(1) THE issue which arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave pertains to an open space of land adjoining the house of the appellant. (2) THE appellant had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that an open space of land to the west of his house was for common use of the appellant as well as Respondents 1 and 2 herein. According to the appellant. Respondent 2 was the owner of House No. 3-1-50 and Respondent 1 had purchased a house which was previously an evacuee property at the time when the property was sold by public auction. There was an open space of land which was surrounded by a road in the north, by the house of the appellant in the east, the house of Respondent 1 in the south and the house of Respondent 2 in the west. Evidence was led before the trial court which, inter alia, came tothe conclusion that the said open space was government land and had not been sold to Respondent 1 and nor was it a common property of Respondents 1 and 2. This conclusion was arrived at notwithstanding the fact that the Government had in the said suit contended that the said open land did not belong to it. (3) THE documentary evidence on the basis of which the trial court came to the conclusion that the open space was government land and not the land of Respondent 1 was essentially that of the Evacuee Department. The trial court while giving the declaration that the land in question was government land issued a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, who are respondents in this appeal, from preventing the appellant from use of the said open space. (4) IN appeal, the lower appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court. It, however, modified the trial courts judgment to the extent that it set aside the last relief which had been granted by the trial court to the effect that a perpetual injunction had been granted restraining the Municipal Council from removing doors, windows, water spouts, etc. on the western wall of the appellants land. The appellant herein had no complaint with regard to the modification to that extent of the trial courts decree but the respondents herein filed a second appeal before the High Court. on the western wall of the appellants land. The appellant herein had no complaint with regard to the modification to that extent of the trial courts decree but the respondents herein filed a second appeal before the High Court. (5) BY order dated 11/1/1984, the High Court framed the following questions stated to be substantial questions of law: "7. Whether the conclusion of the courts below that Defendant 1 does not get any title by virtue of the sale deed even including the amended sale deed, Exhibit-P2, is proper and legal when the Government itself admits that it was an evacuee property. Was it sold to Defendant 1 ? 2. Whether the dismissal of the previous suit bars the present suit under Order 2 Rule 2? 3. Whether the suit is barred by Section 33 of the Evacuee Property (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?" (6) THE High Court then proceeded to examine the evidence and came to the conclusion that the open space was situated in such a way that it was of no use to any person other than Respondents 1 and 2 and the said open space would go along with the two houses. The High Court did not expressly deal or answer the questions of law which had been formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal. (7) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that in fact no question of law, leave alone a substantial question of law, arose in the present case. It is not in dispute that the government auction which took place had described the property in question as being, inter alia, bounded on the north side by "open space public road". The bid sheet of 7/5/1970 also described the property as being bounded on the north by "open space of Government and public road". It is Property No. 3/129, Mohalla Berron Killa, Raichur which had been purchased which, as indicated in the bid sheet and in the advertisement, did not include the said open space. Also placed on record is a letter dated 7/7/1970 written by Respondent 1 to the Minister for Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, asking for the release of sale certificate. In this letter written by Respondent 1, the property purchased by him is stated to have been bounded on the north by "Nadim Sahebs house and open space and adjoining government road". Also placed on record is a letter dated 7/7/1970 written by Respondent 1 to the Minister for Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, asking for the release of sale certificate. In this letter written by Respondent 1, the property purchased by him is stated to have been bounded on the north by "Nadim Sahebs house and open space and adjoining government road". (8) RESPONDENT 1 received a sale certificate dated 21/9/1970 and there also the property was described as being bounded on the north by "open space of Government and public road". (9) THE trouble for the appellant herein arose when the respondents herein were able to secure an amended certificate of sale dated 28/6/1972. At the foot of the said certificate, the boundary as to the north was described as follows: "OPEN space and the house of Shri Sawkar Nadeem Saheb now purchased by Shri Shaik Hussain, H. No. 3-1-53. Beyond the open space one public road is lying. As per the plan of registered sale deed open space is common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb." (10) IT is the latter certificate of 28/6/1972 which has been relied upon by the High Court in coming to the conclusion that the open space of land was common between Respondents 1 and 2. (11) APART from the fact that the conclusion which was arrived at by the High Court was essentially one of fact and, therefore, outside its jurisdiction while deciding an appeal under Section 100 CPC, even on facts we find that the decision of the High Court was incorrect. Right from the auction notice till the grant of the certificate of sale in 1970, the open space in question had never been shown as having been auctioned in favour of Respondent 1. This open space has always been regarded as being north of the boundary of the house purchased by Respondent 1. Secondly, even in the amended sale certificate, this land is still shown as open space. It is not indicated in the amended sale certificate that the land in question had been sold as evacuee property in favour of Respondent 1. The last sentence in the description of the boundary toward the north has added the sting in the tail. It is stated therein that as per the plan of registered sale deed open space is common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb (Respondent 2). The last sentence in the description of the boundary toward the north has added the sting in the tail. It is stated therein that as per the plan of registered sale deed open space is common between evacuee property and Sawkar Nadeem Saheb (Respondent 2). (12) WHAT is in question is as to who is the owner of the said open space. The amended certificate of sale does not state that this open space is owned either by Respondent 1 or Respondent 2 or by them jointly. By mentioning that the open space is common between the evacuee property and the property of Respondent 2, it clearly indicates that it is certainly not part of the property of Respondent 1 or of Respondent 2. Admittedly, Respondent 2 at no point of time took part in the auction-sale which had been conducted and, therefore, there should have been no occasion for the certificate of sale to indicate that the open space is common between the evacuee property and Respondent 2. We have little doubt that in coming to the conclusion that the amended certificate of sale was procured solely with a view to oust the user of the open space by the appellant herein. The said amended certificate of sale is not in consonance with the earlier documents regarding the sale of the evacuee property. (13) THE High Court, in our opinion, fell in error in reversing the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the trial court and the lower appellate court. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the lower appellate court. The appellant will be entitled to costs.