JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---The present appellants/original plaintiffs initiated Regular Civil Suit No. 407/1980 against the present respondents original defendant for recovery of possession of their ancestral house bearing Gram Panchayat House No. 5 as properly as described in the plaint. The plaintiff's case, in short, is that the plaintiffs happened to be the owners and possessors of the suit house having five Zinc sheets and RCC roof with its Courtyard admeasuring 22 ft. North-South and 15 feet East West; along with the assetion that the property is the ancestral property of plaintiff No. 1's husband and of plaintiffs Nos. 5 and 6. On 4th August, 1980, Piraji, the husband of the plaintiff No. 1 Sushilabai expired. He was survived by plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 as his legal heirs. The plaintiff No. 1 happened to be the wife, the plaintiff Nos. 2, 3 and 4 happened to be the sons and daughters. The plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6 happened to be the brothers of late Piraji. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiff No. 1 and her husband were at village Ardhapur Tq. Nanded since last one year for the purpose of labour work, Piraji died there only. The plaintiffs 5 and 6 who happened to be the brothers of Piraji were also away from the village in search of job. It is the case of the plaintiffs that taking an undue advantage of their absence from the village, the defendants forcibly took possession of the suit property and this action of the defendants was absolutely illegal. Naturally having come to know about this fact, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to vacate the premises in question and to hand over the possession. 2. The defendant No. 1 Raosaheb told the plaintiffs that he had purchased the suit property by a registered sale-deed on 7th August, 1980 from defendant No. 2 Begaji s/o Dawaji Gajabhare. The defendant No. 1 stated that since the date of purchase, he is in possession of the suit house as an owner thereof and on that ground the defendant No. 1 refused to vacate the premises in question. The defendant No. 2 contended that the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit house. He further denied that the property happened to be the ancestral property of the plaintiff No. 1's husband and the plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6. The defendant No. 2 contended that the plaintiff was not the owner of the suit house. He further denied that the property happened to be the ancestral property of the plaintiff No. 1's husband and the plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6. It is contended that the husband of the plaintiff No. 1 i.e. Piraji was at Nanded since last 12 to 15 years where he died. The defendant No. 2 further contended that the plaintiffs 5 and 6 are out of village Mendale since more than twenty years and that the story of dispossession on 15th August, 1980 was incorrect. The defendant No. 2 denied to have taken an illegal possession of the house in question on the said date. Taking into consideration the relationship between the contesting parties necessary genealogical tree is already referred to in the judgment by the learned Judge of the trial Court which is not disputed and can be very well relied upon for all practical purposes for the decision of the present matter. In short, the defendants resisted the suit on all counts with one additional specific plea which is said to be the plea of adverse possession to which a reference has been made in paragraph 8 of the written statement. 3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties necessary issues were framed by the learned Judge of the trial Court, evidence is adduced by the parties in support of their contentions and, the learned Judge of the trial Court, after appreciating the evidence reached to the conclusion that the plaintiffs did prove that the suit house belongs to them i.e. belongs to the branch of Bhagoji, who happened to be brother of Dawaji, father of the defendant No. 2. It is, however, clear that defendant No. 2 happened to be the nephew of Bhagoji. Taking into consideration the findings on this issue, the learned Judge of the trial Court naturally held that the plaintiffs were entitled for recovery of possession of the suit premises. In the background of these findings, the learned Judges also tried to weigh the case of defence as regards adverse possession which the learned Judge rejected holding that the defendants had to be precise, the defendant No. 2, failed to prove his case for adverse possession. In the background of these findings, the learned Judges also tried to weigh the case of defence as regards adverse possession which the learned Judge rejected holding that the defendants had to be precise, the defendant No. 2, failed to prove his case for adverse possession. Naturally, the learned Judge of the trial Court also held that the plaintiff's were entitled for a declaration that the sale deed dated 7th August, 1980 was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. In short, the suit of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession has been decreed and the sale deed dated 7th August, 1980 executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 1 pertaining to the suit property has been declared to be ineffective and not binding on the plaintiffs. This necessarily prompted the learned Judge of the trial Court to grant the further reliefs to the plaintiffs by passing an order perpetually restraining the defendants from alienating the suit house to any other person. This judgment and order is dated 8th December, 1981. 4. The above said judgment and decree happened to be the subject matter of challenge at the instance of the defendants before the learned Assistant Judge, Nanded in Regular Civil Appeal No. 9/1982. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court who dealt with the manner, re-appreciated the evidence and reached to the conclusion that the plaintiffs proved their ownership over the property in question. Their possession was not proved for last more than twelve years and therefore, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court reached to the conclusion that the defendant No. 2 did prove his case as regards adverse possession. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, therefore, straightway allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court is dated 15th October, 1983. It is this judgment and decree which is the subject-matter of this second appeal. 5. I have heard Shri H.K. Mundhe, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants 1 to 4, at length and also the learned Advocate Shri M.V. Deshpande, for respondent No. 1. 6. It is this judgment and decree which is the subject-matter of this second appeal. 5. I have heard Shri H.K. Mundhe, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants 1 to 4, at length and also the learned Advocate Shri M.V. Deshpande, for respondent No. 1. 6. Shri Mundhe, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants 1 to 4 vehemently urged that so far as regards the ownership is concerned both the courts have reached a concurrent finding as regards ownership of the presents appellant original plaintiffs. This position is also not disputed by the learned Advocate Shri M.V. Deshpande, appearing for respondent No. 1. It is also clear that though this finding as regards ownership has been held against the original defendants, the original defendants have in no way either challenged the same by way of an appeal nor have they raised any challenge by way of cross-objection here. In view of this the scope of hearing and consideration of the arguments in the present appeal has substantially been reduced and narrowed down. The only point that needs consideration in the present appeal is as regards adverse possession claimed by the defendants which has been held to have been proved by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court. 7. Shri Mundhe, Advocate pointed that merely making a bare statement as regards adverse possession in the written statement, would not suffice for treating the claim of the defendants as of adverse possession. According to Shri Mundhe it was for the defendant to show that since what period they were actually in possession of the property in question and that too on the basis of assertion of an hostile title against the plaintiffs. According to Shri Mundhe, it was not for the defendants to show that the plaintiffs since long was not in possession of the property, but, according to Shri Mundhe, it was incumbent on the defendants to show that the defendants possession was with the knowledge of the plaintiffs and at the same time adverse, to the possession of the plaintiffs and further that his possession with an assertion of hostile title against the plaintiffs. According to Shri Mundhe merely because the plaintiffs were not in possession of the property in question for a considerably long time that, by itself, would not prove the defence of the defendants as regards adverse possession and unless all the necessary ingredients which are required to be fulfilled while claiming adverse possession, are so fulfilled. 8. As against the arguments of Shri Mundhe, Mr. M.V. Deshpande, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1-defendant, vehemently urged that it was sufficient for the defendants to show that he had rightly denied the possession and title of the original owner i.e. of the plaintiff, further that he asserts ownership over the property in question along with possession thereof and further that he is having the possession of the property in question under that assertion of ownership for the more than twelve years. Shri Deshpande, took this Court through his defence and, to be precise, in paragraphs 8-A, B, C of his written statement. With all curiosity, with the help of the learned Advocate, I have gone through the defence and after having read the same along with the Advocates, this Court has to reluctantly observe that but for a bare statement in paragraph 8-B of the written statement, which is a plea taken by way of an alternative plea, there is nothing which really can be said to have complied with the necessary ingredients of adverse possession. The plea taken is that "in the alternative, the defendants claim their ownership on the basis of adverse possession and that too of more than twelve years". This defence of adverse possession, in my mind, is not sufficient. In fact, the defence in the case of adverse possession has definitely to indicate that the said possession of the defendants is with the knowledge of the plaintiffs or to the knowledge of the plaintiffs adverse to the possession of the plaintiffs and even adverse to the whole world. Assuming for the sake of arguments that this happened to be the matter of adducing evidence in that respect, even then, in the view of this Court, the evidence as adduced is too short to prove that the defendants claimed the possession adverse to the interest of the plaintiff and that too with the knowledge of the plaintiffs. Assuming for the sake of arguments that this happened to be the matter of adducing evidence in that respect, even then, in the view of this Court, the evidence as adduced is too short to prove that the defendants claimed the possession adverse to the interest of the plaintiff and that too with the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The evidence adduced is only as regards non possession of the plaintiff for twelve years and more but no evidence is adduced to show that the defendants openly asserted of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by him to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. In the instant matter, to appreciate the arguments of Shri Mundhe, that the evidence is not at all there as regards adverse possession and further to appreciate the arguments of Shri Mundhe that the findings of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court on this point are totally perverse, this Court was required to see whether the evidence is such as alleged by Shri Mundhe. Shri Deshpande Advocate for respondent No. 1 also to show that the evidence was sufficient to hold the adverse possession also requested the Court to refer to the evidence of four witnesses. This Court is aware of its power under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code as regards appreciation of the evidence. However when the judgments of the courts below are contrary to each other and when a case of perversity is argued particularly alleging that no evidence as regards adverse possession was there in spite of the fact that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court reached to that conclusion of adverse possession having been proved, this Court cannot be a silent spectator and to appreciate the case of no evidence, the Court has to shuffle the papers of evidence. 9. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court touched to the evidence of D.W. 1 Raosaheb, D.W. 2 Sudam and D.W. 3 Ram and also the evidence of P.W. 1 Govinda to prove the case of adverse possession. All these witnesses do definitely say about possession of twelve years and more of the defendant No. 2. 9. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court touched to the evidence of D.W. 1 Raosaheb, D.W. 2 Sudam and D.W. 3 Ram and also the evidence of P.W. 1 Govinda to prove the case of adverse possession. All these witnesses do definitely say about possession of twelve years and more of the defendant No. 2. However, howsoever long may be the possession of the defendants, that itself, is not sufficient to observe that he has acquired the title by adverse possession and the evidence has to be in the nature that the said possession was with the assertion of hostile title as against the plaintiffs and that plaintiff was aware of such a possession of the defendants only then it could be said that a case of adverse possession is made out. Shri Mundhe, the learned Advocate, rightly brought to my notice a judgment of this Court reported in 1987(3) Bom.C.R. 252 in the matter of (Joti Dadu v. Manukabai)1. While dealing with the identical question, this Court observed that if there is no evidence of open assertion of hostile title against the plaintiff and if no evidence is there as regards or indicating the ouster of the plaintiffs within twelve years prior to the initiation of the suit, then in such a case, the plea as regards adverse possession put forward by the defendants can hardly be accepted. The evidence of the above said three witnesses on which reliance has been placed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, as pointed out earlier, simply talk about the possession of the defendants and not of the ouster of the plaintiffs nor does the evidence say that the possession was against the plaintiffs and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. Much weightage is given to Exh. 32, a certificate issued by one Govinda, the Sarpanch of the village who has been examined by the plaintiffs themselves. The certificate only indicates about possession but does not indicate that it was with the knowledge to the plaintiffs or that plaintiffs were aware of the same. That certificate in no manner can confer the title over the defendants. 32, a certificate issued by one Govinda, the Sarpanch of the village who has been examined by the plaintiffs themselves. The certificate only indicates about possession but does not indicate that it was with the knowledge to the plaintiffs or that plaintiffs were aware of the same. That certificate in no manner can confer the title over the defendants. In any case, unless and until it is established by the defendants on the record that he claims possession and title with an open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment and that too to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, till then it cannot be said that the defendant has made out a case of adverse possession. A reliance has been rightly placed by Shri Mundhe on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1337 in the matter of (Shambhu Prasade Singh v. Foolkumari)2. Shri Mundhe also brought to my notice yet another decision reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1254 in the matter of (S.M. Karim v. Mst Bibi Sakina)3. From the decisions referred to above, it is clear that a mere suggestion by the defendants that there was an uninterrupted possession of his over the property in question for several years and more than twelve years or that he had acquired an absolute title, could not be said to be enough to raise the plea of adverse possession. Long possession is not necessarily an adverse possession and therefore, unless and until it is shown that the adverse possession was to the knowledge of the plaintiffs till then it cannot be said that the defendants made out a case of adverse possession. 10. In the instant matter, keeping in view the limitation of this Court in second appeal, this Court has to observe that the evidence which is there on the record, is not at all sufficient in any manner to prove the case of the defendants of adverse possession. In fact, it is a case of no evidence on the point of adverse possession except for the bare statement in the written statement. This Court has, therefore, no alternative but to quash and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court in the suit. This Court has, therefore, no alternative but to quash and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court in the suit. In the circumstances, the second appeal deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed, with cost. Appeal allowed. -----