several decisions. Non explanation of injuries to accused is, indeed, one of the circumstances which will have to be borne in mind by the court while dealing with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. 12. In this connection my attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the parties to several decisions. In the leading case of State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima and another, (AIR 1975 SC 1478), the Supreme Court observed that when the prosecution fails to explain injuries on the person of an accused, three consequences may ensue depending upon the facts of each case: 1. That the accused had inflicted the injuries on the members of the prosecution party in exercise of the right of self defence. 2. It makes the prosecution version of the occurrence doubtful and the charge against the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 3. It does not affect the prosecution case at all. 13. Similarly, in Lakshmi Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (AIR 1976 SC 2263), following Bai Fatima and reiterating the principles laid down therein, the Court stated: "It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court can draw the following inferences : (1) That the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) That the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) That in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one." 14. In the instant case, from the prosecution evidence itself it is evident that injuries were sustained by accused and a cross case was filed. It was not the case of prosecution that injuries were self inflicted injuries. In the instant case, from the prosecution evidence itself it is evident that injuries were sustained by accused and a cross case was filed. It was not the case of prosecution that injuries were self inflicted injuries. Hence, the said fact will have to be considered while dealing with the evidence of prosecution witnesses in the light of statements of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a right of way was blocked by the complainant and in spite of the direction issued by the panchayat, obstruction was not removed and when it was sought to be removed by the accused some incident took place in which the complainant side was injured. 15. It is also in evidence and admitted by prosecution witnesses that other labourers were present at the scene of offence. They were, however, not examined. It was further alleged that children of accused were present and they pelted stones. According to Dr. S.D. Barwal, injuries sustained by both PW 1 and PW 3 were possible by stones. In these circumstances, it is quite possible that the injuries might have been sustained by PW 1 and PW 3 because of the stones pelted by children of accused. No complaint, however, was made against them and no case was registered nor they were made accused in the present proceedings. It is neither the case of PW 1 nor of PW 3 that injuries sustained by them were caused by stones. Positive case of both the injured witnesses was that injuries were caused by Salnga. 16. Finally, the learned Magistrate, after appreciating the evidence, acquitted all the accused and this Court is dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. It is, no doubt, true that before the appellate Court the matter is at large and it is power and duty of this Court to reappreciated the evidence and to come to its own findings. At the same time, however, limitations on appellate Court also cannot be ignored. It is, no doubt, true that before the appellate Court the matter is at large and it is power and duty of this Court to reappreciated the evidence and to come to its own findings. At the same time, however, limitations on appellate Court also cannot be ignored. As observed by the Supreme Court in several cases, including Sita Ram Durga Prasad v. State of Kiadhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 77, the High Court in an appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 378 of the present Code of 1973) has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach to its own conclusion upon the evidence. It can reverse the finding of acquittal and no limitations can be placed upon that power unless it is found expressly in the Code. But while exercising the said power and before reaching its conclusion upon the fact, the High Court will have to give proper weight and consideration to such matters, as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he had been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. 17. The learned Magistrate has observed that the complainant PW 1 and her mother-in-law PW 3 Ram Jani were interested witnesses. In the words of the learned Magistrate, they were not disinterested and their evidence could not be said to be satisfactory, convincing and worthy of reliance. In my opinion, the said observations are sweeping in nature as a person injured at the incident cannot be described as "interested" witness. On the contrary, he is a person who has sustained injuries at the occurrence and his evidence, therefore, should be relied upon. May be, that in a given case, in the light of attending circumstances, the Court may not consider it safe to rely on the said evidence and may not record a conviction merely because the witness is an injured witness. May be, that in a given case, in the light of attending circumstances, the Court may not consider it safe to rely on the said evidence and may not record a conviction merely because the witness is an injured witness. That, however, does not mean that he is an interested witness and without there being independent evidence, no conviction can be based. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Santosh Kumari and others, (Criminal Appeal No. 262 of 1997), decided on July 27, 2000, I have dealt with the said question elaborately and it is not necessary in this matter to refer to relevant decisions on the point. It is sufficient to state that the evidence of such witness will be considered on the touchstone of probability without describing the witness as interested one. 18. In the instant case, however, looking to other circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate was not right in acquitting the accused. Hence, the final order passed by the learned Magistrate is not vitiated and does not require interference. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Bail bonds stands discharged. Appeal dismissed.