Judgement This Second Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree dated 10th April, 1996 passed by the Learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala whereby Title Appeal No. 55 of 1995 preferred by the appellant was dismissed. 2. The appellant Shri Jamini Kumar Bhattacharjee instituted Title Suit No. 154 of 1989 in the Court of Sadar Munsiff, Agartala for declaration of possessory right, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction in respect of a plot of land measuring 0.99 acres pertaining to the Rent Free Taluk No. 3. The learned Munsiff dismissed the suit on contest. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant had preferred Title Appeal No. 55 of 1995 which came to be dismissed on 17th April, 1996. Hence, this appeal. 3. This appeal was admitted by this Court by order dated 5-2-1997 for adjudication of the following questions of law : (1) Whether the first appellate Court was right in holding that the suit was barred under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 in view of the existence of the finding of the first appellate Court made on 31-5-1995 in Title Appeal No. 82 of 1994 in respect of the same suit or not? (2) Whether the impugned judgment and decree are tainted with illegality or with material irregularities. 4. I have heard Mr. A. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. A. M. Lodh, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and also Mr. T. D. Majumder, learned counsel for the State. 5. The dispute relates to a plot of land measuring 0.76 acre pertaining to Khatian No. 2296 and 1708 of C.S. Plot No. 8890, 9703, 8887 and 8926 described in the schedule to the plaint. The plaintiffs case is that he had taken settlement of 1 Kanis and odd lands i.e. 0.99 acre from the original owner Kumari Indra Prava Devi and has been in peaceful possession thereof. In para-3 of the plaint it is further pleaded that the possession of the plaintiff has all along been adverse to the interest of others. In para-4 of the plaint it is submitted that the plaintiff purchased the said land in 1956 A.D. and after such purchase it was found to be in excess of the land possessed by him after taking settlement from the original owner on payment of Rs. 20/- as premium. In para-4 of the plaint it is submitted that the plaintiff purchased the said land in 1956 A.D. and after such purchase it was found to be in excess of the land possessed by him after taking settlement from the original owner on payment of Rs. 20/- as premium. The said land was also enclosed by the plaintiff by boundary fencing. During the Survey and Settlement Operation the suit land was wrongly shown in Khas Khatian No. 2296 and 1708 of the Government of Tripura. According to the plaintiff, the State has no right, title or interest over the suit land which is possessed by him since 1956. The plaintiff filed a Revenue Case No. 75 of 1987 under Section 11(3) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 for correction of records, but the Learned District Collector dismissed the said case vide order dated 16-12-1989 although reports submitted by S.D.O. and other officials were in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, this suit was filed for declaration of possessory right, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction. 6. The defendants, who have been arrayed as respondents in this appeal, filed two sets of written statement challenging the claim of the appellant. Plaintiffs claim that he had taken settlement of the suit land pertaining to Jote No. 225 has been denied. His claim of possession on the basis of settlement including the plea of adverse possession have also been challenged. According to them, the land was settled with respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and 5 by the competent authority by order dated 29th July, 1987 for consideration of Rs. 2,000/- as premium. The State and the District Collector in their written statement submitted that the disputed land being Khas land of the Government was settled with the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and they are in possession thereof. 7. The learned Munsiff framed the following issues on consideration of the pleadings of the respective parties :- "1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the part of the suit land is purchased land of the plaintiff? 3. Whether the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since 1956 and the plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession? 4. Whether the record of right No. 2296 and 1708 of Barjala mauja has been recorded in the name of the Government wrongly instead of plaintiff? 5. Whether the defendant Nos. 3. Whether the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since 1956 and the plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession? 4. Whether the record of right No. 2296 and 1708 of Barjala mauja has been recorded in the name of the Government wrongly instead of plaintiff? 5. Whether the defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 have any lawful right in the suit land? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief sought. 7. Whether the District Collectors order dated 16-12-89 passed in Revenue Case No. 75/1987 is illegal and wrong?". 8. The learned trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record - both oral and documentary - dismissed the suit primarily on the ground that there is no evidence to show that the suit land is covered by the purchase deed of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff failed to prove his possession. It is further held that the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the allotment of land in favour of the defendants. The learned District Judge, on appeal, held that the plaintiff has no right over 4 gondas of land which was allotted by the District Collector in favour of the defendant No. 3 and that the suit is barred under provision of sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act as it was not filed within the prescribed period of six months. 9. In a Second Appeal, the powers of this Court is limited in as much as a Second Appeal is maintainable under the law only for adjudication of the substantial questions of law. The decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal, (1999) 7 SCC 288 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3325 ) made it abundantly clear that the existence of a specific question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Amendment Act, 1976. Therefore, I would like to confine the discussion on the questions formulated at the time of admission of the appeal. Therefore, I would like to confine the discussion on the questions formulated at the time of admission of the appeal. Hereinbelow, the provisions embodied in Section 11 of the Act are reproduced for better appreciation of the question at hand :- "11(1) All lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, ditches, dikes and fences on or beside the same, the beds of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, and all right in or over the same or appertaining thereto, which are not the property of any person, are and are hereby declared to be the property of the Government. (2) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in the terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, quarries, minerals and mineral products including mineral oil, natural gas and petroleum shall vest in the Collector whose order shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be enjoyment of such right. (3) Where any property or any right in or over any property it claimed by or on behalf of the Government, or by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such dispute shall be decided by the Collector whose order shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be final. (4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order and the decision of the Civil Court shall be binding on the parties.". 10. The finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the plaintiffs claim for title over 4 gondas of land which was allotted to the defendant No. 3 is not enforceable in view of his failure to bring the suit within the prescribed period of six months. The plaintiff staked his claim before the Collector, and the Collector vide order dated 16-12-1989 rejected the petition of the plaintiff-appellant filed under sub-section (3) of Section 11 disallowing his claim in respect of 0.76 acres of land in plots No. 8890/9703, 8887 and 8926. However, in respect of Plots No. 8927/9713 it was ordered that the land measuring 0.26 acres be recorded in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. Ext. 2 is the order of rejection of the claim of the plaintiff in respect of Plot Nos. However, in respect of Plots No. 8927/9713 it was ordered that the land measuring 0.26 acres be recorded in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. Ext. 2 is the order of rejection of the claim of the plaintiff in respect of Plot Nos. 8890, 8890/9703, 8887 and 8926 passed by the Collector in the Revenue Case No. 75/1987 initiated under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. The plot of land was allotted with the defendant-respondents after conversion into khas land. The question, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the plaintiffs suit could be maintained for declaration of the title and confirmation of possession as against the Government in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 11. Sub-section (4) provides that any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the date of such order and the decision of the Civil Court shall be binding. The plaintiff-appellant in Sections 93 and 95 of the Act against the order passed vide Ext. 2. Therefore, the suit filed by him beyond the prescribed period of six months from the date of the order of the Collector is obviously barred by the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 11. It is pertinent to mention here that the dispute in the proceeding before the Collector under sub-section (3) of Section 11 was between the plaintiff-appellant and the Government. The land was converted into Khas and, thereafter, it was allotted in favour of the defendants. The order of the Government was challenged with a prayer for correction of the Record of Rights in favour of the appellant. The dispute being between the appellant and the State Government the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) do not admit of any scope for adjudication of a suit for declaration of possessory right and confirmation of possession after expiry of the period of six months to set at naught the order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 11. 11. Since the matter is before this Court in Second Appeal, it would not be appropriate to make any observation about the validity and legality of the provision incorporated in sub-section (4) of the Act. The law as it is has to be enforced. 11. Since the matter is before this Court in Second Appeal, it would not be appropriate to make any observation about the validity and legality of the provision incorporated in sub-section (4) of the Act. The law as it is has to be enforced. Whether a suit is barred under the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 11 is a matter of fact and not of law. The suit is obviously barred under sub-section (4). Therefore, the judgment and decree appealed against do not warrant any interference by this Court in Second Appeal. 12. In the result the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.