MAHESH NARAIN SRIVASTAVA v. UTTAR PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, HEAD QUARTERS LUCKNOW
2000-02-04
BHANWAR SINGH
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
BHANWAR SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has invoked this Courts Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of india by filing this writ petition praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondent to revoke the order dated 26. 2. 1990, whereby the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service. ( 2 ) THE matrix of the petitioners case is that he was appointed in the Roadways Department in the year 1948. He always discharged his duties satisfactorily and on the basis of his performance, he was promoted as Station Superintendent/traffic Superintendent. After the Assembly election in the year 1989, a new Government was installed in the State and the then Chief Minister issued a circular order to weed out the corrupt officials/employees in the State and it was in pursuance of such general direction that a very large number of officials were compulsorily retired from service and the petitioner also fell victim of those circumstances. The respondent vide order dated 26. 2. 1990 ordered for compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The said order of the respondent was motivated, illegal and mala fide. The petitioner was not given any opportunity of being heard before passing of the impugned order. As a matter of fact, the order was stigniatic as it had been issued in the background of the circular dated 11. 12. 1989 of the Chief Secretary, directing for retirement of corrupt officials. On searching enquiry made by the respondent, it was revealed that there were some adverse entries against him but not all were communicated to him. During the last 5 years, he was communicated only one adverse entry for the year 1986-87 and against the said adverse entry he filed a representation which was pending before the impugned order having been passed. Otherwise also, the impugned order was contrary to the provisions of rule 38 of the U. P. S. R. T. C. Employees Service Rules. 1981, as no opportunity to defend was afforded to him. In ordinary course, the petitioner would have retired on attaining the age of superannuation, approximately a year after the impugned order but in the given circumstances, it was a proof of his being victimised to order for his retirement. On the basis of these grounds the petitioner has sought for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondent to revoke the order for compulsory retirement.
On the basis of these grounds the petitioner has sought for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondent to revoke the order for compulsory retirement. ( 3 ) THE respondent filed its reply through the counter-affidavit of Shri Harish Kumar, Dy. General manager (Personnel ). It was asserted by Shri Harish Kumar that the petitioner had been retired from service in public interest on the report of Screening Committee comprising of Addl. General Manager (Operation), Dy. General Manager (Operation) and Dy. General Manager (Personnel ). While screening the case of the petitioner, annual entries appearing in his character roll for the last 10 years were taken into consideration and as for 5 years, i. e. , 1980-81. 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1986-87 he earned adverse entries, the Committee recommended that he was not fit to be retained in service and it was on the basis of this recommendation that order for his compulsory retirement was issued. The claim of the petitioner that his performance throughout was satisfactory, has been disputed by the respondent, it was also denied that the impugned order pertaining to compulsory retirement of the petitioner was issued as to sequel to the instructions/directions of the Chief Minister of the State. ( 4 ) AS a matter of fact, there was sufficient material before the Screening Committee to come to the conclusion that his continuance in service was not in the public interest. The petitioners representation against the adverse entry for the year 1986-87 was rejected vide order of October 29. 1988. It was asserted on behalf of the respondent that the order for compulsory retirement was not stigmatic, as such it was not required to afford an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. In other words, the impugned order was not an order of punishment, as the petitioner on retirement was entitled to all retiral benefits. ( 5 ) A careful perusal of the service record filed before this Court would reveal that during the last 10 years, following was the position regarding the favourable and adverse entries : year Remarks 1980 Adverse 1981 Adverse 1982 Adverse 1983 Adverse 1984 Satisfactory 1985 Good 1986 Adverse 1987 Satisfactory 1988 Excellent ( 6 ) OBVIOUSLY a look at the chart indicated above reveals that the petitioners work and performance during five different years were termed to be adverse.
The position of the detailed adverse entries appears to indicate that the petitioner was very weak in route-checking. The way he conducted the checking was ineffective and he was considered to be unfit. While assessing his work for the year 1981-82, the Assistant Regional Manager observed that despite his work being unsatisfactory, he was being tolerated. In the succeeding year, he was asked to improve his output. In the year 1983-84 also, his performance was considered to be unsatisfactory. Similarly in the year 1986-87, it was observed that his checking work was not of standard. ( 7 ) FROM the performance of the petitioner as quoted above, it is clear that his service record was not good and it is a settled law that if an order pertaining to premature compulsory retirement issued on the basis of adverse record, is in the public interest in the opinion of the competent authority, it is not permissible to interfere with it under a judicial scrutiny. In other words, judicial scrutiny of any order, imposing premature retirement of an official is permissible. If the order is either arbitrary or mala fide or if it is passed on the basis of no material. ( 8 ) IN this context. It was pressed into service on behalf of the petitioner that no adverse entry except for the year 1986-87 was communicated to him and order of compulsory retirement on the basis of uncommunicated entries is vitiated as it is against the principle of natural justice. Reliance was placed upon the citations State of U. P. v. Mahesh Chandra Maheshwari, 1995 (13)LCD 385 ; Rajjan Lal Srivastava v. State of U. P. . 1995 (12) LCD 639 and Baidyanath mahapatra v. State of Orissa and another, 1989 (4) SCO 664. ( 9 ) IN the decisions of all these citations, it was held that to rely upon the entries which were not communicated is not in consonance with the principles of natural justice, and as such compulsory retirement, ordered on the basis of such entries is vitiated. As a matter of fact, the purpose of apprising an official of the adverse entries awarded is to enable him to improve the efficiency in his work and conduct and further afford him an opportunity to make amendment and improve his functioning.
As a matter of fact, the purpose of apprising an official of the adverse entries awarded is to enable him to improve the efficiency in his work and conduct and further afford him an opportunity to make amendment and improve his functioning. However, if the entries are not justified the communication gives opportunity to the concerned official to make representation, explaining his version. ( 10 ) IN the case in hand the position is different as all adverse entries were communicated to him as is evident from record. The adverse entry for the year 1980-81 was communicated to the petitioner vide letter No. 485crs/82-13 Gopan.-82 dated 6. 10. 1982. Similarly adverse entry for the succeeding year was conveyed to him vide letter of 27. 2. 1985. The entry for the year 1982-83 was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 1. 2. 1986. The adverse entry for the succeeding year 1983-84 was communicated vide letter dated 1. 2. 1985. It is admitted to the petitioner that the adverse entry for the year 1986-87 was communicated to him in due course. His contention that the order for compulsory retirement was issued by the authority concerned without waiting for his representation for expunction of the said entry being decided, is not tenable in view of the respondents statement that the petitioners representation in that respect had been rejected on 29. 10. 1988. A copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure-CA-1. The order for compulsory retirement was issued on 26. 2. 1990 obviously after the petitioners representation having been rejected. In this background, the citations referred to above do not help the petitioner as he has not been condemned was unheard. Each adverse entry was conveyed to him and he was given an opportunity to improve his work and mend his ways of functioning but in the year 1986-87 his performance remained to be as substandard. The checking work entrusted to him was not executed by him in satisfactory manner. He was considered to be a liability on the corporation and he was being tolerated by the department inspite of his malfunctioning.
The checking work entrusted to him was not executed by him in satisfactory manner. He was considered to be a liability on the corporation and he was being tolerated by the department inspite of his malfunctioning. ( 11 ) THE judgment of this Court passed in Writ Petition No. 2427 of 1990 ; Mohan Chandra kukrati v. U. P. S. R. T. C. , is also of no help to the petitioner as in that case the screening committee had ordered for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner of that case before his representation pending against an adverse entry, was disposed of. ( 12 ) THE principle laid down in Sri Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, 1987 (2) SCC 188 , is also not applicable to the case in hand as the entries beyond 10 years were taken into consideration while it is not so in this case. ( 13 ) FURTHER, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Addl. General Manager was not the competent authority to issue an order for compulsory retirement of the petitioner, and as such the impugned order is bad in law. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has with reference to Annexure-CA-4 argued that the powers of appointing authority and disciplinary authority were delegated by the Managing Director to the Addl. General manager (Operation) and, therefore, the impugned order issued by the said authority was valid in all respects. A perusal of the Annexure-CA-4 reveals that the Addl. General Manager was the competent authority to issue the impugned order in case of the petitioner who was a Class III employee. This document obviously rules out the petitioners contention in this regard. ( 14 ) IT was then submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of Regulation 38 of u. P. S. R. T. C. Regulation cannot be utilised in contravention of Article 311, sub-clause (2) of the constitution of India and, therefore, an opportunity of being heard should have been given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. This contention is devoid of merit as Regulation 38 clearly postulates that an official can be retired after he attains the age of 50 years without assigning any reason subject to a notice of 3 months or 3 months salary in lieu thereof. All these conditions of Regulation 38 were complied with by the competent authority.
This contention is devoid of merit as Regulation 38 clearly postulates that an official can be retired after he attains the age of 50 years without assigning any reason subject to a notice of 3 months or 3 months salary in lieu thereof. All these conditions of Regulation 38 were complied with by the competent authority. The provisions of regulation 38 are based on the Rule 56 of U. P. Fundamental Rules of Financial Hand Book vol. 2 Part II-IV. Such an order of compulsory retirement is issued in the public interest and if from the perusal of the order, it appears that the competent authority formed bona fide opinion on the basis of the material before it, it would be deemed that the order was made in the public interest. This view-point finds assurance from the decision of this Court delivered in Hira Lal srivastava v. State of U. P. and others, (1999) 17 LCD 974. The relevant observations of the court may be quoted as below ; "it is well-settled law that if the appointing authority bona fide forms opinion that it was not in the public interest to retain a Government servant in service, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before the Courts. " "this Court, as stated above, could scrutinise as to whether the decision was arbitrary or was based on no evidence but cannot sit as a Court of appeal and cannot substitute its own opinion. If, however, there is absolutely no material on record, formation, of opinion could be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable and in that event this Court can interfere and upset the order of compulsory retirement," ( 15 ) IF tested on the touchstone of the principle of law laid down by this Court as quoted above, it would be revealed that the impugned order directing for compulsory retirement of the petitioner, was based on sufficient material before the screening committee and none, much less the competent authority issuing the order in question, had any mala fide with them. In other words, the impugned order was issued on the basis of relevant material before the authorities and it was issued in bona fide manner. There is absolutely nothing on record to indicate that the impugned order suffers from any arbitrariness or any unreasonableness. ( 16 ) HAVING regard to all what has been discussed above.
In other words, the impugned order was issued on the basis of relevant material before the authorities and it was issued in bona fide manner. There is absolutely nothing on record to indicate that the impugned order suffers from any arbitrariness or any unreasonableness. ( 16 ) HAVING regard to all what has been discussed above. I am of the decisive view that this writ petition, having no merit, deserves to be dismissed. As a consequence, the petition is dismissed. No order as to cost. .