Judgement A claim case being MACT Case No. 3 of 1983 was filed before the Member, M.A.C.T., Sonitpur at Tezpur by the present appellant claiming a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- as compensation for causing injury to him as well as damage to his property in an accident which took place on 27-1-1983. The Learned Tribunal on appreciation of the materials on record came to a finding that the total amount of money available to the claimant is Rs. 22,000/- for damages caused to the car and Rs. 10,000/- for loss, damage etc. with regard to the injury) but while fixing this amount at Rs. 22,000/- the learned Judge came to the finding that the car of the petitioner was also responsible for causing accident. So, for contributory negligence 50% of the money should be reduced and accordingly, an amount of Rs. 11,000/- was awarded with 12% interest from the date of application i.e., 1-2-1983 till realisation. Further, a sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five hundred) was also given as cost. 2. This appeal has been filed by the claimant challenging the finding/decision to the tribunal reducing the amount of compensation to 11,000/- on the ground of contributory negligence. In Halsburys Laws of England 3rd Ed. Vol. 28 p. 87, contributory negligence has been described as follows : "CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE : In an action for injuries arising from negligence. It is a defence at common law if the defendant proved that the plaintiff, by some negligence on his part, directly contributed to the injury in the sense that his negligence formed a material part of the effective cause thereof. When this is proved the plaintiffs negligence is said to be contributory. Contributory negligence consists of the absence of that ordinary care which a sentient being ought reasonably to have taken for his own safety, and which had it been exercised would have enable him to avoid the injury of which he complains, or the doing of some act which he ought not to have done and but for which the calamity would not have occurred. Wakelin v. London and South Western Ry. Co. (1886) 12 AC 41." 3. In Salmonds on the law of Torts, Seventh Edition at Page 511 it is stated with regard to the contributory Negligence as follows : "192. Contributory Negligence : Preliminary. Contributory negligence once comprised one of the most difficult branches of the law. Wakelin v. London and South Western Ry. Co. (1886) 12 AC 41." 3. In Salmonds on the law of Torts, Seventh Edition at Page 511 it is stated with regard to the contributory Negligence as follows : "192. Contributory Negligence : Preliminary. Contributory negligence once comprised one of the most difficult branches of the law. Fortunately, however, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, and several decisions of the highest Courts, have introduced a straightforward and comprehensive body of principles in place of a mass of subtle arguments and tedious refinements. The account which follows is intended to contain no more than is necessary for an understanding of the present law, which is derived from more than one source. In particular it embodies two distinct principles which do not always harmonise. The doctrine that if the plaintiffs act was the proximate cause of the damage the plaintiff could not recover was a well-established principle of medieval law. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the conception of negligence as a ground of liability worked its way into the common law. Therefore a practice grew up of alleging that a plaintiff could not recover because he was debarred by his own negligence. So we find a penal theory of contributory negligence. In the same way it is common to speak of a plaintiff as being "guilty" of contributory negligence. But the penal theory is inconsistent with the application of the law by the Courts. A plaintiff may have been ever so negligent at some stage of the proceedings, but he will be able to recover if his negligence did not contribute to the accident, even if his negligence was criminal. On the other hand, the doctrine of contributory negligence is more than an application of the rule as to remoteness of damage. For if a third party is injured the negligence of each - both the plaintiff and the defendant - is treated as a cause of the accident ; each is liable to the third party. Nor is the defence of contributory negligence an application of the maxim volent non fit injuria, although the two principles often concur and have often been confused. Nor is the defence of contributory negligence an application of the maxim volent non fit injuria, although the two principles often concur and have often been confused. The defence of contributory negligence confesses and avoids a prima facie liability, it excludes the idea of deliberation, and relies upon the failure of the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care of the defence that the plaintiff has consented to run the risk, none of these statements is true. 193. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE : THE COMMON LAW "The rule of law", said Lord Blackburn, "is that if there is blame causing the accident on both sides, however small that blame may be on one side, the loss lies where it falls." Thus in Butterfield v. Forrester the defendant wrongfully obstructed a street in Derby by placing a pole across it, and the plaintiff rode along the street "at eight oclock in the evening of August, when they were just beginning to light candles", but while there was still sufficient light to notice the obstruction, and coming into collision with the pole he was thrown from his horse and injured. It was held that he had no cause of action, as he could, notwithstanding the defendants negligence, have avoided the accident by the use of due care. Principle in Davies v. Mann (1842) 152 ER 588. It soon became apparent however, that there were cases where there was no substantial a difference between the position of the two parties at the material time that, although the accident would not have occurred without the plaintiffs negligence, it would not be fair or reasonable to regard him as the author of his own wrong. This is the fundamental (though seldom openly expressed) idea behind a series of cases which begin with Davies v. Mann. In this case the plaintiff negligently left his wagon and horses "at a smartish pace", crashed into the animal and killed it. It was held that the defendant was liable. "Although the ass may have been wrongfully there", said Parke B., "still the defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as would be likely to prevent mischief. Were this not so, a man might justify the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a carriage going on the wrong side of the road. Were this not so, a man might justify the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a carriage going on the wrong side of the road. "In this case the expression" contributory negligence "was not used, nor is it clear whether the defendant did or did not see the ass; he probably did see it but too late". 4. In an English case which holds the field has been stated by Salmond at page 516 as follows : "In this case a collision had occurred in the North Atlantic between the Radstock, a destroyer, and the Volute, a merchant ship under convoy. The collision was due to the fault of the Volute in changing her course without giving the proper whistle-single, and to the immediately subsequent fault of the Radstock in increasing her speed with knowledge of the danger caused by the Volutes change of course. For the volute it was argued that apportionment was possible only when the faults of the two ships were simultaneous or synchronous and never when (as was alleged against the Radstock) one ship had an opportunity of avoiding the accident which the other had not. "If such should be the rule", remarked Lord Birkenhead, "it will be found that the cases of contributory negligence would be few." Equally fallacious was the argument of the Radstock to the effect that whenever a collision was brought about by the faults of two vessels the loss must automatically be divided in some proportion, for it might be possible to find a clear dividing line so as to entitle the court to throw the entire loss on the party subsequently and severally negligent. A middle view was possible and desirable. It was held that both ships were to blame and that both were responsible, although the last opportunity of avoiding the collision was with the Radstock. A middle view was possible and desirable. It was held that both ships were to blame and that both were responsible, although the last opportunity of avoiding the collision was with the Radstock. Indeed, where, as in the case of most collisions at sea, two vessels are so moving in relation to each other that the safety of each other bdepends largely upon the care and skill of those in charge of the navigation of the other, it will be seldom that the mere fact that one is aware, or should have been aware, of a negligent course of conduct adopted by the other will compel the triers of fact to hold that the negligence of the latter has thereby become spent, stabilised, static or functus culpa (to mention a few of the phrases judically used) so as to throw the entire loss on the former." 5. The basic principles of contributory negligence in the field of accident under the Motor Vehicle Act is that when the defendants prove that the plaintiff has failed to take precautions against the possible danger and that those precautions, if taken, would have been effective to protect against the danger which occurred. Salmond in his book has given a classic example regarding the motorists. That is quoted below : "A motorist who drives straight across a light-controlled crossing against the red light and knocks down a pedestrian who has begun to cross in reliance on the lights but without looking over his right shoulder cannot be heard to say that the pedestrian is thereby guilty of contributory negligence as against him, though such conduct on the part of the pedestrian might attract that description if he had been knocked down by a motorist lawfully turning left with the green light in his favour." 6. So, the law is that if there is negligence on the part of the claimant the amount of compensation that he is entitled will certainly be reduced to the extent or for which he is negligent. It is the finding of the Tribunal in this particular case that the accident would not have been there if the claimant would have taken proper care and that not being done rightly the Tribunal reduced the amount of compensation by 50%. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, the meaning of contributory negligence has been given as follows : "Contributory negligence. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, the meaning of contributory negligence has been given as follows : "Contributory negligence. The act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on part of complaining party, which, concurring with defendants negligence, is proximate cause of injury. Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495,57 S.W. 2d 502. Conduct by a plaintiff which is below the standard to which he is legally required to conform for his own protection and which is a contributing cause which cooperates with the negligence of the defendant in causing the plaintiffs harm. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,864,532 P. 2d P. 2d 1226. Conduct for which plaintiff is responsible amounting to a breach of duty which law imposes on persons to protect themselves from injury, and which, concurring and cooperating with actionable negligence for which defendant is responsible, contributes to injury complained of as a proximate cause. Cowan v. Dean." 7. Regarding fixing reducing sum for contributory negligence one may have a look at AIR 1988 Andh. Pra. 382 (Etikala Varalaxmi v. The General Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation). 8. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same shall stand dismissed. 9. I have heard Mr. P.K. Baruah, Learned Advocate for the appellant, and Mr. D. Sur, Learned C. S. S.C. for the Election Commission of India and none appears for the State of Assam. Petition dismissed.