JUDGMENT: This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Poonamallee, in M.C.O.P.No.274 of 1989. The State Transport Corporation is the appellant in the above appeal. 2. According to the claimant/deceased first respondent herein on 8.11.1988 at 2.00 p.m. when he got into the bus bearing registration No.TMN.8671 at Thirumullaivoyal Bus stop, Chengalpattu District, the conductor of the bus blew the whistle and the driver took the said bus in a rash and negligent manner, as a result of which he fell down and the bus ran over his left leg and as a result his left leg was amputated. The accident was due to the negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. A sum of Rs.1,25,000 was claimed as compensation. 3. In the counter filed by the respondent/ State Transport Corporation, it was stated that the same petitioner had filed another claim petition in M.C.O.P.No.85 of 1989 with reference to the very same accident claiming Rs.50,000 and as such the present petition was not legally maintainable. The said M.C.O.P. filed earlier was still pending and the same has been suppressed by the claimant. The manner of the accident as stated in the claim petition was denied. The bus was proceeding in accordance with the traffic rules and regulations at a normal speed from Poonamallee to Ambattur Industrial Estate. On the way, the bus stopped at Thirumullaivoyal bus stop. After alighting and picking up the passengers, the conductor gave whistle and the driver started the bus. Thereupon, the vehicle slowly proceeded to some distance. At that time, the claimant under the influence of alcohol attempted to get into the moving bus and as he was fully drunk without having control of himself, he was unable to hold the handle in the bus and as a result he fell down. Therefore, the accident was invited by the claimant himself. On seeing this, the conductor gave a long whistle and the bus was stopped. The claimant was taken to Kilpauk Medical College Hospital and the fact that he was in a drunken state was recorded in the hospital records. The claimant alone was responsible for the accident and there was no basis for the allegation that the driver of the bus drove the bus in a negligent manner. The claimant was taken to Kilpauk Medical College Hospital and the fact that he was in a drunken state was recorded in the hospital records. The claimant alone was responsible for the accident and there was no basis for the allegation that the driver of the bus drove the bus in a negligent manner. The nature of the injuries sustained by the claimant as well as the quantum of compensation as claimant was also disputed. 4. An additional counter statement was filed by the respondent/ Corporation, contending that the petitioner had recently withdrawn the earlier M.C.O.P.No.85 of 1989 without liberty to proceed with subsequent claim petition and as per the principles under Sec.10, C.P.C. the later petition was not maintainable. 5. On a consideration of the evidence, the Tribunal held that the accident had occurred only as a result of the negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. Having regard to the nature of the injuries a sum of Rs.1,15,000 was awarded as compensation. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that inasmuch as the earlier M.C.O.P.No.85 of 1989 was withdrawn by the claimant without seeking any liberty to file a fresh M.C.O.P. or to proceed with the later M.C.O.P. the later M.C.O.P. was not maintainable. In this context, learned counsel for the appellant relies on the provisions of O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. He would also state that the decision in the earlier O.P. would operate as res judicata. 7. On the issue of negligence, in the evidence of the driver of the vehicle, according to the learned counsel it has been clearly brought out that the accident occurred only as a result of the claimant having attempted to get into the moving bus and therefore, the appellant cannot be held responsible for the accident. On the quantum of compensation awarded in favour of the respondents, learned counsel states that having regard to the nature of injury, the amount awarded by the Tribunal, is on the higher side. 8. As far as the issue relating to the withdrawal of the earlier proceedings without seeking liberty to proceed with the later claim petition, it is no doubt true that the provisions under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. are applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act also. 8. As far as the issue relating to the withdrawal of the earlier proceedings without seeking liberty to proceed with the later claim petition, it is no doubt true that the provisions under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. are applicable to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act also. It is not contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the said provisions will not apply to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. However according to learned counsel in the earlier claim petition signature of the claimant appears to have been obtained in the hospital even while he was in a semi conscious condition and therefore, the said petition was not proceeded with. In view of the physical and mental condition of the claimant, the earlier claim petition was totally incompetent and non est in the eye of law. He would also state that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act being beneficial Legislation required to be interpreted liberally and the petition may not be rejected merely on a technical ground. 9. Learned counsel relies on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Girdharilal v. Chairman, B.B.M. Board, A.I.R. 1985 P. and H. 219. In that decision, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dealt with a suit arising out of the Arbitration agreement and it was held that filing of a second suit on the same allegations and for the same relief before first suit was withdrawn, it was held that the provisions of O.23, Rule I was not attracted and thus the second suit was not barred. 10. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court reported in Dinabandhu v. Nirada Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1982 Gau. 42. In that case, the petition regarding the maintainability of the suit in view of O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. was taken up only at the stage of argument and there was no pleading to the said effect. The trial Court without framing the issue held that the second suit was barred under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. In the said circumstances, the Division Bench held that the trial Judge had no jurisdiction to enter into the controversy as to whether the suit was barred or not. 11. In the present case, there is no question of any belated raising of the objection filed by the appellant. 11. In the present case, there is no question of any belated raising of the objection filed by the appellant. In the written statement itself an objection has been raised and the Tribunal has framed a separate issue and had also discussed the same and rendered a finding. While it is not disputed that the provisions of O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C., will be applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, at the same time, it has to be seen whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the objection under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. would result in the dismissal of the second petition. As stated earlier, the claimant has stated that the signature in the earlier claim petition appears to have been taken from him while he was in a semi-conscious condition and therefore, he did not know the circumstances under which the said petition was filed. The earlier petition appears to have been filed by a different counsel and withdrawn without conforming to O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. The said facts have not been seriously disputed. Therefore, considering the overall circumstances and having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances, the issue requires to be viewed in a liberal manner and not in a hyper-technical or rigid view. 12. In Konkan Trading Company v. Suresh Govind Tarkaraj, (1986)2 S.C.C. 424 , the Supreme Court was confronted with an order passed under O.23, Rule 1, C.P.C. directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants cost within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Court before the second suit was filed and that if the plaintiff failed to comply with the said direction it would be open to the Court to reject the plaint. The costs were ordered to be deposited as a condition precedent before the institution of the next suit and hence as a result of the default, it was contended that the second suit was not properly instituted. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there was no warrant for taking a hyper-technical rigid view which would result in denying the person access to justice and therefore, when it is possible to take a liberal view, which promotes the ends of justice, such a view should be adopted. 13. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there was no warrant for taking a hyper-technical rigid view which would result in denying the person access to justice and therefore, when it is possible to take a liberal view, which promotes the ends of justice, such a view should be adopted. 13. Therefore, having regard to the circumstances mentioned by the claimant for not having complied with the technical requirement of seeking leave of the Court to proceed with the subsequent petition, I am inclined to hold that the second petition is maintainable. 14. With reference to the negligence, the Tribunal has examined the witness in detail along with the eye-witness account of the claimant himself and the driver, R.W.1. After detailed discussion, the Tribunal has rightly held that there was contradiction between the oral evidence of R.W.1 and the counter statement of the appellant/ Corporation. The Tribunal has taken note of the statement of the driver to the effect that he did not observe the claimant getting into the bus. The said statement was contrary to the facts stated in the counter statement. There was also no independent evidence to show that the claimant was trying to get into the bus while it was on its move. The Tribunal has taken note of the fact the allegation that the claimant was drunken had not been properly established by producing any such evidence issued by the hospital. Therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere with the findings rendered by the Tribunal in the context of the negligence. 15. With reference to the quantum of compensation, it is not disputed that as a result of the accident, the claimant lost his left leg from the thigh portion which had to be amputated subsequently. The claimant was a carpenter and as a result of the disability suffered by him, he was undoubtedly rendered jobless. Under Ex.P-4 the disability has been certified at 90 per cent. Therefore, towards disability alone the claimant is entitled to Rs.90,000 and adding further amount towards pain and suffering and medical expenses caused by repeated surgery, would definitely exceed Rs.1,15,000 as awarded by the Tribunal. 16. Therefore, in the result, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the order of the Tribunal and the appeal is dismissed. No costs.