JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - Delay in disposal of G.R. Case No. 1009 of 1998 has been fore-focused by the Petitioner to propel the prayer of quashing the said proceeding. Petitioner is one of the accused persons in the above noted G.R. Case pending in the court of S.D. J.M. Cuttack. 2. A scomfish investigation displaying a sad scenario in essence is the target of attack to scot free the Petitioner from the cage of a criminal proceeding where he with co-accused have been allayed for offences punishable under Sections 460/420/471 and 120(B), Indian Penal Code (in short, 'I.P. C.'). Petitioner's effort in that respect is propelled in this application u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'the Code'). After scanning the lower courts record (which includes the case diary) relevant facts therefrom is stated, as hereafter, in pith and substance. 3. About a decade back on 18-7-1988, the Charge Officer,Cuttack belonging to (Settlement and Revenue Departments) having the occasion to opine about genuineness of some 'patta'(record of rights) pertaining to Oriiginal Khata No. 198 of Unit No. 7 and Sikim Khata No. 12 found the same to be fabricated for forgery. Thus, he requested the Inspector in-charge of Malgodown Police Station, Cuttack to investigate the matter. Accordingly, P.S. Case No. 97 (II) of 1988 was registered and investigation was taken up by Sub-Inspector of Police. On 8-11-1988, the investigation was made over to C. 1. D. (Crime Branch), Cuttack. After completion of investigation. on 29-8-96 final form (charge-sheet) was submitted against four accused persons for the aforesaid offences and it was stated in the report that Petitioner was an absconding accused. Discovery of the forgery by the Charge Officer was made when one Gouri Sankar Agrawal, a charge-sheet witness was persuaded to accept the aforesaid pattas as genuine and to purchase a piece of land covered by that patta. In that respect, as alleged, a sum of' Rs. 40,000/i. e., a part consideration money allegedly was received by the Petitioner but later on when this investigation started he returned that money. 4. On perusal of the case diary, it reveals that on 30-11-1989, the first investigating officer from the Crime Branch handed over the charge of the investigation due to his retirement. 40,000/i. e., a part consideration money allegedly was received by the Petitioner but later on when this investigation started he returned that money. 4. On perusal of the case diary, it reveals that on 30-11-1989, the first investigating officer from the Crime Branch handed over the charge of the investigation due to his retirement. On 6-7-90, the second investigating officer handed over the investigation due to transfer and on 28-9-91,the latter handed over the investigation to the next investigating officer who, fortunately, though belatedly completed the investigation after a span of about five years from the date of taking charge of the investigation. It is devoid of doubt, on perusal of the case diary, that there was no effort much less a sincere effort to conduct and complete the investigation. Witnesses needed to be examined and records required to be verified were few. If the contention in the case diary is correct, then it goes to show the sleeping attitude of the concerned bureaucrats and the concerned ministerials in the offices of the Collector, Tahasildar and the Settlement Officer besides the concerned officer in the hand-writing Bureau of the State Government who shuttled the Investigating Officers from one office to the other when effort was made by him (Investigating Officer) to ascertain if the documents were the forged or fabricated one. It is wished that the higher and the apex authority in the Police and the Crime Branch Department should peruse the case diary of this case not as a measure to punish the wrong doer but as a lesson to learn regarding the lapses and to train the officers not to commit such mistakes and negligence while investigating into a serious crime of the present nature and at the same time, to impart appropriate direction/instruction to the superior supervising officers to kept track up investigation and to snap the callousness if any apart from coming to the rescue of the investigating officers while they deal with high officials in other departments while handling a case of the present nature. In fact, it reveals at some place in the case diary that the investigating officer, had requested the Superintendent of Police of the concerned Crime Branch to help him in negotiating with the Collector but that remained unsolved by the higher up. In fact, it reveals at some place in the case diary that the investigating officer, had requested the Superintendent of Police of the concerned Crime Branch to help him in negotiating with the Collector but that remained unsolved by the higher up. Investigation of a crime besides being a routine duty of the investigating agency, it is also their responsibility to properly and effectively protect the interest of the State to safeguard the public at large from the cases of cheating and forgery which is rampant in present days. 5. On 4-12-95, the co-accused persons of the Petitioner were arrested and released on bail by the investigating officer, The reasons for releasing them on bail is not at all noted in the case diary. Though it appears that the investigating officer improperly relased them on bail but no further discussion or observation is made as the said point is not under consideration and the parties and the concerned investigating officer have not been heard in that respect. However, the Petitioner did not/ could not avail that advantage of discretion from the investigating officer because, as noted by the investigating officer, he was found absconding. 6. Petitioner's contention is two fold viz: (i) that due to the long abnormal delay as noted above, the criminal proceeding against him should be quashed and alternatively; (ii) since a prima facie case for the alleged offence is not disclosed against him the order issuing processes against him should be quashed; that is to say, the criminal proceeding as against him be quashed. 7. Learned Addl. Standinig Counsel voicing for the prosecution argued that the admitted undue delay has not shown to have caused any prejudice to the Petitioner, hence no benefit for that delay accrue in favour of the Petitioner and that materials in the case diary amply shows existence of a strong prima facie case against the Petitioner for the alleged offence and therefore Petitioner's prayer be non-licet. 8. A detailed documentation is not necessary to examine correctness of the rival arguments advanced by the parties with respect to existence of a prima facie case. The statement of the witnesses and the forged patta squarely speak about existence of a prima facie case for the aforesaid offences as alleged against the Petitioner. Reading from one stray statement of witnesses, learned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. The statement of the witnesses and the forged patta squarely speak about existence of a prima facie case for the aforesaid offences as alleged against the Petitioner. Reading from one stray statement of witnesses, learned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Jatin Mohanty with all professional efficiency argued that Petitioner got the patta from his father and therefore, he cannot be a party to the alleged forgery and fabrications etc. The other relevant facts which are available in the case diary does not show such mute innocency of the Petitioner. Apart from that he being the member in the family,a co-owner, cannot escape horn the charge at the stage of taking cognizance on the ground that patta was handed over to him by his father. However, the aforesaid contention of the Petitioner, if raised and proved, may be properly considered by the trial court. As an off-shoot of his argument, Mr. Mohanty contended that the intending buyer was immediately repaid his money soon after a doubt was entertained about genuineness of the patta and therefore, absence of intention of the Petitioner to cheat the said buyer is apparent on the face of the record. Repayment of the said amount is hardly a consolation to close the eyes and the mind to the allegation of forgery. Thus, that argument also does not find favour. So it is recorded that learned cognizance taking Magistrate has correctly stated that there exists a prima facie case for the alleged offences showing complicity of the Petitioner committing that crime. 9. Is the delay caused by the Investigating Agency sufficient in this case to extend the benefit of quashing the Criminal Proceeding as against the Petitioner? If it has to be quashed, then, the whole Criminal Proceeding should be quashed or should it be alone against the Petitioner ? In support of his argument to quash the proceeding against the Petitioner due to the aforesaid delay, Mr. Mohanty relies upon the ratio in the case of P. Chiranjivi Vs. Principal, M. K. C. G. Medical College and Another, ;, Sri Harekrushna Mahatab Vs. Republic of India Jogendra Mahanta v. State of Orissa 1985(1) O.L.R.558,Rajkishore Mohanty v. State of Orissa Vol. 79(1995) C.L. T. 88. 10. In the case of P. Chirarijivi (supra) it was alleged that Petitioner got admission by producing a false declaration and false nativity certificate. Principal, M. K. C. G. Medical College and Another, ;, Sri Harekrushna Mahatab Vs. Republic of India Jogendra Mahanta v. State of Orissa 1985(1) O.L.R.558,Rajkishore Mohanty v. State of Orissa Vol. 79(1995) C.L. T. 88. 10. In the case of P. Chirarijivi (supra) it was alleged that Petitioner got admission by producing a false declaration and false nativity certificate. Petitioner took admission in 1964 and completed his M.B.B.S, course in 1970 and two years thereafter, the aforesaid allegation was made. Petitioner faced the inquiry before charge. He contested the matter relating to framing of charge and failed in the trial as well as in the revisional court and therefore, approached the High Court u/s 482 of the Code. This Court on appreciation of the evidence adduced before charge found that in spite of dismissal of Petitioner's revision application, his application u/s 482 of the Code was maintainable and that evidence adduced by the prosecution did not make out a prima facie case for the alleged offences and accordingly, the charge was quashed. While disposing of the matter in the aforesaid manner, it was observed that permitting continuance of the proceeding after lapse of fourteen years would not achieve any salutory public purpose. It is apparent from the said decision that it was Jack of prima facie case and not the factum of delay which was the reason to quash the criminal poceeding. In the case of Harekrushna -Mahatab (supra) F. 1. R. was lodged in 1973 alleging that Sri Mahatab during his incumbency as the Chief Minister of the State from 19-10-1956 to 24-2-1961' on receipt of grantification, dealt with the matter relating to lease of kendu leave in 1958, 1959 and 1960. Saraju Prasad Commission, enquired into the matter under the Commissions of Inquiries Act and submitted the report in 1972. On that basis, F.I. R. was lodged in 1973 and the C.B. 1. was entrusted with the investigation. In 1977, charge-sheet was submitted for the offence u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and Section 161, I.P. C. At the stage of consideration of charge, argument was advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the complained act of grant of lease of kendu leaves was on the basis of the decision of the Cabinet and therefore, Petitioner could not be squarely held responsible. Rejecting that contention, the Special Judge framed charges. Rejecting that contention, the Special Judge framed charges. A Division Bench of this Court after referring to several authorities from the Apex Court as well as this Court, held that after lapse of 20 years from the date of occurrence, when material witnesses were admittedly dead, the chance of conviction was bleak, Petitioner a man of 80 years old, had retired from active Politics thus it was held appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings. In the case of Jogendra Mahanta (supra) the Petitioner was charged for the offence u/s 477-A, 1. P.C. relating to a case of defalcation of Rs. 743/-committed in the year. 1971. F.I.R. was lodged on 29-8-73, and after investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 12-4-81 and thereafter charges were framed on 5-1-82. Petitioner prayed to quash the criminal proceeding inter alia on the ground of delay. In that case, though the F. 1. R. was lodged on 29-8.73. yet the G.R. case was registered in 1978. The matter remained with Police for long 5 years for the reasons not known to anybody and three more years were taken to submit the charge-sheet. Taking into consideration all such facts and circumstances and the ratio from the Apex Court and this Court,it was held that- In my opinion, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it would be in the interest of justice to quash the proceeding in exercise of inherent powers as I am fully satisfied that proceeding with the trial would be an undue harassment to the accused and would be achieve any public purpose. In the case of Rajkishore Mohanty (supra) on the basis of Special Audit Report of 1979, F. 1. R. was lodged on 23-10-81 alleging misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 13.784.90 paise by the Petitioner as the Head-Clerk in Puri District Excise Office. He retired from service on 1-4-1982. On 11-1-84, charge-sheets were submitted for the offence u/s 5(a) read with Section 5(1), (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s 409, I.P.C.. On 21-12-1992. Special Judge split-up the said case into four separate cases. Petitioner's application to interfere with that order was declined by this Court but a direction was issued for expeditious hearing of the case. In 1994, Petitioner filed the application to quash the criminal proceeding on the ground-of undue delay and relied upon the case of Jogendra Mahanta (supra). On 21-12-1992. Special Judge split-up the said case into four separate cases. Petitioner's application to interfere with that order was declined by this Court but a direction was issued for expeditious hearing of the case. In 1994, Petitioner filed the application to quash the criminal proceeding on the ground-of undue delay and relied upon the case of Jogendra Mahanta (supra). On being asked by the Hon'ble Judge about the progress in the trial, learned Additional Government advocate, due to lack of information, could not provide proper intimation. Thus. it was held that-"It is, therefore, clear that the criminal case has been inordinately delayed and further continuance of the case will be an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, for the ends of justice, the criminal proceeding against the Petitioner should be quashed, 11. Though at all the times the Apex Court and this Court besides other High Courts have expressed their anxiety for inordinate delay in disposal of Criminal Proceeding and particularly trial of Criminal offences, in the recent past, in the case of "Common Cause a Registered Society v. Union of india. AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 . the Apex Court keeping in view the factum of 'delay' provided a guideline concerning disposal of certain types of criminal proceedings and criminal trials. In that connection, the first phase of the direction pertains to release of the under trial prisoners in different categories of cases after lapse of specified periods. The 2nd phase of the directive was for discharge and acquittal of the accused persons, and closing of the cases as the case may be, where relating to compoundable offences, non-cognizable and bailable offences, offences prescribing the punishment of fine only and not of recurring nature, and offences prescribing maximum punishment of one year or three years with or without fine if the trial is not over by respective specified period as noted in respect of each category of cases. In that respect, the period of pendency was to be computed from the date the accused was summoned to appear in the Court. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, however, it was provided that the aforesaid direction for discharging the accused and to close the case or to release the accused persons on bail shall not be applied to certain categories of offences and one of such offence is the offence of cheating. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, however, it was provided that the aforesaid direction for discharging the accused and to close the case or to release the accused persons on bail shall not be applied to certain categories of offences and one of such offence is the offence of cheating. It appears from the decision reported in AIR 1997 S.C. 1509 that in the above case of "Common Cause" the Apex Court heard further and modified and clarified the above noted direction,inter alia, in the following manner. Hon'ble Apex Court stated that the terms' 'pendency of trials' and 'non-commencement of trial' which were used respectively in the directions contained in paragraph 1(a) to (c) and paragraph 2(b) to (f) of the previous judgment (A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619) shall be construed from the date of framing of charge in Sessions cases and warrant cases and from the date of explaining the accusation to the accused u/s 251 of the Code in cases governed by the summons procedure. At the out set of the said modification and clarification Honourable Apex Court held that time limit mentioned regarding pendency of Criminal cases shall not apply to cases where the delay is wholly or in part attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the concerned accused. In the case of Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, that Appellant applied for quashing of the prosecution including the F. 1. R.,on the ground that 13 years had elapsed since the institution of the F. 1. R. and yet trial had not proceeded substantially. The contention of the Respondents as well as the Investigating Agency was that due to lack of adequate number of courts it resulted in such delay in disposal of such cases. High Court rejected Appellants application to quash the proceeding and then the Appellant approached the Apex Court for the self same relief. Hon'ble three Judges Bench of the Apex Court referring to and adopting the ratio of various authorities including the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc., and Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, and also the above noted case of Common Causes (supra) have been pleased to held as follows: "16. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc., and Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, and also the above noted case of Common Causes (supra) have been pleased to held as follows: "16. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay's case (supra) with the following directions: (i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail, or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has been examined all the witnesses or not, within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial Court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the Court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no Court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by Clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of Court or by operation of law such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence. (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of Court or by operation of law such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in Common Cause A Registered Society through its Director Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in "Common Cause a Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Before fixing the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court also propounded that-"8. In Hussainara Khatoon and Others Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, this Court held that financial constraints and priorities in expenditure would not enable the Government to avoid its duty to ensure speedy trial to the accused. 12. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Champalal Punjaji Shah, the Court took cognizance of the fact that the prosecution would in some cases deliberately adopt delaying tactics to keep the accused person in jail as long as possible and to harass them particularly when the evidence is of a weak character and the conviction is not a probable result. The Court also pointed out that a delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial and the delay may be occasioned by the tactics or the conduct of the accused himself. 13. In Madhu Mehta Vs. Union of India and Others, this Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment while holding that inordinate delay should be taken into account for purpose of deciding whether the execution of the sentence should be carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. The Court also observed that no fixed period of delay would be considered to be decisive. 14. After the above noted decision (A.I.R 1988 S.C. 3281) an application was filed seeking certain clarification and modification in the directions issued Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1999) 17 O.C. R. (S.C.). 482, per majority view, inter alia, held that: 15. 14. After the above noted decision (A.I.R 1988 S.C. 3281) an application was filed seeking certain clarification and modification in the directions issued Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1999) 17 O.C. R. (S.C.). 482, per majority view, inter alia, held that: 15. The present, petition is filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B. I for short) for clarification (and also for some modification) of the above directions, by stating (1) that the said directions are only perspective and (2) that the time taken by the court on account of its inability to carry on day-to-day trial due to pressure of work will be excluded. We wish to reiterate that we have not fixed an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings in a case. Nor did we go counter to the decisions of the Constitution Benches of this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc.,,and Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab. In paragraphs 12 to 14 of our judgment we have considered the ratio in the aforecited decisions and by keeping tract with the observations therein we made the endeavour to achieve to the possible extent the noble ideal of "speedy trial" which has been held repeatedly by this Court to be an incidence of Article 21 of the Constitution. 16. The whole idea was to speed up the trial in criminal cases to prevent the prosecution from becoming a persecution of the person arrayed in a criminal trial. No trial can be allowed to prolong indefinitely due to the lethargy of the prosecuting agency or the State machinery and that is the rais on detre in prescribing the time frame within which prosecution evidence must be closed. 17. It may be remembered that even the different periods suggested by this Court for closing prosecution evidence in different categories of cases are not unexceptional as could be noted from the two exceptions provided therein. 17. It may be remembered that even the different periods suggested by this Court for closing prosecution evidence in different categories of cases are not unexceptional as could be noted from the two exceptions provided therein. They are: (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by Clauses (i) to (iii); (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence. The above direction will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by the Court in "Common Couse" Common Cause A Registered Society through its Director Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others as modified by the same bench through the order reported in "Common cause" Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . 18. We are inclined to state by way of clarification that the discretion of the Courts in granting further time (exercisable "for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice" as for Direction No. (iii) above) can be imported in respect of Direction No. (i) as well. 19. Keeping in view the ratio in the various decisions referred to above, it emerges that though speedy trial is a protecting value guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and available to be availed by persons facing Criminal proceedings but every delay is neither fatal to the prosecution nor actionable by the Court. In case of allegation of delay and the ground of prejudice alleged therefrom it has to be considered keeping in view several factors like the nature and gravity of the allegations, nature of the offence, cause for the delay, conduct of the accused, if prejudiced is caused and if so how and so on and so forth. In case of allegation of delay and the ground of prejudice alleged therefrom it has to be considered keeping in view several factors like the nature and gravity of the allegations, nature of the offence, cause for the delay, conduct of the accused, if prejudiced is caused and if so how and so on and so forth. In the present case save and except stating in the application u/s 482 of the Code that there does not exist a prima facie case, which aspect has already been discussed and finding recorded, Petitioner has not stated how the delay has occasioned prejudicial to his right and interest or making him handicapped to persue his defence. It is the settled principle that 'VANI TIMORIS JUST A EXCUSATlO NON EST'. i. e. to say a frivolous fear is not a legal excuse. 20. It appears from the case diary that at no stage of the investigation, accused participated or co-operated with the investigating officer so that investigation could have been completed early. He has been shown as an absconder all throughout the investigation and also in the charge-sheet filed in the case. Though the total or substantial delay in investigation is not attributable to Petitioner's absconding yet the fact remains that the conduct of the Petitioner in remaining as an absconder has occasioned in partial delay, Thereafter it appears that the G.R. case is lingering at the stage of appearance of accused persons (which includes the Petitioner) and non-bailable warrants of arrest issued long back are yet to be executed. Such conduct of the Petitioner cannot at all be ignored while considering the prayer to quash the criminal proceeding on the ground of delay. 21. Under the given facts and circumstances, Petitioners prayer to quash the cognizance order or the criminal proceeding is devoid of merit and accordingly rejected and the criminal misc case is dismissed. 22. Before parting with the case, it is felt necessary and expedient in the interest of justice to make a few directions and observation which are as follows: It reveals from the lower court's record that though nonbailable warrant of arrest has been issued not only against the Petitioner but also the other charge-sheeted accused who are serving in Government offices and notwithstanding that such warrants are yet to be executed. It may be suggestive circumstance regarding apathy in executing the warrants. It may be suggestive circumstance regarding apathy in executing the warrants. Thus soon after receipt of a copy of this judgment learned S.D,J.M., Cuttack shall do well to issue fresh warrant against those accused persons whose warrants of arrest are pending execution and the same be forwarded to the concerned Superintendent of Police along with a demi official letter and a copy of this order with a request to execute the warrants through efficient and dutiful subordinate Police Officer/Officers. In spite of that if the warrants or any of the warrants shall remain unexecuted, for a period of three months from the date of issue of the warrants and demi-official letter, as observed above, then learned S.D. J.M. may submit a status report to this Court immediately after expiry of the said period or three months. It is wished that such a situation should not arise. However, if it happens, after receipt of that letter, Registry of this Court shall do well to list the matter in the Bench for appropriate orders. 23. If the Petitioner and/or any of the accused persons shall surrender in the court of S.D. J.M. within a period of ten days hence and shall apply for bail, learned S.D. J.M. may do well to hear and dispose of such bail applications in accordance with Jaw and the instruction contained in General Letter 3 of 1986 issued by the High Court. In the event Petitioner or such of the surrendering accused persons, if any, are allowed to go on bail suitable terms and conditions may be fixed which shall be effective enough to guard against future default in appearance and such other conditions which shall be deemed just and proper. In view of this direction warrants and the demi official letter need not be issued till expiry of the aforesaid period of ten days. If the accused persons shall appear or brought before the S.D. J.M. in the manner indicated above, that Court shall take up the case for consideration of charge and trial expeditiously. After hearing the parties, if charge shall be framed, then at the stage of heating, the trial court shall strictly follow the directions contained in Section 309, Cr. P.C. and complete the trial as early as possible. 24. After hearing the parties, if charge shall be framed, then at the stage of heating, the trial court shall strictly follow the directions contained in Section 309, Cr. P.C. and complete the trial as early as possible. 24. Registry is directed to ensure in sending back the L.C. R. along with a copy of this judgment to the Court of S.D. J.M.. immediately so that it shall be received by that Court latest by tomorrow (19-4-2000). Ordered accordingly.