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2000 DIGILAW 2 (MAD)

Arcot Textiles Mill Ltd. , Ulagamkathan Village, Kallakurichi Taluk by Managing Director, Nadrajh Annamali v. S. Rajendran and others

2000-01-03

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body2000
Judgment : Both the revision petitions are filed by plaintiff in O.S.No.195 of 1999 on the file of principal District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi. 2. Material averments in the plaint which are necessary for disposal of the revision petitions could be summarised thus: It is the case of plaintiff that petitioner Mill is notified as Public Utility service and on 11. 1999, workers of the Mill resorted to illegal strike blocking main passage in front of the main gate, dug up the access road to the distance of about 10 feet and 2 feet depth, thereby causing obstruction to the access by way of ingress and egress of the transportation of goods from and to the Mill and also preventing entry of willing workers into the Mill including the office and maintenance staff. In view of the illegal strike, it became impossible for management to do anything to the willing workers and to make arrangements to work the Mill. Plaintiff therefore filed O.S.No.195 of 1999 praying for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants their men and members from in any manner obstructing its office and all and maintenance staff from entering into the mill premises for doing their routine work and for permanent injunction to restrain defendants, their men and workers in any manner obstructing the movement of vehicles carrying raw materials and finished goods from and to the Mill premises and for other reliefs. 3. Alongwith the suit, plaintiff also filed I.A.No.886 of 1999 praying for interim injunction restraining defendants from obstructing the office staff and the maintenance staff from entering into the Mill premises for doing their work and to restrain them from in any manner obstructing the movement of vehicles carrying materials and finished goods to and from the factory. 4. Lower court held that plaintiff is entitled to injunction, but at the same time it appointed three advocate commissioners directing them to sell the materials lying in the factory. According to plaintiff, those goods belong to third parties with whom plaintiff entered into tie up arrangement and on the basis of that arrangement plaintiff will have to convert those goods and finished goods will have to be supplied to their customers. According to plaintiff, those goods belong to third parties with whom plaintiff entered into tie up arrangement and on the basis of that arrangement plaintiff will have to convert those goods and finished goods will have to be supplied to their customers. But trial court while disposing of the injunction application held that commissioner will sell the properties and deposit 2/3rd of the amount which shall be utilised to meet the demands of the workers and the remaining 1/3rd will be utilised for running the factory. 5. Aggrieved by the order, plaintiff came to this Court in C.R.P.No.1679 of 1999 under Art.227 of Constitution of India. This Court refused to entertain the revision on the ground that the order is appealable. Thereafter, plaintiff also preferred C.M.A.No.20 of 1999 on the file of Subordinate Judges Court, Kallakurichi and the same is pending. 6. It is the further case of plaintiff that after appeal was filed, there was settlement between the management and the workers under Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Mill is also reopened. In view of the settlement, plaintiff wanted to withdrawn the suit for which a memo was filed. Lower court refused to give permission to withdraw the suit, which is challenged in C.R.P.No.2425 of 1999. 7. Defendants also moved an application in I.A.No.1974 of 1999 seeking permission to give police protection to commissioners, who were appointed as per the order in I.A.No.886 of 1999 and which is now pending in C.M.A.No.20 of 1999. Lower court allowed that application. The same is challenged in C.R.P.No.2424 of 1999. 8. When the matter came for admission, I ordered notice of motion and the order in I.A.No.1974 of 1999 was also stayed. Further proceedings in the suit was also stayed. 9. Respondents have entered appearance and moved and application to vacate the interim order. Since arguments on interlocutory application as well as revision petitions are same, both parties agreed to have the revision itself disposed of. 10. I will first consider C.R.P.No.2425 of 1999 and the result of the same will dispose of the revision in C.R.P.No.2424 of 1999 also 11. While narrating facts I have stated that after filing C.M.A.No.20 of 1999, case of plaintiff is that they have settled the matter under Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. I will first consider C.R.P.No.2425 of 1999 and the result of the same will dispose of the revision in C.R.P.No.2424 of 1999 also 11. While narrating facts I have stated that after filing C.M.A.No.20 of 1999, case of plaintiff is that they have settled the matter under Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is the further case of plaintiff that all the defendants also signed the settlement, xerox copy of which also made available before me. Pursuant to the alleged settlement, a memo was filed by plaintiff, which reads thus: “It is submitted that in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute in this case, as between the plaintiff and the defendants in the presence of leaders at Coimbatore, on 8. 1999, an agreement of compromise under Sec.18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been reached between the plaintiff and the defendants. In pursuance thereof, it is submitted that the suit has been settled out of court.” The memo was filed on 8. 1999. Lower court directed notice to defendants. Some of the defendants contested the memo and by the impugned order lower court rejected the same. Legality of that order is challenged in this revision petition. 12. Relevant portion of O.23, Rule 1, Sub-rule (1) reads thus: “At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in Rules 1 to 14 of O.32 extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the court.” 13. In Bijayananda v. Satrughna Sahu , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1566 their Lordships held that the plaintiff got unconditional right to withdraw the suit. In that case, their Lordships were considering the scope of right to withdraw in an appeal under Representation of People Act. 14. M/s.Hulas Rai v. K.B.Bass and Co. M/s.Hulas Rai v. K.B.Bass and Co. M/s.Hulas Rai v. K.B.Bass and Co. , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 111 was a case filed by principal against his agent for rendition of accounts. Issues were framed and settled and evidence was also taken. But no preliminary decree was passed. The question was, whether plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the suit at that stage. M/s.Hulas Rai v. K.B.Bass and Co. M/s.Hulas Rai v. K.B.Bass and Co. , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 111 was a case filed by principal against his agent for rendition of accounts. Issues were framed and settled and evidence was also taken. But no preliminary decree was passed. The question was, whether plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the suit at that stage. In para.2 of the judgment, it is held thus: “The short question that, in these circumstances, falls for decision is whether the respondent was entitled to withdraw from the suit and have it dismissed by the application dated 5th May, 1953 at the stage when issues had been framed and some evidence had been recorded, but no preliminary decree for rendition of accounts had yet been passed. The language of O.23, Rule 1, Sub-Rule (1), C.P.C., gives an unqualified right to a plaintiff to withdraw from a suit and if no permission to file a fresh suit is sought under Sub-Rule (2) of that Rule, the plaintiff becomes liable for such costs as the court may award and becomes precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of that subject-matter under Sub-Rule(3) of that Rule. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the court to refuse permission to withdraw the suit in such circumstances and to compel the plaintiff to proceed with it. It is, of course, possible that different considerations may arise where a set off may have been claimed under O.8, C.P.C. or a counter-claim may have been filed, If permissible by the procedural law applicable to the proceedings governing the suit. In the present case, the pleadings in paragraphs 8 and 11 of the written statement, mentioned above, clearly did not amount to a claim for set-off. Further, there could be no counter-claim because no provision is shown under which a counter-claim could have been filed in the trial court in such a suit. There is also the circumstance that the application for withdrawal was moved at a stage when no preliminary decree had been passed for rendition of accounts and, in fact the appellant was still contending that there could be no rendition of accounts in the suit because accounts had already been settled. [Italics supplied] 15. There is also the circumstance that the application for withdrawal was moved at a stage when no preliminary decree had been passed for rendition of accounts and, in fact the appellant was still contending that there could be no rendition of accounts in the suit because accounts had already been settled. [Italics supplied] 15. The same principle was reiterated in the decision reported in R.Ramamurthi v. V.Rajeswararao R.Ramamurthi v. V.Rajeswararao R.Ramamurthi v. V.Rajeswararao , A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 643 and in para. 7, their Lordships considered whether the right of plaintiff to withdraw the suit unconditionally will apply to all circumstances. Their Lordships said that if a right has accrued to the defendant pending suit, then the court will have to exercise discretion after taking into consideration the circumstances and it cannot be said that plaintiff got unconditional right. In that case, the question came for consideration was relating to a suit for partition. Though preliminary decree passed, plaintiff filed an application under Sec.2 of the Partition Act to have the property sold. Defendant also moved an application for leave to buy at a valuation the share of the plaintiff under Sec.3. Following Supreme Court Practice in England. Their Lordships held that plaintiff cannot have any unconditional right of withdrawal. 16. In Appalaswamy v. M.Anjaneyulu Appalaswamy v. M.Anjaneyulu Appalaswamy v. M.Anjaneyulu , A.I.R. 1974 A.P. 268 a Division Bench had occasion to consider similar question in para.10 of the judgment, which reads thus: “Now, under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. at any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may, as against all or any of the defendants, withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim. According to Sub-Rule (2), where the court is satisfied about the defects in the suit, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or abandon such part of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of a claim. What follows this provision of law is that it is only when the plaintiff desires to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter or part of it that the permission of the court is required. What follows this provision of law is that it is only when the plaintiff desires to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter or part of it that the permission of the court is required. In other cases, the plaintiff is free to either withdraw the suit or abandon part of his claim as against all or any of the defendants. It is only in pursuance of this provision of law that the plaintiff abandoned the suit as against the 2nd defendant. It did not require any permission of the court to dismiss the suit as abandoned against the 2nd defendant. Even in regard to the other defendants, although a compromise memo was filed, there was nothing in the terms of compromise which required a decree to be passed by the trial court. In fact the application of the 1st defendant was that the suit should be dismissed in terms of the compromise. The recording of compromise would not alter the position that what was desired by the plaintiff was to withdraw his suit without the leave of the court to institute a fresh suit as against all the defendants excluding the 2nd defendant because as against him, the plaintiff had already abandoned his claim. In any case, the compromise admittedly did not come under O.3, Rule 3, C.P.C., but it came only under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. It is fairly clear that a withdrawal under Sub-Rule (1) may be in any form; where the plaintiff enters into a compromise with the defendants but does not communicate the terms of compromise to the court, he is held to have withdrawn his suit under Sub-Rule (1). Similarly where a suit is dismissed at the request of the parties on a memo of compromise filed, the dismissal operates as a withdrawal of the suit under Sub-Rule (1). The result therefore was that although the trial court had not specifically stated that the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed in terms of the compromise even as against all the defendant, other than 2nd defendant, it will be deemed to have been so dismissed. In that view of the matter, it was really unnecessary for the 2nd defendant to go in appeal, He was perhaps justified in going in appeal because of the vague orders passed by the trial court. In that view of the matter, it was really unnecessary for the 2nd defendant to go in appeal, He was perhaps justified in going in appeal because of the vague orders passed by the trial court. If the trial court had been a little more careful and explicit in its order the litigation which proceeded further could have been very well avoided.” [Italics supplied] 17. In Ajita Debi v. Hossenara Begum , A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 59 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that court cannot compel the plaintiff to proceed with the suit and the defendants cannot be allowed to complain against such order. But where there is an affinity or identity of interests between the plaintiffs and one or more of the defendants, the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to withdraw or to compromise the suit with one of the defendants if an application on behalf of other defendants having an interest in the suit is made for their transposition to the category of plaintiffs and for transposition of the plaintiffs to the category of the defendants. 18. Similar is the view taken in Basudeb Narayan v. Shesh Narayan , A.I.R. 1979 Pat. 73. 19. From the above decisions it is clear that plaintiff has got right to withdraw suit at any stage unless defendant is able to show that he has got vested right. 20. Courts below have held that permission cannot be granted since it is representative suit. I do not think the finding of the lower court is correct. Plaintiff has filed the suit against defendants who are various Trade Unions. Plaintiff is a legal person and only for the purpose of effective representation of defendants an application was filed under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C. It is not representative suit as found by court below. A suit is filed by a legal person against various persons who are represented by Secretaries or presidents of various Trade Unions. A Trade Union is not a legal person. It is recognised only for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act. In the civil suit, actual person must be made as party, since the workers are numerous, their cause is taken by various Trade Unions represented by its office bearers. Instead of impleading all the workers, plaintiff has impleaded all the Trade Unions and moved an application under O.1, Rule 8. 21. In the civil suit, actual person must be made as party, since the workers are numerous, their cause is taken by various Trade Unions represented by its office bearers. Instead of impleading all the workers, plaintiff has impleaded all the Trade Unions and moved an application under O.1, Rule 8. 21. Again, the bar found by the court below also may not have any application in this case since plaintiff does not want to record compromise or agreement. In the memo for withdrawal though plaintiff has stated that there is settlement, he does not want that to be recorded by civil court and to permit him to withdraw the suit. Prayer of the plaintiff is for unconditional withdrawal. Bar contemplated under O.23, Rule 3(b) also will have no application in this case as found by the court below. Again, what is the representative suit is explained under O.23, Rule 3(b). It means a suit under Sec.92 of C.P.C.; a suit under O.1, Rule 8, C.P.C., etc. So person, who files the suit must file it in representative capacity. .22. In commentaries to Code of Civil Procedure by A.N.Saha (5th Edition, 1996), learned author has considered this question under O.23, Rule 1 also, which reads thus: .“A representative suit may not be withdrawn without leave of the court for the suit itself in instituted after notice to all such persons on whose behalf it is instituted and consequently withdrawal could be only after notice to them. But those are not the only suits which cannot be withdrawn without notice to other having similar interest in the subject-matter. There are other suits which fall into this class and such suits are, suits for partition, suit for accounts, suit for specific performance, suits by trustees which may effect the entire body of the trustees and the beneficiaries. Where the yajman of a family governed by Madras Aliyasanthana Act withdraws a suit without liberty to sue afresh, a suit instituted on behalf of entire family comprising of members including the one who subsequently filed suit on same cause of action, the subsequent suit to enforce the rights of the entire family including that of the member who had filed the earlier suit, would not be maintainable under O.23, Rule 1(4) (b), C.P.C.” 23. The suit instituted by plaintiff is neither representative suit, nor suit filed on behalf of others, who has got common interest. The suit instituted by plaintiff is neither representative suit, nor suit filed on behalf of others, who has got common interest. Plaintiff wants relief against defendants in the nature of injunction. Plaintiff has now come to court and says that he does not want to prosecute the suit. On filing memo itself, the suit stands withdrawn. Defendants are not entitled to be heard since plaintiff is not seeking for any conditional relief. 24. Respondents contend that in the interim order, some benefits are given to plaintiff, I got my own doubts about the jurisdiction of trial court in imposing conditions on interlocutory orders. That is also a matter pending in appeal in C.M.A.No.20 of 1999. That right also cannot be taken as vested right as far as respondents are concerned since it is a matter to be adjudicated under Industrial Disputes Act. What the plaintiff wanted was to compel defendants not to interfere with their right to movement of finished goods over which workers have no right. An interim order has been granted by appointment of Commissioner. Certain conditions have been imposed by lower court, which is challenged in appeal. In a suit for injunction, defendant cannot claim that they are entitled to salary of workers. That is a matter which has to be adjudicated by the appropriate forum. 25. What is the effect of interlocutory orders passed when the suit is allowed to be withdrawn. 26. InM.Kishore Kumar v. Mohd.Akbar Siddiqui M.Kishore Kumar v. Mohd.Akbar Siddiqui M.Kishore Kumar v. Mohd.Akbar Siddiqui , (1993)3 A.L.T. 429 it is held that it is natural that when once a suit is withdrawn by the plaintiff for the reasons best known to him/her, it automatically follows that whatever benefits that were initially gained by the plaintiff by way of interim orders of the court, would naturally vanish and cease to exist. The resultant effect is the interim order becomes non est. .27. Even if plaintiff has taken any benefit on the interim order, that should not be treated as vested right of defendants. At the most, defendant can contend that on withdrawal of the suit benefits obtained on the basis of interim order will have to be restored. But that will not stand in the way of allowing withdrawal. 28. .27. Even if plaintiff has taken any benefit on the interim order, that should not be treated as vested right of defendants. At the most, defendant can contend that on withdrawal of the suit benefits obtained on the basis of interim order will have to be restored. But that will not stand in the way of allowing withdrawal. 28. When the plaintiff has moved a memo that he do not want to prosecute the matter, the court has no option but to allow it in view of the circumstances mentioned above. Lower court went wrong in allowing the application of defendants in providing police protection for defendants for removal of goods. It may be noted that interim injunction is in favour of plaintiff. Plaintiff does not want to implement it. Defendant cannot compel implementation of injunction order by providing police protection. Once suit itself is allowed to be withdrawn police protection also cannot be provided. Lower court acted illegally in providing police protection to the commissioners when plaintiff do not want to prosecute the suit. 29. The procedure adopted by lower court is also not correct in providing police protection. It is admitted by both sides that plaintiff preferred C.M.A.No.20 of 1999 against the conditional order of injunction. When the main order itself is pending consideration by lower appellate court, whether to provide police protection or not also should have been considered by that court. Even though there is no stay of the order, proprietary demands to consider this question only by the appellate court. 30. In the result, both the revision petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. O.S.No.195 of 1999 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi is dismissed as withdrawn. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.Ps. are closed.