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2000 DIGILAW 2 (JHR)

ABU TAHER ALI v. SETA CHAND, CHAIRMAN, AD HOC COMMITTEE, MURSHIDABAD

2000-04-27

MAHEMMAD HABEEB SHAMS ANSARI

body2000
Judgment : M. H. S. ANSARI, J. ( 1 ) THE instant contempt case is filed by the writ petitioner alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court dated 2-9-98. ( 2 ) THE petitioner had filed the writ petition being W. P. No. 16703 (W) of 1998 for a direction inter alia, upon respondents therein to allow the petitioner to appear for the interview for the post of Primary School Teacher in the district of Murshidabad, and to consider the petitioners candidature as a trained candidate treating B. Ed. qualification of the petitioner as equivalent to Junior Basic Training. By way of interim relief injunction was prayed for restraining the respondent authorities from holding interview for the post of Primary School Teacher. ( 3 ) THE foundation for the aforesaid relief as set out in the writ petition is that the petitioner passed the Madhyamik Pariksha in 1978 and registered his name with the local employment exchange on 6-9-1978 and thereafter, the petitioner passed the Higher Secondary Examination and B. A. Examination which was incorporated as his qualification in the employment exchange. The petitioner thereafter passed M. A. Examination in 1990 and his card was transferred to the National Employment Exchange. ( 4 ) THE petitioner in the year 1981 passed B. Ed. examination from the University of North Bengal and secured 1st class. The said qualification was also included in his employment exchange card. ( 5 ) THE petitioners name was included in the list at serial No. 304 for being sponsored for the interview by the employment exchange and forwarded to the District Primary School Council, Murshidabad. Upon a writ petition filed by the petitioner, a direction was issued in the said writ petition by Justice N. K. Mitra (As his Lordship then was) directing the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee to allow the petitioner to appear before the Interview Board, this was by an order dated 24-9-97 and was duly communicated by the petitioner to the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee by his letter being Annexure c to the writ application. The petitioners name which had been sponsored by the employment exchange was directed to be treated as cancelled by the employment exchange concerned on certain grounds and thereafter by letter dated 30-6-1998, the employment exchange also informed the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee that the cancellation of petitioners name was withdrawn and name stands sponsored. The petitioners name which had been sponsored by the employment exchange was directed to be treated as cancelled by the employment exchange concerned on certain grounds and thereafter by letter dated 30-6-1998, the employment exchange also informed the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee that the cancellation of petitioners name was withdrawn and name stands sponsored. Despite the efforts made by the petitioner, the petitioner was not issued any call letter and, therefore, he filed the writ petition being W. P. No. 17063 (W) of 1998. ( 6 ) IN the said writ petition, this Court by an order dated 2nd September, 1998 passed the following interim order :"in view of urgency of this writ petition Rule 27 of the writ rules is dispensed with. There shall be an interim direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner to appear before the Interview Board for the post of Primary School Teacher in the category of trained teachers. However, the result of the interview in so far as the petitioner is concerned shall not be published until further orders on this petition. The petitioner shall serve copy of the above writ petition upon all the respondents within two weeks from date and file affidavit of service. Let the matter be listed as listed Motion immediately after reopening of the Court after the long puja vacation. Let a plain copy of this order duly countersigned by an Assistant Registrar (Court) be handed over to the learned Advocate for the petitioner for the purpose of communication and compliance thereof. " ( 7 ) IN the instant application, it is alleged that the opposite party alleged contemner wilfully violated the above order dated 2-9-98 and did not allow the petitioner to appearbefore the interview Board on 28-2-99. ( 8 ) RULE was issued and affidavit-in-opposition has been filed affirmed on 24-11-99. ( 9 ) VARIOUS allegations in the contempt application have been traversed in the affidavit-in-opposition. It is not disputed that the opposite party-alleged contemnor was served with a plain copy of the order dated 2-9-98. From the annexures to the contempt application, it is seen that the petitioners advocate had communicated the said order dated 2-9-98 by his letter dated 9-9-98 enclosing therewith a xerox copy of the plain copy of the order dated 2-9-98. It is not disputed that the opposite party-alleged contemnor was served with a plain copy of the order dated 2-9-98. From the annexures to the contempt application, it is seen that the petitioners advocate had communicated the said order dated 2-9-98 by his letter dated 9-9-98 enclosing therewith a xerox copy of the plain copy of the order dated 2-9-98. Thereafter, by another letter dated 24-11-98, the petitioners advocate reminded the opposite party-alleged contemnor of the said order and requested for taking necessary steps so that the petitioner may be able to appear before the Interview. Once again, on 22-2-99 petitioners advocate after referring to the aforesaid letters dated 9-9-98 and 24-11-98 requested that his client be permitted to appear before the Interview Board on 28-2-99. ( 10 ) THE opposite party-alleged contemnor in paragraph 8 of the opposition has stated that a plain copy of the order was communicated but no copy of the writ petition had been served upon the Council. In paragraphs 7 and 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition, the reasons why the petitioner was not allowed to appear at the interview have been set out by way of defence to the contempt action initiated against the opposite party. The said paragraphs 7 and 9 read as under :"7) With regard to the statement made in paragraph 2 sub-paragraph IX of the said contempt petition I state and contend that as per recruitment and leave rules candidates must possess Junior Basic Training Certificate then he can be treated as Trained Candidate and entitled to get chance to get call letter. I say that as per Recruitment and Leave Rules if any person fulfil all criteria then he deserves right to get call letter to appear in the interview, in that circumstances Chairman cannot refuse to give him call but in the instant case admittedly the writ petitioner does not possess such qualification accordingly he was not entitled to be considered for interview. "xx xx xx xx (9) With regard to the statement made inparagraph 6 of the said contempt petition I strongly deny and dispute that the answering respondent arrogantly refused to issue interview letter inspite of full knowledge of the order. I say that as per Rules a person cannot be treated as trained candidate unless having Junior Basic Training Certificate. B. Ed. I say that as per Rules a person cannot be treated as trained candidate unless having Junior Basic Training Certificate. B. Ed. Decree cannot be at par with the Junior Basic Training Degree, accordingly, there is no scope of allowing any person including petitioner who does not possess Junior Basic Training Certificate as per Rules in the interview for selection to the post of Assistant Teacher of Primary School. Hence, there is violation of the part of answering respodent and the contemnor has violated the specific direction of the Honble Court wilfully, deliberately and accordingly does not arise at all. " ( 11 ) THE very question for determination in the writ application is whether the B. Ed. qualification possessed by the petitioner can qualify him and render him eligible for appointment to the post of Primary School Teacher. The opposite party-alleged contemnor was directed by the said order dated 2nd September, 1998 to permit the petitioner to appear before the Interview Board in the category of trained teachers. It was further directed that the result of the interview in so far as the petitioner is concerned, shall not be published until further orders on the pending application. Directions were also issued for service of notice of the writ application and for listing of the writ petition as listed Motion. The order dated 2nd September, 1998 is clear and unambiguous. Also, it is not the case of the opposite party-alleged contemnor that the order dated 2-9-98 is either ambiguous, unworkable or any ground of genuine inability to comply with the said order has been pleaded. ( 12 ) IN terms of the said order dated 2nd September, 1998, the direction was specific that the petitioner shall be permitted to appear before the Interview Board as trained candidate. His result, however, was directed not to be published until further order of this Court. ( 13 ) FROM the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition and in particular in paragraph 7 and 9 extracted supra, it is apparent that despite having fully understood the effect of the order, the opposite party-alleged contemnor did not permit thepetitioner to appear at the Interview. ( 13 ) FROM the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition and in particular in paragraph 7 and 9 extracted supra, it is apparent that despite having fully understood the effect of the order, the opposite party-alleged contemnor did not permit thepetitioner to appear at the Interview. ( 14 ) EVEN during the course of hearing of the instant case, the contention has been reiterated by the learned counsel on behalf of the opposite party-alleged contemnor was that the petitioner does not possess the requisite qualification and was, therefore, not eligible to be considered for interview. ( 15 ) THE only question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether there has been wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court dated 2-9-98 by the opposite party-alleged contemnor. ( 16 ) THIS Court in its contempt jurisdiction can only consider whether there has been disobedience of the order of Court and whether the disobedience alleged is wilful and deliberate. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear violation of the Courts order. This Court has to be fully satisfied that there is disobedience of the order of Court and such disobedience is wilful. Disobedience of the Courts order strikes at the very root of the Rule of Law on which our system of Government is based. Power conferred upon Courts to punish for contempt is for the purpose of maintenance of effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. No person can be allowed to defy the Courts order. Accidental bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order may constitute a valid defence and plausible ground for dropping a contempt case against an alleged contemnor. Such, however, is not the case pleaded by the opposite party-alleged contemnor in the matter on hand. A positive stand has been taken and it is contended by way of defence that the petitioner as per Recruitment and Leave Rules does not possess Junior Basic Training Certificate. B. Ed. Degree possessed by the petitioner, it has been contended, cannot be treated at par with the Junior Basic Training Degree and, therefore, there was no scope of allowing the petitioner to appear at the interview for selection to the post of assistant teacher of primary schools. B. Ed. Degree possessed by the petitioner, it has been contended, cannot be treated at par with the Junior Basic Training Degree and, therefore, there was no scope of allowing the petitioner to appear at the interview for selection to the post of assistant teacher of primary schools. Despite clear directions in the order dated 2-9-98, the petitioner was not allowed to appear for the interview. The plea advanced on behalf of the opposite party-alleged contemnor is not that the violation alleged was either accidental or unintentional or act of any genuine inability to comply with the order. ( 17 ) THIS Court cannot in its contempt jurisdiction either review its order, violation of which is alleged or pass fresh orders. Also, no application for vacating, modifying or reviewing the order dated 2-9-98 has been filed by the opposite party-alleged contemnor. The said order had been communicated to the opposite party and thus the opposite party was aware of the said order is not in dispute. It is also not disputed that the interview was held on 28-2-99. Despite clear directions of the Court dated 2nd September, 1998, the petitioner was not allowed to appear for the interview on the ground that he does not possess the requisite qualifications. ( 18 ) IN the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the opposite party-alleged contemnor is guilty of violation of the order of this Court dated 2-9-98. The next question for consideration is whether such violation is wilful and deliberate. The answer to that question would depend upon the consideration of the defence set up in the instant case by the opposite party. ( 19 ) AS noticed supra, the defence set up in the instant case is that under the Recruitment Rules a person cannot be treated as trained candidate unless having Junior Basic Training Certificate. B. Ed. Degree possessed by the writ petitioner, it is stated, cannot be treated at par with the Junior Basic Training Decree and accordingly, there was no scope for allowing any person including petitioner in the interview. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, reported in 1952 All ER 567, the Court of Appeal held :"it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, reported in 1952 All ER 567, the Court of Appeal held :"it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L. C. said in Chuck v. Cremer (1) Co-op. Temp. Cott. 342 ). a party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. . . It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitor, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid -- whether it was regular or irregular. That they shouldcome to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed. such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attached or otherwise. The second is that no application to the Court by such a person will be entertained until he has purged himself of this contempt. " ( 20 ) THE above decision of the Court of Appeal in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson was considered by the Karnataka High Court in D. M. Samyulla v. Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore 1991 Kar LJ 352 (sic) and it was observed :". . . . . . the principle laid down in the said decision is, a party who knows an order, whether it is null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it and it would be dangerous to allow the party to decide as to whether an order was null or valid or whether it was regular or irregular. . . . the principle laid down in the said decision is, a party who knows an order, whether it is null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it and it would be dangerous to allow the party to decide as to whether an order was null or valid or whether it was regular or irregular. " ( 21 ) IN Nalla Senapati Sarkarai Mandariar Pallayakottai v. Shri Ambal Mills Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1966 Mad 53 : (1966 Cri LJ 146) it was observed (at page 149 of Cri LJ) :". . . an order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as a nullity but must be implicitly obeyed until by a proper application, it is discharged. " ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hindu Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. , reported in 1997 (2) Supreme 395 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1240 ) has considered a question viz. , whether a person who disobeys an interim order of injunction made by the Civil Court can be punished even where it is ultimately found that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. After considering the various judgments including those to which reference has been made supra, the Supreme Court answered the said question in the following terms (at page 1250 of AIR) :". . . . . . A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the Court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim order so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the Court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punishment even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction. " ( 23 ) THE judgment of the Supreme Court in Tayabhai M. Bagasarwalla cited supra, though rendered in a different context, reference to the same has been made in the instant case for the reasons that by this judgment, the Supreme Court has settled the controversy and laid down in clear terms that even interim orders passed by a Civil Court have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff. The only condition being that the violation was committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction. The decisions referred to in the said judgment of the Supreme Court have an important bearing on the decision of the instant case. That is the other reason why the said judgment of Supreme Court has been referred to in his order. ( 24 ) IN the light of the judgments, cited supra, it must be held that the defence as set up in the instant case cannot constitute avalid ground for disobeying the order of this Court dated 2-9-98. ( 25 ) THE opposite party was aware of the order passed by the Court. Even, if according to the opposite party, the order of this Court was not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, it was not open to the opposite party to disobey the said order. The opposite party has chosen the dangerous path to decide for itself the eligibility of the writ petitioner and after having so taken upon itself decided that as the writ petitioner does not possess Junior Basic Training Certificate, B. Ed. The opposite party has chosen the dangerous path to decide for itself the eligibility of the writ petitioner and after having so taken upon itself decided that as the writ petitioner does not possess Junior Basic Training Certificate, B. Ed. Degree possessed by the writ petitioner cannot be treated at par with that qualification and on that ground, the writ petitioner was not allowed to appear at the interview despite the specific direction of this Court. The proper course for the opposite party was to have applied to this Court either for modifying or vacating the order and not taken upon itself to determine such question. As long as the order dated 2-9-98 subsisted, it was required to be followed and implemented and not disobeyed. It must, therefore, be held that the opposite party has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of this Court dated 2-9-98. ( 26 ) AS the interview has already been held on 28th February, 1999, it may not be possible for the contemnor to purge out the contempt. I accordingly impose a fine of Rs. 1,500/- (Rupees one thousand and five hundred only) upon the contemnor, Ms. Swetachandra, Chairman, Ad hoc Committee, Murshidabad District Primary School Council for the violation of the order of this Court dated 2nd September, 1998. Such fine shall be paid within three weeks from date hereof and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for two (2) weeks. ( 27 ) WHAT other further or consequential directions that can be issued by the Court is a matter to be considered at the time of hearing and final disposal of the writ application. ( 28 ) THE Rule is thus made absolute in terms as above. ( 29 ) URGENT xerox certified copy of this order be supplied to the ld. counsel appearing for the parties within 7 days, if the same is applied for. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .