JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10th November, 1998, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.140 of 1997, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants as being not maintainable in view of the alternate remedy available to the appellants by way of arbitration. 2. On 16th September, 1981, the appellants and the respondents' entered into a contract for manufacture and supply of Monoblock Concrete Sleepers. Under the said contract the appellant Company was to set up a factory/plant for the manufacture of concrete sleepers at any place between Kharagpur Section in West Bengal and Gondia Section in Maharashtra. The appellant Company was, thereafter, required to manufacture and supply 2,10,000 pieces of Monoblock Concrete Sleepers to the respondent Railway authorities at the first instance. The Railway authorities reserved their right to place orders for a further quantity of 2,00,000 sleepers with the appellant company at the same price and on the same terms and conditions as were applicable in respect of the initial order for 2,10,000 sleepers. 3. In keeping with the said contract, the appellants set up their factory/ plant which was completed and commissioned in 1983. 4. According to the appellants, they duly supplied 2,10,000 sleepers at the first instance during the period from 1983 to 1988. A further 2 lakh sleepers were supplied by the appellants to the Railway authorities during the period 1988 to 1989, Thereafter, in October, 1991, the Railway authorities placed a repeat order, being order No. TC/Concrete/OCAIL Repeat Order 89/90/4064, for supply of 11.1 lakh sleepers on the appellant Company and the said quantity was supplied during the period 1990-93. 5. It is the common case of the parties that cement and High Tensile Steel wire, "H.T.S. wire" in short, are two of the essential inputs which are required for manufacturing concrete sleepers. According to the appellants, in clause 16.1 of the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981, it was stipulated that 60 kgs of cement and 9.7 kgs of H.T.S. wire would be the input for the manufacture of one concrete sleeper. According to the appellants, in clause 16.1 of the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981, it was stipulated that 60 kgs of cement and 9.7 kgs of H.T.S. wire would be the input for the manufacture of one concrete sleeper. According to the appellants the same terms and conditions had more or less been followed in respect of the several orders placed by the Railway authorities on the appellants from time to time and no dispute had ever been raised as to the consumption of raw materials as fixed by the Railway. 6. In February, 1995, the Railway authorities entered into a contract with the appellants, being Contract No. TC/Concrete/OCAIU Repeat Order/91-95/ 699 dated 14.2.95, for supply of 8.25 lakhs concrete sleepers, on the terms and conditions contained in the Railway Board's letter dated 3rd February, 1995. According to the appellants, in clause 10 of the new contract it was stipulated as follows : "All other terms and conditions of the present repeat order shall be as per the earlier contract, i.e. contract No. TC/Concrete/79/2355 dated 16th September, 1981 and the Repeat Order No. TC/Concrete/OCAIU Repeat Order/89-90/4064 dated 31st October, 1991." 6. According to the appellants the norms for consumption of cement and H.T.S. wire remained unchanged and were not separately indicated in the new contract and in view of clause 10 of the new contract would remain the same as laid down in Contract No.TC/Contract/79/2356 dated 16th September, 1981. It is the case of the appellants that for about fifteen years during which several orders had been placed by the railway authorities the appellants had always supplied sleepers manufactured as per the norms of inputs of materials as indicated in clause 16.1 of the aforesaid contract dated 16th September, 1981, namely, 60 kgs of cement and 9.7 kgs of H.T.S. wire, for each concrete sleeper. 7. It appears that on 18th December, 1996, the appellants were served with a letter from the railway' authorities, being No. TC/Concrete/OCAIU Repeat Order/94-95/8069 dated 18th December, 1996, wherein it was stated that the Railway Board vide its letters dated 28th March, 1995 and 27th September, 1996, addressed to the railway authorities, had allegedly directed them to revise the norms regarding consumption of raw materials such as cement and H.T.S. wire so that from thenceforth 55 kgs. of cement and 9 kgs. Of H.T.S. wire were used for manufacturing one concrete sleeper. of cement and 9 kgs. Of H.T.S. wire were used for manufacturing one concrete sleeper. In the said letter was also stated that such revision of norms would be applicable with retrospective effect in respect of all sleepers already produced and to be produced under the existing contract dated 14th February, 1995. The appellants claim that they had no knowledge of the instructions of the Railway Board contained in the two letters dated 28th March, 1995 and 27th September, 1995, before they were served with the said letter dated 18th December, 1996, by the railway authorities. 8. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Samaraditya Pal submitted that 8 bills had been raised and submitted by the appellants in respect of 27925 sleepers manufactured and supplied by the appellants prior to 18th December, 1998. Mr. Pal submitted that while making payment of the said bills the railway authorities arbitrarily deducted a sum of Rs. 95,029.02p presumably because the same were received and paid after the railway authorities had taken the decision to revise the norms of consumption of cement and H.T.S. wire. 9. Mr. Pal submitted that since the railway authorities had not informed the appellants of the decision to revise the norms relating to input of cement and H.T.S. wire before 18th December, 1996, the revised norms could not apply to sleepers produced on the basis of the norms as existing prior to 18th December, 1996, and the deduction made by the railway authorities from the bills submitted by the appellants on account of such revision was arbitrary and unreasonable and could not be sustained. Mr. Pal submitted hat the Railway Board was fully alive to the situation that the contract entered into with the appellants provided for adoption of the norms for input contained in the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981, and that if any changes were to be effected to such norms, it would have to be by way of negotiation. Mr. Pal submitted that in its letter dated 28th March, 1995, the Railway Board while instructing the South Eastern Railway to reduce the use of permitted amount of special cement from 60 kgs to 55 kgs and H.T.S. wire from 9.7 kgs to 9 kgs also advised the zonal railway to negotiate with the appellants so that the changes recommended could be incorporated into the contract. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Pal urged that when the manufacturing process according to the unrevised norms was already in progress and 3,16,111 pieces of sleepers manufactured under such norms had already been supplied by the appellants to the railways the retrospective application of the revised norms relating to changed input was illegal and arbitrary and offended the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. Mr. Pal also submitted that when a contract had been entered into between the appellants and the Railway authorities it was not open to the Railway authorities to unilaterally alter the agreed terms of the said contract. Referring to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Marine Engineer & Ors. vs. Siddeswar Halder & Ors., 1991 (1) C.L.J. page 467, in which the Court was called upon to consider a case of cancellation of the acceptance of a tender, Mr. Pal submitted that the Division Bench, inter alia, held that whatever be the activity of the Government, the constitutional power conferred on it cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprincipled manner. 12. Mr. Pal then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gouind Prasad vs. R.G. Prasad & Ors., 1994 (1) SCC page 437, wherein while considering an administrative order containing the policy decision of the Government to change the conditions of promotion, the Supreme Court observed that an executive order of the Government cannot be made operative with retrospective effect. 13. Mr. Pal submitted that the letter of the South Eastern Railway dated 18th December, 1996, is contrary to the Railway Board's instructions which advised the Railway authorities to negotiate and incorporate the proposed amendments in the subsisting contract. Mr. Pal contended that since the impugned decisions have civil consequences they were violative of the principles of natural justice as they had been arrived at without reference to the appellants. 14. In this regard reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1) State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Das, AIR 1967 SC page 1269 and 2) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1978 SC page 851, where the above principle has been emphasised. 15. Mr. 14. In this regard reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1) State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Das, AIR 1967 SC page 1269 and 2) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1978 SC page 851, where the above principle has been emphasised. 15. Mr. Pal submitted that the impugned directions contained in the letter of the South Eastern Railway dated 18th December, 1996, were arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice and were liable to be declared illegal, unconstitutional and void, and the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the writ application was not maintainable in view of the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract dated 14th February, 1995. Mr. Pal urged that it was not the terms of the subsisting contract which were the subject matter of the dispute but the new terms being sought to be unilaterally imposed on the basis of the letters written by the Railway Board. Mr. Pal submitted that the dispute had arisen from a policy decision of the Railway Board which was not a party to the contract dated 16th September, 1981, or any subsequent repeat order. 16. Mr. Pal urged that the dispute was not covered by the arbitration agreement contained in clause 33 of the parent contract which stipulated that the Arbitrator is to be appointed in terms of clause 2900 of the Indian Railways Standard Conditions of Contract which made a distinction between the Railway Board and the Zonal Railways as contracting parties. Mr. Pal submitted that when the appellant's contract was with a Zonal Railway, and the notification had been issued by the Railway Board, the arbitration clause contained in the contract between the appellants and the Zonal Railway would have no application. It was urged that the failure to negotiate and modify the existing contracts but proceeding to take action, which is not referable to the contract, cannot be the subject matter of reference as per the arbitration agreement contained in clause 33 of the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981. 17. It was urged that the failure to negotiate and modify the existing contracts but proceeding to take action, which is not referable to the contract, cannot be the subject matter of reference as per the arbitration agreement contained in clause 33 of the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981. 17. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge had erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternate remedy was available to the writ petitioner by way of arbitral proceedings the scope whereof was very wide and all contentions raised in the writ application could also be raised before the Arbitrator and, in any event, the Arbitrator could award damages for breach of contract, if any, on the part of the respondents. It was urged that the existence of an alternate remedy was not an absolute bar to the filing of a writ petition and provided the requisite grounds existed, both mandamus and certiorari would lie although an alternate remedy had been provided by statute. 18. In support of his submission Mr. Pal referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1) State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC page 86, 2) A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC page 1506 and Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai,1998 (8) SCC page 1, wherein it was emphasised that the existence of an alternate remedy did not bar the entertainment of a writ petition and no inflexible rules could be laid down in that regard. The matter was one for proper exercise of discretion by the High Court. Mr. Pal submitted that the learned Single Judge misconstrued the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions while dismissing the writ petition upon holding that the writ petition was not maintainable as the appellants/writ petitioners had an alternative remedy which they could take recourse to. 19. On behalf of the respondents it was urged by Mr. Swapan Gorai that the dispute raised by the appellants/writ petitioners was of civil nature which could not be decided by the writ court but in a civil suit. Furthermore, in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement the writ application was not maintainable as had been held by the learned Single Judge. 20. Mr. Swapan Gorai that the dispute raised by the appellants/writ petitioners was of civil nature which could not be decided by the writ court but in a civil suit. Furthermore, in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement the writ application was not maintainable as had been held by the learned Single Judge. 20. Mr. Gorai also urged that no writ petition would also lie on the allegation of breach of some of the terms and conditions of the contract and the relief, if any, of the appellants/writ petitioners lay in a civil action. 21. Mr. Gorai submitted that with time and acquired experience in the manufacturing process of concrete sleepers, the Railway authorities began to realise that the input levels for manufacture of sleepers were in the high side, and, accordingly, the Railway Board revised the input of cement from 60 kgs to 55 kgs and H.T.S. wire from 9.7 kgs to 9 kgs and directions were given that such revised norms would govern all repeat orders placed after June-July, 1993. Mr. Gorai submitted that, in any event, the appellants were aware of the aforesaid position and had already lowered their input levels of cement and H.T.s. wire prior to the issuance of the aforesaid instructions by the Railway Board and they could raise bills based only on actual consumption of raw materials. Instead, the appellants had raised bills with inflated quantities of raw materials which did not reflect the actual input level. 22. Mr. Gorai submitted that since the raw materials were being supplied to the appellants by the railways themselves they could have no grievance regarding the input levels as revised by the Railway Board which was not a party to the writ proceedings and, in any event, if the appellants had any grievance, the same would be covered by the arbitration agreement. Mr. Gorai urged that the writ application was misconceived and had been rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge. 23. Although, several points were urged on behalf of the parties, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ application only on the ground of its maintainability in view of the arbitration clause included in the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981. 24. 23. Although, several points were urged on behalf of the parties, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ application only on the ground of its maintainability in view of the arbitration clause included in the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981. 24. On behalf of the appellants it has been urged that the arbitration agreement contained in clause 33 of the parent contract would have no application in this case, inasmuch as, the dispute involved did not relate to the contracting parties, namely, the South Eastern Railway and the appellants and had arisen on account of the directions given by the Railway Board altering the input levels. According to the appellants, the dispute which had arisen could not be said to be a dispute or difference arising in connection with the contract since the input levels remained unchanged in the contract and the altered norms had not been included in the contract by negotiation, as had been suggested by the Railway Board. 25. It has also been urged that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for seeking redress under Article 226 of the Constitution and the decision to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy exists is purely discretionary depending on the facts of each case. 26. From the facts as revealed, the dispute, though referable to the contract, does not really arise out of the contract. The input norms which had been laid down in the parent contract was sought to be altered unilaterally on the instructions of the Railway Board without altering the terms of the subsisting contract and that, too, retrospectively. It is nobody's case that the subsisting terms were altered upon negotiation. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with Mr. Pal that the dispute which has arisen on account of the letter written by the South Eastern Railway on 18th December, 1996, attempting to enforce the altered norms of input of cement and H.T.S. wire with retrospective effect, does not attract the arbitration clause contained in the parent agreement and the findings of the learned Single Judge to the contrary cannot be sustained. 27. In view of our aforesaid finding, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of whether alternate remedy by way of arbitration would constitute a bar to the filing of a writ petition. 28. 27. In view of our aforesaid finding, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of whether alternate remedy by way of arbitration would constitute a bar to the filing of a writ petition. 28. On merits we are also inclined to agree with Mr. Pal's submission that even if the altered norms relating to input of cement and H.T.S. wire have been accepted by the appellants, such acceptance would be prospective and not retrospective. In other words, the same would have application from the date on which the appellants were informed of the altered norms, that is, from the date of the letter written by the South Eastern Railway on 18th December, 1996, informing the appellants of the altered norms as suggested by the Railway Board. The altered norms could not, therefore, be made applicable to sleepers which had already been manufactured as per the specifications contained in the parent contract dated 16th September, 1981, prior to 18th December, 1996, and any deduction made in respect of bills submitted in respect thereof cannot be maintained. 29. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The respondents are directed not to make deductions and recoveries from the bills submitted by the appellants/ writ petitioners in respect of sleepers manufactured and delivered prior to 18th December, 1996, and to refund to the appellants such amounts as may have been deducted and/or recovered on account of bills already submitted in respect thereof. 30. The appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 31. There will be no order as to costs. 32. All parties to act on a signed copy of the quantitive portion of the judgment on the usual undertakings. Appeal disposed of with directions.