Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 226 (HP)

SHRIMATI ASHA GUPTA v. YAS PAUL

2000-08-25

C.K.THAKKER

body2000
JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—The present revision raises an interesting question of law relating to interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Before adverting to the actual question posed before this Court, few relevant facts may be stated. The petitioner is a landlady and the respondent is the tenant and they will be referred to as such in the course of the judgment. The landlady filed Rent Petition No. 1/2 of 1990 in the Court of the Rent Controller (II), Sirmaur District at Nahan, on April 9, 1990, for eviction of the tenant. Her case was that she was the owner of a Pan shop approximately 6-Vi x S-Vi in Ward No. 13 (suit premises, for short). It was let to the tenant in 1986 on a monthly rent of Rs. 550/- excluding electricity charges. On two grounds eviction was sought, firstly, the tenant was in arrears of rent since February, 1988, and as rent was not paid as required under the Act, the tenant was liable to be evicted. Another ground was that the landlady required the suit premises as she had been medically advised not to climb stairs and she required premises for use as passage-cum-parking space for scooter. 3. A reply was filed by the tenant contesting the petition of the landlady. It was stated in the reply that the suit premises were let to him in October, 1985 at the rent of Rs. 450/- per month, which was subsequently increased to Rs. 500/- from April, 1989. According to the tenant, though the amount of rent was sent by money order, the same was not accepted by the landlady since January, February, 1990. It was alleged that the landlady wanted to further increase the rent from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 550/-. As it was declined by the tenant, a petition was filed with an oblique motive. The tenant, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. After appreciating the evidence on record, the Rent Controller held that the landlady was entitled to rent for two months. 550/-. As it was declined by the tenant, a petition was filed with an oblique motive. The tenant, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. After appreciating the evidence on record, the Rent Controller held that the landlady was entitled to rent for two months. He further held that it was proved by the landlady that she had been advised by the doctor not to climb stairs but it was not suffice to order eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. 5. On the basis of the said findings, the Rent Controller passed the following order: "In the light of the findings arrived at on the issues above, the petitioner is held to be entitled only for the rent of two months at the rate of Rs. 500/- for the period January and February, 1990. The other claim of the petitioner is not proved and the same stands rejected. The eviction of the respondent, therefore, from the demise premises in question is ordered on the ground of failure to make payment of two months of rent i.e., for the period of January and February, 1990 amounting to Rs. 1,000/-. In case payment of rent alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum is made to the petitioner the petitioner within 30 days from the passing of this order in that eventuality, the order of eviction shall not be given effect. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own respective costs. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly. After due completion the petition be consigned to the General Record Room." 6. The above order passed by the Rent Controller was not challenged by the tenant. The landlady, however, preferred an appeal No. 10-N/ 14 of 1993. 7. Both the grounds which were pressed before the Rent Controller were also pressed in service before the Appellate Authority The Appellate Authority however, confirmed the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that the landlady was not entitled to an order of eviction against the tenant on the ground of requirement. 8. Regarding arrears of rent, the Appellate Authority held that there was non-payment of arrears of rent by the tenant to the extent of Rs. 49,000/-. A period of 30 days was granted to make such payment. 8. Regarding arrears of rent, the Appellate Authority held that there was non-payment of arrears of rent by the tenant to the extent of Rs. 49,000/-. A period of 30 days was granted to make such payment. In Paragraph 30, the Appellate Authority observed thus: "In view of my findings on points No. 1 and 2 above, the appeal is partly allowed. The result is that the petition, seeking eviction of the respondent, on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, amounting to Rs. 49,000/- w.e.f. January, 1990 to February, 1998, succeeds and is hereby allowed. The respondent is directed to pay to the landlady the said arrears of rent, which is the amount due, alongwith 9% interest, per annum on the said amount together with cost of Rs. 200/- within the period of 30 days from the date of order, failing which the respondent shall be liable to be evicted. However, in view of my findings on point No. 3 above, the petition on the ground of bona fide requirement fails and is hereby dismissed. Memo of costs be prepared. Record of the trial Court alongwith copy of this judgment be returned to that Court and file of this Court be consigned to record room." 9. It is that order, passed by the Appellate Authority, which is challenged in the present revision. 10. I have heard Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel on behalf of the landlady and Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned Senior Counsel alongwith Mr. Jitender Thakur, learned instructing Counsel, on behalf of the tenant. 11. Mr. Sood strenuously argued that an error of law and of jurisdiction has been committed by both the Authorities. Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority, and the orders passed by them deserve to be quashed and set aside by granting an order of eviction against the tenant. It was submitted that in the light of the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the tenant to pay the "amount due" within a period of 30 days from the date of the order of Rent Controller. According to the learned Counsel, it was not done in the instant case and hence, the Rent Controller ought to have made an order of eviction. By not doing so, he has not acted in consonance with sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, it was not done in the instant case and hence, the Rent Controller ought to have made an order of eviction. By not doing so, he has not acted in consonance with sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. It was also contended that as per the finding of the Rent Controller, the tenant was in arrears of rent from January, 1990. That part of the order passed by the Rent Controller became final and binding upon the tenant as he had not filed any appeal. An appeal was filed only by the landlady. It was, therefore, not open to the Appellate Authority to grant further time of 30 days ignoring the provisions of law. Such a direction, therefore, is illegal and requires to be quashed and set aside. Though the second ground relating to requirement of the landlady is also put forward, but the learned Counsel could not point out any reason how, the finding recorded by the Authorities on that point could be said to be illegal or contrary to law. The only question which remains for my consideration relates to observance or otherwise of third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. 12. Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the tenant, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Authorities. He stated that, no doubt, the order passed by the Rent Controller was not challenged. by the tenant. But as per the operative part of the order, the payment was made and hence, the tenant cannot be said to be in default. In an appeal filed by the landlady, a direction was issued by the Appellate Authority for the first time to the tenant to pay a specific amount within 30 days, which was also complied with by him. It, therefore, cannot be said that there was non compliance with the provisions of the law and the tenant was liable to eviction. It was also argued that once an appeal was preferred against the order passed by the Rent Controller and certain directions were issued by the Appellate Authority, no order passed by the Rent Controller remained operative as it merged with the order of the Appellate Authority. What was required to be seen thereafter was the order passed by the Appellate Authority. What was required to be seen thereafter was the order passed by the Appellate Authority. Since it was not even the case of the landlady that the order passed by the Appellate Authority was not complied with, the landlady had no grievance or cause to make complaint. It was also submitted that even if it is assumed that the order, passed by the Rent Controller was not strictly in accordance with law, it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and was binding on all the parties and payment was required to be made as per that order. As the order was complied with, the tenant was not liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent. Finally, it was submitted that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the tenant was liable to pay some more amount on proper construction of third proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act in the light of decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court, in view of specific direction by the Rent Controller, no eviction can be ordered against the tenant. It was, therefore, prayed by Mr. Singh that there is no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the authorities and the revision petition deserves to be dismissed. 13. From the facts stated and the orders, operative parts of which have been extracted hereinabove, certain facts do not appear to be in dispute. Though it was the case of the landlady that the tenant was in arrears for a long period and the outstanding arrears of rent was to the tune of Rs. 14,300/-, a specific finding was recorded by the Rent Controller that the tenant was in arrears of rent for two months, January and February, 1990. Monthly rent was of Rs. 500/- and hence, an order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller against the tenant with a direction to make payment of two months rent for January and February, 1990, amounting to Rs. 1,000/- alongwith interest @ 9% per annum within a period of 30 days from the passing of the order. The said order was not challenged by the tenant. The tenant made the payment as directed by the Rent Controller. 1,000/- alongwith interest @ 9% per annum within a period of 30 days from the passing of the order. The said order was not challenged by the tenant. The tenant made the payment as directed by the Rent Controller. The landlady, however, preferred an appeal and the Appellate Authority, partly allowing the appeal held that the tenant was liable to pay arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 49,000/- from January, 1990 to February, 1998 and was liable to be evicted if the said amount would not be paid alongwith 9% interest per annum together with costs of Rs. 200/- within 30 days from the date of the order. The said order was passed on February 20, 1998. It is not disputed by the landlady that payment as per the said order was made. 14. Learned Counsel for the landlady, however, has urged that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 has not been complied with and hence the tenant was liable to be evicted. Section 14 of the Act provides for eviction of tenants. Sub-section (1) declares that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) enumerates grounds of eviction and one of them relates to non-payment of rent by him. 15. The relevant part relating to non-payment of rent and consequential eviction reads as under: "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict, his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Sub-section (2) enumerates grounds of eviction and one of them relates to non-payment of rent by him. 15. The relevant part relating to non-payment of rent and consequential eviction reads as under: "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict, his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied— (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable: Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid: Provided further that if the arrears pertain to the period prior to the appointed day, the rate of interest shall be calculated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum: Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order; or (ii) ..................................................... (iii) ...................................................... (iv) ..................................................... (v) ..................................................... the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application." 16. According to the learned Counsel for the landlady, reading the above provision, it is abundantly clear that if a tenant is in arrears of rent, he is liable to be evicted. The Legislature, however, has conferred certain conditional rights and opportunities before he is actually evicted. If the tenant complies with the provisions of law, he would not be physically evicted. The Legislature, however, has conferred certain conditional rights and opportunities before he is actually evicted. If the tenant complies with the provisions of law, he would not be physically evicted. In the case on hand, strong reliance was placed by the Counsel on the third proviso to Section 14 (2) which deals with a situation wherein an order of eviction has been passed against the tenant by the Rent Controller. According to the said proviso, the tenant against whom the Rent Controller has made an order of eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted if he pays "the amount due" within 30 days from the date of the order. It was submitted that the connotation "the amount due" would mean the rent due when proceedings were initiated by the landlady before the Rent Controller as also when final order was made by him. 17. In this connection, my attention was invited to several decisions. It may not be necessary to consider all the decisions since the point is directly dealt with by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 437. In Madan Mohan, a petition was filed by the landlord for eviction of tenant, inter alia, on the ground of non-payment of rent. It was averred that the tenant was in arrears of rent from March, 1980 to February, 1983. The Rent Controller made an order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent on July 29, 1986. It was the case of the tenant that he had paid the rent as per the direction of the Rent Controller, whereas, according to the landlord, there was shortfall in payment by the tenant. An execution petition was filed by the landlady seeking possession for non compliance with the order of the Rent Controller. In execution petition, an issue was framed as to whether there was shortfall in payment by the tenant. It was held in the affirmative but the Rent Controller allowed the tenant 15 days time to deposit the amount. Being aggrieved by the said order, the landlord filed a revision petition in the High Court. It was contended before this Court that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend time for making good the deficiency of shortfall and no such time, therefore, could be enlarged. Being aggrieved by the said order, the landlord filed a revision petition in the High Court. It was contended before this Court that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend time for making good the deficiency of shortfall and no such time, therefore, could be enlarged. The High Court, however, dismissed the petition, interpreting the words, "amount due" in the third proviso that the said expression applied only to arrears of rent and not to interest and costs. Aggrieved landlord approached the Supreme Court. 18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14, the Apex Court held that the High Court committed an error in interpreting the expression "amount due" as only arrears of rent and not interest and costs. It was ruled that the said connotation included arrears of rent as also interest and costs. Since payment was not made as per the order of the Rent Controller, within the stipulated period of 30 days and there was shortfall, the tenant was liable to be evicted. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Executing Court to issue a warrant for possession. 19. Considering the provisions of the Act, the Apex Court also observed that the words "may make an order", must be read as "shall make an order", otherwise the provisions might violate Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also indicated by the Apex Court that once the Rent Controller passed a composite order of eviction and payment of rent, it had to be complied with. Such an order might be right or wrong but it could not be said to be without jurisdiction. It was not a nullity and the Executing Court could not ignore it. Once it was established that there was non-compliance with the order, consequences must ensue. 20. Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 14, the Court stated: "It will be noticed that there is no provision in the Act for giving powers to the Controller to direct payment or deposit of pendente lite rent for each month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the tenant. 20. Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 14, the Court stated: "It will be noticed that there is no provision in the Act for giving powers to the Controller to direct payment or deposit of pendente lite rent for each month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the tenant. First proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 shows that in order to show payment or valid tender as contemplated by clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 by a tenant in default, he has to pay on the first date of hearing the arrears of rent along with interest and costs of the application which are to be assessed by the Controller. Surely where a tenant does not avail of the first opportunity and contests the eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and fails to show that he was not in default and Court finds that the ground has been made out, an order of eviction has to fellow. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that such a tenant who contests a claim and fails to avoid order of eviction can still avoid it by merely paying the rent due till the date of the filing of the application for ejectment. The third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 should also receive an interpretation which will safeguard the rights of both the landlord and tenant. The "amount due" occurring in the third proviso in the context will mean the amount due on and up to the date of the order of eviction. It will take into account not merely the arrears of rent which gave cause of action to file a petition for eviction but also include the rent which accumulated during the pendency of eviction petition as well. If the tenant has been paying the rent during the pendency of the eviction petition to the landlord, the "amount due" will be only arrears which have not been paid. The landlord, as per the scheme of the section, cannot be worse off vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enough to deposit in Court the arrears of rent together with interest and costs on the first date of hearing. The landlord, as per the scheme of the section, cannot be worse off vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enough to deposit in Court the arrears of rent together with interest and costs on the first date of hearing. If the interpretation given by the High Court is accepted the result would be that the tenant will be better off by avoiding to pay the arrears of rent with interest and costs on the first date of hearing and prefer suffering order of ejectment after contest and then merely offer the amount due as mentioned in the application for ejectment to avoid eviction. This could not be the intention of the legislature." 21. Strong reliance was placed on the above observations of the Supreme Court by Mr. Sood and it was urged that the point is finally concluded by the Apex Court. As per the ratio laid down therein, "the amount due" occurring in the third proviso to Section 14 (2) means "the amount due and upto the date of order of eviction". 22. According to Mr. Sood, in the present case, admittedly, no payment was made by the tenant of "the amount due". The Counsel stated that the Rent Controller passed an order on June 30, 1993 wherein a clear-cut, specific and explicit finding was recorded that the tenant was in arrears from January, 1990. Third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 got immediately attracted. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part if he wanted protection of the said proviso to make payment of "the amount due", i.e. the entire amount of rent due from January, 1990 to June 30, 1993 together with interest and costs. Since the amount was not paid, the ratio laid down in Madan Mohan got attracted. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Appellate Authority to order eviction of the tenant. The revision petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed. Mr. Sood submitted that in the light of Madan Mohan, no Court or authority could pass order, issue direction or grant time inconsistent with the legislative mandate and all such orders or directions have to be ignored. 23. At the first blush, the argument appears to be attractive but on close scrutiny and in the light of the relevant provisions of law, the decision in Madan Mohan and other cases, it cannot be upheld. 23. At the first blush, the argument appears to be attractive but on close scrutiny and in the light of the relevant provisions of law, the decision in Madan Mohan and other cases, it cannot be upheld. In the case on hand, reading paragraphs 22 and 32 of the order passed by the Rent Controller, it is clear that a direction was issued to the tenant to pay arrears of rent of Rs. 1,000/- for the months of January and February, 1990 alongwith interest. It was an order passed by a competent Court, i.e. Rent Controller. As held by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan, the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to pass such order. May be, the order might not be strictly in accordance with law. At the most, it was wrong. But a wrong order is not necessarily an order without jurisdiction. The Rent Controller had jurisdiction to pass an order which he has passed. According to the direction in the order, the tenant was to pay an amount of Rs. 1,000/- alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum, and it had been complied with. It is true that under the relevant provisions of Section 14 as interpreted in Madan Mohan, the tenant was liable to pay the entire amount due from January, 1990 to the date of the order, The question, however, is, if the tenant had paid the amount of Rs. 1,000/ - with interest as per the direction issued by the Rent Controller, would his case fall within the mischief of third proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 14. In my opinion, it would not. Once the order was passed by the Rent Controller, which was within the jurisdiction of Rent Controller, irrespective of its legality, compliance with the said order would save the tenant against eviction. 24. My attention was also invited in this connection by the learned Counsel for the tenant to a decision in Chinnamma v. Gopalan and others, (1995) 6 SCC 491. In that case, a similar provision of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. There also, eviction was sought by the landlady against the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent, payment whereof was not made within the stipulated period. In that case, a similar provision of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. There also, eviction was sought by the landlady against the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent, payment whereof was not made within the stipulated period. There also the tenant had made deposit of the amount of arrears as specified in the order of eviction but there was default in making payment of rent for the period subsequent to the passing of the eviction order. It was, therefore, contended that the tenant was liable to be evicted as he was obliged to pay "rent due by him" which would include the entire amount from the date of arrears till the day on which the order was passed by the Rent Control Court. 25. Negativing the contention and considering the language of Sections 11 and 12, the Apex Court held that the "whole of the arrears of rent" would mean only the arrears of rent demanded in the notice. Mr. Sood attempted to distinguish the judgment on the ground that in that case the Apex Court was considering two Sections (Section 11 as well as Section 12) and the latter section provided for "all arrears of rent", which had a restricted meaning and hence, ratio laid down in Chinnamma does not apply to the present case. In my opinion, however, Section 11 which was interpreted by the Apex Court was similar to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act and interpreting the same the Supreme Court held that if there was default in making payment of the entire due till the date of the decision by the Rent Control Court, the tenant was not liable to be evicted. Chinnamma, therefore, in my view, helps the tenant and the order of eviction cannot be passed against him. 26. Reference was also made to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Raj Kumar v. Roshan Lal and others, 1997 (3) Sim. LC 491. In Raj Kumar, direction was issued by the Rent Controller to deposit the entire amount within 30 days from the date of the order to the extent indicated in the said order. Such payment was made by the tenant. LC 491. In Raj Kumar, direction was issued by the Rent Controller to deposit the entire amount within 30 days from the date of the order to the extent indicated in the said order. Such payment was made by the tenant. The legality of the order was, however, challenged on the ground that considering the ratio laid down by, the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan, the tenant was bound to pay the entire amount of arrears of rent not till the date of the petition but till the date of order of eviction and since it was not done, the eviction order was required to be passed against the tenant. Considering Madan Mohan, this Court observed that if the order of the Rent Controller was wrong, the tenant could not suffer. His duty was to comply with the provisions of third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 and when he made payment as per the directions of the Rent Controller, he could not be evicted. The landlady thereafter could not contend that the payment was not made till the date of the order and as such, the case attracted third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act as interpreted in Madan Mohan, and the tenant was liable to be evicted. 27. The facts in Raj Kumar were almost identical to the facts in the present case. Initially, Mr. Sood submitted that in Raj Kumar, the Rent Controller decided the petition on July 1, 1992, whereas Mad!hn Mohan came to be decided by the Apex Court on January 12, 1993. Thus, Raj Kumar was decided prior to the decision by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan. In my opinion, however, the said argument does not in any way. help the landlady as it is settled law that whenever a case is decided by a Judiciary, it is merely an interpretation of law and it has retrospective effect. A Judiciary does not make the law, it merely declares the law and the effect of the decision is that it is the law and it was the law since the beginning, L.C. Golak Nath and others v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1967 SC 1643, (unless specific prospective effect is given by the Apex Court to such a decision). 28. The Counsel thereafter submitted that Raj Kumar does not lay down correct law and requires reconsideration. 28. The Counsel thereafter submitted that Raj Kumar does not lay down correct law and requires reconsideration. He, therefore, prayed that the matter may be referred to a Division Bench. In my opinion, however, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge has rightly distinguished Madan Mohan, and I see no reason to take a different view or to refer the matter to a Division Bench. 29. It was also submitted by Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the tenant, that the doctrine of merger applied to the present case. He submitted that order passed by the Rent Controller was complied with by the tenant. The landlady, being aggrieved by that order, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was thereafter the order by the Appellate Authority, which was in force and was to be complied with. Once the order was passed by the Appellate Authority, in the eye of law, the order passed by Rent Controller did not remain operative. 30. In this connection, he invited my attention to a decision in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582. No doubt Mr. Sood referred to decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Company Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681; State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, and of this Court in M/s. K.N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Simla, ILR 1982 HP 279, for a proposition that it is not in each and every case that the doctrine of merger is attracted. It is not a principle of rigid and universal application and there may be situations where two orders may remain operative. The application of the doctrine depends on the nature of appellate or revisional order in each case and to be ascertained considering the statutory provisions before the Court. 31. There is no quarrel about the above proposition of law and it has not been disputed by the learned Counsel for the tenant. In my opinion, however, the learned Counsel for the tenant is right in submitting that there may be more than one order which may remain in operation but there cannot be two or more orders on one and the same issue at a time. In my opinion, however, the learned Counsel for the tenant is right in submitting that there may be more than one order which may remain in operation but there cannot be two or more orders on one and the same issue at a time. In the instant case, once the order was passed by the Rent Controller directing the tenant to pay an amount of rent of two months and the said order was complied with and the Appellate Authority directed him to pay the entire amount within) the stipulated period of 30 days, the order required to be complied with was of the Appellate Authority, which was also done. The contention of the landlady that the order passed by the Rent Controller was not legal and in accordance with law, did not survive as the said order merged with the order passed by the Appellate Authority. Since the order passed by the Appellate Authority was complied with, the tenant was not liable to eviction. 32. It was then submitted on behalf of the tenant that a Court may also bear in mind a well known principle that no litigant would suffer for the fault of Court. It has been reflected in well known maxim actus curie nemineum gravabit. It was urged that even if it is assumed that there was an error on the part of the Rent Controller in deciding the amount and in directing the tenant to make payment of Rs. 1,000/-, when the tenant made such payment as per the said order, he could not be subsequently told that the order of the Rent Controller was not correct and the tenant was liable to pay the entire amount due and as there was default on his part in making payment as required by third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, as interpreted in Madan Mohan, he must vacate the suit premises. As the order of the Rent Controller was not proper, it was rightly corrected by the Appellate Authority but it would not result in an action of eviction against the tenant. I find considerable force in the said submission as well. Since the order of the Rent Controller was clear and was obeyed by the tenant, he cannot be evicted. 33. I find considerable force in the said submission as well. Since the order of the Rent Controller was clear and was obeyed by the tenant, he cannot be evicted. 33. The Counsel for the tenant also submitted that as observed in Liaq Ahmed and others v. Habeeb-ur-Rehman, (2000) 5 SCC 708, Rent Acts have been enacted with a view to safeguard and protect interests of tenants and they have to be interpreted liberally in favour of the weaker section, i.e. tenants and the Court will try to adopt such interpretation which would promote social justice by safeguarding their interests and extending protection to them. 34. Keeping in mind the underlying object of Rent Acts, Madan Mohan which was a case in execution proceedings, must be applied. In this connection, it is profitable to refer to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the reported case wherein the Supreme Court observed: "In such cases it will be advisable if the Controller while passing the order of eviction on the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act specifies the "amount due" till the date of order and not merely leave it to the parties to contest it after passing of the order of eviction as to what was the amount due. Surely the Rent Control Acts, no doubt, are measures to protect tenants from eviction except on certain specified grounds if found established. Once the grounds are made out and subject to any further condition which may be provided in the Act, the tenants would suffer ejectment. Again the protection given in the Acts is not to give licence for continuous litigation and bad blood." It was submitted that the Supreme Court "advised" the Rent Controllers to specify "the amount due" till the date of the order and not merely leave the parties to contest it after passing the order of eviction as to what amount was due. It was submitted that this is with a view to see that innocent tenants may not suffer. The Counsel submitted that an advice of the Apex Court must be treated as mandate to the subordinate authorities in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and statutory law, Spencer & Company Ltd. and another v. Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and others, (1995) 1 SCC 259. The Counsel submitted that an advice of the Apex Court must be treated as mandate to the subordinate authorities in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and statutory law, Spencer & Company Ltd. and another v. Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and others, (1995) 1 SCC 259. In the instant case, the amount was already specified by the Rent Controller and it was paid by the tenant. Hence, there was no default resulting in his eviction. 35. From the above discussion, in my opinion, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed by the Appellate Authority in not granting a prayer for eviction against the tenant. Since at both the stages, i.e. at the stage of passing the order by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority, payment of rent was made by the tenant, his case did not fall within the mischief of third proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. He was, therefore, not liable to be evicted from the suit premises for non observance of Section 14 (2) of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, I see no substance in the matter. The revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.