Vikramajit Sen, J. ( 1 ) THE facts of the present case are not disputed between the parties, who are siblings of each other. The two Plaintiffs are the sisters of the Defendant No. 1. All of them being the children of late Smt. Gobind Kaur and late Lt. Col. U. S. Sethi. The dispute between them pertains to property bearing No. B-7/6, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. A Collaboration Agreement has been executed by Defendant No. 1 with Defendant No. 2 in respect of the development of this property. ( 2 ) THE original Lease of the plot was in the name of late Smt. Gobind Kaur who expired on 16. 4. 1976. In his Written Statement Defendant No. 1 has staled that she left behind a Will dated 1. 10. 1974, but whilst this document has been mentioned in the List of Documents filed along with the Written Statement it has not been filed. The reason for this non-filing is that it is misplaced. Shri A. S. Chandhiok, Learned Senior counsel for Defendant No. 1, in the course of arguments, had stated that no reliance was being placed on this Will because of its non-availability. This document will not engage my attention any further but I am constrained, however, to observe that the mystery behind this missing Will would lead me alleast to one conclusion, it is that the said Defendant intended to unfairly gain some mileage from this otherwise non-existent document. ( 3 ) A series of Relinquishment Deeds have been executed in this case. Their execution is admitted, but their legal efficacy and applicability is hotly contested. On 15. 5. 1982 Lt. Col. U. S. Sethi and Plaintiff No. 2 executed a Relinquishment Deed in favour of Defendant No. 1. This deed duly recorded that the legal heirs of late Smt. Gobind Kaur were her late husband Lt. Col. H. S. Sethi and the siblings before the Court. By this Deed the Executants had relinquished their share in favour of Shri Amar Jeet Singh Sethi, Defendant No. 1. This was followed by another Relinquishment Deed dated 25. 8. 1984 executed. by Plaintiff No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 1. Col. H. S. Sethi and the siblings before the Court. By this Deed the Executants had relinquished their share in favour of Shri Amar Jeet Singh Sethi, Defendant No. 1. This was followed by another Relinquishment Deed dated 25. 8. 1984 executed. by Plaintiff No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 1. At this stage I would only mention the basic legal fallacy in the document is that a relinquishment perforce cannot be in favour of any particular co-sharer; if it is to operate in favour of a particular party it amounts to a transfer and must be effected either by Sale Deed or by a Gift Deed, depending entirely on whether there was any consideration for such a transfer. ( 4 ) THE Plaintiffs case is that a Family Settlement was arrived at between August 25, 1984 and 18th October, 1984 when the third Relinquishment Deed was executed. The last document was executed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of his father, that is, late Lt. Col. H. S. Sethi. In this Deed there is also a recital that the Plaintiffs would also execute Relinquishment Deeds in favour of their father. The fourth Relinquishment Deed was subsequently executed by Plaintiff No. 2 in favour of her father on 30. 7. 1985. As was expected in the third Relinquishment Deed, Plaintiff No. did not execute any Relinquishment Ltd. in favour of her father but the averments in the plaint are to the effect that she had intention to do so. Late Lt. Col. H. S. Sethi admittedly died intestate ( 5 ) ON 12. 8. 1995. The Plaintiffs assert that in these circumstances they along with their brother Defendant No. 1 being the Class I legal heirs of their father, succeeded to his estate (read the property in suit namely B-7/6, Safdurjang Enclave, New Delhi) in equal shares, that is, l/3rd each. Defendant No. 1, however, asserts that on the execution of the second Relinquishment Deed he became the exclusive owner of the suit property. It is his case that he was compelled to execute Deed dated 25. 8. 1984 whereby he had relinquished all his rights in the property in favour of his father. Defendant No. 1, however, asserts that on the execution of the second Relinquishment Deed he became the exclusive owner of the suit property. It is his case that he was compelled to execute Deed dated 25. 8. 1984 whereby he had relinquished all his rights in the property in favour of his father. Since this Deed was executed without his free consent it is non-est and in any event it was not legally possible for him to relinquish his shares in favour of his father, who had no subsisting share in the property on 25. 8. 1984, and that there is an inherent contradiction in this Deed itself inasmuch it speaks of the acts of Defendant No. 1 having th share only. It is from this skein of Relinquishment Deeds that the Court is expected lo extricate itself and finally decide on whether to grant or not to grant temporary injunction. An ex-parte ad-interim injunction directing maintenance of status quo has already been granted on 28. 8. 1997. ( 6 ) HAVING given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments addressed on behalf of the Plaintiffs by their learned Senior Counsel Dr. a. M. Singhvi and on behalf of Defendant No. 1 by his leaned Senior counsel Shri A. S. Chandhiok, I am of the opinion that the ex-parte ad-interim injunction deserves to be confirmed and the application should be allowed. I have already indicated above that it is a legal misnomer, unfortunately frequently followed, that a relinquishment can be effected in favour of a particular person. To this extent Mr. Chandhiok s arguments must be upheld. What is sauce for the goose is also the sauce for the gander, so the idiom proclaims. If the Relinquishment Deed dated 25. 8. 1984 whereby Defendant No. 1 had given up his rights in favour of his father is rightly available, this contradiction also pervades the other two earlier Relinquishment Deeds whereby Defendant No. 1 had become the exclusive owner of the suit property. They must all be considered or rejected together. For reasons contained below I will consider all of them rather than reject them. ( 7 ) MR. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Senior counsel for Defendant No. 1 vehemently argued that the averments pertaining to. the Family Settlement are bereft of any details ami must be rejected on this ground. They must all be considered or rejected together. For reasons contained below I will consider all of them rather than reject them. ( 7 ) MR. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Senior counsel for Defendant No. 1 vehemently argued that the averments pertaining to. the Family Settlement are bereft of any details ami must be rejected on this ground. The statements made in the plaint, however, on a holistic reading, and if this is done the Family Arrangement is not of ethereal nature. It is plausible that between the execution of the third and fourth Relinquishment Deeds all oral Family Settlement Deed take place and, therefore, the fourth Relinquishment Deed was executed. The version that the third Relinquishment Deed was executed on the behest of late Shri Jai Singh Sethi (since deceased, conveniently) is far less possible. The statement pertaining to pressure brought on Defendant No. 1 by late Shri Jai Singh Sethi and his wife Smt. Amrit Kaur (since deceased, conveniently) is as illusory as the Will which is stated to have been executed by late Smt. Gobind Kaur in, favour of Defendant No. 1. At this stage of the proceedings a Final verdict on either of the stands cannot be taken. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for Defendant No. 1 has also strenuously argued that since no prayer has been made for declaring the 4th Relinquishment Deed invalid or improbable, an unsurmountable legal hurdle exists in the path of the Plaintiffs. This argument is also self destructive inasmuch as Defendant No. 1 has not made a similar prayer in respect of the third Relinquishmert Deed whereby he had relinquished his shares in favour of his father. Inasmuch as the stand of sole and exclusive ownership of the property runs counter to the third document it would be fair to expect that some legal action would have been initiated for declaring it as having been cancelled. This has not been done. Reliance has been placed by the Plaintiffs on the last Relinquishment Deed and I see no impediment in their way in so doing. At this stage it would be relevant to mention that on the filing of the Written Statement it has been unfolded that a Conveyance Deed has now been executed infavour of Defendant No. 1. Reliance has been placed by the Plaintiffs on the last Relinquishment Deed and I see no impediment in their way in so doing. At this stage it would be relevant to mention that on the filing of the Written Statement it has been unfolded that a Conveyance Deed has now been executed infavour of Defendant No. 1. In earlier hearings it was first submitted on behalf of this Defendant that the mutation and the execution of the Lease Deed in favour of Defendant No. 1 was done with the knowledge of the Plaintiffs. Subsequently, on being asked to file an affidavit to this effect, Defendant No. 1 has significantly resiled from this stand. The position thatemerges, therefore, prima fade is that the mutation as well as the Conveyance Deed was surreptitiously obtained by Defendant No. l. In view of the existence of the third Relinquishment Deed it is incumbent on tills Defendant to substantially discharge the burden of proving that the Plaintiffs had either acknowledged or acquiesced in his sole ownership. This is also wholly missing. If they were unaware of the execution of in Conveyance deed, the Plaintiffs can hardly be faulted for not initiating legal proceedings for the reversal or a cancellation thereof. ( 9 ) MR. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Senior counsel appearing for Defendant No. 1 had also sought reliance on the definition of "gift" and that even if 4th Relinquishment Deed was to be treated as a gift, it had to be accepted. Since there is no acceptance even this fiction cannot be assumed, so his argument can be paraphrased. Dr. A. M. Singhvi, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs has countered these arguments by relying on the cases of Shaklmtla Devi v. Amar Devi, AIR 1985 HP 109 and Mt. Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal and Ors. AIR 32 All. 444, both of which have been rendered by Division Benches of that Court and on Vannathi Valappil Jattaki and Ors. v. Pllthiya Purayil Pani and Ors. , AIR 1986 Ker 110 . these decisions undoubtedly and un- equivocally stale that acceptance can be inferred from the silence of the parties. The 4th Relinquishment Deed was executed on 30. 7. 1985. Running counter thereto, the execution of a Collaboration Agreement by Defendant No. 1 only with Defendant No. 2 had come to the notice of the Plaintiffs much later. these decisions undoubtedly and un- equivocally stale that acceptance can be inferred from the silence of the parties. The 4th Relinquishment Deed was executed on 30. 7. 1985. Running counter thereto, the execution of a Collaboration Agreement by Defendant No. 1 only with Defendant No. 2 had come to the notice of the Plaintiffs much later. Immediately thereupon the Plaintiffs have approached the court. Therefore, if there was any acquiescence it must be construed to have existed on the part of Defendant No. 1 and not on the Plaintiffs. ( 10 ) IF all the Relinquishment Deeds are ignored the result would be that the siblings would inherit the property in 1/3rd share each. If all the Relinquishment Deeds are given effect to the result also would be same. The only argument is that whereas the sisters and father could have released or relinquished their shares in favour of Defendant No. 1, all being co-owners of the property, the first two Relinquishment Deeds, inasmuch they do not relinquish or release or extinguish the shares of the Executants but instead have the effect of transferring the shares of the Executants in favour of prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either fpr the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17 (2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties io the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other parly relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona Fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement". ( 11 ) IN conclusion I am satisfied that a primafacie case exists in favour of the Plaintiffs for confirming the ex-parte ad interim injunction already graited. The balance of convenience is undoubtedly in favour of the Plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1 has entered upon a Collaboration Agreement with Defendant No. 2, which Agreement if implemented, would have the effect of totally transforming the character of the immovable property. Most importantly it would have the effect of creating third party interests therein which would unalterably affect the equities of the case. It is expedient- to put a hault straightaway. Since immovable property is in dispute, as generally recognised and specifically acknowledged in the Specific Relief Act, irreparable injury is likely to result to the Plaintiffs if the injunction application is not allowed. In these circumstances the application is accepted. Accordingly till the final outcome of the suit the Defendants, their servants, agents, employees, representatives and/or anybody claiming through them or on their behalf are restrained from in any manner whatsoever creating any lien, encumbering, creating any third party rights, disposing off and/or parting with the whole or any part of the properly and premises known as No. b7/6, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. The Defendants, their servants, agents, employees, representatives and/or anybody claiming through them or on their behalf are further restrained from raising any construction and carrying out any addition and alteration in the suit premises being No. B-7/6, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. I. A. stands disposed of.