JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—Petitioners herein, are the judgment debtors before learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Bilaspur. It appears, decree passed by the learned trial Court in Civil Suit No. 137/1 of 1997 dated 12th March, 1998 was sought to be executed in terms of execution petition No. 7/10 of 1998 by the decree holder respondent herein. The judgment debtors resisted the execution petition and filed objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The objections were dismissed by the learned trial court vide impugned orders dated 7th April, 2000. Aggrieved, the judgment debtors have filed the present revision petition under Section 115 of the Code. 2. In order to appreciate controversy the relevant facts, for the disposal of this petition, may be noticed thus: Petitioners No. 1 to 4 (before this Court) are the legal representatives of judgment debtor Bhagat Ram, who was defendant No. 1 in the Civil Suit. Petitioner No. 5 Babu Ram judgment debtor was defendant No. 2. Learned Trial Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 5th May, 1997, passed an ex-parte decree against the defendants Bhagat Ram and Babu Ram in the following terms:— “......It is ordered that the suit of the plaintiff succeeds and is hereby decreed ex-parte with costs against the defendants No. 1 and 2. The defendants No. 1 and 2, shall pay the balance amount of loan standing against tractor No. HIB 884 to the Punjab National Bank, Barmana, within four months from today, obtain "No Objection Certificate" and give it to the plaintiff before the expiry of this period of four months from today. Secondly, a decree for recovery of Rs. 1,52,000 is hereby passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants No. 1 and 2, ex-parte as consolidated damages as per agreement dated 26.11.1996 which amount shall be paid by the defendants within four months from today. The defendants shall not be entitled to the accident claims of the Tractor No. HIB 884 qua the accident dated 26.4.1997, which amount shall be paid to the plaintiff by Insurance Company with which the Tractor was insured/ 3. The decree was not satisfied which resulted into the filing of the execution petition. The judgment debtors resists the execution petition by filing objections under Section 47 of the Code. The decree was not satisfied which resulted into the filing of the execution petition. The judgment debtors resists the execution petition by filing objections under Section 47 of the Code. Objection of the judgment debtors is that decree sought to be executed is illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction. The objections may be reproduced for convenience:— "1. That the decree passed by this Honble Court which is being executed is illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction as the agreement of sale on the basis of which the decree has been obtained is forbidden by law and is against the public policy, therefore, cannot be enforced through a court and the decree is nullity and is non est and cannot be executed. 2. That the question of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage even during execution proceedings therefore, this Honble Court has got the jurisdiction to hear and decide the objections". 4. It is to be noticed that the execution petition is resisted on the sole ground that ex-parte decree against the judgment debtors is illegal and without jurisdiction because the agreement of the sale of the tractor, on the basis of which the decree was passed, "is forbidden by law and is against the public policy, therefore, cannot be enforced". (Emphasis supplied) 5. The decree holder in his reply controverts the allegation. It is pleaded that the judgment debtors never challenged the legality of the agreement in the written statement which was filed by the defendants in the suit, rather, pleads decree holder, in para 3 of the written statement defendants-judgment debtors unequivocally admitted the sale of the tractor and the execution of the documents. The defendants did not raise any objection relation to the validity of the agreement of sale or it being against the public policy. The decree holder draws the attention of the executing court to the fact that judgment debtors have not mentioned, in their objection petition, as to under which provisions of law the sale of the tractor is prohibited or the agreement executed between the plaintiff and defendants is against public policy. According to the decree holder, the objections have been filed simply to delay the execution of the decree. 6. Learned trial Judge vide his impugned judgment dismissed the objections holding that ex-parte decree, sought to be executed cannot be said to be nullity or without jurisdiction. 7. According to the decree holder, the objections have been filed simply to delay the execution of the decree. 6. Learned trial Judge vide his impugned judgment dismissed the objections holding that ex-parte decree, sought to be executed cannot be said to be nullity or without jurisdiction. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the judgment debtors, submits that the trial Court ought to have given opportunity to the judgment debtors to lead evidence to show that the decree was nullity and without jurisdiction. He further submits that learned trial Court has not given any reason for not permitting the judgment debtors to adduce evidence. 8. The perusal of record shows that learned trial Court vide its order dated 3rd April, 2000, held that question involved was purely legal and therefore, there was no need to adduce any evidence. It is in these circumstances that the learned trials Judge proceeded to dispose of the objections of the judgment debtors. 9. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors refers me to Hem Raj Bansal v. State Bank of India, 1990 Civil Court Cases 105 (P&H); Ravinder Kumar v. Jaswant Singh and others, 1990 Civil Court Cases 397 (P&H) and Charanjit Singh and another v. Manmohan Singh and others, 1989 Civil Court Cases 190 and strenuously urges that the trial court has committed material irregularity in not permitting the judgment debtors to lead evidence in support of their objections. The ratio of these cases is of no assistance to the judgment debtors. It is true that a party has a right to lead evidence in support of the objections which may be filed under Section 47 of the Code. The question of opportunity to lead evidence will arise where the objection raised by the judgment debtors requires examination on the face of the record. In Hem Raj Bansal v. State Bank of India (supra) the order of the trial court did not contain relevant facts and contentions raised by the petitioners-objectors in the objections-petition, it is in this context that the court directed the framing of the issues and disposal of the objections after giving an opportunity to lead evidence. In Hem Raj Bansal v. State Bank of India (supra) the order of the trial court did not contain relevant facts and contentions raised by the petitioners-objectors in the objections-petition, it is in this context that the court directed the framing of the issues and disposal of the objections after giving an opportunity to lead evidence. In Ravinder Kumar v. Jaswant Singh and others (supra) it was observed that when question of fact is involved issue should be framed and the party be allowed to lead evidence. In the present case, question of fact is not involved. Similarly, in Charanjit Singh and another v. Manmohan Singh and others (supra) objections were filed by judgment debtors against the attachment of the house alleging that the house was owned by the husband and wife and that they have nothing to do with the money decree passed against M/s. Shivalik Savings and General Investment Ltd. The objections were resisted by the decree holder alleging that objector Charanjit Singh was Managing Director and sole owner of M/s Shivalik Savings and General Investment Ltd. and therefore, the decree was executable against the Managing Director. The executing Court without framing the issues and allowing the parties to lead evidence, dismissed the objection petition. It is in this context that it was held that dispute raised certain questions of fact which require recording of evidence and therefore, executing court should have framed the issues and allowed the parties to lead evidence. 10. There can be no scope of dispute that where the dispute raised question of fact which requires recording of evidence then party should be permitted to lead evidence. In the present case, as already noticed, the only objection of the judgment debtors is that the decree is without jurisdiction and therefore, nullity. This objection on the face of it does not require any evidence. 11. Ordinarily the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the decree unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. The decree would be nullity if a court passing such decree lacks inherent jurisdiction. A decree which has been passed erroneously or even on the basis of mis-reading of evidence or under the wrong impression of law cannot be said to be nullity. The decree would be nullity if a court passing such decree lacks inherent jurisdiction. A decree which has been passed erroneously or even on the basis of mis-reading of evidence or under the wrong impression of law cannot be said to be nullity. Reference may be made to Hiralal Mollchand Doshi v. Barto Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1993 SC 1449, which has also been noticed by the learned trial Judge. Learned Judges of the Supreme Court in para 8 of the judgment observed:— "8. It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears, there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". In the context which we are dealing a decree is said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree." (Emphasis supplied) 12. This court cannot lose sight of the fact that the question of lack of jurisdiction was not raised by the judgment debtors in the written statement filed before the trial court. Merely labelling a decree as nullity will not make such decree a nullity. The matter stands concluded by the ratio in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, AIR 1970 SC 1475. In this case the apex Court held that court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until such decree is set aside by an appropriate proceedings in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. Until such decree is set aside by an appropriate proceedings in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. It was further held that when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record; where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In the present case, as already noticed, the defendants-judgment debtors could have taken objection regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit and pass such decree. But such objection was not taken, therefore, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. 13. A Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Moolchand and others v. Maganlal (AIR 1965 MP 75) had occasion to interpret the provisions of Sections 47 and 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held by the Full Bench that if a court passing the decree has jurisdiction to pass it, then even if the decree is contrary to certain provisions of law, it would not be a nullity and a plea about the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings. The Full Bench in para-7 of the judgment observed:— "A distinction must, however, be drawn between a decree which is a nullity and decree which is not according to law in that the Court passing the decree ignored certain provisions of the law. The Full Bench in para-7 of the judgment observed:— "A distinction must, however, be drawn between a decree which is a nullity and decree which is not according to law in that the Court passing the decree ignored certain provisions of the law. The equally well settled rule with regard to the power of the executing Court to question the legality or correctness or validity of a decree is that a decree may not be according to law, yet it is binding and conclusive between the parties until it is set aside either in appeal or in revision, and the executing Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that it is not according to law. (See V. Ramaswami v. Kailasa Thevtir, AIR 1951 SC 189; Jnanendramohan v. Rabindranath, AIR 1933 PC 61 and Bhagsingh v. Govindram, AIR 1943 Nag 325 : ILR (1943) Nag 757. If a Court passing the decree had jurisdiction to pass it, then even if the decree is contrary to certain provisions of law, it would not be a nullity and a plea about the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings. This matter has been put by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) in Harkishandas v. Gulabdas Kalyandas, (S) AIR 1956 Bom. 513 thus : "In determining the jurisdiction of the executing Court to entertain pleas under Section 38, Civil P.C., it is always necessary to make a distinction between pleas that tend to show that the decree in question is a nullity and pleas that merely challenge the validity or the propriety of the decree on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of law. If the plea is that the decree is a nullity and so cannot be executed, it would be open to the executing court to entertain the plea. On the other hand, if the plea is that the decree is contrary to law in the sense that in passing the said decree certain provisions of the law have been ignored or contravened that would not necessarily make the decree a nullity and allegations about the impropriety or the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings." 14. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down in Mool Chands case (supra). I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down in Mool Chands case (supra). In the present case the decree sought to be executed cannot be said to be nullity on the face of it. It cannot be said that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pass such decree. Even if it be against law, the decree, so long it is not set aside is binding conclusively between the parties and the executing court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that "decree is forbidden by law and is against the public policy", particularly when it is not detailed that how the decree is forbidden by law or against public policy. The trial court was satisfied that the objections have been filed merely to delay the execution of the decree and I have no reason to differ with the observations of the trial court. 15. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors refers to Sardar Mohar Singh through Power of Attorney Holder, Manjit Singh v. Mangilal alias Mangtya, 1997 (1) SLJ 334 and Md. Alimuddin v. Waizuddin and another, AIR 1997 SC 1995. In both these cases it has been held that court has the power to enlarge the time in favour of the judgment debtors to pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in the decree for specific performance. This is not the question germane to the present controversy and these authorities are of no assistance to the judgment debtors/petitioners. 16. Learned Counsel for the judgment debtors lastly submits that judgment debtors have filed an application for the setting aside of the ex-parte decree which is pending before the trial court and the trial court ought to have stayed the execution proceedings. The judgment debtors are at liberty to move such application, if so advised. The application, if filed, shall be considered and dispose of in accordance with law. 17. In result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Revision dismissed.