JUDGMENT: The first defendant in O.S.No.1033 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, and the first respondent in A.S.No.97 of 1996 on the file of the District Court, Dindigul, is the appellant in the second appeal. 2. One Swarnammal and her daughter Kanthayee Ammal alias Leela, the first respondent herein, represented by Dhanraj Pillai, the second respondent herein, as Power Agent, filed the suit to set aside the decree passed in O.S.No.951 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Dindigul. 3. The facts leading to the second appeal are as follows: The parties will be referred to according to their array in the suit. The plaintiffs were the owners of a large extant of land in S.No.685, Sirumalai Hills, Sirumalai Village, Dindigul Taluk. They entered into agreements for sale of sandalwood trees grown, in the said land with one P.C.Meeran, father of Mohammed Syed Ibrahim, the second defendant in the suit, and the fifth respondent herein, on 30.3.1974 under Exs.A-1, A-2. There was some misunderstanding between them, which resulted in a compromise dated 7.10.1986 under Ex.A-4 as per the terms of which it was agreed that a joint petition by the owner and the said Meeran for getting orders before the authorities could be filed and permit could be issued in favour of the second defendant Mohammed Syed Ibrahim, This compromise was as per the directions of this Court in W.P.Nos.5890 and 1563 of 1984 (Ex.A-24). The District Forest Officer, Dindigul, was directed to issue permit in favour of Ibrahim. According to the first defendant/ appellant, the second defendant, after becoming the owner of the sandalwood billets, entered into an agreement Ex.B-7 on 21.2.1988 with him and there was an irrevocable Power of Attorney executed by the second defendant in his favour under Ex.B-8 on 3.4.1991. There were disputes between the first and second defendants resulting in various writs and other proceedings being taken. Ultimately, in W.A.No.598 of 1994 a Division Bench of this Court directed the parties concerned to approach the Civil Court for resolving the dispute. The plaintiffs also became parties to this order by getting themselves impleaded in W.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994. It is the further case of the first defendant that the second defendant entered into an compromise with him under Ex.B-37 on 30.9.1994 whereby he agreed to relinquish his right on receipt of Rs.10 lakhs. The plaintiffs also became parties to this order by getting themselves impleaded in W.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994. It is the further case of the first defendant that the second defendant entered into an compromise with him under Ex.B-37 on 30.9.1994 whereby he agreed to relinquish his right on receipt of Rs.10 lakhs. The first defendant paid a total sum of Rs.10 lakhs to Dhanraj Pillai, the Power of Attorney Holder of the plaintiffs and Rs.5 lakhs to the second defendant on 14.11.1994 and that this was vouched by execution of receipt under Ex.B-40 and release of the rights over the sandalwood billets. According to the first defendant this arrangement was brought to the notice of the Conservator of Forests at Trichy and necessary orders for release of sandalwood billets were requested to be passed that the suit in O.S.No.951 of 1994 was filed as per the direction of the Division Bench of this Court and that the Conservator of Forests also represented that he would instruct the Government Pleader to accede for passing of a consent decree. The suit was for declaration of the first defendant’s title to the sandalwood billets and for the consequential relief. The suit was filed on 28.11.1994 and a consent decree came to be passed on 7.12.1994. The second defendant filed C.R.P.No.3859 of 1994 before this Court challenging the validity of the consent decree made in O.S.No.951 of 1994 on 7.12.1994. The plaintiffs filed the present suit O.S.No.1033 of 1994 for setting aside the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994. 4. On 12.9.1995 this Court permitted the civil revision petition to be converted into an application for setting aside the decree dated 7.12.1994 in O.S.No.951 of 1994 in terms of the law laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1139 and directed the trial Court to try the converted civil revision petition into an application along with the suit O.S.No.1033 of 1994. The plaintiffs averred that their non-impleading as parties in O.S.No.951 of 1994 was contrary to the direction given by the Division Bench, that the agreement entered into with Meeran on 30.4.1974 was abandoned and that there was no privity of contract between them and the appellant. They further contended that the decree passed in O.S.No.951 of 1994 on 7.12.1994 was out of collusion between the first defendant and the second defendant. They further contended that the decree passed in O.S.No.951 of 1994 on 7.12.1994 was out of collusion between the first defendant and the second defendant. They prayed for setting aside of the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 and for a permanent injunction restraining defendants from removing the sandalwood billets from the godown. 5. The second defendant contended that he did not engage any lawyer, that one Rajendran, Advocate had represented him in that suit though he had not been given any vakalat and that he had not received any amount on 14.11.1994. He also denied the compromise set up. He also prayed for setting aside the decree. 6. The first defendant/ appellant, besides setting up the defence already elaborated contended that the suit as framed in O.S.No.1033 of 1994 was not maintainable for want of seeking the declaratory relief and that no suit would lie to set aside the decree passed under O.12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further contended that the Power of Attorney Holder Dhanraj Pillai was not made a party in view of the release deed executed by him on payment of Rs.5 lakhs on 3.11.1994 and that specific averments had been made in the suit O.S.No.951 of 1994. Objections regarding under valuation and court-fee were also taken. 7. The trial Court dismissed the application I.A.No.726 of 1995 (converted pursuant to the direction by the Bench - C.R.P.No.3859 of 1994) as also the suit O.S.No.1033 of 1994 holding that the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 declaring the title of the appellant in relation to the sandalwood billets was a consent decree passed on admission under O.12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that there could be no separate suit seeking to set aside the decree. The appellate Court in appeal A.S.No.97 of 1996 reversed the decision of the trial Court, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding that it was doubtful that Ex.B-8 irrevocable Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant on 3.4.1991 was a true document inasmuch as it had been written on old stamp papers purchased on 23.12.1987 and 1.1.1998 and the second defendant had also disputed his signature and the first defendant had not taken steps to prove that the signature in Ex.B-8 was that of the second defendant. Exs.P-39 and P-40 receipts alleged to have been given by Ibrahim and P.W.1, Dhanraj Pillai the Power of Attorney Holder of the plaintiffs, were not true documents, that the second defendant had disputed his signature in Ex.C-2 consent memo dated 7.12.1994 and the first defendant had not taken steps to get the signature compared with the admitted signature of the second defendant that it was doubtful that the second defendant had given the vakalath Ex.C-3 on 2.12.1994 to D.W.5 Advocate Rajendran that the second defendant was not a consenting party for passing of a decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994, that the suit by the first defendant appellant without impleading the present plaintiffs as parties, though directed by this Court, was deliberate and the decree obtained in O.S.No.951 of 1994 was not binding on the plaintiffs that the Forest Officials colluded with the first defendant for the decree being passed in O.S.No.951 of 1994 and that suit as framed without seeking a declaration with regard to sandalwood trees was maintainable. However, the appellate Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to permanent injunction as sought for in that the sandalwood had already been transported from the Salem Forest Department by the first defendant to his village and kept in his premises by him. 8. Aggrieved, the present second appeal has been filed. Notice of motion was ordered and elaborate arguments were heard. 9. Mr.R.Krishnamurthi, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is based purely on presumptions and assumptions, that the judgment merely narrates the contentions without giving any finding, that the lower appellate Court has also not rendered a finding as to the maintainability of the present suit. The learned senior counsel further contended that the trial Court on comparison of signature and the oral evidence of D.W.1 has found the case of the first defendant to be true while the lower appellate Court was not justified in deciding the question on wholly extraneous considerations, viz., stamp papers were dated 23.8.1987 and 1.1.1988. The learned senior counsel further contended that the trial Court on comparison of signature and the oral evidence of D.W.1 has found the case of the first defendant to be true while the lower appellate Court was not justified in deciding the question on wholly extraneous considerations, viz., stamp papers were dated 23.8.1987 and 1.1.1988. As regards Ex.B-40 the receipt attributed to the Power of Attorney Holder Dhanraj Pillai, the second respondent herein, the trial Court relied on the evidence of D.W.3 to hold that P.W.1 signed on each page in Ex.B-40 and as regards Ex.B-39 the consent deed stated to have been signed by the second defendant the trial Court has come to a proper conclusion. The lower appellate Court was not justified of D.W.3 on the ground that it has been signed in different ink and the father’s name had not been mentioned. 10. The following substantial questions of law arise for decision in the second appeal; (i) Whether in law the burden has been wrongly cast on the first defendant to prove Exs.C-2, C-3, B-39 and B-40 (ii) Whether the suit is maintainable in terms of Secs.31 and 35 of the Specific Relief Act? and (iii) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in rejecting the finding of the trial Court, which has found on visual comparison of the documents that those documents bore the signature of the respective parties to whom they were attributed? 11. Mr.K.Srinivasan representing the second plaintiff and the legal representatives of the first plaintiff, who are arrayed as respondents 1 to 4 herein, submitted as follows: The reasons given for not making the plaintiffs parties to the earlier suit cannot be accepted. In Ex.B-37, which is the letter alleged to have been jointly written by the second defendant, the Power of Attorney Holder Dhanraj Pillai and the first defendant Thangavel Udayar and submitted through the Conservator of Forests cannot also be accepted and has been rightly rejected by the lower appellate Court. The decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 grants a mandatory injunction directing defendants 3 and 4 to hand over the sandalwood billets to the first defendant. The decree further states that the said defendants are not to interfere in any manner with the first defendant’s possession and enjoyment and they should not cause any interference or damage to the sandalwood billets. The decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 grants a mandatory injunction directing defendants 3 and 4 to hand over the sandalwood billets to the first defendant. The decree further states that the said defendants are not to interfere in any manner with the first defendant’s possession and enjoyment and they should not cause any interference or damage to the sandalwood billets. A specific direction was given by this Court in writ appeals W.A.Nos.598 of 1994, 599 of 1994 etc. in paragraph 5 stating that the plaintiffs represented by their Power of Attorney Holder, have to the made parties in the civil suit. There was a review application n stating that the plaintiffs had lost their rights as owners and therefore the direction in the order in the writ appeals should be reviewed was rejected by the Bench. In these circumstances, there was absolutely no justification for not impleading the plaintiffs as parties. The learned counsel also refereed to the plaint in O.S.No.951 of 1994 and in particular paras.4 to 6 and 9 to 11. There were interim applications filed for advancing the hearing and the suit was advanced on no objection being given by defendants 3 and 4. There was a civil revision petition filed by the second defendant in C.R.P.No.359 of 1994 under Art.227 of the Constitution specifically referring to the fraudulent methods adopted in getting the suit O.S.No.951 of 1994 decreed. The learned counsel also submitted that Ex.B-37 was inadmissible in evidence and no case had been made out for admission of the secondary evidence. According to the learned counsel, the reasons given in para.11 of the plaint in the earlier suit are absolutely meaningless. The learned counsel also relied on a number of decisions in support of this contention that fraud had been played on the present plaintiffs. The learned counsel also submitted that the lower appellate Court while reversing the decision of the trial Court had stopped with granting declaration only and refusing the relief of injunctions and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be invoked and relief granted to the plaintiff. 12. 12. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the second defendant, submitted that a bare perusal of the dates and events would show that the earlier suit had been rushed through and a fraud had been played on the plaintiffs and the second defendant by the first defendant/ appellant. The learned senior counsel submitted that the suit was filed on 28.11.1994 numbered on 2.12.1994, compromise memo was signed on 5.12.1994 and the suit decreed on 7.12.1994. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the appellant had deliberately omitted to make Dhanraj Pillai a party to the proceedings notwithstanding specific directions given by this Court on 12.9.1995. The learned senior counsel submitted that the signatures in Exs.C-2 and C-3 had been rejected by the lower appellate Court, that there was vital admission by D.W.5 that there were blanks in Ex.B-40 with reference to material particulars, that there was no mention of Ex.B-40 in the plaint in O.S.No.951 of 1994 and that Ex.B-37 was not a compromise memo, but only a petition seeking adjournment. The reliance placed by the trial Court on the para. was erroneous as the compromise was on 14.11.1994, that Ex.B-37 had also not been referred in the pleadings, that in Ex.A-30 which is dated 30.3.1993 there is a finding with reference to tampering of Ex.B-8, that the typing in Ex.B-8 page 5 last line differs and this is referred to by the lower appellate Court, that stamp papers had been procured and the document created, the receipt Ex.B-36 purports to bear date 3.4.1991 attributed to the second defendant and there is no reference to this receipt in Ex.B-8 Power of Attorney or in the pleadings. That if really the documents were in existence during the relevant time, they could have taken them to the authorities, that no appeal had been filed against the decision in the I.A. and that because the suit was a comprehensive suit, both the suits were heard together and a common judgment was rendered. 13. That if really the documents were in existence during the relevant time, they could have taken them to the authorities, that no appeal had been filed against the decision in the I.A. and that because the suit was a comprehensive suit, both the suits were heard together and a common judgment was rendered. 13. An application in C.M.P.No.4102 of 1999 has been filed in the second appeal by one Sanjay Kumar & Co., represented by its proprietor for impleading the petitioner as a party in the above appeal alleging that the appellant herein had sold and the petitioner had purchased the sandalwood, taken delivery of the same from the appellant on 4.1.1995, that the said sale and purchase had also been brought to the notice of this Court by the first defendant himself during the proceedings in this Court and the parties in the second appeal are also aware of the said sale and purchase, that the petitioner has by virtue of such purchase become entitled to the sandalwood in question and therefore he is a necessary party to the proceedings and he should be impleaded. 14. A counter affidavit has been filed by the appellant disputing the alleged transaction dated 4.1.1995, that the petitioner is neither a proper nor a necessary party. 15. A reply, affidavit has been filed reiterating the contentions made in the main affidavit. 16. Having gone through the relevant and material papers, I am clearly of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu’s case, (1994)1 S.C.C. 1 : (1994)1 L.W. 21 (S.C.) will come into play. The appellant has played fraud on Court and obtained a decree. 17. Though several documents have been filed and witnesses examined the key documents are Exs.A-1, A-2, A-10, A-17 and A-18, Exs.B-1, B-7, B-8, B-37, B-39 and B-40 and Exs.C-2 and C-3. 18. Let us first dispose of the question whether the decree in the earlier suit will bind the plaintiffs. The answer to this question is an emplhaticno. The facts have already been narrated. There was a specific direction issued by this Court on 15.7.1994 in C.M.P.Nos 9964, 9965, 10719 and 10180 of 1994 in W.A.Nos.598 and 599 of 1994 why the plaintiffs in the present suit had to be made parties in the civil suit directed to be filed. The answer to this question is an emplhaticno. The facts have already been narrated. There was a specific direction issued by this Court on 15.7.1994 in C.M.P.Nos 9964, 9965, 10719 and 10180 of 1994 in W.A.Nos.598 and 599 of 1994 why the plaintiffs in the present suit had to be made parties in the civil suit directed to be filed. The appellant who filed O.S.No.951 of 1994 purposely did not implead the present plaintiffs as parties. The reason given by the appellant for not making the appellants as parties is found in the paragraph 11 of the plaint in O.S.No.951 of 1994. Para.11 runs as follows. “In the order in W.A.Nos.598 of 1994 and 599 of 1994, W.P.No.4264 of 1994 and 3120 of 1994 the High Court has directed the plaintiff and defendants to seek their remedy in a civil suit by establishing their right and title to the suit property. However their Lordships have also given a further direction to implead Dhanraj Pillai, Power Agent of the landowners also in the suit. However, the landowners later on 14.11.1994 settled their claim with the 1st defendant and received an amount of Rs.5 lakh in full quit. Therefore they have no right or claim in the suit property and so they are not added as parties.” 19. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that under Exs.A-1 and A-2 the title to the goods had passed on to the second defendants father Meeran, that the present plaintiffs did not have any title, that Exs.A-1 and A-2 had operated as sale deeds and that it was not necessary to implead the present plaintiff as parties. On 28.4.1994 the First Bench passed orders in W.A.Nos.598 and 599 of 1994 in W.P.Nos.4264 and 5120 of 1994 and in paragraph 5 the Bench has stated as follows: “The petitioner in C.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994 (the appellant herein) is treated as a party to this judgment and it is also open to him to go to the Civil Court to establish his title and to any suit filed by the petitioner and the first respondent, the petitioner in C.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994 (Dhanraj Pillai) shall also be made a party.” This specific direction had been deliberately ignored by the appellant when he filed the suit. There were review petitions C.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994 in W.P.Nos.4264 and 5120 of 1994. There were review petitions C.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994 in W.P.Nos.4264 and 5120 of 1994. By order dated 26.8.1994 the review petitions were disposed of and the order passed in the review petitions reads as follows: “These review petitions are filed only on the ground that the observations contained in para.5 of our order dated 28.4.1994 passed in W.P.Nos.4264 and 5120 of 1994 come in the way of the petitioner and the first respondent therein settling their disputes and the petitioners in W.M.P.Nos.10976 and 10978 of 1994 having lost their right as owners, they are now, on the basis of the observations made in para.5 trying to place obstructions between the petitioner and the first respondent in settling the case. It is not possible to review the order on the basis of the aforesaid submission, because on the date of the order was passed, the title to the sandalwood trees in question was in dispute and we held that it should be decided by the civil Court only. Even the owners of the trees also disputed and we had to observe as per para.5 of the said order. We see no ground to entertain these review petitions and the same are accordingly rejected.” Even after this the appellant chose to keep the plaintiffs/ Dhanraj Pillai out. The plaintiffs/ Dhanraj Pillai were not parties to O.S.No.951 of 1994. The appellant ought to have impleaded the plaintiffs as parties. In spite of the directions by this Court. The appellant chose not to implead the plaintiffs/ Dhanraj Pillai as parties. 20. It has been held in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jegannath, (1994)1 S.C.C. 1 : (1994)1 L.W. 21 (S.C.) that, “Non-disclosure of relevant and material documents with a view to obtain advantages amounts to fraud and a decree thus obtained is liable to be set aside.” 21. Conceding that there had been a valid compromise decree, so far as the plaintiffs in the present suit are concerned, they were not parties to the compromise decree and for all practical purpose they were strangers to the compromise decree and therefore the said compromise decree was not binding on them and liable to be set aside. The contention of the appellant that the title to the sandalwood billets passed to the second defendant’s father Meeran and therefore they had been rightly left out of the party array has not been accepted. The contention of the appellant that the title to the sandalwood billets passed to the second defendant’s father Meeran and therefore they had been rightly left out of the party array has not been accepted. In these circumstances, the conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff in the present suit were entitled to have the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 set aside cannot be taken exception to and the same is confirmed. 22. The next question relates to the binding nature of the decree on the second defendant Ibrahim. Ex.A-10 is the certified copy of the plaint in O.S.No.951 of 1994. Exs.A-17 and A-18 are respectively the certified copies of the judgment and the decree in the said suit. The prayer in that suit is for a declaration that the appellant herein was entitled to the sandalwood billets in the custody of the Forest Officials as per the order of this Court in W.A.Nos.598 and 599 of 1994 for delivery of the same by the Forest Officers and for permanent injunction restraining the second defendant herein and the Forest Officials from tampering with the sandalwood billets and from interfering with the constructive possession and enjoyment of the same by the appellant. 23. Some of the dates culminating in the suit being decreed would be very relevant. The suit was filed on 28.11.1994, admitted on 2.12.1994 and summons was directed to be issued to the second defendant in the present suit, who was the first defendant in that suit for the hearing on 6.1.1995. There was an I.A. filed in I.A.No.755 of 1994 for dispensing with notice under Sec.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this is evidenced by Ex.A-12 which is the certified copy of the petition and orders in the said I.A. The first hearing which was posted to 6.1.1995 was advanced to 7.12.1994 as per order in I.A.No.754 of 1994 dated 7.12.1994 and this is evidenced by the certified copy of the petition and orders in I.A.No.754 of 1994 marked as Ex.A-13. The suit was decreed on 7.12.1994 stating that the consent memo was filed by the second defendant herein and Forest Officials, who were defendants 2 and 3 in that suit. The case of the second defendant is that he did not engage D.W.5 advocate Rajendran to appear on his behalf and to file the consent or compromise memo in that suit. The case of the second defendant is that he did not engage D.W.5 advocate Rajendran to appear on his behalf and to file the consent or compromise memo in that suit. It is the contention on behalf of the appellant herein that the suit O.S.No.951 of 1994 was decreed as prayed for pursuant to the memo filed by the second defendant herein and the Forest Officials and as such the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 is binding on the second defendant. Ex.C-2 is the memo alleged to have been filed by the second defendant. It bears date 7.12.1994. No doubt, the second defendant has admitted his signature in the vakalat Ex.C-3 filed in O.S.No.951 of 1994. He has also admitted his letters Exs.B-16 to B-33 addressed to the appellant herein. Though the signature in the vakalat has been admitted by the second defendant, his specific case was that he did not give the said vakalat to Advocate Rajendran to appear for him in O.S.No.951 of 1994, according to the second defendant, he had signed two vakalats to engage advocate Allah Bux and entrusted the vakalat to Dr.Hanifa, his relation, who conspired with the appellant herein and made it appear as if the appellant had engaged Rajendran as his counsel in O.S.No.951 of 1994. Under Ex.B-33 dated 15.10.1994 the second defendant wrote to Dr.Hanifa clearly stating that he did not engage Advocate Rajendran (D.W.5) to appear on his behalf in the suit and that he had never seen the said Advocate. No doubt, Advocate Rajendran had sent a reply stating that the second defendant came with Dr.Hanifa to his office on 2.12.1994 and gave the vakalat duly signed requesting him to appear on his behalf in the suit to be filed by the appellant herein on 5.12.1994. The Advocate further deposed that the second defendant Dr.Hanifa and the appellant herein came to his office and informed him that the matter had been compromised and requested him to submit to a decree on the date when the appellant would file a petition for advancing the hearing of the said suit. It was further stated in that letter that the second defendant informed the Advocate that his presence was not necessary and at the suggestion of Dr.Hanifa and the appellant herein, the second defendant dictated the consent letter to the clerk of Advocate Rajendran and that the letter was with Mr.Rajendran. It was further stated in that letter that the second defendant informed the Advocate that his presence was not necessary and at the suggestion of Dr.Hanifa and the appellant herein, the second defendant dictated the consent letter to the clerk of Advocate Rajendran and that the letter was with Mr.Rajendran. Advocate Rajendran had further deposed that the consent memo Ex.C-2 was written by his clerk in which the second defendant had signed, that the second defendant came to his office on 5.12.1994 along with Dr.Hanifa and the appellant and two others in the evening at 5 or 6 p.m. However, the principal of Haji Kartha Rowther Gowdia College, Uthamapalayam, had given a certificate under Ex.B-6, dated 11.8.1995 stating that the second defendant Mohammed Syed Ibrahim, Lecturer in the English Department of that college, attended the college from 5.12.1994 to 7.12.1994. It was therefore highly improbable that the second defendant came to the office of the Advocate Rajendran on 5.12.1994 at 5 or 6 p.m. along with Dr.Hanifa. Dr.Hanifa has not been examined on the side of the appellant and the letter alleged to have been written by him to the Advocate also had not been produced. In these circumstances, the appellate Court was perfectly justified in expressing doubt that the second defendant had at all given the vakalat Ex.C-3 on 2.12.1994 to advocate Rajendran to appear on his behalf in O.S.No.951 of 1994 and he signed in the consent memo Ex.C-2 bearing date 7.12.1994. The second defendant had also denied his signature in Ex.C-2, but the appellant did not choose to have the same compared by a competent Handwriting Expert with the admitted signature of the second defendant. The lower appellate Court also chose to disbelieve the evidence of the Advocate Mr.Rajendran that he did not receive any fees, that he was paid only Rs.200 towards expenses. I do not find any infirmity in the reasoning and conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court that the consent memo had not been signed by the second defendant. When once the consent memo goes, it must be held that the decree had been obtained by practice of fraud. 24. I do not find any infirmity in the reasoning and conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court that the consent memo had not been signed by the second defendant. When once the consent memo goes, it must be held that the decree had been obtained by practice of fraud. 24. It is the further case of the appellant that he entered into an agreement with the second defendant under Ex.B-7 dated 22.2.1988 as per the terms of which the second defendant agreed to execute an irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of the appellant to transfer the permit that was to be obtained by the second defendant for cutting the sandalwood trees fixing the sale price amount of the said trees at Rs.20 lakhs. According to the appellant pursuant to this agreement Ex.B-7 the second defendant executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney Ex.B-8 dated 3.4.1991. This again was disputed by the second defendant. The stamp papers for Ex.B-8 had been purchased on 23.12.1987 and 1.1.1988. If really, as contended by the appellant, Ex.B-8 was a true document. the stamp papers would have been purchased only at the time of execution of Ex.B-8. If Ex.B-8 came into existence on 3.4.1991, it is understandable as to why the stamp purchased on 23.12.1987 and 1.1.1988 had been used. This casts very serious doubts as to whether Ex.B-8 actually came into existence on 3.4.1991. Again, the signature in Ex.B-8 was disputed by the second defendant. This takes us to Ex.B-36 bearing date 3.4.1991 which purports to be a receipt executed by the second defendant in favour of the appellant for Rs.10 lakhs towards the sale price of sandalwood trees mentioned in the permit issued to the second defendant under Ex.D-9. As pointed out by the lower appellate Court, if the second defendant had been paid Rs.10 lakhs by the appellant and the receipt Ex.B-36 had been obtained from him, the same should have been mentioned in the Power of Attorney Ex.B-8. It is also to be further noticed that the receipt Ex.B-36 dated 3.4.1991 admittedly was not filed along with the plaint in O.S.No.951 of 1994. This also lends room for suspicion with regard to the genuiness of the document. It is the case of the appellant that he withdrew money from the banks and borrowed money from his friends for paying Rs.10 lakhs. However, the same had not been proved. This also lends room for suspicion with regard to the genuiness of the document. It is the case of the appellant that he withdrew money from the banks and borrowed money from his friends for paying Rs.10 lakhs. However, the same had not been proved. The second defendant has particularly denied that he received Rs.10 lakhs on 13.11.1994 from the appellant and that out of the said sum of Rs.10 lakhs he paid Rs.5 lakhs to P.W.1 Dhanraj Pillai, obtained receipt Ex.B-40 from him stating that a sum of Rs.5 lakhs was received from him from the second defendant and he released the sandalwood trees. Exs.B-39 and B-40 were not filed along with the plaint. The non-filing of both the receipts along with the plaint creates serious suspicion as to the bona fides of the case set up by the appellant. The receipt Ex.B-40 is typed and attested by a Notary Public. A perusal of Ex.B-40 shows that there are blanks with regard to the amounts paid by the second defendant’s father Meeran to the plaintiffs pursuant to the earlier agreements Exs.A-1 and A-2 of the year 1974. All these put together clearly show that the second defendant was not a consenting party to the passing of the decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994. If really those things had happened there was no need for filing the suit O.S.No.951 of 1994 at all. 25. Certain other militating facts have also to be stated. The suit was posted to 9.12.1994. It was advanced to 7.12.1994. On that day, according to the appellant, the second defendant filed memo Ex.C-2 and the Government Pleader for the Forest Officials made endorsement of no objection for a decree being passed in the suit. The summons in the suit admittedly was not served on the Forest Officials and it is really baffling as to how the Forest Officials instructed the Government Pleader to report that they had no objection for a decree being passed on 7.12.1994. This would clearly show that the Forest Officials had also colluded with the appellant while bringing about a decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994. The lower appellate Court chose to reject the evidence of D.W.3 Balakrishnan about the execution of Exs.B-36 and B-39 and there is no reason why this rejection cannot be accepted by this Court. This would clearly show that the Forest Officials had also colluded with the appellant while bringing about a decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994. The lower appellate Court chose to reject the evidence of D.W.3 Balakrishnan about the execution of Exs.B-36 and B-39 and there is no reason why this rejection cannot be accepted by this Court. It is also pointed out by the lower appellate Court that in Ex.B-8 after the seal of the Notary Public and the signatures of witnesses 1 and 2 with their address D.W.3 Balakrishnan signed in different ink and wrote below the signature as vakil’s clerk to make it appear as though he along with the two other witnesses signed. Ex.B-8 had been rightly found to have been concocted after the filing of the suit. 26. The first substantial question of law is whether in law the burden has been wrongly cast on the first defendant to prove Exs.C-2, C-3, B-39 and B-40. In my view, the burden has been rightly cast on the appellant to prove these exhibits and the appellant has miserably failed to discharge the burden. 27. The next question is as to whether the suit is maintainable in terms of Secs.31 and 35 of the Specific Relief Act. As has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Muppudathi v. Krishnaswamy, A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 1 (F.B.), the principle of the Section is that such document though not necessary to be set aside may if left outstanding be a source of potential mischief and therefore should be got rid of. The decree in O.S.No.951 of 1994 if left in tact is likely to cause injury to the plaintiffs. Sec.31 of the Specific Relief Act covers a wider field than Sec.27 of the said Act taking care of case of a void document which under the law need not be set aside. 28. Again, since the plaintiffs are not parties to the decree, they need not pay court-fee for cancellation of the decree and the suit as framed for declaration that the decree is invalid so far as they are concerned is perfectly maintainable. It is settled law that the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint taken as a whole should be looked into and not the form of the prayer in which the relief is cast. Vide: Ramaswami v. Rangachariar, (1940)1 M.L.J. 32 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad. It is settled law that the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint taken as a whole should be looked into and not the form of the prayer in which the relief is cast. Vide: Ramaswami v. Rangachariar, (1940)1 M.L.J. 32 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 113: 51 L.W. 11: 1940 M.W.N. 126 (F.B.). 29. Having regard to the nature of the prayer in the suit, it is totally unnecessary to seek any consequential declaration with regard to sandalwood trees and a suit for a mere declaration is maintainable. 30. As regards the third substantial question of law, the trial Court had found of visual comparison of the documents that those documents bore the signature of the respective parties to whom they were attributed. In my view, the finding by the trial Court on visual comparison without expert aid cannot be conclusive. It was incumbent on the appellant too have proved that the documents contained the signatures of the persons to whom they were attributed. This the appellant has failed to do. In these circumstances, the lower appellate Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the finding of the trial Court in this regard. 31. The principle of “finality of litigation”cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. A person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/ decree by the first Court or by the highest Court-has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings. Vide: S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jegannath, (1994)1 S.C.C. 1 : (1994)1 L.W. 21 (S.C.). 32. In the instant case, the appellant had created documents and hood winked the Court and obtained a decree. In the language of the Supreme Court he had cheated with intention to get an advantage. He has been guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. 33. 32. In the instant case, the appellant had created documents and hood winked the Court and obtained a decree. In the language of the Supreme Court he had cheated with intention to get an advantage. He has been guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. 33. For all the reasons stated above, I find that the conclusion reached by the lower Appellate Court is unassailable and the substantial questions of law raised are therefore answered against the appellant. 34. The next question relates to whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in refusing the relief of injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs. The reasoning in this regard by the lower appellate Court appears to be faulty. When it is found that the appellant has played a huge fraud on the Court and brought about a collusive decree by refusing injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, the very purpose of setting aside the decree is defeated. The mere fact that from the Commissioner’s report Ex.C-1 it is seen that the sandalwood billets had been already transported from the Salem Forest Depot by the appellant to his village and kept in premises will not entitle the appellant to have custody of the same. The lower appellate Court should have moulded the relief having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. This is a fit case where the provisions of O.41, Rule 33 have to be invoked and the plaintiffs given relief. 35. There will be a decree for permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs restraining the appellant from removing the sandalwood billets stated to be stored in his premises and the same will be returned to the plaintiffs. The decree of the lower appellate Court will stand modified to the extent indicated above. The second appeal is dismissed with costs of plaintiffs. Counsel fee Rs.5,000 one set. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions, C.M.P.Nos 6412 and 6413 of 1998 are also dismissed. Appeal and petitions Dismissed.