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2000 DIGILAW 203 (CAL)

Sakti Bala Samanta v. Union of India

2000-04-20

BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA

body2000
JUDGMENT 1. In all these writ applications, some common questions of law are involved and as such these applications were heard analogously. 2. Common features:– "All the writ petitioners are applicants for 'Freedom Fighters Pension' either for self or as dependant of deceased freedom fighter, the original applicant. None of the applicants claimed that he suffered imprisonment or externment or internment or loss of property due to order of confiscation or permanent incapacitation or loss of job or means of livelihood for participating in the freedom struggle of the nation; but all of them in one voice asserted that they remained underground for more than six months to avoid warrant of arrest. Some of the applicants described themselves to be proclaimed offender. None of the applicants (except one) could however even disclose the name of the Court, which issued such warrant or the case number in which they were involved or the particular section of the Indian Penal Code or any other statute under which allegations were leveled against them. All of them have come forward with the case that the official records in support of their claims are not traceable and hence they have relied upon Certificates of co-freedom fighters who were in jail for more than two years as required under the modified scheme framed by the Government." 3. All the applicants however have disclosed the period of abscondence beginning from a particular date or month and ending with another. The special feature of all these cases is that the period of abscondence ended at least three years prior to the date of independence and not followed by arrest or conviction. 4. I now proceed to deal with the applications separately. A.S.T. No. 332 of 2000 Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta vs. Union of India & other 5. In this application, the petitioner, the widow of the original applicant has challenged the order dated December 14, 1999 passed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India by which the application of her deceased husband has been turned down on the ground of lack of supporting documentary evidence. By the said order, the concerned respondent assured the petitioner to reconsider the case provided sufficient documentary evidence from official records mentioned in the said order were placed with the report or recommendation of the State Government. 6. This case has a chequered past. By the said order, the concerned respondent assured the petitioner to reconsider the case provided sufficient documentary evidence from official records mentioned in the said order were placed with the report or recommendation of the State Government. 6. This case has a chequered past. The husband of the petitioner applied for pension claiming to be active participant in the freedom movement and a proclaimed offender disclosing the period of abscondence as from October 2, 1942 to July 25, 1944. Alleging inaction on the part of Union of India in the matter of disposal of the said application, the present petitioner after the death of her husband moved a writ application before this Court being C.O. No. 2388 (W) of 1996 which was disposed of by S.B. Sinha, J. by directing the Central Government to dispose of the application within a specified period. 7. Pursuant to such direction, the Central Government disposed of the said application by rejecting the same on the ground of absence of necessary material in support of the case of the husband of the petitioner. 8. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner moved her second writ application before this Court being W.P. No. 12202 (W) of 1999 which was disposed of by P.C. Ghose, J. by setting aside the order impugned therein and directing the Central Government to consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Gokul Ch. Panja vs. Union of India & other, 1999(1) CLT 241 (HC) and also of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Union of India vs. Haripada Samanta & other (F.M.A.T. No. 2823 of 1993) within eight weeks from the date of communication of such order. 9. In view of the aforesaid order passed by P.C. Ghose, J., the respondent concerned has considered the case afresh and has again rejected the prayer on the ground of lack of sufficient material with further observation that the principles laid down in those two cases do not apply to the fact of the present case. 10. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner has come up with the instant writ application against the aforesaid order. 11. Mr. Biswas, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has strongly criticized the order passed by the Central Government and has contended that the decision of this Court in the case of Gokul Ch. 10. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner has come up with the instant writ application against the aforesaid order. 11. Mr. Biswas, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has strongly criticized the order passed by the Central Government and has contended that the decision of this Court in the case of Gokul Ch. Panja vs. Union of India & other (supra) squarely applies to the fact of the present case and as such the respondent concerned acted illegally in passing the order impugned by ignoring the decision of P.C. Ghose, J. passed earlier. 12. For the appreciation of the aforesaid contention of Mr. Biswas if will be profitable to refer to some of the salient provisions of the scheme for grant of pension framed by the Central Government named as Swatantrata Sainik Samman Scheme (SSSS). 13. The underground suffering for six months which is recognized as a ground for grant of pension provides that the person should have gone underground only after he was wanted by police for his activities relating to National struggle for freedom. In other words, the freedom fighter should either be a proclaimed offender or on whom an award for arrest was announced or on whom detention order was issued but was not served; but voluntary abscondence or issue of warrant on any other ground than the one mentioned above will not make a person eligible for pension. Furthermore, it must be shown that the applicant did not secure reprieve on account of any oral or written apology tendered by him. The liberalized pension scheme however provides with effect from August 1, 1980 that in the absence of official record because of their non-availability, the certificate issued by a certifier who had undergone a minimum imprisonment for two years in connection with National Freedom Struggle may be accepted as a proof of the fact of abscondence for the purpose of the said scheme. 14. Therefore, by taking aid of the liberalized scheme, an applicant can insist on acceptance of a certificate by a freedom fighter having requisite eligibility as a secondary evidence in support of his claim if thy official records are not available. But, in a given circumstances, the Central Government is entitled to reject such certificate if other contrary evidence is available falsifying the claim of the applicant or the contents of the certificate. But, in a given circumstances, the Central Government is entitled to reject such certificate if other contrary evidence is available falsifying the claim of the applicant or the contents of the certificate. Similarly, there may be cases where on the basis of the averments made in the application itself, the claim of the applicant may be shown to be apparently an absurd claim and in such cases those applications deserve outright rejection notwithstanding the fact that those are supported by certificates of co-freedom fighters. 15. In the instant case, the husband of the petitioner stated in the application that he absconded from October 2, 1942 to July 25, 1944 and was a proclaimed offender. A person is declared a proclaimed offender by a Court in accordance with the provision contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and is preceded by issue of a warrant and is consequent to abscondence or concealment of such person with an intention that such warrant cannot be executed. Such proclamation continues so long such person is not arrested. Such proclamation may however cease if the criminal case in which such warrant was issued is ultimately dropped in the absence of any material against such person or reprieve is given to such person after acceptance of apology. 16. Thus, the husband of the petitioner himself having admitted in his application that he did not abscond any further from July 26, 1944 nor was he ever arrested, only conclusion that emerges out is that from July 26, 1944 there was neither any warrant nor any valid order of proclamation against him as the said case was dropped either because he was wrongly impleaded or due to tender of apology by the petitioner, he was given a reprieve. In either of the circumstances, the applicant was not entitled to get pension. If the abscondence continued till August 15, 1947, the petitioner could successfully contend that due to independence the case was not proceeded with after August 15, 1947. 17. Thus, the assertion of the husband of the petitioner that for involvement in freedom struggle he was declared a proclaimed offender but he did not abscond from July 26, 1944 nor was he arrested is an absurd story unless he was mistakenly involved in the criminal case or he was pardoned after acceptance of his apology. 17. Thus, the assertion of the husband of the petitioner that for involvement in freedom struggle he was declared a proclaimed offender but he did not abscond from July 26, 1944 nor was he arrested is an absurd story unless he was mistakenly involved in the criminal case or he was pardoned after acceptance of his apology. The averments of the husband of the petitioner in the application itself make him ineligible for the grant of pension. 18. The next question is whether the application of the husband of the petitioner was accompanied by a valid certificate given by a co-freedom fighter in accordance with the scheme. 19. In the instant case, the certificate has been given by one, Rabindra Nath Giri whose eligibility to grant certificate has not been disputed. The certificate runs as follows: – "I do hereby certify that Sri Ratneswar Samanta s/o of late Srinath Ch. Samanta of Village Gaurangapur, P.S. Tamluk, District Midnapur, West Bengal, is a bona fide freedom fighter, who remained underground for 1 year 9 months 23 days from 2nd October, 1942 to 25th July, 1944 and was a proclaimed offender. To the best of my knowledge and belief, he did not secure reprieve on account of any oral or written apology tendered by him. He also went underground neither of his own accord nor for fear of police torture, but exclusively for continuance of his services to the country under my guidance. He deserves Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension and Tamrapatra." 20. In my view, the said certificate is not in conformity with the requirement of the scheme. 21. What has been certified is that the husband of the petitioner was a bona fide freedom fighter, who remained underground for the period mentioned above and was a proclaimed offender. It was further certified that he went underground neither of his own accord nor for fear of police torture, but exclusively for continuance of his service to the country under the guidance of the certifier. 22. The scheme does not make a freedom fighter eligible for pension if he remained underground for more than six months exclusively for the continuance of his service to the country under the guidance of the certifier unless it is shown that the underground continued for six months from the date of issue of warrant of arrest for involvement with freedom struggle. Therefore, if a freedom fighter under the guidance of the certifier remains underground for years for continuance of his service to the country but not preceded by any warrant of arrest or order of proclamation on the aforesaid ground, he is not entitled to get pension. The aforesaid certificate merely described the husband of the petitioner as a "Proclaimed Offender" but did not asseverate that the period of underground was more than six months from the date of issue of warrant nor did it assert that he was declared a proclaimed offender for the above reason. The certifier after such a long time could remember the date of beginning of the period of abscondence and that of the end but the date of issue of warrant of arrest or order of proclamation or the name of the Court which passed such order or the provision of the statute under which the applicant was charged with, did not find place in the certificate. 23. Moreover, the certifier did not take the responsibility of the statement that the applicant did not secure reprieve on account of any oral or written apology by not certifying the statement as true to his knowledge. To qualify the certificate as to the best of my knowledge and belief he did not secure reprieve means that the certifier is not prepared to vouch for the veracity of such statement. 24. A certificate is the testimony given in writing to declare or verify the truth of something. Such element is absent in the above certificate in respect of some of the statements as mentioned above. 25. What is more surprising is that in the said printed certificate there is another clause viz. one for whose detention, orders were issued but he/she evaded arrest, but the certifier deleted such clause by a stroke of pen. 26. I have already indicated that the applicant's statement that he remained absconder till July 25, 1944 but was neither arrested on the following day nor was the case dropped is absurd and as such a certificate to that effect should not be accepted. 27. I, therefore, hold that the certificate given by Rabindra Nath Giri has not complied with the requirement of the scheme and is otherwise absurd and as such it must be held that the application was not supported by an appropriate certificate in accordance with the scheme. 28. 27. I, therefore, hold that the certificate given by Rabindra Nath Giri has not complied with the requirement of the scheme and is otherwise absurd and as such it must be held that the application was not supported by an appropriate certificate in accordance with the scheme. 28. Having failed to find any answer to the aforesaid questions raised by the Court, Mr. Biswas put forth the following objections against disposal of this application on the aforesaid grounds: – (a) Neither the State Government nor the Central Government having taken the aforesaid points and the application of the petitioner having been dismissed on different grounds, this Court should restrict its investigation to those points only and cannot supply additional reason. (b) The State Government having recommended the case of the petitioner cannot now contend before this Court that such recommendation was wrongly given as contended by Mr. Chakraborty appearing for the State. (c) While disposing of the earlier writ application filed by the petitioner, P.C. Ghose, J. having set aside the earlier order of the Central Government and having directed the Central Government to consider the case of the petitioner in the light of observation made in the cases of Gokul Ch. Panja vs. Union of India & other (supra) and Union of India vs. Sukumar Barik (supra) and the respondents having failed to raise these points on the earlier occasion, these points are barred by the principles of constructive res-judicata. In other words, the decision of P.C. Ghose, J. was an order of limited remand and as such the application cannot be dismissed on any other ground. 29. In support of the first point Mr. Biswas has firstly relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Samboo Nath Tikoo & other vs. S. Gian Singh & other, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 266, and contended that neither the State Government nor the Central Government having taken the aforesaid points in their affidavit-in-opposition, this Court should not go into such new cases. All that was laid down in the said case was that a new case not borne out by the pleadings should not be entertained. But, in the instant case for adjudication of the points raised by this Court no new investigation of fact is necessary and such fact is apparent from the case of the writ petitioner. All that was laid down in the said case was that a new case not borne out by the pleadings should not be entertained. But, in the instant case for adjudication of the points raised by this Court no new investigation of fact is necessary and such fact is apparent from the case of the writ petitioner. Therefore, without even using affidavit, the respondents can obviously point out that on the basis of averments made in the writ application, the same is liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, find that the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court has no application to the fact of the present case. The other decision referred to by Mr. Biswas in the case of M. Ramaswamy Pillai vs. Hazarath Syeed Shaw Mia, 1992(4) SCC 731 , is equally inapplicable to the fact of the present case. In that case, in view of clear plea taken by the plaintiff that the respondent was a tenant holding over, it was held that a different plea that the mutwalli had no power to grant lease could not be taken. 30. Mr. Biswas next relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh vs. Chief Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 , and contends that the Central Government having dismissed the application of the petitioner on some definite grounds, this Court cannot supply additional reason. 31. In the said case, it has been held by the Supreme Court that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reason in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. It was further pointed out by the Apex Court that otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes before Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. 32. The petitioner, in my view, cannot take advantage of the aforesaid decision for the simple reason that in order to invoke writ jurisdiction, the onus is upon the petitioner to satisfy the Court that he has a legal right to get the relief claimed. 32. The petitioner, in my view, cannot take advantage of the aforesaid decision for the simple reason that in order to invoke writ jurisdiction, the onus is upon the petitioner to satisfy the Court that he has a legal right to get the relief claimed. If on his own showing it appears that he has no such right, the High Court will not exercise its power even if the reasons assigned by the authority below are not approved by the High Court. 33. Let us assume a case where the applicant has given a date of birth in the application which is after August 1947, but nevertheless claimed freedom fighter's pension. But, instead of rejecting that application on that ground, the Central Government has given different reason for rejecting such application. In a writ application filed by the petitioner against such order, the Court may not approve the reason assigned by the authority but can dismiss the writ application on the ground that the petitioner's case is an absurd one he having born after independence. In the same way, in the case before us, the applicant's plea of abscondence upto July 25, 1944 not followed by arrest or conviction was an impossible plea as discussed earlier. Therefore, the aforesaid decision cited by Mr. Biswas is of no avail to his client. 34. Mr. Biswas also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Goverdhan, AIR 1970 SC 1926 , and contended that the petitioner should be permitted to make further clarification in the application. In the aforesaid case, an application for permit under Motor Vehicles Act was filed not in accordance with the Rules and having been summarily dismissed, the Supreme Court observed that such application should have been considered on merit or the authority could ask for more complete details. 35. In the instant case, the petitioner's husband had fully completed the form, deleted the other portions indicating that he was neither convicted nor arrested, nor lost his job nor was there any order of externment etc. and having specifically taken benefit of a certificate of co-freedom fighter on the allegation of non-availability of any official record, no question of giving any fresh opportunity to supply fresh material arises at this stage. and having specifically taken benefit of a certificate of co-freedom fighter on the allegation of non-availability of any official record, no question of giving any fresh opportunity to supply fresh material arises at this stage. Moreover, the authority concerned has already assured the petitioner that if fresh materials are brought to the notice of the authority they will consider those fresh materials. 36. The other decision cited by Mr. Biswas viz. Mukundlal Bhandari vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SCW 2508 , has hardly any application to the fact of the present case. In the said decision, the Apex Court held that application for freedom fighter's pension should not be rejected on the ground of limitation. 37. I, therefore, find no substance in the first contention of Mr. Biswas. 38. In support of his second point that the State Government having recommended the case of the applicant cannot revoke the same. Mr. Biswas relied upon an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in F.M.A.T. No. 660 of 1994 disposed of on June 15, 1994 by K.C. Agarwalla, C.J. and M.G. Mukherjee, J. (as His Lordships then was). In a short judgment Their Lordships made the following observations: – "Learned Single Judge rightly held that once the case had been recommended by the State Government for granting of political pension, it had no occasion to recall such recommendation on the ground of fresh material having become available after the recommendation was given. Learned Single Judge correctly allowed the writ application and granted relief." 39. With great respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to accept the aforesaid judgment as a correct proposition of law. In my view, the State Government has the right to reconsider the recommendation on the basis of fresh materials if it appears that previous recommendation was wrongly given due to fraud practiced or suppression of fact. However, in such a case the applicant should be given opportunity to explain the additional materials on the basis of which the State Government was going to recall the recommendation Mr. Biswas submitted that I should refer the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench if I intend to disagree with the view taken by the Division Bench. Biswas submitted that I should refer the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench if I intend to disagree with the view taken by the Division Bench. In my opinion, such course is not necessary in view of the fact that the recommendation of the State Government is not binding upon the Central Government. Therefore, even if the recommendation of the State Government remains in force, there is no bar in rejecting the prayer of the applicant. Moreover, the view taken by Their Lordships is in conflict with the one expressed by the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu vs. Jagannath, 1994 (1) SCC 1 , where the Supreme Court has held that if any decision is procured by a party by suppressing something and if such material is subsequently detected, the decision so procured will be treated as non-est. Therefore, the second objection taken by Mr. Biswas is equally devoid of any substance. 40. As regards the third point raised by Mr. Biswas, there is no dispute with the proposition of law that principles of res-judicata and constructive res-judicata generally applies to a writ proceeding. But, the question is whether the decision of P.C. Ghose, J. will operate as a constructive res-judicata against Central Government. It appears from the order of P.C. Ghose, J. that His Lordship although set aside the earlier order of the Central Government rejecting the petitioner's prayer for pension on the ground of lack of materials did not arrive at any conclusion whether the petitioner's husband was eligible. His Lordship remanded the entire matter to the Central Government to consider whether the husband of the petitioner was entitled to the pension and directed the Central Government to follow the principles laid down in the case of Gokul Ch. Panja vs. Union of India & other (supra) and Union of India vs. Sukumar (supra). Those are the decisions which lay down the procedure to be adopted when official records are not available. Therefore, the order was an order of open remand directing the Central Government to arrive at a decision whether the husband of the petitioner was really eligible. The said order cannot be said to be an order of limited or restricted remand because His Lordship did not arrive at any conclusion as regards the eligibility of the husband of the petitioner. The said order cannot be said to be an order of limited or restricted remand because His Lordship did not arrive at any conclusion as regards the eligibility of the husband of the petitioner. In such a situation, if it appears from the own averment of the applicant that his claim was an absurd one, there is no bar in rejecting the claim of the petitioner on that ground. 41. In the case of State of Punjab & other vs. Surbinder Kumar and Co. & other, 1997 (9) SCC 66 , relied upon by Mr. Biswas an order of suspension of liquor licence was challenged on the ground of mala fides against a minister and the said minister was made respondent. At the time of hearing, the said respondent was no longer a minister and the High Court, recording such fact refused to entertain the writ application on the ground of existence of alternative remedy of appeal thereby giving liberty to the writ petitioner to prefer appeal after the period of limitation recording that the respondents would not take the plea of limitation. The appellate authority on merit found that the writ petitioner violated the terms of licence but instead of canceling the licence treated the period of cancellation till the disposal of the writ petition to be period of substantive suspension as a penalty. Being aggrieved the writ petitioner moved the second writ application. The Division Bench set aside the order of the appellate authority and remanded the matter to decide the question of mala fide of the minister. In an appeal against such order, the Apex Court, held that the question of mala fide of the minister cannot be reagitated in view of the earlier order of High Court directing decision on merit excluding the question of mala fide. 42. The said decision cannot have any application to the fact of the present case because in the previous writ application the Central Government's decision to reject the application on the ground of lack of materials was the subject-matter. If on the previous occasion Central Government had rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the grounds on which I propose to reject this application and the same was set aside by Ghose, J., Mr. Biswas could successfully rely upon the aforesaid decision and the plea of constructive res-judicata. 43. If on the previous occasion Central Government had rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the grounds on which I propose to reject this application and the same was set aside by Ghose, J., Mr. Biswas could successfully rely upon the aforesaid decision and the plea of constructive res-judicata. 43. At this stage it will not be out of place to mention that in this type of cases the applicability of the doctrine of res-judicata is not absolute. Even if an order of pension has been granted on the basis of materials-on-record, the same cannot only be revoked subsequently but the applicant may also be prosecuted for cheating the nation and be sued for recovery of the amount already paid if it appears that the applicant has obtained such order by practicing fraud upon the Government. The statements made in the application for pension are all within the special knowledge of the applicant and the burden is upon him to prove such fact. If in spite of the fact that a person is not eligible to get pension comes up with a plea that he is so entitled, such act on the part of the applicant cannot but be described as a heinous crime against the nation. The doctrine of res-judicata or finality of litigation, as pointed out by Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu vs. Jagannath, 1994 (1) SCC 1 , cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting Justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eye of law. Such a judgment or decree by the first Court or the highest Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, even in a collateral proceeding. 44. In the said decision, the Supreme Court treated a valid decree as a nullity as the same was obtained by suppressing a document executed by one of the parties. 45. It can be challenged in any Court, even in a collateral proceeding. 44. In the said decision, the Supreme Court treated a valid decree as a nullity as the same was obtained by suppressing a document executed by one of the parties. 45. Therefore, if a person comes forward with an absurd case supported by an evasive certificate not in conformity with the scheme claiming pension and such defects in the application or the certificate escaped the notice of the Government at the earlier stage, the applicant cannot take advantage of the mistake of the Government by raising the plea of res-judicata. An applicant for freedom fighter's pension should at all material time be answerable to any legitimate query of the Government justifying his claim, if occasion so arises. 46. As pointed out earlier, in spite of giving opportunity to explain the statements as regards plea of abscondence which is absurd according to law and the deficiency in the accompanying certificate, the learned Counsel for the petitioner found no reply and raised the aforesaid technical objections. 47. In order to succeed in a writ application the first and foremost duty of the petitioner is to establish his legal right entitling him to get the relief prayed for. If such right is not established from his own statement, his application is bound to fail even if the order complained of is not impeccable. 48. Therefore, although I am not approving all the reasons assigned by the Central Government in the order impugned, its ultimate conclusion is correct in the fact and circumstances of the case as discussed earlier and as such the petitioner is entitled to no relief in this application. 49. Application is thus dismissed. Re: W.P. No. 2720 (W) of 2000 Umapada Manna vs. Union of India & other 50. In this case, the petitioner's grievance is that although he has applied for freedom fighter's pension on the ground of abscondence for more than six months, till date the same has not been considered. Since the petitioner has not annexed his application for grant of pension, this Court is not in a position to verify his application. 51. Be that as it may, the Central Government is directed to dispose of his application positively within two months from date in accordance with law and to communicate the decision within the said period. Since the petitioner has not annexed his application for grant of pension, this Court is not in a position to verify his application. 51. Be that as it may, the Central Government is directed to dispose of his application positively within two months from date in accordance with law and to communicate the decision within the said period. I make it clear that I have not gone into the merit. 52. Writ application is thus disposed of. Re: W.P. No. 2594 (W) of 2000 Ram Gobinda Mondal vs. Union of India & other 53. The fact of this case is similar to the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta. The period of alleged abscondence is same and the certifier is also the said Rabindra Nath Giri with same evasive certificate. 54. In view of the decision in the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta, this writ application is also dismissed for the same reasons. Re: W.P. No. 2752 (W) of 2000 Smt. Basanti Bala Patra vs. Union of India & other 55. This case is exactly similar to the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta and is disposed of accordingly by rejecting the same for the reasons recorded in the said judgment. Re: W.P. No. 7572 (W) of 1999 Satish Chandra Maity vs. Union of India & other 56. The fact of this case is similar to the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta and as such this application is dismissed for the same reasons assigned therein. Re: W.P. No. 2817 (W) of 2000 Sarat Chandra Maity vs. Union of India & other 57. The fact of this case is similar to that of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta with this difference that period of abscondence is from August 1943 to September 1944 and the certificate has been given by Sri Sushil Kumar Dhara instead of Rabindra Nath Giri. But, the certificate is as evasive as the one granted by Rabindra Nath Giri. 58. Therefore, for the same reasons, this application is dismissed. Re: W.P. No. 2751 (W) of 2000 Smt. Goyabati Bhowmik vs. Union of India & other 59. The grievance of the petitioner is that the application for pension has not been disposed of by the Central Government. 58. Therefore, for the same reasons, this application is dismissed. Re: W.P. No. 2751 (W) of 2000 Smt. Goyabati Bhowmik vs. Union of India & other 59. The grievance of the petitioner is that the application for pension has not been disposed of by the Central Government. I, thus, dispose of this application by directing the Central Government to dispose of the same in accordance with law by a reasoned order positively within two months and to communicate the same to the petitioner immediately thereafter. 60. I make it clear that I have not entered into merit. 61. Writ application is thus disposed of. Re: W.P. No. 2721 (W) of 2000 Gourhari Jana vs. Union of India & other 62. Fact of this case is similar to the one of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta. The petition is thus dismissed for the same reason. Re: W.P. No. 3818 (W) of 2000 Ambika Charan Bhim vs. Union of India & other 63. The case is similar to that of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta with this difference that period of abscondence is from October 1942 to December 1943 and the certificate has been given by Sri Hiralal Maity in the same evasive way. 64. The application is thus dismissed for the same reason assigned in the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta. Re: W.P. No. 18063 (W) of 1999 Siba Kali Misra vs. Union of India & other 65. This case is factually different from others. The petitioner herein has alleged that for participating in the freedom struggle a case being G.R. Case No. 26 of 1942 under Sections 54(4) and 38(5) of D.I.R. (Emperor vs. Shib Kali Misra) was initiated against him as a result he absconded from September 12, 1942 for a year. Curiously enough, he did not disclose the ultimate fate of the said case nor did he assign any reason why he ceased to abscond after one year i.e. after September 1943. It is also not his case that he was ever arrested or convicted. 66. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the conclusions possible are either he was involved in the case through mistake as a result the case was not proceeded with after a year or his apology was accepted and he was given reprieve. No third conclusion is possible when he has himself said that he did not abscond beyond one year from September 1942. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the conclusions possible are either he was involved in the case through mistake as a result the case was not proceeded with after a year or his apology was accepted and he was given reprieve. No third conclusion is possible when he has himself said that he did not abscond beyond one year from September 1942. In this case, certificate has been given by one Radharaman Chakraborty who was in jail for more than five years (period not disclosed) between 1930 and 1945. He has certified him to be a proclaimed offender but was evasive in the certifying that he never tendered apology by using the phrase to the best of my knowledge and belief. 67. In view of my observations made in the case of Smt. Sakti Bala Samanta, this case should also be dismissed. Re: W.P. No. 17082 (W) of 1999 Rabindra Nath Bose vs. Union of India & other 68. The fact of this case is different from the others. The petitioner has challenged the order dated June 5, 1997 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal refusing to recommend the name of the petitioner for freedom fighter's pension on the ground that his name did not figure in the official record. 69. The allegation of the petitioner is that at the age of 15 while participating in the student movement against the trial of INA soldiers he sustained bullet injury in the chest and was admitted in Medical College Hospital. Copy of the newspaper publishing such incident has been filed in support of his case. It appears from the various papers submitted by him that he was released from Medical College after 20 days and was advised four months rest. According to the petitioner a case was filed against him but the same was withdrawn. It appears from his application that he subsequently passed Matriculation Examination from Calcutta University, joined service, married and became father of three children and has ultimately retired from his service at the usual age of 58 in the year 1988. Therefore, petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as permanently incapacitated for joining in the freedom struggle even if his case is believed. 70. It goes without saying that he has not been convicted in any case. Therefore, petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as permanently incapacitated for joining in the freedom struggle even if his case is believed. 70. It goes without saying that he has not been convicted in any case. The withdrawal of the case indicates that either he was mistakenly implicated or he tendered apology for which he was given reprieve. Anyway, his case does not fall within any of the categories under the scheme justifying grant of pension. Moreover, the State authority did not find his activities recorded in the official record. 71. Under the aforesaid circumstances, State Government rightly refused to recommend his case for freedom fighter's pension. 72. The writ application is thus devoid of any substance and is dismissed. An these applications are thus disposed of.