Brijesh Kumar, C.J.— This first appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 14.12.95 passed in MS No.245 of 1993 by Assistant District Judge No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati. 2. The appellant is aggrieved by only a part of the impugned decree by S which interest payable under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 has not been awarded from the appointed day i.e. on expiry of 30 days of the supply of goods. Instead the trial Judge allowed interest with effect from 23.9.92 when the Act of 1993 came into force. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents. 4. The plaintiff-appellant is a firm registered as a small scale unit manufacturing medicines. It had taken loan for the purpose of its pharmaceutical factory from the Bank of Baroda on interest as per the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India. The appellant had been supplying medicines as per orders placed to it by the respondents from time to time against different indents in the year 1988-89. According to the appellants, the total amount outstanding for payment as price of medicines supplied comes to Rs. 1,21,293.60. The said amount was not paid despite several letters/reminders and requests of the plaintiff-appellant. Ultimately the plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants under section 80 CPC on 7.9.93 demanding payment of the principal amount and the interest. No payment was made even after notice under section 80 CPC was served. Hence, the appellant filed a suit for realisation of the principal amount and a sum of Rs. 2.75,878.60 as interest i.e. for a total sum of Rs. 3,97,222.20. The appellant had claimed interest under section 4 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act. 1993, hereinafter for short to as the Act No. 32 of 1993, which provides interest at a higher rate by 5% of the usual rate of lending as per circular of the Reserve Bank of India during the period and floor rate of comparable lending. The higher rate is chargeable with, effect from the appointed day namely, immediately after expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of acceptance i.e. the date of delivery of the goods. The higher rate is chargeable with, effect from the appointed day namely, immediately after expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of acceptance i.e. the date of delivery of the goods. The trial Court framed several issues out of which Issue Nos 5 and 6 are relevant for the purposes of decision of this first appeal. The said issues are : 5. Whether Rs. 1,21,343.69 being value of medicines and Rs. 2,75,870.60 as interest thereon are due to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs? 6. Whether the claim of the plaintiff in respect of interest is inflated? 5. The trial Court decreed a sum of Rs. 1,21,293.80 with compound interest (with monthly interest) @ 23.25% per annum with effect from 23.9.92 till the date of realisation. It was further held that the amount of interest as claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint was inflated. The interest in accordance with the Act No. 32 of 1993 was held to be not admissible prior to 23.9.92, namely, for the period before the said Act came into force since it was found that the medicines were supplied by the plaintiff-appellants on 16.10.89,22.4.89 and 19.3.88, that is to say, much before the Act came into force. The trial Court held that the Act had no retrospective effect so as to entitle the appellant for higher rate of interest for the period prior to the coming into force of the Act itself. 6. In this appeal the controversy is only confined to the question as to whether section 4 of the Act No. 32 of 1993 is retrospective in effect or it is prospective in operation. The appellant's entitlement to the interest at the higher rate with o effect from the appointed day, which is relatable in this case to a day prior to coming into force of the Act No. 32 of 1993, would depend upon the answer to the question involved, as indicated above. In order to determine the above question, we may peruse the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act No. 32 of 1993 provides as under”: “3. In order to determine the above question, we may peruse the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act No. 32 of 1993 provides as under”: “3. Liability of buyer to make payment-Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefore on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day.” According to the above provision, payment is to be made before the appointed day in absence of any agreement in respect thereof. In case of non-payment as required under section 3, the consequences which follow are indicated in section 4 of the Act No. 32 of 1993, which reads as under : “4. Date from which and rate at which interest is payable -Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 3, the buyer shall notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at such rate which is five percent points above the floor rate of comparable lending. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "floor rate for comparable lending means the highest of the minimum lending rate charged by Scheduled banks (not being co-operative banks) on credit limits in accordance with the directions given or issued to banking companies generally by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulations Act, 1949.” 7. Section 5 of the Act No. 32 of 1993 provides for payment of compound interest with monthly rests at the rate as provided under section 4 of the Act. The term 'appointed day' as defined under clause (b) of section 2 reads as under: “2.(b) 'appointed day' means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the day of acceptance of the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. The term 'appointed day' as defined under clause (b) of section 2 reads as under: “2.(b) 'appointed day' means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the day of acceptance of the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. Explanation: For the purposes of this clause : (i) 'the day of acceptance' means - (a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or (b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods of services within thirty days from the day of the delivery of the goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier; (ii) 'the day of deemed acceptance' means, where no objection, is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within thirty days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; . (c) 'buyer' means whoever buys any goods or receive any services from a supplier for consideration; (d) 'goods' means every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; (e) 'small scale industrial undertaking' has the meaning assigned to it by clause (j) of section 3 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; (f) 'supplier' means an ancillary industrial undertaking or a small scale industrial undertaking holding a permanent registration certificate issued by the Directorate of Industries of a State or Union Territory.” 8. In the case at hand, according to the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, supplies were made on 19.3.88, 24.4.89 and 26.10.89 and no payment was made so far. It is submitted that the appointed day with effect from which the interest would be payable to the appellant in accordance with sections 4 and 5 of the Act is the day falling immediately after expiry of thirty days from the date of acceptance or the deemed acceptance of goods. The Act has been made effective with effect from September 23,1992. The Act has been made effective with effect from September 23,1992. According to the plaintiff-appellant the date of enforcement of the Act will not be material, so far it relates to the claims of the appellant about higher rate of interest as according to the appellant, it is a social welfare legislation. A liberal interpretation is called for to declare the Act retrospective in order to enable the small scale units to avail of the benefits of the Act. It has further been submitted that interest at the higher rate in the instant case be ordered to be paid from the appointed day notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the parties. According to the provisions of the Act the appointed day as defined under section 2 (b) would be a day falling immediately on expiry of 30 days of the supplies or deemed supply. It is submitted that the above position flows on the plain reading of the provision and it shall be supplied as it is even in respect of supplies made before the Act came into force. It is also submitted that .by necessary implication the Act has to be construed to have retrospective effect. 9. In support of the above submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to certain decisions. Before referring to these decisions, we would like to observe that legislation in question cannot be said to be in category of social welfare legislation. It is true that the Act seeks to protect the interest of those who invest in small scale industries after taking loan from financial institutions and Banks as they have to pay back installments to such financial institutions within time schedule failing which they are not only liable to penal interest etc but also subjected to recovery proceedings etc. It is no doubt that it is for protection of the interest of such borrower entrepreneurs, higher rate of interest in the case of non-payment of their dues on account of supply of goods made by them has been provided. Despite that, the Act cannot be equated with legislations made for weaker section and deprived classes of the people in general, like providing for bare medical care, protection against exploitation of any kind or to provide for such living condition as may be necessary under the sweep of 'right to life' and other conditions enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the emphasis laid on behalf of the appellant that it is a social welfare legislation and the maximum possible benefit should be extended to those or for whom it is meant, is misplaced. As observed earlier, the statute aims at timely payment of dues of borrower entre­preneurs and in case of delay, for some kind of compensation by way of higher rate of interest and compound interest so that perhaps it may take care of the entrepreneurs interest etc as may be leviable upon them by the lending institution in case of delayed payment of installments by them and to save the industry. 10. Reliance has first been placed upon a case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1511 , Mustt Refiqunessa vs. Lal Bahadur Chetri & others. It has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted decision that Legislature is competent'to take away the vested rights by means of legislation. Similarly, Legislature is equally competent to make laws which override and materially h affect the terms of contracts between the parties, but unless a clear and unambiguous intention is indicated by the Legislature by adopting suitable express words, no provision of a statute should be given retrospective operation to affect the vested rights. It has further been held that intention of the Legislature to give retrospective effect to a piece of legislation can be inferred only when it appears to be clearly implicit in the provision in the context where it occurs. It is further a observed, "In other words, a statutory provision be held to be retrospective either when it is so declared by express terms or the intention to make it retrospective clearly follows from the words and the context in which they occur." The provision of law under consideration was section (1) (a) of the Assam Non Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act (Act No. 12 of 1955). The said provision provided protection to the tenants against their eviction in case they had constructed house of permanent structure within five years of the tenancy irrespective of the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the tenant and the landlord, before or after commencement of the Act. The Court found that the provision namely, section 5 itself gave a unmistakable indication to make this provision retrospective. The Court found that the provision namely, section 5 itself gave a unmistakable indication to make this provision retrospective. It was a provision to protect tenants who had built a permanent structure within five years from the date of contract of tenancy whether before or after the commencement of the Act. In this case a different language was employed in the provision giving clear intention of extending benefit to all those tenants who had constructed their houses within five years of the contract of tenancy. Therefore, such a provision could apply even in the proceedings pending in appeal. It does not help the appellant for the proposition that higher rate of interest would be payable with effect from the appointed day falling before the date of enforcement of the Act. The trial Court as a matter of fact has not denied the benefit of the provision from the date of enforcement of the said provision even though contract was entered into or transaction related to period prior to enforcement of the Act. In this way the provision was made applicable to the contracts which came into existence before the provisions were enforced e but the benefit was made admissible only with effect from the date of coming into force of the provision. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1984 SC 87 , Punjab Tin Supply Company vs. Central Govt & others. It has been held in the above noted case that all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectively if they affect the vested rights and obligations unless legislative intent is clear and compulsive. It depends primarily on the language in which the provision is couched. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. Where the language is unclear, the question is to be decided in the light of surrounding circumstances. It is clear thus from the above observation that laws affecting rights of the parties generally operate prospectively unless by clear language it is given retrospective effect. If the language is clear, the effect will have to be given to the said provision. Where the language is unclear, the question is to be decided in the light of surrounding circumstances. It is clear thus from the above observation that laws affecting rights of the parties generally operate prospectively unless by clear language it is given retrospective effect. If the language is clear, the effect will have to be given to the said provision. Yet another decision referred on behalf of the appellant is reported in (1970) 1 SCC 248 , Rustam K. Cooper vs. Union of India. On the basis of the said decision it is urged that the Legislature is competent to legislate retrospectively. There can hardly be any dispute to the above proposition. 12. Yet another case referred to is reported in AIR 1989 SC 1024 , Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. Smti Hasmatunnessa Begum. This case has been cited for the proposition that where the meaning of the statutory provision is plain, it must be given effect to regardless of the results. Therefore, it is submitted that the meaning of the word appointed day is definite under the Act, the said provision must be given effect to irrespective of the fact that the date falls in the present case before coming into force of the Act. Yet another decision cited by the appellant is reported in (1995) 2 SCC 736 , Union of India & another vs. Pradip Kumari & others. In this case the question is related to application of period of limitation of three months for the purpose of application for redetermination of compensation in the matters relating to land acquisition. It has been held that such application could be made within three months on the basis of any one of the awards made by the Court after coming into force of section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. The right of predetermination of compensation is not confined to the earliest award made by the Court. The benefit of redetermination can be applied for on the basis of any judgment or award given. For the above purposes, it was observed that in interpreting beneficial provision it is to be seen that the benefit is not curtailed and the construction which advance policy of the legislation should be adopted rather than to restrict the scope of the said provision. For the above purposes, it was observed that in interpreting beneficial provision it is to be seen that the benefit is not curtailed and the construction which advance policy of the legislation should be adopted rather than to restrict the scope of the said provision. A decision reported in AIR 1989 SC 1247 , Mithilesh Kumari & another vs. Prem Behari Khare, has been referred to. It has been held that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair statutory right or obligation otherwise even as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of an enactment. It is also observed "However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing." The matter related to prohibition on acquiring benami properties. Considering the over all background of the law made and holding that it was permissible to consider the recommendation of the Law Commission to interpret the language and the intention. It was held that the provision was retrospective in effect, and apply to the pending suits. So far the proposition of law is concerned, it is to the same effect as indicated in the case cited earlier. It is permissible to construe a provision to have retrospective effect by necessary implication. 13. From the decision which have been cited on behalf of the appellant the position that emerges is that all statutes affecting vested or substantive right of parties would be presumed prospective in operation except the procedural laws. The retrospective effect can be given by express provision in the enactment. But it can also be inferred as implicit, in the facts and circumstances and the legislative intent of the legislature. Whether a particular provision or statute is retrospective in effect or not even though not so expressly provided, would be a question to be examined in the set of circumstance and legislative intent and on the basis of the principle indicated above. The Act No. 32 of 1993 does not contain any provision expressly providing for retrospective operation of the Act. It is thus only to be examined as to whether there is anything to indicate that the Act has retrospective effect implicitly or by necessary implication. The Act No. 32 of 1993 does not contain any provision expressly providing for retrospective operation of the Act. It is thus only to be examined as to whether there is anything to indicate that the Act has retrospective effect implicitly or by necessary implication. As observed earlier every statute and its provision not being procedural in nature, but affecting substantive or vested rights as presumed to be prospective in nature. 14. On behalf of the appellant the only argument which has been advanced in support of the contention that the operation of the Act is retrospective in nature is based on definition of 'appointed day' as provided under section 2 (a) of the Act. The said provision as already quoted above, according to which it means the day falling immediately after expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of acceptance of the goods. It is submitted that in view of the above provision in the case in hand, the appointed day shall fall on expiry of 30 days from the date of supply of goods namely 17.3.88,24.4.89 and 26.10.89. Therefore, it is submitted that the appellant would be entitled for enhanced rate of interest as provided under section 4 from the appointed day. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the language of section 2 (b) and section 4 are unambiguous and plain. It is further submitted that plain and unambiguous provisions of law must be interpreted as it is irrespective of the consequence. We, however, fail to see anything in the provisions referred to above to come to an irresistible conclusion that the provisions would be retrospective in effect in the sense that appellant would be entitled to interest at a higher rate even for the period during which the provisions of the Act were not available, namely, for the period prior to coming into force of the Act. There is no doubt about the fact that the provision for d enhanced rate of interest is by no means is procedural in nature. It relates to substantive and existing right of the parties. Under the agreement the liability of interest was at a particular rate which may have been payable to the appellant. The provisions for enhanced rate came into force with effect from September 23,1992 with effect from which date the Act No.32 of 1993 is deemed to have come into force. It relates to substantive and existing right of the parties. Under the agreement the liability of interest was at a particular rate which may have been payable to the appellant. The provisions for enhanced rate came into force with effect from September 23,1992 with effect from which date the Act No.32 of 1993 is deemed to have come into force. The period prior to coming into force of the Act was not covered by any provision for enhancement of rate of interest. The liability to pay interest at a rate higher than what is agreed or was required to be paid under the law operative up to 23.9.92 would definitely affect the substantive right of the parties. There is nothing impliedly so imperative in the provisions in question as to irresistibly come to the conclusion that the said provision is retrospective in effect. Merely because the appointed day has been defined would not mean that liability of J payment of enhanced rate of interest also accrued even for the period during which the law relating to enhanced rate of interest was not in force at all. It would be difficult to accept the contention pressed on behalf of the appellant to saddle the respondents with financial liability. With effect from an interior date and for the period which is not covered by any provision of law requiring payment of interest at the enhanced rate. The definition of the expression 'appointed day will cover the cases prospectively after coming into force of sections 3 and 4 of the Act and the prospective operation would cover the period after coming into force of the said provisions for the purpose of payment of enhanced rate of interest. Even though the transaction may be old i.e. relating to period prior to coming into force of the relevant provisions yet the enhanced rate of interest becomes payable on coming into force of new provisions notwithstanding anything contained in any existing agreement between the parties or any law for the time being in force. The new provision will supersede the existing agreement or any provision under the law and enhanced rate of interest would be leviable under section 4 of the Act with effect from 23.9.92. 15. The new provision will supersede the existing agreement or any provision under the law and enhanced rate of interest would be leviable under section 4 of the Act with effect from 23.9.92. 15. In connection with what we have observed above, it would be relevant to quote the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court hi the case of Mithilesh Kumari (supra), as quoted earlier also “However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing”. The present case may be covered by the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted above. The said position of law has been reiterated in some other decisions also decided by the Supreme Court. It will, however, relevant to refer to a few other decisions as well relevant to the point namely 1950 (2) All England Repot 525, Master Ladies Tailor Organisation & another vs. Minister of Labour and National Service. In this case the holiday remuneration, as provided, under the Wage Council Act, 1945, was challenged on the ground that it may make the employers liable for holiday remuneration for the period before the order became effective. Thus, the employers were saddled with the liabilities in respect of antecedent to implementation of the Act. The vires of the order was upheld holding that it cannot be given retrospective effect and the payments were to be made for the period after the order came into force. A similar question arose for consideration in another case reported in 1975 (1) All England Report 439, Customs & Excise Commissioner vs. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd. It was held that operation of law imposing value added tax was not retrospective in effect though the payment arose out of an agreement that was ante dated the 1972 Act, but the tax was chargeable on payment made after the Act had come into force and not before that the transaction having come into existence before the said date of enactment of the 1972 Act. Similarly, in the case of DS Nakara, reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 , though the benefit of revised pension scheme was made admissible to the persons who had already retired, but from the date the scheme was enforced and not prior to that 16. Similarly, in the case of DS Nakara, reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 , though the benefit of revised pension scheme was made admissible to the persons who had already retired, but from the date the scheme was enforced and not prior to that 16. From the decisions cited above, legal position that emerges is that merely for the reason that in some cases 'appointed day' may be referable to a date ante to the date of enforcement of the Act, but that would not necessarily mean that the provision of the Act became retrospective in operation. In the present case the provisions have been applied by the trial Court prospectively in the sense that higher rate of interest has been made admissible as provided under section 4 of the Act with effect from the date the Act No. 32 of 1993 was enforced even though the transaction of supply and receipt of goods between the parties had taken place prior to 23.9.92, the date of enforcement of the Act. It has been rightly held to be not retrospective in effect in the sense that enhanced rate of interest was not admissible for the period during which the Act No. 32 of 1993 did not come into effect nor its provisions were operative. The interpretation /j as canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant will lead to unreasonable and untenable results. Claims may be made to reopen the matters which stood closed before 23.9.92. Such a situation is not envisaged under the provisions of the Act. There is no such provision which may lead to the necessary conclusion that section 4 is implicitly retrospective in operation. The provision has been rightly given prospective effect by the trial Court allowing higher rate of interest from the date of coming into force of the Act. New liabilities can not be created with retrospective effect nor substantive rights can be altered unless specifically provided for under the enactment, or it may be so invariable by necessary implication. None of the above two conditions is found in the present case. We find no merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and hence the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We, however, make no order as to cost.