Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This is a revision petition against the order dated 4.11.1996 passed by the trial Court dismissing the application of Vinod Kumar defendant for permission to re-examine himself as a witness. 2. The facts which are necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are that Vijay Kumar etc. had filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts against M/s Vinod Kumar and Co. etc. After the plaintiffs had closed their evidence, the case was fixed for defendants evidence. Vinod Kumar defendant had, appeared in the witness box as D.W.I on 2.8.1996. His examination-in-Chief was recorded but his cross-examination was deferred since counsel for the plaintiffs was not prepared for cross-examination. The case was still at the stage of recording cross-examination of Vinod Kumar defendant as D.W. 1 when he moved the application in question for permission to re-examine himself. In the application, it was alleged that it was a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts and that actual work was being conducted by the Applicant-defendant No.2 whereas the accounts were being maintained by plaintiff No. 1 Vijay Kumar and that as per income tax laws, profit and loss accounts were being prepared regularly and were being submitted to the concerned offices from time to time and since all these accounts books were in possession of plaintiff No. 1, the applicant was not equipped with copies of the balance sheet while plaintiff No. 1 was avoiding to even show those copies to the applicant. It was alleged that due to personal efforts, the applicant was able to locate few documents such as profit and loss accounts, contract account, and balance sheet bearing the signatures of plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No.2 jointly and which was submitted to the income tax authorities while the other documents were signed by Vijay Kumar plaintiff No. 1 alone and were given to the income tax authorities. It was alleged that from various communications which the applicant was able to locate, it was clear that plaintiff No. 1 was managing the whole show and was managing the accounts, it was alleged that for this reason, these documents could not be produced at the time when the statement of Vinod Kumar applicant was being recorded as D.W.1 on 2.8.1996. It was alleged that these documents could be proved only by the applicant in whose presence most of these documents were prepared and who was conversant with the writing and signatures of plaintiff No. 1 and it was alleged that this evidence, if allowed to be produced in examination-in-Chief, would help the Court in arriving at a just and correct decision of the real controversy between the parties. It was accordingly prayed that the applicant be allowed to produce these documents by allowing re-examination of the applicant. 3. The said application of Vinod Kumar was contested by the plaintiffs by filing the written reply dated 29.10.1996, controverting the allegations contained in the application and alleging therein that no case was made out for allowing the applicant to re-examine himself. It was alleged that the examination-in-chief of D.W.1 Vinod Kumar was recorded on 2.8.1996 and the case was fixed for cross-examination and that on 23.10.1996 the applicant had filed the present application for re-examination. It was denied that the accounts were being maintained by plaintiff No. 1 or that the account books were in his possession. It was accordingly prayed that the application be dismissed. 4. The learned trial Court after hearing both sides and after perusing the record dismissed the application of Vinod Kumar defendant vide order dated 4.11.1996. It is against this order of learned trial Court that the present revision petition has been filed by defendant No.1 and 2 i.e. the firm M/s Vinod Kumar and Co., being defendant No.1 and Vinod Kumar as defendant No.2. 5. Notice of motion was issued. Counsel for the parties have been heard. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted before me that the learned trial Court had erred in law in dismissing the application of the petitioners. It was submitted that the case was still at the stage of defendants evidence and only examination-in-chief of D.W.I Vinod Kumar had been recorded and he is yet to be cross-examined by the plaintiffs. It was submitted that certain documents which were not in the know of Vinod Kumar and which were not in his possession could not be produced at the time when his examination-in-chief was being recorded and in the interest of justice, Vinod Kumar could be allowed to produce and prove those documents in his examination-in-chief before he is cross-examined by the plaintiffs. Reliance was placed on Charanjit Singh v. Ajit Singh etc., (1992-2)102 P.L.R. 671 and Banwari v. Nagina, (1998-1)118 P.L.R. 765. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents submitted before me that no case was made out for allowing Vinod Kumar defendant to re-examine himself in examination-in-chief at this stage especially when his examination-in-chief is already over. Reliance was placed on Birham Parkash alias Rohtas v. Ilaqa Magistrate, Gurgaon and Ors., 1980 P.L.J. 651, Smt. Chhotu v. Bijinder Kumar and Ors., 1994 P.L.J. 241, Naresh Kumar v. The Lok Sewak Co-op. Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd, (1998-2)119 P.L.R. 291, Amrit Singh v. Prahlad Singh and Ors., 1998(1) P.L.J. 627 and Jaipur Development Authority v. Smt. Kailash Wati Devi (1993-2)104 P.L.R. 880. 8. After hearing both sides and after perusing the record, I find force in the submission made before me by learned counsel for the petitioners. Before considering the application of the petitioners for re-examination of D.W.I Vinod Kumar for the purpose of further examination-in-chief, the facts of the case have to be kept in view. As referred to above, plaintiffs Vijay Kumar etc. had filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts against Vinod Kumar defendant. The plaintiffs had already produced their evidence. The case is still at the stage of defendants evidence. DW1 Vinod Kumar defendant has already been examined for his examination-in-chief on 2.8.1996. He is still to be cross-examined on behalf of the plaintiffs. In fact, his cross-examination was deferred on 2.8.1996 because counsel for the plaintiffs was not prepared for the same. The case was still at the stage of recording cross-examination of DW1 Vinod Kumar applicant when the present application was filed for permission to re-examine Vinod Kumar applicant, in order to prove/produce various documents. The said application was contested by the plaintiffs by filing written reply on 29.10.1996. The learned trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 4.11.1996 and the case was adjourned to 26.11.1996 for evidence of the defendants. Keeping these facts in view, it would be clear that examination of DW1 Vinod Kumar was not yet completed inasmuch as he was yet to be cross-examined when the present application was filed to recall him for further examination in order to prove/produce certain documents which could not be produced/proved at the time when his examination-in-chief was recorded on 2.8.1996. Keeping these facts in view, it would be clear that examination of DW1 Vinod Kumar was not yet completed inasmuch as he was yet to be cross-examined when the present application was filed to recall him for further examination in order to prove/produce certain documents which could not be produced/proved at the time when his examination-in-chief was recorded on 2.8.1996. As referred to above, the cross-examination of Vinod Kumar had not yet started when the present application for permission to re-examine him was filed in the Court. Keeping all these facts in view, the present application filed by Vinod Kumar is to be considered. In my opinion, keeping all these facts in view, no case was made out for dismissing the application of Vinod Kumar defendant for permission to re-examine himself for his examination-in-chief before he was cross-examined on behalf of the plaintiffs. If Vinod Kumar defendant wanted to produce/prove certain documents which were not relied upon by him or were not included in the list of documents, the plaintiffs could be compensated by costs. However, Vinod Kumar could not be refused permission to produce/prove those documents by way of further examination-in-chief, especially when his cross-examination had not yet started and he was yet to be cross-examined on behalf of the plaintiffs. 9. In Chamnjit Singhs case (supra) counsel for the plaintiff closed the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff but because of bona fide mistake and inadvertence on the part of the counsel, two material witnesses could not be examined the prayer was made for summoning the said witnesses by way of additional evidence. The application was contested by the defendant. However, the learned trial Court allowed the said application subject to payment of costs. In the revision petition this Court, after considering various authorities, upheld the order of the trial Court holding that even if there was some element of negligence on the part of the applicant, that by itself may not be a sufficient ground to debar the applicant from proving his case by producing additional evidence. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported as Jaipur Development Authority v. Smt. Kailash Wati Devi, (1993-2)104 P.L.R. 880. Similarly in Banwaris case (supra) the trial Court had dismissed the application of the plaintiff to produce additional evidence. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported as Jaipur Development Authority v. Smt. Kailash Wati Devi, (1993-2)104 P.L.R. 880. Similarly in Banwaris case (supra) the trial Court had dismissed the application of the plaintiff to produce additional evidence. This Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction had allowed the plaintiff to produce the additional evidence considering that it would not cause any prejudice to other party if the plaintiff was permitted to lead additional evidence. While allowing the revision petition it was also held by this Court that the concept of additional evidence had been given wider dimensions in the recent judgment of Honble Apex Cpurt in Jaipur Development Authoritys case (supra) where the Court held that additional evidence could be allowed even at the appellate stage, if the applicant satisfies the basic requirement of the rules and even no evidence has been led by the applicant at the trial stage. In the case of Hazara Singh and Ors. v. Bachan Singh and Ors.,9 (1998-1)118 P.L.R. 765, cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, the plaintiffs filed an application for additional evidence which was dismissed by the trial Court. The plaintiffs wanted to examine an expert to prove the thumb impression on the disputed Will. In revision the order passed in by the trial Court dismissing the application was set aside and the application of the plaintiffs for additional evidence was allowed holding that the other side would not suffer any prejudice if the additional evidence was permitted to be led. 10. The various authorities relied upon by the plaintiffs-respondents in my opinion, would have no application to the facts of the present case. In Birham Parkash alias Rohtas s case (supra) it was held by the Division Bench of this court that under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17-A, CPC, summoning of the same witness over and over again was not permissible. In the reported case the witness was summoned for production of record and he appeared and stated that no record was available and the same witness was summoned for third time for production of record. Under those circumstances, it was held that there was no provision of law under which same witness can be repeatedly called for production of documents. In the reported case the witness was summoned for production of record and he appeared and stated that no record was available and the same witness was summoned for third time for production of record. Under those circumstances, it was held that there was no provision of law under which same witness can be repeatedly called for production of documents. The provision of Order 18 rule 17 CPC did not give any right to a party asking the Court to summon the same witness over and over again. In Smt. Chhotus case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court was considering the provision of Order 41 Rule 27, CPC, as the additional evidence was sought to be produced during the pendency of the appeal and on the facts of the said case, it was held that production of additional evidence could not be allowed because no reasons were disclosed for moving the application at a belated stage. In Naresh Kumars case (supra), a witness was examined to prove the sanctioned site plans and during examination of the witness it was observed by the Court that those documents were signed and sanctioned by an Executive Officer who was still alive but in spite of that he was not examined. Lateron he was sought to be examined by way of additional evidence and under those circumstances, the order passed by the trial Court rejecting the application for additional evidence was upheld by this Court. In Amrit Singhs case (supra) the plaintiff wanted to prove the sale deeds, copies of which were already on the record and no cogent or specific reason was given as to why the sale deeds could not be produced earlier. Furthermore, in the said case, the High Court had directed the trial Court to grant only one opportunity for examining the evidence and the said opportunity was availed and the witness was examined but still the trial court gave one more opportunity for additional evidence. It was under those circumstances that the order passed by the trial Court allowing the additional evidence was set aside by this Court. The law- laid down in these authorities would be of no held to the plaintiff-respondents in view of the peculiar facts of the present case. It was under those circumstances that the order passed by the trial Court allowing the additional evidence was set aside by this Court. The law- laid down in these authorities would be of no held to the plaintiff-respondents in view of the peculiar facts of the present case. The authority in J.T. 1997(7) S.C. 643 (supra) is also reported in (1997-3)117 P.L.R. 880 and it has already been considered by this Court in Banwari and Charanjit Singhs cases (supra). Even this authority would be of no help to the plaintiff-respondents. 11. In view of my detailed discussion above, in my opinion, the learned trial Court committed illegality and irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction while dismissing the application of Vinod Kumar defendant for permission to re-examine himself in the examination-in-chief before he was cross-examined by the plaintiffs. I am further of the view that it is a fit case which calls for interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. However, considering that the present application filed by the petitioners has caused considerable delay in the disposal of the suit, in my opinion, it is a fit case where necessary costs should be imposed upon the petitioners which would compensate the plaintiffs. 12. For the reasons recorded above, the present revision petition is allowed, the order dated 4.11.1996 passed by the trial Court is set aside and the application filed by the petitioners for permission to re-examine Vinod Kumar defendant is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 2,500/-as costs. 13. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 3.4.2000, on which date the conditional costs shall be paid. Thereafter, the trial Court shall fix a date for further examination of DW1 Vinod Kumar. In case, he has already been, cross-examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, subsequent to the passing of the impugned order dated 4.11.1996, the plaintiffs would be given further opportunity to cross-examine DW1 Vinod Kumar after he is re-examined.