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2000 DIGILAW 224 (CAL)

Jiban Krishna Paul v. State

2000-05-03

Debiprasad Sengupta, Sujit Barman Roy

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JUDGMENT S. Barman Roy, J.: By this application petitioner has prayed for releasing him on bail as he is detained in custody pursuant to an order issued by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his power under section 8B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 2. Initially this application was filed under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the Matter was heard partly on 12.4.2000, a supplementary affidavit was filed on his behalf on 17.4.2000 for inserting section 482 of the Code in place of section 439. It appears, therefore, that the petitioner could realise that in the circumstances of the case no order for bail can be passed in his favour under section 439 as the petitioner is not detained in custody in connection with any penal offence. Therefore, petitioner filed supplementary affidavit praying, inter alia, to treat this application as one under section 482 instead of treating the same as an application under section 439 of the Code. 3. At the very outset learned Counsel for the respondents raised an objection against the maintainability of this application on the ground that the petitioner is not concerned with any offence or any matter covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, inherent power of this court under section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked. It is contended that the petition being not maintainable, it should be dismissed at the threshold without entering into the question of merit. 4. Petitioner is stated to be a Director of Assam Bidi Factory (Private) Limited having its head office at 13A Indra Roy Road, Calcutta -25. It is a company within the meaning of Companies Act, 1956 and it carries on business of manufacturing bidi under the brand name "Joy Hind Bidi". For better appreciation of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents, it is considered necessary to give a brief outline of certain important provisions of the said Act. Section 2(aa) defines authorised officer to mean the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government by a notification in the official gazette. Section 2(aa) defines authorised officer to mean the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government by a notification in the official gazette. Sub-section 1(b) of section 7A of the Act further provides that the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner or any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner or any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of the said Act, or the scheme or the pension scheme or the insurance scheme contemplated under the said Act, as the case may be and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. Sub-section (2) of section 7 A further provides that the officer conducting inquiry under sub-section (1) thereof shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure for trying a suit in respect of some matters, namely, (a) enforcing attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196 of I.P.C. From this provision it is, therefore, manifest that the officer conducting such inquiry is not at all court of law though it can exercise some of the powers, as set out above, vested in a court under the C.P.C. and that such inquiry is deemed to be a judicial proceeding only for the limited purpose of sections 193, 228 and for the purpose of section 196 I.P.C. In all other respects the officer conducting such inquiry is not a court of law nor such inquiry shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding except for the limited purposes as set out hereinabove. Sub-section (3) further provides that no order under section 7A shall be made unless the employer is given reasonable opportunity of representing his case. Sub-section (3) further provides that no order under section 7A shall be made unless the employer is given reasonable opportunity of representing his case. Section 7D empowers Central Government to constitute., by notification in the official gazette, one or more appellate tribunals to be known as Employers' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal to exercise the powers and discharge the function conferred on such tribunal by this Act and every such tribunal shall have jurisdiction in respect of establishments constituted in such area as may be specified in the notification constituting the tribunal. Section 7-I of the Act further provides that any person aggrieved, inter alia, by an order passed by the authority under sub-section (1) of section 7 A may prefer an appeal to a tribunal against such order. Sub-section (2) lays down that every appeal under sub-section (1) of section 7- I shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. Section 7-J of the Act prescribes for the procedure of the tribunals. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that a tribunal shall, for the purpose of discharging its functions, have all the powers which are vested in the officers referred to section 7- A and any proceeding before the tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purpose of section 196 of I.P.C. and the tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the limited purpose of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is, therefore, apparent from these provisions that the proceeding before the tribunal is not at all a judicial proceeding except for the limited propose set out therein and the tribunal is also not a civil court for any purpose of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Other provisions deal with various other matters in respect of proceedings before the appellate tribunal and in course of inquiry contemplated under section 7-A. 5. Section 8 of the Act further provides for mode of recovery of money due from employers. Other provisions deal with various other matters in respect of proceedings before the appellate tribunal and in course of inquiry contemplated under section 7-A. 5. Section 8 of the Act further provides for mode of recovery of money due from employers. It provides that any amount due (a) from the employer in relation to an establishment to which any scheme or insurance scheme applies in respect of any contribution payable to the fund contemplated under the said Act or as the case may be, insurance fund, damages recoverable under section 14B, accumulations required to be transferred under subsection (2) of section 15 or under sub-section (5) of section 17 or any charges payable by him under the provision of this Act or of any provision of the scheme or the insurance scheme; or (b) from the employer in relation to an exempted establishment in respect of any damages recoverable under section 14B or any charges payable by him to the appropriate Government under any provision of this Act or under any of the conditions specified under section 17 or in respect of contribution payable by him towards the pension scheme under section 17, may, if the amount is in arrear be recovered in the manner specified in sections 8B to 8G. In the instant case we are concerned with recovery under sections 8B to 8G. Section 8B provides that where the amount is in arrear under section 8, the authorised officer may issue to the Recovery Officer, a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears and the Recovery Officer, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover the amount specified therein from the establishment or, as the case may be, the employer by one or more of the modes, namely, (a) attachment and sale of movable or immovable property of the establishment or as the case may be, the employer, (b) arrest of the employer and his detention in prison, (c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the establishment or, as the case may be, the employer. Proviso thereto further provides that the attachment and sale of any property under this section shall first be effected against the properties of the establishment and where such attachment and sale is insufficient for recovering the whole of the amount or the arrears specified in the certificate, Recovery Officer may take such proceedings against the property of the employer for recovery of the whole or any part of such arrears. After the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, West Bengal, etc., Employees Provident Fund Organisation, Calcutta in compliance with various provisions of the Act determined the arrear due from the said Company, issued necessary certificate to the Recovery Officer. It appears therefrom that an amount of Rs. 38,31,612.10 fell due from the said Company and accordingly, the Recovery Officer by his demand notice dated 1.3.2000 to the petitioner and other Directors of the said Company required them to pay the said amount within 15 days from the date of service of the said notice at the State Bank of India to the credit of respective Employees Provident Fund Accounts. The petitioner's Company was further required to pay interest for the said amount in accordance with provisions the said Act for the period commencing immediately after date of issuance of the ....... said certificate. Again by notice dated 16.3.2000 said Recovery 'Officer informed the petitioner that he had failed to pay the amount of arrears specified in the certificate dated 28.2.2000 forwarded by the authorised Officer, West Bengal, to the Recovery Officer under section 8-C of the said Act for recovery of arrears from him. The petitioner was, therefore, required by the said notice to appear before the said Recovery Officer on 24.3.2000 at 9.30 a.m. and to show-cause as to why he should not be committed to civil prison in execution of the said certificate. It appears that the petitioner received the said notice on 22.3.2000 and yet he did not take any step in compliance with the directions contained in the said notice dated 16.3.2000. 6. Despite the aforesaid, the Company neither deposited the amount due from it under the said certificate nor it showed any cause against the said, notice dated 16.3.2000. Recovery Officer by his order dated 24.3.2000 recorded aforesaid facts and issued warrant or arrest against all the Directors of the said Company including the petitioner. 6. Despite the aforesaid, the Company neither deposited the amount due from it under the said certificate nor it showed any cause against the said, notice dated 16.3.2000. Recovery Officer by his order dated 24.3.2000 recorded aforesaid facts and issued warrant or arrest against all the Directors of the said Company including the petitioner. In execution of the said warrant of arrest, petitioner was arrested and produced before the Recovery Officer on 29.3.2000. By his order dated 29.3.2000, Recovery Officer recorded brief history of the case and issued the following direction:- "I, therefore, in exercise of powers vested in me under section 8B(1)(b) of the Act direct Shri S.N. Bagchi anbd Shri K.B. Ghosh Dostidar, E.O., to take Sri Jiban Krishna Paul, Director, M/s. Assam Bidi Factory (P) Ltd. to the Officer-in-charge, Alipore Central Jail and put him under his custody for his detention to Civil Prison for a period of 45 days at the first instance or payment, whichever is made earlier." 7. Since then petitioner is detained in civil prison pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 29.3.2000. Petitioner has now challenged this order on various grounds and has prayed for bail. 8. I have heard Mr. B.C. Roy learned Counsel for the petitioner as also learned Counsel for the opposite parties and learned Addl. P.P. 9. Contention of Mr. B.C. Roy, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that petitioner filed an appeal against the determination under section 7A before the appellate tribunal contemplated by the said Act. But, because of certain notice his appeal has not yet been processed. In this connection Mr. Roy drew our attention to Annexure A being notice dated 28.2.2000 issued by or on behalf of Acting Deputy Registrar of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal. Said notice reads as under:- "NOTICE It is brought to the knowledge of all concerned that because of non-appointment of Registrar and Deputy Registrar, no appeal is to be processed till a Registrar/Deputy Registrar is provided by the Central Government. The litigants may seek redresal in other competent forum, if they have urgency. Sd/ Acting Deputy Registrar" 10. In these circumstances learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner is suffering immense injustice and, therefore, this court in exercise of inherent power as saved and recognised by section 482 of the Code may pass appropriate order to secure ends of justice. To buttress the aforesaid contention, Mr. Sd/ Acting Deputy Registrar" 10. In these circumstances learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner is suffering immense injustice and, therefore, this court in exercise of inherent power as saved and recognised by section 482 of the Code may pass appropriate order to secure ends of justice. To buttress the aforesaid contention, Mr. Roy referred to various aspects of the case to show that the determination made under section 7 A of the Act as regards the amount due from the said Company is highly illegal and arbitrary and, therefore, the petitioner is suffering immense injustice. It is not disputed by Mr. Roy that the subject matter of this case has nothing to do with any penal offence or the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact, the impugned order/orders have absolutely no nexus with any criminal matter. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel for the petitioner even then contended that where injustice is done, this court can invoke its inherent power to secure the ends of justice irrespective of whether subject matter of the dispute is covered by any provisions of the Code or any penal law of the land. In this connection, Mr. Roy pointed out that an order in exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the Code can be passed in three circumstances, namely, if it is found that such order may be necessary (i) to give effect to any order under this Code; or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court; or (iii) otherwise to secure ends of justice. Mr. Roy admits that the subject matter of this case has no nexus with any provision or order under this Code. It has also no connection with any abuse of process of any court inasmuch as the authorities who passed the impugned order/orders are not courts of law. However, he is very much emphatic that under the last clause of section 482, namely, "otherwise to secure the ends of justice," this court can pass necessary order to do justice in the matter irrespective of whether subject matter of the case has any connection with any penal offence or not or whether it is covered by any provision of the Code or whether it has any connection with any court of law. Code of Criminal Procedure is an adjective criminal law which provides a machinery for the punishment of offenders against substantive criminal laws, namely; the penal code and other penal statutes. Criminal Procedure Code though mainly is an adjective or procedural law, it also deals with many other things, i.e., it deals with constitution of criminal courts, their classification, respective powers, lays down the procedure for criminal proceedings, investigation, inquiries or trials, prescribes the duties of the police in arresting offenders and investigating offences and also certain provisions for their prevention. The Code of Criminal Procedure deals with aforesaid aspects in relation to penal offences mainly. However, it also deals with some other matters having no direct connection with penal offences. These provisions are to be found in chapters (viii), (ix) and (x) of the Code. Apart from these chapters all other provisions are directly or indirectly concerned with penal offences only for their investigation, inquiry and trials. But, the subject matter of the present case has absolutely no nexus with any matter covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other penal law of the land. Question, therefore, arises as to whether such a matter being the subject matter of "the instant case which has no direct or indirect connection with any matter covered by the Code of penal law of the land can be dealt with by this court in exercise of its inherent power under section 482 of the Code? 11. As is manifest from the preamble of the Code, this Code was enacted by the Parliament to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. The impugned orders have no connection or relation with criminal procedure. The impugned orders have also not been passed by any court of law. Section 482 occurs in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that where there is great injustice this court by invoking this inherent power can secure the ends of justice to the affected party irrespective of the nature of the subject matter. It is an age old and well-established principle that this court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists. The section assumes that the Code is not exhaustive, though it is exhaustive with regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. It is an age old and well-established principle that this court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists. The section assumes that the Code is not exhaustive, though it is exhaustive with regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. As is evident from the preamble itself, the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with criminal procedure only. Therefore, section 482 merely saves and recognises the inherent power of High Court to be exercised only in relation to matters of criminal procedure. It cannot be exercised or invoked in relation to a subject matter which has no connection whatsoever with the criminal procedure. It is apparent from section 4 of the Code that its provisions are applicable to investigation, inquiry and trial of offences under penal code or other penal laws subject to certain limitations mentioned therein. In this connection, we are well fortified by two decisions of the Apex Court in Khatri vs. State of Bihar, 1981 Cr. L.J. 597 (SC) and Mirza Iqbal, AIR 1982 SC 60 . It has also been held in AIR 1946 Lahore 112 that the terms of section 482 are very wide, but at the same time it must be clearly understood that they do not extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to matters which are not inherently within that jurisdiction. Therefore, section 482 applies only when the impugned order is passed by a criminal court. It cannot be invoked to remedy a wrong done by an executive or administrative order in exercise of its power. In this respect we are fortified by as many as four decisions of different High Courts reported in AIR 1946 Patna 191, AIR 1950 Allahabad 632, AIR 1961 Kerala 35 and AIR 1969 A.P. 444 . According to us the last words, namely, "otherwise to secure ends of justice" occurring in section 482 cannot cover a subject matter not covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure or not dealt with by any criminal court. According to us the last words, namely, "otherwise to secure ends of justice" occurring in section 482 cannot cover a subject matter not covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure or not dealt with by any criminal court. These last words take their hue from the words which precede them, namely, "as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court.", It is true that if the aforesaid last words occurring is section 482 are construed in a vacuum, it may support the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. But, such interpretation is likely to result in some anomalies/absurdities. It is, of course, the golden rule of interpretation of statutes that grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used by the legislature should bed adhered to. As we have already noted above that if we literally construe the aforesaid last words of section 482, it may cover the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless, that leads to some absurdity or there is something in the context or in the subject of the statute to suggest the contrary. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless, that leads to some absurdity or there is something in the context or in the subject of the statute to suggest the contrary. In Grey vs. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61 Lord Wensleydale stated the rule thus "In construing the wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is adheard to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further." Lord Atkinson in Corporation of the City of Victoria vs. Bishop of Vancouber Island, AIR 1921 PC 240 stated the rule in the following language:- "In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the objects of the statutes in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense." We have already pointed out from the preamble of Code of Criminal Procedure that the said Code was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. Therefore, the Code including its provision section 482 cannot deal with any matter which has no connection to observe that the last words occuring in section 482 were used by the Parliament in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense. In a more recent decision in Suthendran vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, (1976) 3 ALLER 611 Lord Simon of Glaisdale expressed this cardinal principle of statutory constructions in the following language:- Parliament is prima facie to be credited with the meaning what is said in the Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the courts seek whenever possible to apply this golden rule of construction, that is to read statutory language grammatically and terminologically in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in the context, without omission or addition. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the courts seek whenever possible to apply this golden rule of construction, that is to read statutory language grammatically and terminologically in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in the context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction, stultification of the statutory objective, the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further." In Jugal Kishore Saraf vs. Raw Cotton Company Limited, AIR 1955 SC 376 , while dealing with Order 21 Rule 16 C.P.C. , the Supreme Court applied the same rule of construction and held that said provision contemplates actually transfer of a decree by an assignment in writing after the decree is pased. His Lordship S.R. Das, J., as he then was, in referring to the very same rule of construction in the aforesaid case said: "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But, if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from the golden rule of construction." Subsequently in Kanailal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907 , same view with regard to this golden rule of literal construction was reiterated. In Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gamma of Vedum Vasco De Gamma, AIR 1990 SC 981 , the Supreme Court stated this rule thus: "intention of the legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their, plain, normal, grammatical meaning........ In Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gamma of Vedum Vasco De Gamma, AIR 1990 SC 981 , the Supreme Court stated this rule thus: "intention of the legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their, plain, normal, grammatical meaning........ If the straight grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and then interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of legislature may reasonably be considered to have had, will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language used." It is, therefore, apparent that when it is said that the words are to be understood first in their normal, ordinary or popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be understood to make a good sense and should be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. Therefore, subject matter of a particular law has to be taken into consideration while interpreting the provision of such law so that the construction makes a good sense having relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. It is, therefore, manifest from the aforesaid authorities that whenever, we have to construe a statute or document, we do not construe according to mere ordinary, general meaning of the words but "according to ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used." (See Lion Insurance Association vs. Tucker [(1983-1984) 12 QBD 176.] We are further fortified in this respect by the decision of our Supreme Court in Captain Sub has Singh vs. Principal Officer, Markentile Marine Department, AIR 1991 SC 162. Therefore, the last words, namely, "to secure ends of justice" occuring in section 482 must be applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used. Subject matter of the Code of Criminal Procedure is apparent from other provisions of the Code as also preamble of the same. Therefore, above quoted last words occuring in section 482 of the Code cannot be applied to any subject matter not dealt with by the Code. Subject matter of the Code of Criminal Procedure is apparent from other provisions of the Code as also preamble of the same. Therefore, above quoted last words occuring in section 482 of the Code cannot be applied to any subject matter not dealt with by the Code. The Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shankal Chand, AIR 1977 SC 2328 quoted with approval following statement of the rule of construction made by Professor H.A. Smith in "Interpretation in English and continental law" Journal of comparative legislation November, 1927:- " No word has an absolute meaning, for no words can be defined in vacue or without reference to the context." As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Nyadar Singh vs. The Union, of India, AIR 1988 SC 1979 , shorn of the context the words by themselves are "slippery customers." Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is - " what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning lead to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase." The context, as already seen, in the construction of statutes means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. Therefore, while interpreting the above quoted last words occuring in section 482, we must take into account the aforesaid circumstances apart from other provisions of the Code as also the preamble thereof. We must also take into consideration the words which occur immediately before above quoted last words in section 482. The last words of section 482 cannot be construed in a vacuum without reference to the words preceding the same and other provisions and preamble of the Code. They must be so interpreted so as to make a good sense. 12. The rule of the construction noscitur a sociis means the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. In this connection, we may refer to the rule as stated in Salmond on Jurisprudence, Eleventh Addition, page 153. They must be so interpreted so as to make a good sense. 12. The rule of the construction noscitur a sociis means the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. In this connection, we may refer to the rule as stated in Salmond on Jurisprudence, Eleventh Addition, page 153. We may further refer to Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Limited vs. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1991 SC 754 . As stated by the Privy Council in Augus Rebertson vs. George Day, (1879) 5 AC 63, this rule of construction to "is a legitimate rule of construction to construe the words in an Act of Parliament with reference to the words found in immediate connection with them." Therefore, while construing the above quoted last words occuring in section 482 and heavily reiled upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, we must take into account other words/expressions occuring in the same section. This rule of construction noscitur a sociis is a rule wider in its application than the rule of ejusdem generis, rather the latter is only an application of the former. His Lordship Gojendra Godkar, J. as he the, was, lucidly explained this doctrine in State of Bombay vs. Hospital Majdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 in the following language:- "This rule, according to Maxwell means that when two or more words which are suspectible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases volume (XIV) page 207." Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that meaning of the doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the words associated with it, such doctrine is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis. Latter maxim is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis, it must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis' is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider word with the words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. Same view on this maxim was reiterated time and again by the Apex Court. Reference may be made in this connection to Bank of India vs. Vijoy Transport, AIR 1988 SC 151 ; Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 754 ; Kerala State Housing Board vs. Rampraya Hotel (PJ Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 672 ; Samatha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3277 etc. 13. Therefore, keeping the aforesaid maxim in our mind, subject matter dealt with by various provisions of the Code including its preamble and the words "to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code" and also the words" or to prevent abuse of the process of any court" occurring immediately before the last words i.e., "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" in section 482, we are constrained to hold that in exercise of its inherent power High Court cannot interfere or deal with any matter which has no connection with criminal law or penal law of the land. Any other interpretation is bound to be rejected. 14. We have already expressed our view that the impugned orders have no manner of connection with criminal or penal law of the land. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to various decisions of the Apex Court with regard to nature and character of inherent power of this court. But all these decisions were rendered by the Apex Court in the context of penal/criminal law of the land and hence these decisions of the Apex Court cannot have any manner of application in this case. For the sake of brevity, we do not consider it at all necessary to discuss these decisions any further. 15. In the result, we hold that this application is not at all maintainable and, accordingly, same is dismissed. Debiprasad Sengupta, J.: I agree. Application dismissed being not maintainable.