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2000 DIGILAW 198 (PNJ)

Punjab State Electricity Board v. Amrajit Singh

2000-02-17

SWATANTER KUMAR

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Judgment Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. This revision is directed against the order dated 12 February, 1998 passed by the learned Additional district Judge, Amritsar. Along with the revision, counsel for the petitioner Board has filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of 104 days delay in filing the present revision. 2. Amarjit Singh had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he was entitled to have adhoc service counted towards seniority on his regularisation of service. As the defendant were not granting benefits to the plaintiff of the adhoc service rendered by him prior to his regularisation as Lineman, he filed the said suit. The services of the plaintiff as Lineman were regularised on 9.6.1978. There was challenge to the senior framed by the Board. Resultantly, the suit was contested by the defendant raising objection with regard to the maintainability of the suit and it was argued that adhoc service cannot be counted for giving temporary promotion in the event of any junior persons is promoted. Some circular in support thereof issued by the Board was placed by the petitioner herein and it was stated that the plaintiff cannot be granted benefit of seniority. 3. Learned trial court, after framing four issues, answered all the issues against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff and thus decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the adhoc service counted towards the seniority on regularisation of his service. The learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 12.4.1994 while relying upon 1988 (3) service Law reporter, 242, decreed the suit. This decree was challenged in appeal by the respondent-Board, but the appeal when filed was barred by time as such, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was also filed alongwith the appeal. 4. Learned first appellate court, vide its judgment, dated 12.2.1998, found that the Board had failed to show any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The learned first appellate court after framing the issue and granting the opportunities to the parties to lead evidence under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, dismissed the same. Resultantly, appeal was also dismissed. 5. Aggrieved from the said judgment, the present revision has been filed. As already noticed, this revision is also barred by time. 6. The learned first appellate court after framing the issue and granting the opportunities to the parties to lead evidence under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, dismissed the same. Resultantly, appeal was also dismissed. 5. Aggrieved from the said judgment, the present revision has been filed. As already noticed, this revision is also barred by time. 6. The only reason given in the application is that the learned counsel appearing for the Board has shifted his house and during shifting probably the file got misplaced resulting the revision becoming barred by time. No particular or dates have been given in the said application. Revision was filed on 13.7.1999 and till today certified copy of the impugned order has not been filed. The order was pronounced by the learned first appellate court on 12th February, 1988 and despite the fact that certified copy was applied on 15.2.1988. There is no explanation whether the certified copy was received; when was it misplaced and when was it found. 7. The law of limitation cannot be constructed so liberally that a substantive right of any party is taken away so lightly that it would give an impression as if law of limitation does not exist. There has to be some details, some reasons, which would, in law and on facts, constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay and mere fact that the applicant is a Board or government undertaking by itself is no ground for condoning the delay. 8. At this stage it may be appropriate to make reference to the judgment of Honble Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1998-3) 120 P.L.R. 605 (S.C), where the Honble Supreme Court observed in unambiguous terms the settled principles governing the condonation of delay in the following manner. Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs." The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. 9. Following the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Raniachandran (supra). This court in the case of Gram Panchayat Malot v. Prem Singh (1998-2) 119 P.L.R. 325, C.M. No. 4751 and 4852-C of 1997 and RSA No. 2873 of 1997, declined to condone the delay in filing the appeal and dismissed the application preferred by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in that case. Furthermore, the Court in the case of Mauria Udyog and Ors. v. Shubh Karan and Anr., R.S.A. No. 2340 of 1996 decided on 10.10.1996 held as under:- "The term sufficient cause must receive liberal meaning and has to be incorporated so as to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. Certainly, Limitation Act is a substantive law and its provisions have to be adhered to in a manner that once a valueable right accrues in favour of one party, as a result of unexplained sufficient of reasonable cause and directly as a result of negligence, default or inaction of the other party, such a right cannot be taken away lightly and in a routine manner." 10. For the reasons afore-stated, I do not see any sufficient reason has been stated in the application for condoning the delay of 104 days in filing the present revision. Thus, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed. Resultantly, the revision does not survive for consideration.