Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This application under sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in. short the Code) is directed against the judgment dated 16.2.1996 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-V, Patna in Criminal Revision No. 445/95 by which he was pleased to set aside the order dated 25.7.1995 passed by Shri S.K.Srivastava, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patna in Complaint Case No. 553 (C)/1995 by which the learned Magistrate was pleased to take cognizance of the offence against the opposite party nos. 2 to 6 (the accused in the complaint case before him). 2. From the record it appears that the present petitioner had filed the aforesaid case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna on 4.7.1995 who transferred the said case under section 192 of the Code to the court of Judicial Magistrate named above for enquiry and trial. Before the Judicial Magistrate the statement on oath of the present petitioner was recorded and in the course of enquiry under section 202 of the Code two witnesses were examined. Subsequently some documents were also filed and after completing the enquiry under section 202 of the Code the learned Magistrate finding sufficient evidence; by his order dated 25.7.1995 directed for the issue of summons against opposite party nos. 2 to 9. Against the aforesaid order opposite party nos. 2 to 9 filed criminal revision before the learned Sessions Judge (Cr. Revision No. 445/95) which was transferred to the court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-V, Patna who by the impugned order was pleased to set aside the order taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 3. Now the complainant of Case No. 553 (C)/1995 has filed this revision application against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. In this application he has contended that the impugned order is bad on the point of law as well as on facts. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly given his finding about the words "taking cognizance in a case". As a matter of fact the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had applied his judicial mind to the fact of the complaint petition and thereafter he had transferred the case to the court of the Judicial Magistrate under section 192 (1) of the Code. This would obviously amount to taking of cognizance. The learned Judicial Magistrate has committed no illegality in issuing of process to opposite party nos. This would obviously amount to taking of cognizance. The learned Judicial Magistrate has committed no illegality in issuing of process to opposite party nos. 2 to 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly interpreted the word "seen" occurring in the order dated 4.7.1995 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly observed in the impugned judgment that the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate was arbitrary and capricious and passed on inadmissible and irrelevant materials. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has wrongly and illegally rejected the submission of this petitioner made before him. On these grounds amongst others it has been contended that the impugned judgment be set aside and the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate be restored. 4. I have heard the parties in detail. On behalf of the opposite party the first objection raised against this criminal revision is that it is not maintainable inasmuch as it is the second revision application filed against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate for the issue of summons to the accused persons (opposite party nos. 2 to 9). It was the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that though technically the petitioner has come against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and not against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate in effect if it is the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate which is under challenge and, therefore, it has been contended that under the facts and circumstances of this case second revision application will not lie. 5. As against it the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no substance in this submission of learned counsel for the opposite party. He has pointed out that this revision petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 445/95 and not against the order dated 25.7.1995 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate by which he directed to issue summons against opposite party nos. 2 to 9 under section 204 of the Code. On this ground he has submitted that the bar of section 397 (3) of the Code will not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and there is no merit in this submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party. 2 to 9 under section 204 of the Code. On this ground he has submitted that the bar of section 397 (3) of the Code will not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and there is no merit in this submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party. He has further pointed out that in any view of the matter this Court has got sufficient power of superintendence of subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also under sections 482 and 483 of the Code to take notice of the wrong order passed by the learned court below and pass necessary orders in this regard. Since this question of law has been raised by both the parties it has become necessary for me to examine the same in detail at this stage. Before doing so I will firstly refer to sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code which runs as follows : "397 (3). If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of the them." The learned counsel for the opposite party has heavily relied on this provision of law to show that this revision application is not maintainable as hit by section 397 (3) of the Code. 6. In the first place it may be pointed out that the revision application before the learned Sessions Judge was filed by Smt. Urmila Devi and others being present opposite parties whereas the present revision application has been filed by the complainant who was opposite party there. Hence strictly speaking it can not be said that both the applications were filed by the same person. One before the Sessions Judge and the other before this Court. As such the bar of section 397 (3) will not operate under the facts and circustances of this case. Since, however, the submission on this point have been made by both the parties on the question of law I feel it necessary to examine the same in some detail. 7. In this connection reference has been made to the case of Jagir Singh V/s. Ranbir Singh and another (AIR 1979 SC 33). Since, however, the submission on this point have been made by both the parties on the question of law I feel it necessary to examine the same in some detail. 7. In this connection reference has been made to the case of Jagir Singh V/s. Ranbir Singh and another (AIR 1979 SC 33). In the said case the learned Sessions Judge had dismissed the revision application filed against the order of the Magistrate. The second revision application before the High Court was filed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge dismissing the revision application as mentioned above. It was submitted before the court that the two revision applications were not against the same order. While the first application before the Sessions Judge was against the order passed by the Magistrate, the second application before the High Court was against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. However, it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that the petitioner can not circumvent section 397 (3) of the Code by applying the High Court to revise the Session Judges order in revision. It was, however, held that the power of the High Court under section 482 still remained. Also it was observed by the Honble Supreme Court in this case that the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution is a discretionary power to be exercised sparingly to keep subordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. It was also observed that where the statute banned the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court, it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. From this it would appear that even if the bar of section 397 (3) will operate against the second revision application recourse to section 482 of the Code can always be made as held in the case of Raj Kapur V/s. State ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ). So far as Article 227 is concerned it is not subject to any limitation imposed by the Code. 8. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Chandrasekhar Singh and ors. v. Siya Ram Singh and others ( AIR 1979 SC 1 ). So far as Article 227 is concerned it is not subject to any limitation imposed by the Code. 8. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Chandrasekhar Singh and ors. v. Siya Ram Singh and others ( AIR 1979 SC 1 ). This is a case in which the matter for consideration was sub-section (1) (A) and section 146 of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 according to which the finding of the civil court given by it under the sub-section (1) of section 146 of the Old Code was final and it could not be challenged by way of appeal, review or revision. The law further provided that the decision of the Magistrate informity of the decision of the civil court could not be challenged under section 435 (Old) 397 (New) and 401 (New) of the Code of 1898. Under the aforesaid circumstances it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that inspite of this provision the High Court in appropriate case could interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution since section 146 of the Old Code will not effect (sicaffect) the power of the High Court under Article 227. A word of caution was, however, sounded that this power is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate case in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere error. 9. This question again had come up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnan and another V/s. Krishnaveni and another [ (1997) 4 SCC 241 ]. From this it would appear that the first revision application filed before the Sessions Judge was dismissed. The second revision application filed before the High Court was allowed and the order of the Magistrate was set aside. The Honble Supreme Court held that though the revision before the High Court under Section 397 (1) was barred under section 397(3), inherent power of the High Court was still available under section 482 and the power of continuous superintendence under section 483 of the Code. It was further held that under the circumstances the High Court was justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the Magistrate. 10. It was further held that under the circumstances the High Court was justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the Magistrate. 10. From the aforesaid it would become clear that this Court can treat this revision application to be an application under section 482 of the Code. It may be pointed out that it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court that the label of a petition is immaterial and on a petition filed under sections 397 and 401 of the Code the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 can be invoked. This has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye V/s. The State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ). It was held in this case that a plain reading of section 482 will, however show that nothing in the Code which would include section 397 (2) [in the said case the question for consideration was whether the revisional power could be exercised against the bar of section 397 (2)] also shall be deemed to limit the (sicor ?) affect the inherent powers of the High Court. It was held that the bar of section 397 (2) [in the present case section 397 (3)] will operate only in exercise of revisional power by the High Court. Then since there is no provision in the Code for the redressal of the grievances of aggrieved party the inherent power would come into play. A word of caution, however, has been sounded in this case that the High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. Relying on this decision a single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra V/s. The State of Bihar (1989 PLJR 317). It was held by B. Prasad, J. that the inherent power of High Court under section 482 does not stand repelled when the revisional power under section 397 of the Code overlaps. The same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kapoor and others V/s. State and others ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ), and in the case of Krishnan (supra). The same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kapoor and others V/s. State and others ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ), and in the case of Krishnan (supra). In the last mentioned case it was clearly held by the Honble Supreme Court that though the second revision petition before the High Court was barred under section 397 (3) of the Code inherent power of the High Court was still available under section 482 and the power of superintendence under section 483. It was further held that under the facts and circumstances of the said case the High Court was justified in interfering in the second revision and in setting aside the order of the Magistrate. 11. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that this application is maintainable notwithstanding the bar of section 397 (3) of the Code which as held above does not apply to the facts of the present case. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. 12. It has further been contended before me on behalf of the petitioner that in the impugned judgment the learned Additional Sessions Judge has misdirected himself on the question of law and has wrongly held that there has been noncompliance with the provision of section 192 (1) of the Code. This takes us to the consideration of the aforesaid provision of law in proper prospective (sicperspective ?). Section 192 (1) of the Code runs as follows : "192. Making over of cases to Magistrate.(1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him." Crucial words in this sub-section are "after taking cognizance of an offence". Thus before any case is made over for enquiry or trial to the court to any Magistrate subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate this section makes it mandatory for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence before passing of order under this section. This provision of law appears to be mandatory. Thus before any case is made over for enquiry or trial to the court to any Magistrate subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate this section makes it mandatory for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence before passing of order under this section. This provision of law appears to be mandatory. It has been submitted before me that this provision of law has not been complied with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as a result of which making over this case to Shri Srivastava, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class under section 192 (1) of the Code by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is hit by this provision of law inasmuch as before doing so the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence. As against it the learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the order dated 4.7.1995 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna will clearly show that before making over the case to the Judicial Magistrate Shri S.K. Srivastava the cognizance of the offence had already been taken. In view of those submissions I will firstly refer to this order as contained in Annexure-5 which runs as follows : "4.7.95.A complaint has been filed on behalf of the above named complainant alongwith power. Seen. Registered and transferred under section 192 Cr. P.C. to the court of Shri S.K. Srivastava J.M. Ist Class for inquiry and trial fixing the next date on 12.7.95." 13. This order passed under section 192 of the Code was made by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by which he transferred the case to the learned Judicial Magistrate for inquiry and trial. The important question that arises in this connection is that whether the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, before passing of this order transferring the case to the Judicial Magistrate; had actually taken cognizance of the offence or not. A perusal of this order will clearly show that nowhere in it the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has observed that he has taken cognizance of the offence. Now the question for consideration would be how under this circumstances can it be said that before making over the case to the Judicial Magistrate under section 192 of the Code the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. Now the question for consideration would be how under this circumstances can it be said that before making over the case to the Judicial Magistrate under section 192 of the Code the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointedly drawn my attention to the expression "seen" in this order to show that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence before making over the case to the J.M. and, therefore, there has been sufficient compliance of law by him in this regard. On this ground the petitioner has contended that the finding on this point by the Additional Sessions Judge is not correct and the same is fit to be set aside. 14. The word "after taking cognizance" occurring in section 192 together with the language in section 202 (1) of the Code will lead to the result that a complaint case may be transferred by the Magistrate taking cognizance before issuing process and the transferee Magistrate may issue process thereafter. Conversely these words also make it clear that where a Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the Ist Class specially empowered merely sent a case for disposal to another Magistrate without first taking cognizance it would not amount to a transfer within the meaning of section 192. This view finds support from the case of Gopal Dash Sindhi and others V/s. State of Assam and another ( AIR 1961 SC 986 ). Relying on this decision the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Sinha & another V/s. The State of Bihar & another ( 1990 BBCJ 142 : 1990(2) PLJR 511) has held that when there was nothing in the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate making over the case to a Judicial Magistrate to show that the cognizance of the offence has been taken the same order is hit by section 192 (1) of the Code inasmuch as the procedure adopted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was against the provision of this section and was, therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction. In the said case the Chief Judicial Magistrate had passed the following order on 29.4.1982 : "Let the case be sent to Shri S.I. Daudi, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, under section 192 (1) of the Cr. In the said case the Chief Judicial Magistrate had passed the following order on 29.4.1982 : "Let the case be sent to Shri S.I. Daudi, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, under section 192 (1) of the Cr. P.C. for inquiry and disposal." The learned Single Judge (B.N.Sinha, J.) of this Court relying on aforesaid decision of the Honble Supreme Court has held that the order making over this case to the Judicial Magistrate was illegal and without jurisdiction. The only difference between the present case and the case before the Single Bench noted above was that in the said case even the expression "seen" was not mentioned by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Now the question may arise whether this expression "seen" may amount to taking cognizance of the offence or not. On behalf of the opposite party it has been submitted that this will not amount to taking of cognizance. The word "seen" does not disclose that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before passing the order under section 192 of the Code had already taken cognizance of the offence. This expression is too vague to admit of any such interpretation. When the law makes it mandatory for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance before passing the order under section 192 of the Code it is but natural to expect that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate will strictly comply with the mandatory provisions of law as it is well known that criminal law must be strictly construed. Before passing of the order under section 192 of the Code there must be something to show that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had applied his mind to the facts of the case and had come to the conclusion that there was a case to proceed further i.e. whether the order states that he was prima facie satisfied from the F.I.R. or the complaint that the accused has committed the offence alleged. This has been so held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mowu V/s. The Superintendent, Special Jail Nowgong, Assam and others, (1971) 3 SCC 936 . 15. From the detailed discussions made above it becomes perfectly clear to me that there is no merit in this revision application. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment passed by the learned court below. 15. From the detailed discussions made above it becomes perfectly clear to me that there is no merit in this revision application. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment passed by the learned court below. I find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had taken into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case and the relevant law on the subject and the various decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as also of other courts on this point. I further find that he has come to the correct conclusion. Hence I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. 16. In the result this application is dismissed and the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is confirmed.