Judgment :- P. SATHASIVAM, J. The second petitioner before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, in W.C. No. 121 of 1997 against the dismissal of the said petition for compensation has filed the above appeal before this Court. In respect of death of one Jagadeswaran in a motor vehicle accident, the appellant herein along with her husband T. P. Rathinasamy filed W.C. No. 121 of 1997, before the said authority claiming compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs. The said petition was resisted by the respondents stating that the deceased was not a 15 workman as defined under Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and the first claimant being employed and earning, both of them are not dependents; accordingly, they prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. In support of their claim, the first claimant, father of the deceased was examined as P.W. 1, and 2 more persons as P.Ws. 3 and 4 were also examined, apart from marking exhibits A-1 to A-8. On the other hand, on the side of the first respondent herein, one S. Rajendran was examined as R.W.-1 and on behalf of the second respondent-insurance company, none was examined nor any document marked. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation after considering the oral and documentary evidence, and after holding that the deceased being a sales engineer and not a workman under Section 2(1)(n) of the said Act and in view of the fact that the claimants are not dependents as per Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, dismissed the said petition as not maintainable. Aggrieved by the said order, the mother of the deceased alone filed the present appeal. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, as well as the respondents. It is the definite case of the appellant that her son Jagadeswaran who was employed as a production-cum-sales engineer in the first respondent's concern, on March 21, 1997, while on his way from Suriya Mill, Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore, to his factory in a Hero Honda Motor Cycle T.N. 37-J-0791 owned by the first respondent herein along with one S. Krishnan met with an accident, opposite to Goundampalayam Auto Stand by dashing behind a lorry which suddenly stopped, due to which he sustained head injury. He underwent treatment at C.M.C. Hospital, Coimbatore and then at Jipmer Hospital, Pondicherry, where he died. According to her, the deceased was paid wages at Rs. He underwent treatment at C.M.C. Hospital, Coimbatore and then at Jipmer Hospital, Pondicherry, where he died. According to her, the deceased was paid wages at Rs. 2, 400 per month. On the other hand, it is the case of the first respondent that the deceased was not a workman in terms of Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not covered under Schedule II to the said Act. He was only a sales engineer and he is not a workman and he cannot claim compensation under the said Act. Even otherwise, according to them, the accident took place beyond his working hours, i.e. at 10.00 p.m. whereas his working hours came to an end at 5.30 p.m. Hence, the accident did not arise in the course of his employment. It is also their case that inasmuch as the first claimant is employed as a Livestock Inspector at Veterinary Hospital, Thingalur and earning Rs. 6, 000 per month, he cannot be said to be wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of the deceased. The income of the deceased was hardly sufficient to maintain himself. It is the case of the second respondent herein that the employer of the deceased had not paid premium covering the risk of a rider other than the owner of the vehicle. Now, the point for consideration is whether the deceased Jagadeswaran was a workman as defined under Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the appellant is a dependent as per Section 2(1)(d) of ActThere is no dispute that the deceased was employed as a sales engineer in the first respondent concern. It is the case of the claimants that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. It is the case of the claimants that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. Section 2(1)(n) of the Act defines "workman" as follows: "2(1)(n) : 'workman' means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependents or any of them. A perusal of the evidence let in on the side of the claimants and the materials placed does not show that the deceased was a workman within the definition of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act or employed in any such capacity as specified in Schedule II Inasmuch as it is for the claimants to prove and establish the said fact and in the absence of any such acceptable evidence on that score, I do not find any error in the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour. Now, I shall consider the decisions referred to by learned counsel for the appellant. The first one is a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Moideen v. Gopalan, 1996-I-LLJ-1027 (Ker-DB). It speaks about ousting of a person from the definition of workman. The learned judges have held as follows at p. 1028". 7. Even assuming that claimant's employment on that day was of a casual nature, that by itself is not enough to push him out of ambit of the definition of workman. If a person has to be ousted out of the contours of the definition, the casual nature of his engagement must couple with the succeeding postulate in the definition that such employment should not be for the trade or business of the employer. The word 'and' used in the definition is for the conjunction of the two postulates together in one person. The word 'and' used in the definition is for the conjunction of the two postulates together in one person. No interpretation to make the two postulates disjunctive is warranted in the contextIn the case of Parameswaran v. M. K. Parameswaran Nair, 1993-III-LLJ (Suppl)- 707, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has held that a person to be excluded from the definition of "workman" as defined in the clause must not only be one "whose employment is of a casual nature" but also one who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business. Both these qualifications must be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of workman under the Act. In the case of Managing Director, J and K.P.C.C v. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, 1993-I-LLJ-65 (J&K), a learned single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court has held that mere designating him as supervisor will not change his status as workman if he is otherwise qualified for it. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 1993-III-LLJ (Suppl)-493 (Raj), a single judge of the Rajasthan High Court has held that an Assistant Engineer employed in workshop of the Mahri Project (Rajasthan) is a workman as per the amended definition. In our case according to the claimants, their son Jagadeswaran on March 21, 1997, while proceeding on his way from Suriya Mill, Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore, to his factory in a Hero Honda Motor Cycle, owned by the first respondent herein, with one S. Krishnan, in front of Goundanpalayam Auto Stand, dashed behind a lorry which suddenly stopped. Due to the said accident, he sustained head injury and subsequently died in the hospital. It is the case of the opposite party, the first respondent herein that he was neither covered under Schedule II nor a workman as defined under Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. He was a sales engineer and he could not claim compensation under the Act. It is also contended that the accident took place beyond his working hours at 10.00 p.m., whereas his working hours came to an end at 5.30 p.m. In this regard, learned counsel for the first respondent very much relied on a recent judgment of R. BALASUBRAMANIAN, J., in Commissioner, Kovilpatti Municipality V. Tamilarasan, 1998-II-LLJ-683 (Mad). In that case, one Subbiah was a workman employed by the respondent therein. In that case, one Subbiah was a workman employed by the respondent therein. He died on February, 14, 1985, on account of the injuries sustained by him due to an attack by some miscreants. A petition for compensation of Rs. 33, 360 was filed before the Tribunal alleging that he died as a result of the injuries sustained by him arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation passed an award for Rs. 36, 854.05 and the correctness of the said order was questioned in that appeal. After referring to Section 3 of the Act as well as various decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned judge in paragraph 8 has arrived at the following conclusion 1998-II-LLJ-683 at 687, "8. Applying the law laid down by the three judgments referred to above, I have carefully applied my mind to the facts pleaded and proved. It only shows that the deceased workman was attacked while he was in a public road. As said by the Supreme Court, the deceased in this case was there as a member of the public and he was not definitely there in the course of his employment. There is nothing in this case to show that the nature of the employment of the deceased workman made it necessary for him to be there. There is also no evidence to show that the deceased was in the close proximity of his work spot. As already stated, there is nothing on record to show the distance between the work spot of the deceased and the public road where the deceased was attacked. It is not the case of the the petitioners nor can it be that the deceased was in his work site where he had sustained the injuries. The Supreme Court in its judgment in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa 1997-I-LLJ-34, has stated as follows at p. 40 of LLJ. 14. The employee was to report for duty at 4.30 p.m. The accident took place at 4.15 p.m., only one kilometre away from the factory. In our view, this cannot be a ground for departing from the principle laid down by the aforementioned cases that the employment of the workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment ....... In our view, this cannot be a ground for departing from the principle laid down by the aforementioned cases that the employment of the workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment ....... "When this being so, I am of the opinion that a casual relationship between the accident and the employment has not been established in this case. Unfortunately, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had not decided this issue in the forefront which goes to the maintainability of the petition itself. Subbiah, the deceased in this case did not receive the injuries out of his employment. 'Out of', in this context must mean caused by employment. The said word indicates that the injury must be caused by an accident, which had its origin in the employment. A mere road accident, while an employee is on his way to his place of employment cannot be said to have its origin in his employment in the factory. The phrase 'out of employment' is construed in the case of South Mainland Railways Proprietary Ltd. v. James, 67 CLR 496, and when construing the phrase 'out of employment', STARKE, J., heldThe words "out of" require that the injury had its origin in the employment. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the deceased Subbiah in this case sustained injuries resulting in his death in the course of and arising out of his employment." Inasmuch as the deceased met with an accident in a place away from his workspot that too in a road accident, the decision of the learned judge is directly applicable to our case; accordingly I hold that the deceased in our case sustained injuries resulting in his death not in the course of and arising out of his employment. On this ground, the claim petition filed by the claimants under the Act is liable to be dismissed and the same has been rightly dismissed by the Commissioner. The other contention is that the first claimant, father of the deceased is employed as a Livestock Inspector at the Veterinary Hospital, Thingalur and earning sizable income, and that though he is not a dependent, the second claimant, mother of the deceased is partly depending on the income of the deceased, hence she can maintain a claim petition. The other contention is that the first claimant, father of the deceased is employed as a Livestock Inspector at the Veterinary Hospital, Thingalur and earning sizable income, and that though he is not a dependent, the second claimant, mother of the deceased is partly depending on the income of the deceased, hence she can maintain a claim petition. This has been reiterated in B. V. Palampalle v. R. P. Muchala 1991 (1) LLN 1131; and in Ramji v. Lalit Kumar Bardiya 1995-I-LLJ-910 (MP). In view of my conclusion that the deceased met with a road accident and died not in the course of his employment, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is justified in dismissing the claim petition as not maintainable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. I am in agreement with the said conclusion; consequently the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.