K. RAMAMOORTHY, J. ( 1 ) FAO. 352/80 is appeal by the claimants and FAO. 353/80 is appeal by theinsurance Company. The claimants filed the petition u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehiclesact, 1939 claiming a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs on the death of 35 years old man on8. 10. 1971 at about 2. 15 P. M. on the Ring Road, Near Defence Colony. The Tribunalgranted a sum of Rs. 60,868. 00 towards compensation with interest at 6% per annumfrom the date of the petition by order dated 30. 4. 1980. The following issues wereframed by the Tribunal:- "1. Whether G. D. Garg sustained fatall injuries due to rash and negligentdriving of truck No. DLL5127 on the part of the respondent No. l as alleged? 2. Whether the petitioners are the legal representatives of the deceased? 3. Whether the accident occurred due to negligence of the deceased as,alleged in the written statement? 4. To what amount of compensation, if any, is the petitioner entitled? 5. Relief. " ( 2 ) ON issues No. 1 and 3, the Tribunal held:- "for the foregoing reasons I have no difficulty in arriving at the irresistibleconclusion that the accident took place on account of rash and negligentdriving of the Oil tanker on the part of respondent No. l and no negligencecan be attributed to the deceased. Accordingly Issue No. 1 is decided in theaffirmative and issue No. 3 in the negative. ". ( 3 ) WITH reference to the mode of assessment of compensation, the Tribunal heldthat the only dependency of the claimants was Rs. 8,184. 00. The Tribunal applyingmultiplier of 12 years fixed the compensation at Rs. 98,208. 00. Out of this, the Tribunaldeducted certain amounts and ultimately fixed, as I had noticed above, thecompensation at Rs. 60,868. 00. With reference to the claim of compensation, thetribunal gave a finding that the deceased was 35 years old on the date of theaccidenti. e. 8. 10. 1971. 1nparagraph26,thetribunalheld:- "next question that arises for consideration is the probable period for whichthe deceased would have lived up more had he not been killed in thisaccident. Petitioner No. 1 appearing as PW. 10, has stated that her husbandenjoyed an excellent health. She has further stated that the father of thedeceased as well as the mother are still alive and they are 65 years and 60years old respectively,. Petitioner No. 1 appearing as PW. 10, has stated that her husbandenjoyed an excellent health. She has further stated that the father of thedeceased as well as the mother are still alive and they are 65 years and 60years old respectively,. Moreover, there is nothing on the record to show thatthe deceased was suffering any ailment which could have cut short hisnormal span of life which has been held to be between 65 and 70 years bydifferent High Courts as well as Supreme Court of our country. Accordingly Ihold that the deceased would have lied up atleast upto the age of 65 years incase he had not been killed in this accident. " ( 4 ) THIS is not challenged. ( 5 ) WITH reference to the dependency, the Tribunal proceeded to discuss the pointin the following manner:- "in so far as the question of dependency of the petitioners upon the deceasedis concerned, the same has to be determined on the basis of the actual carryhome income which the deceased used to lay by for meeting the familyexpenses. The widow, petitioner No. 1, in her statement as PW10 has assertedthat the deceased was earning approximately Rs. 2000. 00 P. M. The samefigure has also been mentioned in the petition itself. It has been urged onbehalf of the petitioner that the deceased had a brilliant academic careerand that he had left the service of the Heavy Electricals Ltd. , Bhopal andjoined the partnership business as working partner of M/s. United Engineeringworks, Panipat and would have in the course of time earned atleast Rs. 10,000. 00- per month. The actual figure of dependency however has to be determinedon the basis of the actual date furnished on the record and not hypotheticalor conjectural basis. For this purpose the actual income derived by thedeceased as a partner immediately preceding his death has to be taken intoaccount. Record confirms that. the deceased had entered into Partnershipbusiness with M/s. United Engineering Works, Panipat vide partnership deedex. RW2/2. This document reveals that the partnership deed related tospecifically for the execution of some pending contracts as mentioned inschedule a attached to the said partnership deed. To put the recordstraight, it would also be pertinent to note that the deceased had entered into partnership to note that the deceased had entered into partnership businesson 2. 5. 70, while he had left the service of M/s. Heavy Electricals on 17. To put the recordstraight, it would also be pertinent to note that the deceased had entered into partnership to note that the deceased had entered into partnership businesson 2. 5. 70, while he had left the service of M/s. Heavy Electricals on 17. 5. 69. As per Ex. PW10/5, the unfortunate accident which cut short the life ofthedeceased took place on 8. 10. 71. This means that it was only for the briefspell of period between 2. 5. 70 to 8. 10. 71 when the deceased worked as apartner with M/s United Engg. Works. Ex. PW7/1 is the Assessment order ofthe said firm for the assessment year 1971-72 i. e. accounting year 1. 4. 70 to31. 3. 71. According to this document the net share of 45% allocated to thedeceased has been given as Rs. 7010. 00 while the total income of the firm hasbeen shown as Rs. 15,580. 00 inclusive of inadmissible expenses of Rs. 4000. 00. It may be noted that for the purpose of income tax at the total income hasbeen computed including the above expenses which were disallowed by theincome Tax authorities. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 hascontended that the expenses of Rs. 4000. 00 disallowed by the Income taxauthorities should not taken into account as part of the earning of the. . deceased. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for thesimple reason that the expenses claimed by the deceased were disallowedby the Income tax authorities and no rebate was allowed to him and thedeceased was compelled to pay income tax even on his 45% share of thetotal expenses of Rs. 4000. 00. As such I hold that the entire amount ofrs. 7010. 00 has to be treated as income of the deceased for the year 1. 4. 70 to31. 3. 71. The petitioner has also filed on the record another Assessmentorder Ex. P. W. 7/3 or the said period in which in addition to the income ofrs. 7010. 00 derived by the deceased as his share from the aforesaid firm, anadditional income of Rs. 619. 00 has also been shown to the credit of thedeceased i. e. irrall an income of Rs. 7629. 00 which can be rounded off tors. 7630. 00 has been shown as the income of the deceased for the year 1. 4. 70to 31. 3. 71. Similarly, Ex. 619. 00 has also been shown to the credit of thedeceased i. e. irrall an income of Rs. 7629. 00 which can be rounded off tors. 7630. 00 has been shown as the income of the deceased for the year 1. 4. 70to 31. 3. 71. Similarly, Ex. PW7/2 is Assessment order for the period 1. 4. 71 to8. 10. 71 (the date on which the deceased expired in the aforesaid accident)which proves the income for the last six month of the deceased at Rs. 10760. 00. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2, as discussed above has contendedthat out of Rs. 5000. 00 shown as inadmissible expenses, the 45% share of thedeceased should not be taken into account while computing the income ofthe deceased for the last six months. I have already held above that thisargument of the learned counsel does not hold good, for the simple reasonthat the deceased had been compelled to pay income tax on his share of45% of Rs. 5000. 00 and as such that share cannot be ignored while computingthe income of the deceased. In this way, the total income of the deceased for18 months comes to Rs. 7630. 00+ Rs. 10760. 00 = Rs. 18390. 00. As such theaverage monthly income of the deceased comes tors. 1022. 00. Out of thisamount t/3rd amount has to be deducted towards personal expenses of thedeceased.-The same being Rs. 340. 00 balance strikes at Rs. 682. 00 which canbe termed as monthly dependency of the petitioner upon the deceased orrs. 8184. 00annual dependency. This will reflect a reasonable nexus betweenthe amount arrived at and the object sought to be achieved. " ( 6 ) WITH reference to the applicability of multiplier, the Tribunal held:- "still more important question that arises to be determined is the suitablemultiplier that can be adopted in this case. The same is to be determinedafter taking into consideration the number of hears of dependency of thevarious dependents, the number of years by which the life of the deceasedwas cut short the various imponderable factors and like early natural deathof the deceased, his becoming incapable of supporting the dependents dueto illness or any other natural handicap or calamity. The prospects of theremarriage of the widow, the coming of age of the dependents on account ofthe death of the person concerned. The prospects of theremarriage of the widow, the coming of age of the dependents on account ofthe death of the person concerned. This is so in view of the fact that solatiumis alien to the concept of compensation and that the net loss should not beassessed by simply multiplying the annual dependency with the numbers ofyears by which the life has been cut short without anything else. I amsustained in this view by the recent Pull Bench Judgment of the Punjab andharyana High Court in Lachhman Singh and Others Vs. Gurmit Kaur andothers, reported in 1979 PLR page 1. APPLYING the ratio of the above principle, it is to be noted that the deceasedwas about 35 years of age when his life was cut short by the fatal accident. The children who are minors have yet to complete their education. Keepingall the imponderable factors in view, I am of the view that ends of justice wouldbe adequately met if 12 years multiplier is adopted in this case. I amsustained in this view by the decision of the Supreme court cited as 1979a. C. J. 496 Supreme-Court of India in Bishan devi and another Vs. Sirbakshsingh and others in which 12 years was commended as the suitablemultiplier. Thus, the total dependency of the petitioners upon the deceasedcan be arrived at by multiplying the annual dependency of Rs. 8184. 00 by themultiplier of 12 years which work out at Rs. 98,208. 00. " ( 7 ) WITH reference to the deductions, the Tribunal had adopted a very curiousmethod and the same is as follows:- "during the course of arguments it was urged on behalf of the respondentsthat the parents of the deceased are still alive and they have not beenimpleaded as L/rs of the decessed. In this connection it is pertinent to notethat provisions of section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as amended (on2. 3. 1970) makes it obligatory on the part of the petrs. that all the L/rs mustjoin together in claiming compensation and in case all of them do not join theapplication shall be made on behalf and for the benefit of the all the L/rs whomust then be impleaded as respondents to the application. The legal positionhas not undergone the change as a result of the aforesaid amendment whichis mandatory. that all the L/rs mustjoin together in claiming compensation and in case all of them do not join theapplication shall be made on behalf and for the benefit of the all the L/rs whomust then be impleaded as respondents to the application. The legal positionhas not undergone the change as a result of the aforesaid amendment whichis mandatory. Prior to the said amendment even if the petition was not filed byall the L/rs the same was deerned to be in the representative capacity for thebenefit and on behalf of all the L/rs. It is only in the admission of the widow aspw10 that it was disclosed tor the first time that the parents of the deceasednamely Ami Lal and Smt. Bhago Devi were alive. The same finds confirmationfrom the Agreement Ex. RW2/1 which disclosed the names of Smt. Bhago deviand Sh. Ami Lat Garg who were given the share from the income of thedeceased on the dissolution of the partnership firm and this fact of theparents being alive having been disclosed in the course of the proceedingsthe same cannot be legally ignored. There is no explicit provision by whichthe petition can be rendered legally not maintainable for non-joinder. But atthe same time, reason and common sense dictate that the share of theparents cannot be allowed to beappropriated by the petrs. Keeping all thesefactors into consideration particularly, the admission of the widow as PW10that she is still living with her in-laws it can reasonably be inferred that theparents were also dependent upon the deceased. Considering the fact thatthe parents are still alive much after the death of the deceased even on thedate of the deposition of the widow, PW10, they are likely to survive forafurther period of about 10 years. As such it would be reasonable to allowrs. 10. 000. 00 each to the father and mother of the deceased. Accordingly after. making deduction of Rs. 20,000. 00 as the share of the parents, the share of thepetitioners comes to Rs. 60,868. 00. Issues No. 4 is decided accordingly. " ( 8 ) WITH reference to the liability of the Insurance Company on Issue No. 5, thetribunal held that the original policy had not been produced. Accordingly after. making deduction of Rs. 20,000. 00 as the share of the parents, the share of thepetitioners comes to Rs. 60,868. 00. Issues No. 4 is decided accordingly. " ( 8 ) WITH reference to the liability of the Insurance Company on Issue No. 5, thetribunal held that the original policy had not been produced. In paragraph 38 thetribunal discussed this point and had said:- "it may be mentioned here that respondent No. 3 have admitted the ownershipof the offending vehicle in question in the name of respondent No. 2 as well asthe same being insured with them. However, it was contended on their behalfthat their maximum liability was limited as per provisions of the Motor Vehiclesact and the Insurance Policy. In other words, their stand is that the liability ofthe Insurance company was limited to Rs. 50,000. 00 only as per provisions ofthe Motor Vehicles Act. This argument would hold good only where theinsurance policy is proved. the onus to prove the Insurance policy lay uponrespondent No. 3 which they have as already noted above, failed to dischargemeaning thereby that no Insurance policy was produced and proved. In theabsence of the Insurance policy it cannot be held that the liability of theinsurance Co. was limited to Rs. 50,qoo. 00. Besides, it is also pertinent to note that there is no express prohibition in the Motor Vehicles Act for covering ofrisk of a higher amount. In other words, by accepting higher premium theinsurance Co. may accept unlimited liability in respect of a vehicle. This viewfinds support from the authority reported as 1979 A. C. J. 208 Shyam Lal andothers Vs. the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra ). " ( 9 ) THE learned counse) for the appellants-claimants in FA0. 352/80 submitted thatthe learned Tribunal had committed an error in fixing the dependency at Rs. 682. 00 permonth on the basis that the monthly income of the deceased from the partnership, ofwhich he was a partner, entitling to 45% share was only Rs. 1020. 00per month. Thetribunal had taken into account income of the deceased for a period of 18 months. The Tribunal had completed ignored the fact that the deceased was a charteredaccountant and with all potentiality he earned money using his expertise. 1020. 00per month. Thetribunal had taken into account income of the deceased for a period of 18 months. The Tribunal had completed ignored the fact that the deceased was a charteredaccountant and with all potentiality he earned money using his expertise. The Tribunalfailed to see that the income tax records would show the income as produced by thepartnership firm and the records conclusively show for a period of 18 months thedeceased had shown an income of Rs. 1,022. 00 per month. What was shown was thebest evidence and what was not shown when we consider the income tax records. The deceased being a chartered Accountant would have had a very decent life andas per the own finding of the Tribunal the deceased was maintaining very good healthwith enough life and, therefore, the dependency should have been fixed at Rs. 2,000. 00per month. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal in so far as is against the claimants isset aside. The dependency is fixed at Rs. 2,000. 00 per month. ( 10 ) WITH reference to the multiplier, in the light of the judgments of the Supremecourt the multiplier should have been 16 years. Therefore, applying the same, theclaimants shall be entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,84,000. 00. The discussion by the Tribunalwith reference to deductions is absolutely meaningless and while considering thecase of compensation the Tribunal ought not to have indulged in such exegesis. Therefore, the process of deduction is erroneous in law and that part of the findinggiven by the Tribunal is set aside. ( 11 ) WITH reference to claim of interest, the Tribunal had fixed only at 6% per annum. The principles relating to the award of interest have been considered in the followingcases:- "1. Rukmani Devi and others Vs. 0m Prakash and others, 1991 ACJ 3. 2. Bimla deviand another Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others,1995 ACJ 789. 3. Subhadara Kumari and others Vs. Latin Ram and others, 1995 ACJ935. 4. Arvind Kumar Vs. Rajesh Kumar Sharma and others, 1995 ACJ 948 . 5. Sandeep Taneja and others Vs. State of Haryana and another, 1995acj 1030. 6. Kailash Rani and others Vs. Satya Pal Singh and others, 1996 ACJ 297. Ltd. and others,1995 ACJ 789. 3. Subhadara Kumari and others Vs. Latin Ram and others, 1995 ACJ935. 4. Arvind Kumar Vs. Rajesh Kumar Sharma and others, 1995 ACJ 948 . 5. Sandeep Taneja and others Vs. State of Haryana and another, 1995acj 1030. 6. Kailash Rani and others Vs. Satya Pal Singh and others, 1996 ACJ 297. ( 12 ) HAVING regard to the fact that 35 years old man had died and the claim wasresisted on frivolous grounds, I fix the rate of interest at 12% per annum from the dateof the petition. ( 13 ) WITH reference to the expenses of marriage of the daughter, that has not beenconsidered at all by the Tribunal. The Claim was for a sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 and thatwas not granted by the Tribunal. I hereby fix the claim with respect to the marriage ofthe daughter at Rs. 50,000. 00 and that will not carry any interest. ( 14 ) WITH reference tot he case of the Insurance Company that the liability was limitedto the extent of Rs. 50,000. 00, the Tribunal as could be seen from the portion extractedabove, the Insurance Company failed to discharge its burden by producing the validinsurance Policy. Even otherwise, the Tribunal took the view that the Insurancecompany was liable to pay the amount to the claimants. ( 15 ) THE learned senior counsel for the appellant Insurance Company Mr. V. P. Chaudhary submitted that the Tribunal had taken wrong view with reference to policy. The carbon copy of the policy was produced by the Insurance Company. The originalpolicy remained with the owner and the owner had not placed it on record and thatcannot be put against the Insurance Company. The learned senior counsel referredto number of rulings and submitted that once the liability of the Insurance Company islimited, the tribunal was bound to follow the terms of the Policy and cannot direct theinsurance Company to pay larger amount. The learned senior counsel referred to thefollowing rulings:- 1. Shyam Lal and others Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. andanother, 1979 AC. J. 208. 2. Sushila Devi and others Vs. lbrahim and another, 1974 A. C. J. 150. 3. M/s. Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Priatek Ltd and another Vs. Dewalal and others, 1977 ACJ 150 4. Desraj and others Vs. Ram Narain and others, AIR 1979 Allahabad 328 5. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. andanother, 1979 AC. J. 208. 2. Sushila Devi and others Vs. lbrahim and another, 1974 A. C. J. 150. 3. M/s. Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Priatek Ltd and another Vs. Dewalal and others, 1977 ACJ 150 4. Desraj and others Vs. Ram Narain and others, AIR 1979 Allahabad 328 5. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Jugal Kishore and Ors. , 1988 (1 ) ACJ 270 6. Oriental Fire and Gent. Ins. Co. Ltd. Vs. Veena Pruthi and others, 1989 (2)A. C. J. 1163. 7. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shanti Bai and others, 1995 (1) A. C. J. 470. 8. Vilasini and others Vs. Kerala State Road Trans, Corpn. and another,1988 (2) A. C. J. 755. 9. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Kamla Devi and others, 1997 I AD (Delhi) 368. ( 16 ) THE learned senior counsel also submitted written notes in reply to the writtensubmissions made by the learned counsel on behalf of the 6th respondent-owner. ( 17 ) THE. PRINCIPLES laid down in the above rulings do not apply to the facts of thecase. ( 18 ) SECTION 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads as under :- "96. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks.- (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issuedunder sub-section (4) of Section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policyhas been effected, judgment in respect of any such tia6ility as is required tobe covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the Policy) is obtained against anyperson insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may beentitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, theinsurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the personenticed to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assuredpayable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of theliability together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sumpayable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relatingto interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect ofany judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedingsin which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of thebringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long asexecution is stayed thereon pending an appeal: and an insurer to whomnotice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled tobe made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the followinggrounds, namely:- (A) that the policy was cancelled by mutual consent or by virtue of anyprovision contained therein before the accident giving rise to the liability, andthat either the certificate of insurance was surrendered to the insurer or thatthe person to whom the certificate was issued has made an affidavit stalingthat the certificate has been lost or destroyed, or that either before or notlater than fourteen days after the happening of the accident the insurer hascommenced proceedings for cancellation of the certificate after compliancewith the provisions of section 105; or (B) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, beingone of the following conditions, namely:- (I) a condition excluding the use of vehicle- (A) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract ofinsurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (B) for organised racing and speed-testing, or (C) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is usedwhere the vehicle is [a transport vehicle] , or (D) without side-car being attached, where the vehicle is a motor-cycle-, or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by anyperson who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualifiedfor holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification;or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to byconditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion: or (e) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false insome material particular, [ (2a) Where any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) isobtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreignjudgment is, by virtue of the provision s of section 13 of the Code of Civilprocedure, 1908, conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, theinsurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938, andwhether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of thereciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit ofthe decree in the manner and to the extent specified in sub-section (1), as ifthe judgment were given by a Court in India:provided that no sum shall be payable be the insurer in respect of any suchjudgment unless, before or after the commencement of the proceedings inwhich the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the courtconcerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom noticeis so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocatingcountry, to be made a party to the-proceedings and to defend the action ongrounds similar to those specified in sub-section (2)] (3) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) ofsection 95 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much" of thepolicy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby byreference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2)shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policyunder clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95, be of no effect:provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of anyliability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this subsection shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (4) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay inrespect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds theamount for which the insurer would, apart from the provisions of this section,be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall beentitled to recover the excess from that person. (5) In this section the expressions "material fact" and "material particular"mean, respectively, a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence thejudgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the riskand, if so, at what premium and on. what conditions, and the expression"liability covered by the terms of the policy" means a liability which is coveredby the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer isentitled to avoid or cancel or has avoided or cancelled the policy. (6) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) [or subsection (2a)] has been given shall be entitled to avoid has liability to anyperson entitled to the benefit of any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) [or sub-section (2a)] otherwise than in the manner provided for insub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, asthe case may be. ]" ( 19 ) THE Insurance Company cannot put forth the plea of limited liability against athird party without producing the original policy. ( 20 ) IN this view FAO. 352/80 stands allowed and 1. the respondents shall pay a sum of Rs. 3,84,000. 00 along with interest at12% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of payment. 2. The respondents shall pay Rs. 50,000. 00 with respect to the marriage of thedaughter and that will not carry any interest. ( 21 ) THE amount which has already been disbursed to the appellants claimants shallbe taken Into consideration while working out the amount not held payable. FA0. 353/80 stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.