Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. State Of M. P. And Ors.
2000-03-02
N.K.JAIN
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER N.K. Jain, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the Ujjain Development Authority, a Corporation owned and controlled by the Government of M.P., is directed against the State Government and the petitioner is aggrieved by the State Government notification dated 1-1-1990 (Annexure P-4) issued under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whereby the State Government has withdrawn from acquisition of certain lands as specified in the schedule of the said notification. 2. At the out-set, I have to observe that this is a totally unwanted litigation between the Public Sector Undertaking and the State Government and is contrary to the directions given by the Apex Court on more than one occasion. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Anr. v. Collector of Central Excise [1992 Supplementary (2) SCC 432], the Apex Court reiterated: "This Court has on more than one occasion pointed out that Public Sector Undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India should not fight their litigations in Court by spending money on fees of counsel, Court fees, procedural expenses and wasting public time. Courts are maintained for appropriate litigations. Court's time is not to be consumed by litigations which are carried on either side at public expenses from the source." 3. The petition is devoid of any merit even otherwise. Section 48 confers the State Government an absolute right to withdraw from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In the instant case also the possession of the land was not taken. Only very small portions of the land acquired have been denotified as it was subsequently discovered that those plots of land are used by the owners thereof for their residence and their houses are constructed thereon. 4. It was, however, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not noticed nor any opportunity of hearing was given to it before issuing the impugned notification (Annexure P-4). The learned counsel has heavily relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Larsen and Toubro v. State of Gujarat and Ors. ( AIR 1998 SC 1608 ). I am, however, afraid the ratio in this decision is not available to the petitioner in the present case. The said case pertained to an acquisition made for a company.
The learned counsel has heavily relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Larsen and Toubro v. State of Gujarat and Ors. ( AIR 1998 SC 1608 ). I am, however, afraid the ratio in this decision is not available to the petitioner in the present case. The said case pertained to an acquisition made for a company. The Apex Court has referred to the provisions of Chapter-7 of the Land Acquisition Act and held that in the context of those provisions it was necessary for the State Government, to have heard the Company for whom the acquisition was made, before withdrawing from the acquisiton. Chapter-7 provides for acquisition of land for companies. Certain formalities such as drawing of agreement etc., are to be complied with before an acquisition can be made by the Government for a company. The word 'company' has been defined in Clause (e) of Section 3. A perusal of the said definition would show that the word 'company' under the Act would not include a Government company much less "a Corporation owned and controlled by the State". The expression "Corporation owned or controlled by the State" is defined separately in Clause (cc) of Section 3. The provisions of Chapter-7 obviously do not apply to an acquisition made for a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. The petitioner-Authority is also a Corporation which is owned and controlled by the State of M.P. That being so, Chapter-7 had no application to the acquisition made for the petitioner-Corporation and there was thus no question of giving any notice to the petitioner before taking action under Section 48(1) of the Act. 5. It will be thus seen that the petition is totally misconceived and contrary to the directions given from time to time by the Apex Court. It is accordingly dismissed. No order, however, is made as to the costs with fond hope that the petitioner shall in future avoid such unnecessary litigation particularly with the State Government which owns and controls the petitioner-Corporation.