Judgment R.L.Anand, J. 1. This is defendants appeal and has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.11.1999, passed by the Addl. Distt. Judge, Panipat, who decreed the two suits of the plaintiff respondent Ram Lal for pos session and for the recovery of the amount as arrears of rent and interest thereupon. 2. Plaintiff-respondent Ram Lal filed two suits; one bearing RBT No.1028 of 1994 and the other RBT No.695. In the main suit No.1028 of 1994, the plaintiff had alleged that the disputed shop bearing municipal No.271-B situated in Ward No.7 was a newly constructed shop and was so constructed in the year 1978. The defendants were in possession of the disputed shop as tenants under the plaintiff. Since, it was a new construction, the agreed rate of rent payable by defendants was Rs.250/-. The plaintiff did not want to retain the defendants as tenants, therefore, he terminated the tenancy by issuing a notice Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 11.1.1986. The notice was served upon the defendants on 15.1.1986. In the suit notice, the number of the shop was wrongly typed as 271-A instead of 271-B. In order to avoid all objections and complications, the plaintiff again issued a notice Under Section 106 of the Act on 17.12.1986 which was served upon the defendants on 18.12.1986 and the defendants were requested to hand over the vacant possession of the shop in question on the expiry of 15 days and the pay the rent w.e.f. 1.6.1983 against receipt. The possession of the defendants over the disputed property after the expiry of 15 days was in the capacity of a tenant holding over the possession without the consent of the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendants are liable to vacate the property. The defendants did not pay the rent w.e.f. 1.6.1983 despite the notice. The recovery of rent from June, 1983 to November, 1983 has become time barred, therefore, the plaintiff claimed the rent w.e.f. 1.12.1983 to 30.11.1986 at the rate of Rs.250/- per month, which comes to Rs.9,000/-. The plaintiff is also entitled to interest as damages at the rate of 12% p.a. which comes to Rs.2,000/- and in all the amount of Rs. 10,000/- has been claimed by way of arrears of rent and interest etc. 3. This suit was contested by the defendants on various grounds. The plaintiff is also entitled to interest as damages at the rate of 12% p.a. which comes to Rs.2,000/- and in all the amount of Rs. 10,000/- has been claimed by way of arrears of rent and interest etc. 3. This suit was contested by the defendants on various grounds. The main plea of the defendants was that the construction of the shop in dispute was never completed in the year 1978. The defendants even did not admit the rent at the rate of Rs.250/- per month. The defendants maintained that they are in possession of the shop in question since 1.4.1968 and its construction was completed in the year 1959. The plaintiff along with his other relatives who also owned the shop on the northern side of the disputed shop, had constructed one stair case intervening these two shops in the year 1977 with the consent of the defendants and simply construction of a new stair case did not amount to construction of a new shop as the shop remained on the old walls. Therefore, the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act are applicable to the tenant and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiff has not mentioned in his plaint the date or the month regarding completion of construction of the disputed shop. Moreover, the plaintiff has intentionally given wrong numbers of the disputed shop. In some of the previous litigations, he mentioned the shop as 271-A, whereas the number of the disputed shop is 270. The plaintiff has given false and bogus number of the disputed shop as 271-B with ulterior motive and with mala fide intentions in order to connect this shop with some false and bogus evidence. The plaintiff has not given the measurements and boundaries of the shop in dispute. Initially, the rate of rent of the disputed shop was less than Rs.30/- per month. It was raised from time to time with a view to avoid litigation and lastly, the rent was Rs.150/- per month inclusive of all taxes. The plaintiff tried to forcibly dispossess the defendants from the disputed shop as a result of which the defendants had to file a suit for permanent injunction against him in September, 1985. This suit was decided on 29.10.1986. The plaintiff tried to forcibly dispossess the defendants from the disputed shop as a result of which the defendants had to file a suit for permanent injunction against him in September, 1985. This suit was decided on 29.10.1986. The defendants had already paid rent to the plaintiff up to 31.8.1985 and after the decision of the said civil suit, the defendants sent rent at the rate of Rs.150/- per month for 15 months i.e. from 1.9.1985 to 30.11.1986 through Money Order but, the plaintiff refused to accept the same for the reasons best known to him. It has also been submitted by the defendants that the notice dated 11.1.1986 is illegal, void ab initio and does not fulfil the basic requirement of law. Both the notices are contradictory to each other and against facts. 4. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement of the defendants in which he reiterated his allegations made in the plaint while denying those of the written statement. The plaintiff further reiterated that the construction of the disputed shop was completed in the months of February - March, 1978. 5. In the second suit No.RBT-696 of 1995, the plaintiff demanded a sum of Rs. 10,500/- as rent and compensation for unauthorised use and occupation starting from 1.12.1986 to 31.10.1989 by submitting that the tenancy of the defendants stood terminated on the expiry of 15 days from 18.12.1986. The rent w.e.f. 1.12.1986 upto the date of termination of tenancy and compensation for unauthorised use and occupation as the case may be has not been paid for a period of 33 months at the rate of Rs.250/- per month, which amounts to Rs.8,750/-. The plaintiff is also entitled to interest at the rate of 18% on this amount which comes to Rs.2,500/- but the plaintiff confined his claim only to Rs. 1,750/- and, thus, he claimed a money decree for a sum of Rs. 10,500/- in the second suit. 6. This suit was also contested by the defendants on the same pleas which were taken in the first suit. 7. A separate replication was also filed by the plaintiff in the second suit. Both the suits were consolidated by the trial Court and the following issues were framed by the trial Court :- 1. Whether the construction of the shop in dispute was completed in the year 1978? OPP 2. 7. A separate replication was also filed by the plaintiff in the second suit. Both the suits were consolidated by the trial Court and the following issues were framed by the trial Court :- 1. Whether the construction of the shop in dispute was completed in the year 1978? OPP 2. Whether the tenancy of the defendant has been terminated validity? OPP 3. Whether the defendants are liable to be ejected from the shop in dispute? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 10,000/- as arrears of rent/use and occupation charges? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.10,500/- as arrears of rent for the subsequent period? OPP 6. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit? OPD 7. Whether the suits are not maintainable? OPD 8. Whether the suits have not been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 9. Relief. 8. The suit was decreed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.8.1995. The defendants filed an appeal before the first appellate Court and the same was also dismissed vide judgment and decreed dated 29.11.1999 by holding that the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1978 and that the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act are not applicable and so the plaintiff is entitled to get the possession of the shop. The reasons given for the dismissal of the appeal by the first appellate Court are contained in paras 10 to 19 of the judgment, which read as under" 10. To decide the controversy between the parties it is to be decided whether the shop in dispute was newly constructed and was completed in the year 1978 or the shop in dispute is the same old shop. The stand of plaintiff is that the shop in dispute was newly constructed after demolition of the old shop whereas the stand of the defendants is that the shop in dispute is old one in existence and was not newly constructed. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove the shop in dispute was newly constructed. To prove this fact the plaintiff examined-Inderjeet his son, who is also general attorney of the plaintiff and produced Ex.Pl the General Power of Attorney. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove the shop in dispute was newly constructed. To prove this fact the plaintiff examined-Inderjeet his son, who is also general attorney of the plaintiff and produced Ex.Pl the General Power of Attorney. He deposed that he submitted a site plan for getting the same sanctioned to the Municipal Committee, copy of which is Ex.P14. Thereafter they received a notice from the municipal committee as the site plan submitted was in the name of Atam Parkash his real brother and then the name was got corrected in the site plain in the name of his father who was the registered owner. He further deposed that the shop was constructed in the month of November, 1977 and was completed in the month of March, 1978. He deposed that the old shop was in a dilapidated condition. The same was having the roof of batons which was likely to fall. Now, the roof is made of lintel. Previously there was no stair case and now they have constructed the, stair case alongwith other shopkeeper Satnam Dass. He also deposed that the original meter installed in the shop was in the name of his father which was removed at the time of construction and they deposited a sum of Rs.10/- as shifting charges. He deposed that after the construction of the shop, the same was rented out to the defendants. PW7 Ganesh Dass Nuneja Drafts-man proved the site plan which was submitted by the plaintiff to the municipal committee. Ex.P14 the same site plan. PW7 Ganesh Dass also proved Ex.PW7/2 copy of order and also proved Ex.PW7/3 the notice issued by the municipal committee to plaintiff. PW8 Darbara Singh deposed that this shop was constructed by him in the year 1977. PW9 Dr, S.K. Rawal, also deposed that the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1977. To rebut the evidence led by the plaintiff, Madam Lal son of Kartar Chand appeared in the witness box. He is general attorney of the defendants and produced Ex.D4 Copy of General Power of Attorney. He deposed that the shop in dispute is in their possession since 1.4.1968 and they are running the business of fruits vegetables in the shop in dispute and they never vacated the shop. DW3, Bhim Sain also corroborated the version of defendants. He is general attorney of the defendants and produced Ex.D4 Copy of General Power of Attorney. He deposed that the shop in dispute is in their possession since 1.4.1968 and they are running the business of fruits vegetables in the shop in dispute and they never vacated the shop. DW3, Bhim Sain also corroborated the version of defendants. The plaintiff also produced in evidence Ex.P7/1 copy of report of drafts-man dated 3.3.1978, Ex.PW7/3 the copy of notice dated 28.11.1977, Ex.PW7/4 copy of rent dated 3.3.1978, Ex.PW.7/5 copy of assessment register for the year 1977-78, Ex.PW.7/8 copy of assessment register for the year 1966-67, Ex.PW.7/7 copy of assessment register for the year 1968-69, Ex.PW7/8 copy of assessment register for the year 1973-74, Ex.PW7/9 copy of assessment register for the year 1978-79, Ex.PW7/10 copy of assessment register for the year 1983-94. The defendants have also produced Ex.D1 the bills of electric meter. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that even if the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that he repaired the shop in dispute or construction of the stair case, that would not prove itself that the shop in dispute was newly constructed. He argued that the plaintiff has not mentioned the period when the shop was completed. As such, the version of the plaintiff that the shop in dispute was completed in the year 1978, cannot be accepted. The reliance has been placed on G. Khandoba Potanna (died) and Ors. v. Balakonda Gangadhar, 1983(1) B.L.R. 644 where it was held that adding of one or more rooms after 1957 to the existing structure, it cannot be said that the entire building was constructed subsequent to 1957. The entire buildings remains the same and the Rent Act shall be applicable. The reliance has also been placed on Natraj Studio and Ors. v. Smt. Anguri Devi, 1992(3) Latest Judicial Reports 732 where it was held that only a part of the shop newly constructed, other part of the shop only a case of major repairs, tenancy being the same, could not be split up and it was held the shop not exempted from the operation of the Rent Act. The reliance has also been placed on Smt. Parkash Wati etc. of Chhawani Gurgaon v. Jagdish Chand etc. The reliance has also been placed on Smt. Parkash Wati etc. of Chhawani Gurgaon v. Jagdish Chand etc. of Gurgaon Cantt., 1984 Haryana Rent Reporter 496, where in a case of landlord made large scale alterations on ground floor by getting built the disputed shop after 13.12.1962. Back wall and roof of the rooms were allowed to remain intact and only front wall and intervening walls were redesigned. It was held that it was a case of making alteration only. The case falls within the premises of Rent Act Reliance has also been on Imtiaz Hussain alias Chhote v. IV A.D.J., Moradabad, 1994(1) B.L.R. 327 wherein reconstruction of tenanted building old building was demolished. Tenant continued his business on the open land in front of the same building till completion of its reconstruction and continued to pay rent to landlord. Tenant was allowed to occupy the reconstructed shop. 12. There is no dispute regarding the principles laid down in the above mentioned judgments. In the light of observations made in the above mentioned judgments it is to be decided as to whether the shop was newly constructed or it was the old one. In the replication, the plaintiff has admitted the existence of old shops though he has not specially admittedly the tenancy of the defendants prior to period the shop is alleged to be newly constructed. The admission of the plaintiff regarding the exiting of old shop and the statement of Darbara Singh the mason who constructed the shop proves that Kartar Chand defendant was in possession of the shop in dispute at the time the same was constructed. Once it is proved that old shop was in existence and under the tenancy of the defendants, when it is to be decided as to whether the shop was newly constructed or only the material alterations were carried out. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff gave the wrong number of the shop in dispute has no force because in the same locality whether the shop in dispute is situated plaintiff has no other property not to talk of a shop, meaning there in the shop in dispute is the same shop which was in existence and later on alleged to be newly constructed. A close perusal of Ex.PW7/6 proves that old number of the shop in dispute was 559 and new number was 271-B/7. A close perusal of Ex.PW7/6 proves that old number of the shop in dispute was 559 and new number was 271-B/7. Ex.PW7/7 further proves that the old number of the shop was 559 and new number was 271-B Ward No.7. Ex.PW7/8 also proves that old number of the shop in dispute was 559 and the shop in dispute was situated in Ward No.7. Ex.PW7/8 is the copy of house tax register for the year 1973-74 which proves that at that time Kartar Chand was also tenant in the shop in dispute. Kartar Chand defendant only remained tenant in the ship in dispute meaning thereby Kartar Chand was tenant in the shop No.559 and now Ex.PW7/9. copy of assessment register 1978-79 provides that old number of the shop was 559 and new number is 271-B/7. Other copies of assessment registers placed on the record prove that now the shop number is 271-B/7. Thus, it stands proved that the number of the shop is 271-B. Ex.P7/1 the copy of report dated 3.3.1978 proved that the plaintiff submitted a site plan regarding property No.271/7, and the plaintiff was asked to remove the objections and the site plan was rejected, which is proved from Ex.PW7/2 the report. Ex.PW7/3 is the copy of notice dated 28.11.1977 which also proves that the site plan submitted by the plaintiff was not sanctioned as the plaintiff was asked to produce the registered sale deed. Ex.PW7/4 proves that the vide notice dated 3.3.1978 the plaintiff was informed that he had raised the construction without sanction. Ex.P14 is the copy of the site plan which was submitted by the plaintiff to the municipal committee. Thus, the documents produced by the plaintiff prove that in the year 1977-78 plaintiff submitted that site plan to the municipal committee for sanctioning regarding the shop in dispute but the said site plan was not sanctioned as the plaintiff had raised the unauthorised construction. No doubt originally site plan was submitted in the name of Atam Parkash, but later on the mistake was rectified and the site plan was corrected in the name of Ram Lal who is registered owner. Atam Parkash was the son of Ram Lal. So, it stands proved that when the plaintiff wanted to construct the shop in dispute he intended to get the site plan sanctioned. Atam Parkash was the son of Ram Lal. So, it stands proved that when the plaintiff wanted to construct the shop in dispute he intended to get the site plan sanctioned. Statement of Pal Singh U.D.C. PW4 also proves that plaintiff deposited the sum of Rs.10/- for removal of the electric meter when he wanted to rise the construction. This amount was deposited on 25.10.1977. Statement of Inderjit the son of the plaintiff corroborated by the statement of PW8 Darbara Singh proves hat the shop was newly constructed by the plaintiff. The statement of PW9 Dr. S.K. Rawal also proves that the plaintiff constructed his shop after demolishing the old one and one common stair case was also constructed alongwith his shop. The shop of PW.9 Rawal bears No.271 whereas the shop in dispute is 271-B and has a common stair case which was newly constructed. The statement of DW1 Madan Lal general attorney of the defendant Kartar Chand proves that previously the shop in dispute was single storey and now the same is double storey. He admitted that the stair case was constructed but he deposed that the stair case was constructed after reducing the width of the wall. He admitted that previously the roof of old shop was made of batons whereas now the roof is not of batons. He also admitted that shop of the neighbourer Dr. Rawal was constructed in the year 1978 and at that time a common stair case was constructed between the shops. The defendants has admitted the construction of stair case in between the shop of Dr. Rawal and the shop in dispute. The stair case could only be constructed after demolishing the wall and reducing the width of the room. Otherwise no stair case could be constructed. Statement of PW8 Darbara Singh mason proves that the roof of the should shop was that of batons. He deposed that the walls were constructed by him. Statement of PW8 Darbara Singh proves that the total roof of the shop was changed, the walls were changed. Even the width of the shop was reduced to construct the stair case. So, it cannot be said that there were mere alterations or additions. Rather the evidence led by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove that the shop was newly constructed. Even the width of the shop was reduced to construct the stair case. So, it cannot be said that there were mere alterations or additions. Rather the evidence led by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove that the shop was newly constructed. The evidence led by the plaintiff that the wall of the disputed shops towards the shop of Satnam Das was only constructed after removal. The stair case could not be constructed without removal of the said wall. The shop of the Satnam Dass father of S.K. Rawal PW9 was constructed in the year 1978 meaning thereby the joint stair case was constructed in the year 1978. The shop in dispute was previously that of small bricks and that of wooden batons but now it has been reconstructed with big bricks and the roof is made of lintel. The evidence led by the plaintiff including the site plan submitted by the plaintiff including the site plan submitted by the plaintiff and notices received by the plaintiff from the municipal committee which have been proved from the statement of PW7, prove that the shop was newly constructed. The plaintiff has succeeded in proving that there was an electric connection in the shop in dispute No.L2-315 and when the construction was being raised an application was moved for temporary dis-connection of the electric meter. This fact shows that the construction was to be raised after demolishing the walls. Merely if the site plan of the plaintiff was rejected by the municipal committee will not itself prove that the plaintiff did not intend to raise the new construction. Reliance can be placed on Vinod Kumar v. Marina Dass, 1993 H.R.R. 534 where it was held that non-submission of the building plan for construction under the Act cannot be so construed debarring the Court from examining the other evidence to prove that the building was re-corrected (reconstructed (sic)). The plaintiff has succeeded in connecting the document produced on the record with the shop in dispute. It cannot be believed that the plaintiff prepared the false documents nine years ago to seek the ejectment of the defendants. Had the plaintiff prepared the documents only to seek the ejectment of the defendants, in that case he must had filed the suit at a very early stage. It cannot be believed that the plaintiff prepared the false documents nine years ago to seek the ejectment of the defendants. Had the plaintiff prepared the documents only to seek the ejectment of the defendants, in that case he must had filed the suit at a very early stage. No doubt the defendants have succeeded in proving that they were in possession of the shop in dispute in the year 1978 prior to the day it was newly constructed but the defendants have failed to prove that they continued as tenant and continued paying the rent during the period the shop remained under construction. It is not the case of the defendants that when the shop was newly constructed, they remained in occupation or they were paying rent regularly to the landlord for that period or they were running their business in front of the shop. So, the judgment in a case Imtiaz Husain alias Chhote and Ors. v. IV A.D.J. Moradabadand Ors. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The judgment in the case G. Khandoba Potanna (died) and Ors. v. Balakonda Gangadhar, in a case Natraj Studio and Ors. v. Smt. Anguri Devi in a case Smt. Parkash Wati etc. of Chhawani Gurgaon v. Jagdish Chand etc of Gurgaon Cantt. (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In a case Reliable Tractor Services, Karnal and Ors. v. Smt. Kulwant Kaur and Ors., 1992(3) Latest Judicial Reports 734 it was held by our own Honble High Court that construction of two shops in place of one shop of Karies changed with lintel roof, veranda in front of two shops constructed. Upper storey on the old shop demolished. In that case a case of newly constructed building was made out. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant only material alterations or additions were made and - in no case the total roof was changed or width was reduced. Whereas in the present case the roof was totally changed, walls were newly constructed and new stair case was constructed. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly held that the shop in dispute was completed in the month of February-March, 1978. 13. Whereas in the present case the roof was totally changed, walls were newly constructed and new stair case was constructed. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly held that the shop in dispute was completed in the month of February-March, 1978. 13. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff has not given the date and time when the shop was constructed, has no force because in the replication plaintiff has pleaded that the shop was completed in the months of February/March, 1978. The plaintiff has also proved the termination of tenancy of the defendants by proving copy of notices Ex.P2 and P3. Postal receipts Ex.P4. P5 and postal service Ex.P6 to Ex. P13 and as well as reply of the notice Ex.P14. There is no defect in the notices, as such the learned trial Court has rightly held that the tenancy of the defendant was validly terminated by the plaintiff. Since the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1978 suit filed within ten years from the date of construction i.e. on 5.1.1987 is well within period when the property in dispute is out of the purview of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. As such the civil learned counsel for the appellants argued that since version of the plaintiff regarding rate of rent has been found to be false, so his case should be dismissed On this sole ground and the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands. Reliance has been placed in Fakir Chand v. Bhagwan Dass, 1994(2) Rent Law Reporter 182 = (1994-3)108 P.L.R. 129 where it was held that no order of ejectment could be passed if it is found by the Court that the landlord had not approached the Court with clean hands. Simply if the rate of rent as alleged by the plaintiff had not been accepted by the learned trial Court, the suit of the plaintiff could not be dismissed because if the plaintiff fails to prove the rate of rent that can be no ground for rejecting his claim. The plaintiff has also come to the Court with clean hands when he admits the existence of old shop. He was not required to plead the previous tenancy of the defendants if any. So, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands. The plaintiff has also come to the Court with clean hands when he admits the existence of old shop. He was not required to plead the previous tenancy of the defendants if any. So, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands. The judgment in a case Fakir Chand v. Bhagwan Dass (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. At least the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1978 and the plaintiff was even in arrears of rent. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants further argued that the plaintiff himself has not stepped in the witness box and has only produced his general attorney as such the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. He has placed reliance on Ram Parsad v. Hari Narain and Ors., 1998(3) Latest Judicial Reports 576, where it was held that the words acts used in Rule 2 Order 3 of the code does not include the act or power of attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Power of attorney holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity. If the plaintiff is unable to appear in the Court a commission for recording the evidence may be issued. 15. This authority is not applicable to the facts of the present case. All the facts which were in the knowledge of the plaintiff were in the knowledge of his son General Power of Attorney. As such, appearing of the plaintiff in the witness box was not required in this case. No document was to be put to the plaintiff by the defendants. As such non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box is not fatal to the plaintiffs case. 16. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the rent has already been paid by the defendants to the plaintiff as such the defendants were not in arrears of rent. DW1 Madan Lal in his statement on oath deposed that the rent up to 31.8.1985 was paid to Satnam Dass, who was the previous owner. This evidence of the defendants is beyond pleadings. As such, cannot be taken into consideration. DW1 Madan Lal in his statement on oath deposed that the rent up to 31.8.1985 was paid to Satnam Dass, who was the previous owner. This evidence of the defendants is beyond pleadings. As such, cannot be taken into consideration. It is not pleaded by defendants that the shop was taken on rent from Satnam Dass and not from the plaintiff. Since it is not the case of the defendants that Satnam Dass inducted them as tenant, so there was no question of the defendants to make a payment of Satnam Dass. So, even as per the version of the defendants, no payment was made to the plaintiff. Even there is no ocular evidence of the defendants which could prove that the rent was paid to the plaintiff or his sons. As such, the defendants have failed to prove the payment of rent and the learned trial Court has rightly held that the respondents were in arrears of rent with effect from 1.6.1983 to 30.11.1986. The trial Court has rightly awarded the compensation for use and occupation w.e.f. 1.12.1986 to 31.10.1989 as the defendants have failed to prove the rate of rent. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that since the plaintiff has deposed falsely regarding rate of rent, so his version that the rent was not paid to him cannot accepted particularly when the plaintiff has not issued any receipt regarding payment. The onus is on the defendants to prove that the payment was made. Even there is no ocular evidence that the rent was paid to the plaintiff. So, the defendants were failed to prove the payment of rent and argument of learned counsel for the appellant has no force. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the trial Court should have awarded the rate of Rs.250/- per month and has wrongly relied upon copy of assessment register. He has relied upon Jagan Nath v. Smt. Shanti Devi, 1976 Current Law Journal 312 whereas it was held the official making the entries showing figures and the area occupied, the interpretation of the entries cannot be beyond the purpose for which the columns of the register specially state Interpretation made by the Rent Controller upset. 19. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove that what was the rate of rent. 19. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove that what was the rate of rent. The bald statement of general attorney of plaintiff cannot be accepted to prove the rate of rent. The copy of assessment register proves that originally the defendants are shown to be tenants in the year 1973-74 and at that time the annual value was shown as Rs.300/-. Ex.P7/1 0 proves that the defendants were tenant in the shop at the rate of Rs. 150/-. At that time there was no dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. As such, there was no reason for any one to get wrong entry entered in the copy of the assessment register. The copy of assessment register can be taken into consideration for determine the rate of rent. The reliance can be placed on Kewal Krishan v. Bhagwant, 1993 H.R.R. 176 where the version of the tenant corroborated from the entries of the house tax were treated as sufficient to prove the rate of rent. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly held that the shops in dispute was rented out at the rate of Rs.150/-." 9. Mr. Palli made a frantic effort in order to convince me that the plaintiff has concealed the material facts before the trial Court by not stating in the plaint that the shop in dispute was earlier in occupation of the tenants since the year 1968 and at no. point of time, the defendants delivered the possession to the plaintiff in order to raise new construction of the shop and when there is material concealment of facts on the part of the plaintiff, in such a situation, he is not entitled to the decree for possession and it should not be held that the plaintiff completed the construction of the shop in dispute in the months of February-March, 1978. The counsel submitted that it is not even established on the record that a new shop was constructed. Some repairs were effected with regard to the shop in question but it is not a new construction at all. The counsel submitted that it is not even established on the record that a new shop was constructed. Some repairs were effected with regard to the shop in question but it is not a new construction at all. The plaintiff has not been able to procure any certificate from the Municipal Committee certifying that the shop in question was constructed and its construction completed in the months of February-March, 1978 and both the Courts have not rightly appreciated the evidence as a result of which, a serious prejudice has been caused to the appellants and the High Court should interfere in the second appeal when both the Courts below had not rightly appreciated the evidence. 10. I have considered the submissions of the counsel for the appellants and in my view, these are totally devoid of any merit. 11. The case of the plaintiff is very simple. His cause of action was that the shop in question was newly built and was let out to the defendants and since it was a new construction, therefore, it is exempt from the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, for a period of 10 years and since the tenancy of the defendants has been terminated according to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, the defendants are liable to deliver the possession of the shop in question to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not required to prove that the earlier defendants were in possession of the old shop since 1968 or that they surrendered their tenancy or that a new tenancy was created. That was not the cause of action of the plaintiff. The sole controversy which has been rightly appreciated by the Courts below was whether the shop in dispute was an old one or was newly constructed. Both the Courts have given a finding of fact that the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1978. It was a new construction and, in these circumstances, the defendants are liable to vacate the same. It is a settled principle of law that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in Regular Second Appeal. It is obligatory on the part of the appellants to raise substantial questions of law so that the judgments of the Courts below may be interfered. It is a settled principle of law that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in Regular Second Appeal. It is obligatory on the part of the appellants to raise substantial questions of law so that the judgments of the Courts below may be interfered. Still we have to see whether there was wrong appreciation of evidence on the part of the Courts below or not. Certainly, if there is wrong appreciation of evidence on the part of the Courts below, the High Court in R.S.A. will make a substantial question of law and will try to interfere but on going through the discussion of the Courts below, I have come to the conclusion that there was no wrong appreciation of the evidence on the part of the Courts below and the suit of the plaintiff has been rightly decreed. 12. Ex.P-14 is a material document which would show that the plaintiff filed a site plan before the Municipal Committee so that the same may be sanctioned for the purposes of the construction of the new shop. In pursuance of that site plan, the plaintiff received a notice from the Municipal Committee, as the site plan was submitted in the name of Atam Parkash, the real brother of the plaintiff. The Attorney of the plaintiff also (made) the statement that the construction was started in the month November, 1977 and was completed in the month of March, 1978. Evidence has also come that the old shop was in a very bad shape. It was made of batons and was likely to fall. The new construction is of lintel. Previously there was no stair case. Now, the stair case has also been constructed along with the other shopkeeper Satnam Dass. This has been done so that there may be further construction on the first floor of the shop in dispute. Evidence has also come that the original meter which was installed in the shop was in the name of the father of the plaintiff which was removed at the time of the construction and a sum of Rs.10/- were deposited as shifting charges. Had the plaintiff not wanted to construct a new building, he would not have filed the site plan. So much so, the plaintiff was even asked to remove the objections. Had the plaintiff not wanted to construct a new building, he would not have filed the site plan. So much so, the plaintiff was even asked to remove the objections. The site plan which was submitted by the plaintiff for the construction of the new shop was rejected by the Committee as he could not produce the registered sale deed. So much so, the record of the Committee shows that the plaintiff was informed that he had raised the construction without prior sanction from the Committee. Thus, the above documentary evidence clearly shows and is pointer to the fact that there was an old shop which was totally demolished and at that very place, the plaintiff raised a new shop and earlier to the construction of the shop he applied to the Municipal authorities somewhere in the year 1977-78 clearly showing his intention that he wanted to construction a new shop at the premises. Simply that the plaintiff has not been able to get the completion certificate from the Municipal Committee is no ground to say that the shop in question is not a new one. People create new construction against the sanctioned plan even and sometimes they do not get the plans approved but this only gives a cause of action to the Municipal Committee for the demolition of the unauthorised construction or the committee may compound the offence but the point in controversy in the present appeal is whether a new shop came into existence in the year 1977-78 and if that is so, the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, would not apply in the present case. It is not believable that the plaintiff would create fictitious evidence in his own favour with the connivance of the municipal authorities, Earlier, the shop in dispute was single storey and now it has become double storey and to that extent the statement of General Attorney of the defendant Kartar Chand is on the record, who has clearly admitted that the shop in dispute was single storey and now the same is double storey. He further admitted that a stair case was constructed. He also admitted that previously the roof of the old shop was made of batons but now the roof is not of batons. He further admitted that a stair case was constructed. He also admitted that previously the roof of the old shop was made of batons but now the roof is not of batons. It is the admitted case of the parties that the width of the shop in question has been reduced because a stair case has been carved out. In such a situation, when the roof and walls of the property have been demolished, it cannot be said that it was a case of only repairs but it is a case of new building. If the defendants remained in possession of the demised premises throughout from 1968 onwards till the year 1978, they ought to be in possession of the receipts of rent for all this period but the fact is that the defendants surrendered their tenancy to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff may be able to construct a new shop. When the shop was newly constructed, the property was let out to the defendants on different terms altogether. The rent was different. It is not the case of the defendants that when the shop was newly constructed, they remained in occupation or they were paying the rent regularly to the landlord for that period also or that they were running their business either inside the shop or in front of the shop so as to show their possession over the site in question. 13. In this view of the matter, both the Courts have rightly come to the conclusion that the, construction of the shop in dispute was completed in the months of February-March, 1978. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in R.S.A. 14. Resultantly, I do not see any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. However, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the demised premises. The appellants shall give an undertaking before the Executing Court within one month from today stating that the demised premises are in their occupation and they shall not deliver or part with the possession of the demised premises to any third person but the landlord himself. If the undertaking is not given, it will always be open to the landlord to take the possession of the demised premises through execution.

Kartar Chand v. Shanti Devi