GODA RAGHURAM, J. ( 1 ) IN G. O. Rt. No. 2084, Women s development, Child Welfare and Labour (Lab. I) Department, dt. 10-8-1990 the 2nd respondent-State Government referred clauses 16 and 17 of the Memo of settlement dt. 19-10-1985, entered into between the petitioner-APSRTC and the 3rd union, to the Industrial Tribunal, hyderabad-II (1st respondent) for its interpretation under Sec. 36-A of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the act ). The 1st respondent gave its Award dt. 29-3-93 in the matter, in I. D. 14/92. The petitioner Corporation, aggrieved by the award, assails the order of the 2nd respondent dt. 10-8-90 referring the matter to the 1st respondent and the Award dt. 29-3-93 of the 1st respondent, in these proceedings. Chronology of facts: (A) A settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act was reached between the petitioner- corporation and the 3rd respondent-Union on 9-10-1985 revising the pay and allowances of all employees w. e. f. 1-4-1985. After setting out the general principles of the agreement, the instrument of settlement sets out the terms of settlement (in short terms ). Para 7 of the terms sets out the mode of fixation of pay in the revised pay scales. To the extent relevant to the facts on hand, it is noticed that there is no merger of the basic pay and the dearness allowance in the fixation of pay in the revised scales. Paras 16 and 17 of the terms, which have engendered the conflict and are thus relevant and material, read as under: para 16: "the existing rates and basis for paying D. A. , H. R. A. and C. C. A. will continue. " para 17: "in future the D. A. , H. R. A. and c. C. A. will be appropriately revised as and when the Government of A. P. make such revisions in respect of its employees". Cl. 24 of the terms states that other issues figuring in the strike notice served by the Union and not forming part of the settlement will be discussed and finalised by the end of December, 1985 and no fresh issues having financial implications will be raised by the Union during the life period of this settlement. As per para 25, the agreement would endure for a period of 4 years commencing from 1-4-1985. (B) In G. O. Ms. No. 288, dt. As per para 25, the agreement would endure for a period of 4 years commencing from 1-4-1985. (B) In G. O. Ms. No. 288, dt. 17-11-1986, the State Government pursuant to the recommendations of the Pay Revision commission, as contained in its report dt. 13-7-86, revised the scales of pay and allowances in respect of Government employees and other specified employees, w. e. f. 1-7-1986. The Pay Revision commission s recommendations as to revision of scales of pay merging in entirety the D. A. as on 1-1-86 having been accepted orders had been issued in G. O. Ms. No. 288 merging the D. A. as on 1-1-86 with the basic pay. It is the admitted position that the 1986 scales of pay would not per se be applicable to the employees of the petitioner-Corporation. (C) In a consequent order of the State government in G. O. Ms. No. 289 of even date, inter alia the rates of HRA had been revised. Cl. (d) of the G. O. stated that pay for the purpose of calculation of HRA under this order shall be pay in the revised pay scales of 1986 and in Cl. (f) it is ordered that the existing definition of pay for the purpose of HRA shall continue to apply. The revision of HRA affected under this order is as under: (1) At 20% of pay in lieu of existing 15%, subject to a specified maximum; (2) At 10% of pay in lieu of existing 71/2% or 4%,subject to a specified maximum; (3) In other cases the maximum HRA to be Rs. 1,000. 00 p. m. as against the existing maximum of Rs. 400. 00 p. m. (D) On 11-5-87 the 3rd respondent union served a strike notice demanding inter alia appropriate revision of HRA, DA and CCA in terms of Cl. 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 duly considering both the quantum and the rate. (E) The 4th respondent Union on 14-5-87 served a strike notice with substantially similar demands and specifically claiming that the revised HRA and CCA be calculated treating DA as part of the basic pay (notional merger basis) for this purpose. (F) On 19-6-87 another settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act was reached between the petitioner-Corporation and the 3rd respondent-Union revising DA, HRA and cca pursuant to Cls. (16) and (17) of the settlement dt. 9-10-1985. (F) On 19-6-87 another settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act was reached between the petitioner-Corporation and the 3rd respondent-Union revising DA, HRA and cca pursuant to Cls. (16) and (17) of the settlement dt. 9-10-1985. As per para 2 of the settlement the petitioner had decided to revise the rates of HRA as was done by the state Government w. e. f. 1-7-1986. The rates of CCA and DA were agreed to be revised as was done by the Government for its and other specified employees. Para 3. 1 of the 1987 settlement agreed to revision of HRA at the same revised percentage as was adopted by the State Government. Under para 3. 3. 2 the Management agreed that from 1-7-1986 onwards, over and above the da payable as per the rates applicable on 1-1-1986, which have been set out in the settlement, additional DA will be paid at the rates and for the period specified therein, on the basic pay in the revised pay scales of 1985 plus DA applicable as on 1-1-1986. There was thus under this para of the settlement a notional merger of the basic pay in Revised Pay Scales 1985 plus DA applicable as on 1-1-1986 only for the purpose of reckoning the additional DA payable. Para 3. 5 categorically recorded the union s demand for notional merger of DA as on 1-1-1986 for the purpose of calculating hra and the Management recorded its inability to agree to this demand on the ground that this course would amount to revision of pay scales. This para after setting out the contention of the Union that such notional merger does not amount to pay revision, recorded the willingness of the management to discuss the issue further and come to a settlement thereon by 31-12-1987. On 19-6-1987 itself there was a discussion between the Management and the 4th respondent-Union in response to its strike notice dt. 14-5-87 and the record of the said discussion noted the Management s agreement to pay HRA on the basic pay at the revised rates on par with the government. The demand of the 4th respondent-Union for payment of HRA on the notional merger basis was also put on record. (G) 4th respondent became the recognised representative Union in february 1988. This Union on 26-3-88 reiterated the demand for payment of arrears of HRA, urging that this is as per cl. The demand of the 4th respondent-Union for payment of HRA on the notional merger basis was also put on record. (G) 4th respondent became the recognised representative Union in february 1988. This Union on 26-3-88 reiterated the demand for payment of arrears of HRA, urging that this is as per cl. 17 of the settlement dt. 19-5-85. In this meeting the Management took the stand that HRA is calculable on the pay only and that the word appropriate in Cl. 17 of the 9-10-1985 settlement is with reference only to the rate. (H) On 6th and 8th June, 1988 the 4th respondent-Union reiterated its demand in the matter of HRA which was, however, not agreed to by the petitioner. (I) Another set of demands was made on 5-9-88 by the 4th respondent Union which included a request that the entire DA element including the two instalments of da due on 1-1-88 and 1-7-88, may be merged in the pay scales while revising the pay structure and that the DA as may become due on 1-1-88 be treated as dearness pay for all purposes and that in future DA, hra and CCA may be revised and granted on par with the rates of Central government employees. The earlier demands for payment of HRA on the notional merger basis for the period from 1-7-86 to 31-3-89, was however not urged as part of these demands. (J) In late 1988 APSRTC Karmic Sangh filed W. . P. 17232/88 seeking payment of arrears of HRA calculated on the notional merger basis. This writ petition was dismissed on 10-3-89. (K) On 17-12-88 the 4th respondent-Union represented to the State Government seeking reference of the dispute with regard to payment of HRA on the notional merger basis, to the Industrial Tribunal u/sec. 36-A of the Act. (L) On 24-12-88 and 7-2-89 the 3rd respondent Union which ceased to be a recognised-Union since February 1988, served a strike notice on the petitioner setting out its demands including payment of HRA on the notional merger basis. (M) On 11-4-89, the 4th respondent-Union served a strike notice setting out a charter of Demands, which, however, did not include the demand for payment of hra on the notional merger basis for the period from 1-7-86 to 31-3-89. (N) On 21-4-89 yet another settlement u/sec. (M) On 11-4-89, the 4th respondent-Union served a strike notice setting out a charter of Demands, which, however, did not include the demand for payment of hra on the notional merger basis for the period from 1-7-86 to 31-3-89. (N) On 21-4-89 yet another settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act was reached between the petitioner and the workman under which scale of pay and allowances were revised w. e. f. 1-4-1989. This settlement incorporated a merger of DA with the pay as on 1-1-1988. Para 9. 1 of this settlement agreed to continuation of existing rates of hra for different locations and further agreed that in future as and when the government revise the rates for its employees the same would be made applicable to the Corporation employees. Para 22 of this settlement recorded the agreement that all existing pays including monetary benefits not modified by this agreement shall continue. Paras 24 and 25 of the settlement incorporated the agreement that the Union would not raise any issues involving financial implications during the tenure of this agreement and that the validity of the agreement would be for a period of 4 years commencing from 1-4-1989. (O) On 10-8-90 the State Government issued G. O. Rt. No. 2084, in purported exercise of power conferred u/sec. 10 (1) read with Sec. 36-A of the Act, referring cls. 16 and 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10- 1985, for interpretation, to the 1st respondent-Industrial Tribunal. (P) In November, 1990 the petitioner herein filed W. P. 16462/90 assailing the validity of the reference made by the government in G. O. Rt. No. 2084. In the said writ petition this Court granted interim stay of the G. O. impugned, for a period of one month. The stay was however not extended despite an application for extension having been made by the petitioner. (Q) On 29-10-92 the State Government under G. O. Rt. No. 2176 referred the dispute with regard to payment of HRA on the notional merger basis to the Additional industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad, u/sec. 10 (l) (d) (c) of the Act, for adjudication. This dispute was numbered as i. D. 38/94 and is stated, at the Bar, to have been closed by the Industrial Tribunal by its award dt. 27-4-98, in view of the earlier award having been passed by the Tribunal, dt. 29-3-93, impugned herein. 10 (l) (d) (c) of the Act, for adjudication. This dispute was numbered as i. D. 38/94 and is stated, at the Bar, to have been closed by the Industrial Tribunal by its award dt. 27-4-98, in view of the earlier award having been passed by the Tribunal, dt. 29-3-93, impugned herein. (R) Pursuant to the reference made to it by the Government in G. O. Rt. No. 2084, dt. 10-8-90 u/sec. 36-A of the Act, the 1st respondent-Tribunal made its Award dt. 29-3-93 directing the petitioner herein to pay arrears of amounts due to the workmen who are on the rolls of APSRTC from 1-7-86 to 31-3-89 duly calculating the HRA on the revised rates as agreed in settlement dt. 9-10-85, duly taking into account notional merger of DA as on 1-1-1986, with the basic pay for the period 1-7-86 to 31-3-89 as per the interpretation by the Tribunal to the terms of Cls. 16 and 17 of the said settlement. (S) On 21-6-93 the State Government in g. O. Rt. No. 1140 published the aforesaid award of the 1st respondent-Tribunal in la. 14/92 and directed the petitioner-Corporation to pay the arrears to the workmen in terms of the award. (T) On 3-8-93 the present writ petition was filed wherein this Court granted interim stay of the award. (U) On 3-11-97, W. P. 16462/90 filed by the petitioner herein, assailing the orders of the State Government in G. O. Rt. No. 2084 dt. 10-8-90 referring for interpretation of the 1st respondent-Tribunal Cls. 16 and 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 u/sec. 36-A of the act, was dismissed by this Court for non- prosecution. ( 2 ) SRI L. Nageswara Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner- corporation contended that the orders of the State Government dt. 10-8-90 in g. O. Rt. No. 2084 as also the award of the 1st respondent dt. 29-3-93 in I. D. 14/92 are invalid. The grounds urged in support of the aforesaid contentions, in brief, are as under: (1) Rational reasons must exist for the state Government to form an opinion that a difficulty or doubt has arisen as to the interpretation of the settlement dt. 9-10-85. Only on such objective consideration of facts by the State Government could a reference be made u/sec. 36a of the Act. As part of this contention it is urged that the provisions of Cl. 9-10-85. Only on such objective consideration of facts by the State Government could a reference be made u/sec. 36a of the Act. As part of this contention it is urged that the provisions of Cl. 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 on a true and fair construction do not suffer from any ambiguity as to found any reasonable opinion that a difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of its contents. It has also been contended that since the power inhering in the Government u/sec, 36a of the Act is a power coupled with a duty to be exercised within the contours of the grant of power, settled principles of public law obligate the Government to record reasons which will disclose the circumstances under which it came to the opinion that the interpretation of Cls. 16 and 17 need be referred to the Industrial tribunal for its interpretation, ( 3 ) A considerable volume of academic and precedential authority was marshalled on behalf of the petitioner in support of the aforesaid contention. Cl. 16 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 after setting out that the existing rates and basis for paying DA, hra and CCA will continue, sets out in cl. . 17 that in future, the above three allowances will be appropriately revised as and when the Government of A. P. make such revisions in respect of its employees. Demonstrably the expressions "appropriately" and "such revisions" are expressions couched in broad terms and are what could appropriately be characterised as open textured expressions. Such expressions are inherently capable of bearing a plurality of significations and invite construction and interpretation, to arrive at the operative legal meaning. Identification of the appropriate meaning of such expressions requires construction of the terms of the settlement as a whole including the circumstances, which had engendered the specific terms. In the considered view of this Court the decision of the State Government contained in its orders dt. 10-8-90 in G. O. Rt. No. 2084, to refer Cls. 16 and 17 of the settlement to the 1st. respondent Tribunal for its interpretation, does not suffer from any infirmity. The decision is neither irrational, perverse nor patently outside the pale of the power inhering in it u/sec. 36a of the Act. 10-8-90 in G. O. Rt. No. 2084, to refer Cls. 16 and 17 of the settlement to the 1st. respondent Tribunal for its interpretation, does not suffer from any infirmity. The decision is neither irrational, perverse nor patently outside the pale of the power inhering in it u/sec. 36a of the Act. In the above premise this Court is disinclined to enter upon adjudication into the other issues on this aspect of the matter including as to whether any reasons have been recorded or require to be recorded, justifying its opinion which found the decision contained in G. O. Rt. No. 2084. (2) In view of the dismissal of the earlier writ Petition 16462/90 instituted by the petitioner herein assailing the validity of g. O. Rt. No. 2084, by the order of this Court dt. 3-11-97, whether the self same relief could be urged in this writ petition is also a question that arises for resolution. ( 4 ) SRI Nageswara Rao, learned Counsel, contended that as the earlier writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution and not on its merits, the said decision would not constitute res judicata or constructive res judicata as to debar the petitioner from raising the self same issue herein. In support of the said contention various authorities have been cited. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Chancery division in Pople vs. Evans wherein it is held that the principle of estoppel by res judicata could not be maintained merely for reason of the dismissal of an action for want of prosecution. The Chancery Division held that the principle of estoppel by res judicata was intended to be limited to the decision of the issues on their merits. A mere dismissal for want of prosecution does not warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. The same principle has been reiterated by Lord Diplock and Lord salmon in Birkitt vs. James. ( 5 ) IT is not necessary to expatiate on the principles evolved in this area by the Courts in other jurisdictions in view of abundant native authority binding and persuasive on this aspect. The principles contained in sec. 11 of Code of Civil Procedure are held to be substantive principles incorporating public policy and have been held to be applicable even to applications under art. 226 of the Constitution Daryao vs. State of U. . The principles contained in sec. 11 of Code of Civil Procedure are held to be substantive principles incorporating public policy and have been held to be applicable even to applications under art. 226 of the Constitution Daryao vs. State of U. . P. The earlier order of this Court dismissing W. P. 16462/90 was not a decision which is after the issues pleaded have been heard and finally decided. It was for non-prosecution. Principles of res judicata would not per se apply. However, in view of the principles contained in Order 9 rules 8 and 9 C. P. C. , this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner should be precluded as a matter of public policy to urge the validity of G. O. Rt. No. 2084 in these proceedings after having chosen to abandon and not prosecute the earlier writ petition where the validity of the said G. O. has been substantially and exclusively raised. Support is found for this conclusion on the principles expounded by the Supreme court in Sarguja Transport Service vs. State transport Appellate Tribunal wherein it was held that the withdrawal of an earlier writ petition filed under Art. 226 or 227 without the permission of the High Court to file a fresh petition would bar the institution of a fresh petition for the self same reliefs. The supreme Court held that this withdrawal without permission should be deemed to constitute an abandonment by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the earlier writ petition, except in respect of a writ petition involving the personal liberty of the individuals such as rights in the nature of Habeas Corpus involving Constitutional guarantees under art. 21. This principle was evolved by adopting the principles incorporated in order 23 Rule 1 (3) and (4) C. P. C. ( 6 ) IN State of U. P. vs. Labhchand it was held that when a Judge is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such writ petition if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another Judge or a Division bench of the same Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of latches or on the ground of non-availing of alternative remedy. The second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same but because entertainment of such a latter writ petition would render the earlier order for the same Court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory although not reviewed by it in exercise of its recognised powers under law. It was further held that if a Judge can entertain a second writ petition of a person regarding the matter in which the earlier writ petition was dismissed in limine, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petitioner to go on filing petitions after petitions in the same matter in the same Court and have it brought up for consideration before one judge after another and would enable abuse of the process of the Court. Such a situation would also lead to disorder, confusion and chaos and there would be no finality of an order of the Court. ( 7 ) WHILE on this aspect it is useful to extract the pertinent observations in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in ampthill Peerage Case:"as a means of resolution of civil contention, litigation is certainly preferable to personal violence. But it is not intrinsically a desirable activity,. . . . . . The law itself is fully conscious of the evil of protracted litigation. . . . . . . Nevertheless, the law recognises that the process cannot go on indefinitely. There is a fundamental principle of english law [going back to Coke s commentary on Littleton Co. Litt [ (1809) 303] generally expressed by a latin maxim which can be translated. it is in the interest of society that there should be some end to litigation. This fundamental principle finds expression in many forms. Parliament has passed Acts [the latest only last year (Limitation Act, 1975)] limiting the time within which actions at law must be brought. Truth may be thus shut out, but society considers that truth may be bought at too high a price, that truth bought at such expense is the negation of justice. Parliament has passed Acts [the latest only last year (Limitation Act, 1975)] limiting the time within which actions at law must be brought. Truth may be thus shut out, but society considers that truth may be bought at too high a price, that truth bought at such expense is the negation of justice. The great American Judge, Story J. , delivering the judgment of the supreme Court of the United States in bell vs. Morrison [ (182801 Peters 351 at 360] called the first of these Acts of limitation a statute of repose , and in england Best C. J. called it an act of peace [ a Court vs. Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329 at 322, 333 ). The Courts of equity, originally set up to make good deficiencies in the common law, worked out for themselves a parallel doctrine. It went by the technical name of latches. Courts of equity would only give relief to those who pursued their remedies with promptitude. . . . . . . But the fundamental principle that it is in society s interest that there should be some end to litigation is seen most characteristically in the recognition by our law - by every system of law - of the finality of a judgment. If the judgment has been obtained by fraud or collusion it is consdered a nullity and the law provides machinery whereby its nullity can be so established. If the judgment has been obtained in consequence of some procedural irregularity, it may sometimes be set aside. But such exceptional cases apart, the judgment must be allowed to conclude the matter. That indeed, is one of society s purposes in substituting the lawsuit for the vendetta. Sometimes it is the parties to the litigation and those who claim through them who are bound by the judgment, but sometimes it is the whole world, which must accept the decision. . . . . . . Enough is enough. And the law echoes; res judicata, the matter is adjudged The judgment creates an estoppel - which merely means that what has been decided must be taken to be established as a fact, that the decided issue (even though channelled into litigation) must be allowed to subside. . . . . . . Enough is enough. And the law echoes; res judicata, the matter is adjudged The judgment creates an estoppel - which merely means that what has been decided must be taken to be established as a fact, that the decided issue (even though channelled into litigation) must be allowed to subside. " ( 8 ) THOUGH the above observations have been made in the context of construing the application of principles of res judicata, the general enunciation of the public policy involved in endeavouring to stifle endless litigation would be equally applicable to situations where a party has by its conduct abandoned the cause of action in an earlier proceedings. ( 9 ) ON the basis of the conspectus of the principles obtaining in this area some of which have been adverted to supra, this court is of the considered view that the validity of the G. O. Rt. No. 2084 ought not to be permitted to be raised by the petitioner in this writ petition, in view of the dismissal for non-prosecution of the earlier Writ Petition No. 16462/90 by the order of this Court dt. 3-11-1997. ( 10 ) THIS Court is also constrained to record its disapprobation of the conduct of the petitioner-Corporation in urging the self same reliefs (invalidation of G. O. Rt. No. 2084), in this writ petition, which was instituted while W. P. 16462/90, already instituted, was pending adjudication. The litigant is not entitled to institute a plurality of proceedings urging the same cause of action. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances adverted to, part of the relief sought by the petitioner viz. , invalidation of G. O. Rt. No. 2084, dt. 10-8-90 is rejected. (3) It is contended that the award of the 1st respondent dt. 29-3-93 in I. D. 14/92 is invalid. The petitioner-Corporation in elaboration of the above contention urges as under, in brief: (i) The 1st respondent Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of the power inhering in it u/sec. 36-A of the Act. (ii) Under the guise of interpretation the Tribunal proceeded to re-write the terms of settlement by incorporating its subjective views, on what ought to be rather than what is, the agreement between the parties. (iii) As the Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of its power u/sec. 36-A of the Act the award is a nullity and ought to be invalidated. (ii) Under the guise of interpretation the Tribunal proceeded to re-write the terms of settlement by incorporating its subjective views, on what ought to be rather than what is, the agreement between the parties. (iii) As the Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of its power u/sec. 36-A of the Act the award is a nullity and ought to be invalidated. ( 12 ) SRI G. Ramachandra Rao and sri A. K. Jayaprakash Rao, learned Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 Unions, strenuously resisted the challenge to the award contending that the action of the petitioner-Corporation in denying HRA on the notional merger basis is arbitrary and that Cl. 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 should be read along with and into Cl. 16 thereof and so read, both the basis and rates of HRA ought to be in conformity with what had been granted by the Government to its employees in future revisions that had occurred after the aforesaid settlement. On behalf of these respondents is further contended that this Court cannot sit in appellate scrutiny over the award. It is lastly contended that the award does not call for interference. On behalf of these respondents reliance is placed en the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen ofdodsal Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dodsal Pvt, Ltd. and another to contend that if the interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the terms of the settlement was not an unreasonable interpretation, then the High Court would not be justified in interfering with such award by a reappreciation of the material considered by the Tribunal and substituting its interpretation for that of the Tribunal. ( 13 ) THE 1st respondent-Tribunal gave its award, impugned herein, directing payment of HRA to the workmen on the notional merger basis on the following reasons that are culled out from the award: (1) That the basis considered by the government (in G. O. Nos. 288 and 289 both dt. 17-11-86) i. e. , merging of DA with basic pay should be considered in the case of instant petitioner/workmen also as notional merger for the purpose of hra but not for the revision of pay scales from 1-1-86 because rates and basis are two words used in cl. 16 of the seltlement dt. 9-10-85, for the purpose of calculating HRA etc. (2) That in view of the second settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act dt. 16 of the seltlement dt. 9-10-85, for the purpose of calculating HRA etc. (2) That in view of the second settlement u/sec. 12 (3) of the Act dt. 19-6-87, in particular para 3. 3. 2, wherein the Corporation agreed to reckon DA as on 1-1-86 along with basic pay for calculation of additional DA w. e. f. 1-7-86, the hra payable also will have to be paid on the notional merger basis. (3) That in view of the merger of DA with the basic pay in the government s revised scales of pay as contained in G. O. Ms. Nos. 288 and 289 dt. 17-11-86, the petitioner- corporation is bound to follow those G. Os. in letter and spirit because it had chosen the government of A. P. as a model and an example to consider HRA of employees of the Corporation, in cl. 17 of the settlement dt. 9-10-85. (4) That since it is agreed by the corporation in Cl. 17 that in future da, HRA and CCA will be appropriately revised as and when the Government of A. P. make such revision in respect of its employees, it must be held that the petitioner-Corporation has taken the government as a model and that the basis and methods of government of A. P. being comparable for considering wages, pay scales and allowances of the workmen and also in view of cl. 17 using the expression "appropriately" and since appropriately means suitable, adjust and adopt, the petitioner-Corporation is bound to implement the HRA on the basis adopted by the Government. (5) That having regard to the principles underlying the 1986 Pay revision Commission s recommendations as contained in its report the increase in the HRA payable on the actual merger basis as was adopted by the State Government in G. O. Ms. Nos. 288 and 289, dt. 17-11-86, should be adopted though on the notional merger basis but limited to the payment of hra alone. (6) That the proper and correct interpretation of Cls. (16) and (17) of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 should result in the total pay packet of the apsrtc workmen in respect of allowances being equal to that of the similarly placed employees of the State Government. ( 14 ) BY G. O. Rt. No. 2084, dt. 10-8-90 the state Government referred to the 1st respondent-Tribunal Clauses 16 and 17 of the Memo of Settlement dt. 9-10-85 should result in the total pay packet of the apsrtc workmen in respect of allowances being equal to that of the similarly placed employees of the State Government. ( 14 ) BY G. O. Rt. No. 2084, dt. 10-8-90 the state Government referred to the 1st respondent-Tribunal Clauses 16 and 17 of the Memo of Settlement dt. 9-10-1985 for interpretation. The contours of power available to the 1st respondent-Tribunal under the said provisions enables it to interpret Clauses 16 and 17. ( 15 ) IF the award of the Tribunal is the product of the interpretive process then such an award is not open to interference by this Court u/art. 226 merely oh the ground that a more plausible interpretation is available. If the Tribunal acts within the charter u/sec. 36-A of the Act and its interpretation comports with settled cannons of construction and is not either perverse or wholly irrational, no interference with its award in judicial review is called for. ( 16 ) WHAT then is the scope of the power available to a Tribunal u/sec. 36-A of the act on a reference made to it by the appropriate authority? ( 17 ) IN J. C. I. (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. The 2nd industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and others, the Calcutta High Court through Justice sabyasachi Mukharji (as he then was), interpreting Sec. 36-A of the Act, held "the dictionary meaning of the expression interpret is to expound the meaning of; to render clear or explicit; to elucidate; to unfold the meaning. In order to be an interpretation, connotations of words used are vital. Connotation varies often with the change of circumstances and change of situation. Therefore, very often interpretation will have to be in the background of a particular set of circumstances. Words used can very often be understood if the background of such use of words is known. It is in this context important to remember that what is being sought to be interpreted here is not an Act or a statute, but a document executed by the parties. It is therefore vital that the intention of the parties as expressed in the language should be found out. That can only be found by finding out the surrounding circumstances in which these expressions were used. . . . . . . It is therefore vital that the intention of the parties as expressed in the language should be found out. That can only be found by finding out the surrounding circumstances in which these expressions were used. . . . . . . Interpretation may very often involve a question of application but that is no reason why restricted meaning should be given to the expression interpretation. ( 18 ) IN Britannia Engineering Com. , Ltd. and another vs. Basu Muzumdar and others the scope of Sec. 36-A of the Act in the context of whether a reference could be made under the said provision to supplement the original award, fell for consideration. The court held-"under Sec. 36-A of the Act, a reference cannot be made in order to supplement the original award. All that can be referred under this section is an interpretation of an award already made. The implementation thereof will have to be made on the strength of the original award and not the award which interprets it. " ( 19 ) TO the same effect is the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh high Court in Water Works Karmachari sangh, Ujjain vs. Public Health and Engineering department, Bhopal Newaskar, J. speaking for Bench held that it is difficult to say that by process of interpretation the petitioners can get what they may perhaps get on reference under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act. After setting out the genesis "of the provision the Court further held that the power of interpretation can only be utilised for the purpose of giving effect to the terms of the award in its true sense and is not intended to form a basis for deciding something that is ancillary. Dealing with the facts of the case before it the Court held"in the present case what the petitioners wanted to contend was that they were entitled to have their pay fixed, on the basis of the revised scale. This was in no way a matter actually before the Industrial Court at the time of the former award. The Industrial court was therefore right in holding that such benefit cannot be held to belong to the petitioners merely because of the former award. " ( 20 ) THE judgment of the Calcutta High court in Britannia Engineering Co. , case (supra) was quoted with approval. The Industrial court was therefore right in holding that such benefit cannot be held to belong to the petitioners merely because of the former award. " ( 20 ) THE judgment of the Calcutta High court in Britannia Engineering Co. , case (supra) was quoted with approval. ( 21 ) THE scope of the jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal, while acting under a reference made to it u/sec. 36-A of the Act is settled by the decision of the Supreme court in The Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. , kirkee, Poona vs. The Workmen and others. The Supreme Court categorically held-"it is obvious that any question about the propriety, correctness or validity of any provision of the award would be outside the purview of the enquiry contemplated by the section. If a party to the award is aggrieved by any of its provisions on the merits the only remedy available to it is by making an appeal, say for instance under Art. 136 of the Constitution, to this Court. A grievance felt by a party against any provision of the award can be ventilated only in that way and not by adopting the procedure prescribed by. Sec. 36-A. Thus, the enquiry permissible under Sec. 36-A is limited to the question of the interpretation of the provision of the award in question and no more. " (emphasis supplied) ( 22 ) THE principles as to the interpretation of deeds, documents, contracts and for that matter, of statutes, are too well settled. ( 23 ) IN Pioneer Shipping Ltd. vs. BTP tioxide Ltd. Lord Diplock said-"the object sought to be achieved in construing any contract is to ascertain what the actual intentions of the parties were as to the legal obligations each assume by the contractual words in which they sought to express them". ( 24 ) THE intention of the parties has to be gathered from the meaning of the words used and there could be no intention independent of that meaning. ( 25 ) IN Great Western Railway vs. Bristol corporation Lord Shaw said-",. . . ( 24 ) THE intention of the parties has to be gathered from the meaning of the words used and there could be no intention independent of that meaning. ( 25 ) IN Great Western Railway vs. Bristol corporation Lord Shaw said-",. . . ONE hears much use made of the word intention , but Courts of law when on the work of interpretation are not engaged upon the task or study of what parties intended to do, but of what the language which they employed showed that they did, in other words, they are not constructing a contract on the lines of what may be thought to have been what the parties intended, but they are construing the words and expressions used by the parties themselves. What do these mean? That when ascertained is the meaning to be given effect to, the meaning of the contract by which the parties are bound. The suggestion of an intention of parties different from the meaning conveyed by the words employed is no part of interpretation, but is mere confusion. " (emphasis supplied) ( 26 ) NORTON on Deeds has this to say on the appropriate role of interpretation of deeds and documents". . . . . THE question to be answered always is, what is the meaning of what the parties have said? not what did the parties mean to say? . . . . it being a presumption juris et de jure. . . . that the parties intended to say that which they have said. " ( 27 ) IN Ashville Investments Ltd. vs. Elmer contractors Ltd. Lord Justice May, expounded the limits of the interpretative exercise in these words"in seeking to construe a clause in a contract, there is no scope for adopting either a liberal or a narrow approach, whatever that may mean. The exercise which has to be undertaken is to determine what the words mean". ( 28 ) THESE limits had earlier been expounded by Lord Wright in l. R. C. vs. Raphael. The exercise which has to be undertaken is to determine what the words mean". ( 28 ) THESE limits had earlier been expounded by Lord Wright in l. R. C. vs. Raphael. "the words actually used must no doubt be construed with reference to the facts known to the parties and in contemplation of which the parties must be deemed to have used them; such facts may be proved by extrinsic evidence or appear in recitals; again the meaning of the words used must be ascertained by considering the whole context of the document and so as to harmonize as far as possible all the parts; particular words may appear to have been used in technical or trade sense, or in a special meaning adopted by the parties as shown by the whole document. Terms may be implied by custom and on similar grounds. But allowing for these and other rules of the same kind, the principle of the common law has been to adopt an objective standard of construction and to exclude general evidence of the intention of the parties; the reason for this has been that otherwise all certainty would be taken from the words in which the parties have recorded their agreement or their dispositions of property. If in some cases hardship or injustice may be effected by this rule of law, such hardship or injustice can generally be obviated by the power in equity to reform the contract, in proper cases and on proper evidence that there has been a real intention and a real mistake in expressing that intention; these matters may be established, as they generally are, by extrinsic evidence. The Court will thus reform or rewrite the clauses to give effect to the real intention. But that is not construction, but rectification. " (emphasis supplied) ( 29 ) LORD Halsbury L. C. , speaking for the house of Lords in J. T. Smith and The Barrow haematite Steel Company Ltd. vs. Henry Cooke, rachel Swinnerton and others held -"it seems to me that one must take the language of the instrument itself in its ordinary and natural meaning it does not matter that it appears not to carry out the view that one would in the first instance have imagined the parties intended it to carry out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I think I am not entitled to put into the instrument something which I do not find there, in order to satisfy an intention which is only reasonable if I presume what their intentions were. I must find out their intentions by the instrument they have executed; and if i cannot find a suggested intention by the terms of the instrument which they have executed I must assume that their intentions were only such as their deed discloses. . . . . . . I think therefore there would be a risk of doing what was wrong if you were, upon any speculation as to what the parties probably intended, to depart from the language which they have used, and to put into their agreement a provision which is not to be found there. " ( 30 ) in Charles Robert Leader and another vs. George F. Duffey and another Lord Halsbury l. C made the following observations:". . . . . BUT it appears to me to be arguing in a vicious circle to begin by assuming an intention apart from the language of the instrument itself, and having ma. de that fallacious assumption to bend the language in favour of the assumption so made. "analysis of the terms of Clauses 16 and 17:- ( 31 ) THE relevant clauses in the terms of the settlement dt. 9-10-85 are, in brief, as under: (A) In the fixation of revised pay scales there is no merger of the Basic Pay and Dearness Allowance (C1. 7); (b) The existing rates- and basis for paying D. A. , H. R. A. and C. C. A. would continue (Cl. 16); and (c) In future D. A. , H. R. A. and C. C. A. would be appropriately revised as makes such revisions in respect of its employees. (Cl. 17) ( 32 ) ON a true and fair construction of clauses 16 and 17 it is apparent that Cl. 16 deals with in presenti entitlement to DA, hra and CCA, in respect of which the existing rates and basis for payment of the said allowances is agreed to continue. Cl. 17 on the other hand deals with future DA, hra and CCA. The dispute in the case on hand is admittedly confined to only one allowance viz. , HRA. ( 33 ) CL. Cl. 17 on the other hand deals with future DA, hra and CCA. The dispute in the case on hand is admittedly confined to only one allowance viz. , HRA. ( 33 ) CL. 17 incorporates two factors (1) the point of time at which the petitioner-Corporation is obligated to effect revisions in the HRA, and (2) the quantum of such revisions. In respect of either of these factors, the provisions of Cl. 16 would not govern, illumine or help elucidate the meaning, of the terms of the agreement, in cl. 17. Clauses 16 and 17 deal with totally different situations. Cl. 16 sets out the period for which and the rates and basis at which DA, HRA and CCA are to continue from the date of the award and stipulate that the rates and basis shall be as existing and will continue to be so till the obligation in respect of future DA, HRA and CCA comes into being, on the application of cl. 17. To this limited extent the provisions of Cl. 16 are governed by the consequences flowing from the provisions of Cl. 17. ( 34 ) UNDER Cl. 17 the petitioner-Corporation is obligated to make revisions in the three specified allowances as and when the State Government makes such revisions. This obligation of the petitioner-Corporation to effect a revision is thus dependent on the revisions effected by the state Government for its employees. Such revisions are obligated to be made by the petitioner-Corporation as and when the state Government does so in respect of its employees. The quantum of such revisions however, is agreed to be "appropriately revised". ( 35 ) THE expression appropriate is derived from its Latin root appropriates and in the context of the case would mean suitable , proper , fitting or as adoptable or as necessary . It would, however, not bear a signification that the revision needs be identical to that adopted by the State government. If a revision were to be wholly arbitrary and not based on any rational principle, it would be possible to contend that the revision is "not appropriate" and thus in violation of the settlement contained in Cl. 17. But that is neither the grievance nor the plea of the workmen. If a revision were to be wholly arbitrary and not based on any rational principle, it would be possible to contend that the revision is "not appropriate" and thus in violation of the settlement contained in Cl. 17. But that is neither the grievance nor the plea of the workmen. The contention of the workmen as advanced by the respondents 3 and 4 before the industrial Tribunal as well as reiterated before this Court, is that the terms of Cl. 17 ought to take their colour from Cl. 16 and in the premise, appropriately would mean that the petitioner-Corporation is obligated to adopt the identical rates and basis for the revision of the allowances including HRA, as adopted by the State Government in respect of its employees. ( 36 ) NO applicable principle of interpretation or construction supports this view. In the considered view of this Court the obligation of the petitioner-Corporation, referable,to Cl. 17, is to effect revisions in da, HRA and CCA as and when the State government does so in respect of its employees so, however, that the revision shall be appropriate. The expression appropriate as employed in Cl. 17 does not incorporate an obligation to mutatis mutandis adopt the rates and basis of the state Government. ( 37 ) HAVING regard to the different expressions used in Clauses 16 and 17 i. e. , in respect of continuation of the HRA and cca where for it is agreed that the existing rates and basis are to continue (Cl. 16) and that these allowances would be appropriately revised (C1. 17), it cannot be said that the intention of the parties emanating from the expression used in cl. 17 was that the rates and basis adopted by the Government while making future revisions in respect of its employees have been agreed to be adopted by the petitioner- corporation. "appropriately revised" cannot on any true and fair construction, in the setting of the settlement dt. 9-10-85, bear such construction as is contended by respondents 3 and 4. As has aptly been expounded by Lord Wright in Rapheal (supra) the limited charter to interpret cannot extend to reform or rewrite the clauses of the settlement as that would amount to no construction but rectification. ( 38 ) THE 1st respondent Tribunal transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction u/sec. 36-A of the Act. As has aptly been expounded by Lord Wright in Rapheal (supra) the limited charter to interpret cannot extend to reform or rewrite the clauses of the settlement as that would amount to no construction but rectification. ( 38 ) THE 1st respondent Tribunal transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction u/sec. 36-A of the Act. The Tribunal wholly misdirected itself as to its jurisdictional limits in concluding that the petitioner-Corporation is obligated to follow the orders of the State Government in letter and spirit because they have chosen the government of A. P. as a model and as an example to consider HRA of its employees, in Cl. 17 of the settlement. No such choice on the part of the petitioner-Corporation or its concomitant obligation to follow the government in letter and spirit flows or is deducible from the terms of settlement in general or as contained in Cl. 17. The tribunal also grievously erred in holding that Clauses 16 and 17 are inter-dependent for calculation of the allowances. The tribunal has also erred in holding that the petitioner-Corporation is obligated to adopt the methods followed by the Government of A. P. in making suitable revision of the allowances of its workmen. Another fundamental,error that the 1st respondent-Tribunal led itself into, is in determining what constitutes appropriate revision of hra on the basis of what it thought was the spirit and understanding of the recommendations of the 1986 Pay Revision commission of the State Government. The agreement as contained in Cl. 17 does not postulate any intendment of the parties, expressly or by any necessary implication, that the future, 1986 Pay Revision commission s recommendations, should fertilise the revision of the HRA by the petitioner-Corporation. ( 39 ) THIS Court is thus of the considered view that the 1st respondent-Tribunal went about assuming an intention of the parties wholly disassociated from the language of the settlement and on that erroneous assumption bent and redrafted the language, to accord in favour of such fallacious assumption. The Tribunal put into Cl. 17 the provisions of the government s 1986 pay revision, which are not to be found there. The Tribunal could not have, while acting under a reference u/sec. 36-A of the Act, but did, adjudicate the dispute as to the HRA. It has not construed or interpreted the terms of Cl. 17. The Tribunal put into Cl. 17 the provisions of the government s 1986 pay revision, which are not to be found there. The Tribunal could not have, while acting under a reference u/sec. 36-A of the Act, but did, adjudicate the dispute as to the HRA. It has not construed or interpreted the terms of Cl. 17. ( 40 ) THE conclusions of the Tribunal are thus clearly the product of jejune logic, consideration of extraneous and unauthorised material and subjective notions as to what ought to have been the appropriate quantum of revision rather than what the parties agreed upon, by the expressed terms of the settlement. The tribunal s exercise was constitutive not interpretive. ( 41 ) THE award of the Tribunal dt. 29-3-93 is thus patently and fundamentally beyond the pale of its jurisdiction u/sec. 36-A of the act and is thus invalid. It is accordingly set aside. ( 42 ) IN the premises above, the writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.