Judgment : Both the above writ petitions, though filed by different petitioners, the respondents therein, the facts and circumstances in the pleading, the object sought to be achieved, as set out in the prayers, since being one and the same, a common order is hereby passed in both of them. 2. For the sake of convenience, W.P.No.14558 of 1992 is addressed herein as the first writ petition, the petitioner therein as the first petitioner and the W.P.No.14559 of 1992 as the second writ petition and the petitioner therein as the second petitioner. 3. Both the petitioners pray to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the third respondent made in his proceeding Na.Ka.No.C3/5195/89, dated 20.7.1992 and quash the same, consequently directing the third respondent to permit the first petitioner to continue her lease in business premises No.4 and the second petitioner to continue his lease in business premises No.2, both situate eastern side of the Municipality Building, Bus Stand, Wallajapet, North Arcot District on payment of 15% more than the existing lease amount once in a block period of three years as per the judgment of the Supreme Court made in Writ Petition (Civil) No.400 of 1986, dated 24. 1991 and to pass such further orders as this Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 4. In the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, the petitioners would contend that the third respondent issued an auction Notification on 8. 1989 for the lease of 40 shops located on the Eastern side of Municipal Buildings, Wallajapet for the period of three years ending with 30.9.1992, conducting first auction on 29. 1989 and subsequently cancelling the same, conducted the auction on 8. 1990 wherein the petitioners became the successful bidders for the respective shops; that while so, the third respondent issued the impugned proceedings directing the petitioners to vacate the premises by 30.9.1992; that in G.O.Ms.No.285, dated 24. 1989 and subsequently cancelling the same, conducted the auction on 8. 1990 wherein the petitioners became the successful bidders for the respective shops; that while so, the third respondent issued the impugned proceedings directing the petitioners to vacate the premises by 30.9.1992; that in G.O.Ms.No.285, dated 24. 1985 passed by the first respondent, it permitted the existing lease-holders to continue their respective lease on payment of 15% increased lease amount over and above the lease amount of the previous year by amending Rule 12(1), Sub-Rule (3), clause (b) on certain terms, but the judgment of the Supreme Court made in W.P. Civil No.400 of 1986 directed that the 15% increased lease amount should be collected once in a block period of three years and not every year; that in spite of having collected 15% more than that of the previous year lease amount, the third respondent issued the impugned notice requiring the petitioners to vacate the premises, which runs repugnant to the Supreme Court judgment stated supra and also against the Government Order enabling the respondent to permit the petitioners to continue the lease on payment of 15% more than the existing lease amount and hence the impugned order of the third respondent directing the petitioners to vacate the premises amounts to violative of principles of natural justice and the promissory estoppel. 5. With such averment, the petitioners would pray for the relief as sought for in the writ petitions mentioned supra. 6. The operative portion of the order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.1991 to 1994 of 1991 connected with Writ Petition (Civil) No.400 of 1986, dated 24. 1991 is extracted hereunder: “We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions urged by both the parties. It seems to us that there is no point in dispossessing the petitioners if they are prepared to pay the enhanced rent as per the said Government Order. They are in the premises, doing business apparently with considerable investment. The periodical change of premises seems to be detrimental to their interests. If the Municipality is assured of reasonable rent, it is proper that the petitioners be allowed to continue in the premises. They must however, pay the rent at the increased rate at 15% more than the amount, which is payable by them. The periodical change of premises seems to be detrimental to their interests. If the Municipality is assured of reasonable rent, it is proper that the petitioners be allowed to continue in the premises. They must however, pay the rent at the increased rate at 15% more than the amount, which is payable by them. This increased rate of rent at 15% shall be payable once in a block period of three years commencing from 4. 1988. The increased rate of 15% for the period from 4. 1988 to 4. 1991 shall be payable within three months from today. The appeals and the writ petition are accordingly allowed setting aside the judgment of the High Court. No costs.“ 7. In other similar writ appeals pending before the Division Bench of this Court, the Division Bench has also, extracting thereby the entire order of the Apex Court held in the following manner in Writ Appeal Nos.91, 175, 236, 245, 246, 266, 300 and 642 of 1986, dated 7. 1991: ”The counsel appearing for the parties, appellants in these writ appeals, submit that their clients will be content if orders similar to the above are made in these writ appeals also. We do not propose and we do not venture to add anything more than what has been expressed in the order of the highest court in the land and we order these writ appeals in the terms as per the above order of the highest court in the land. There will be no order as to costs.“ 8. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the above writ petitions would reiterate what he has pleaded in the writ petitions, laying emphasis on the orders of the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court. There will be no order as to costs.“ 8. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the above writ petitions would reiterate what he has pleaded in the writ petitions, laying emphasis on the orders of the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court. He would also clarify that after the orders of the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court in the year 1991, on such terms proposed by the said courts, on payment of enhanced rents, the petitioners are in occupation of the respective shops and there is no need or necessity to alter the situation, since the position is not different now than what had been in the year 1991 and would pray for directing the third respondent to execute the lease deeds in favour of the petitioners in respect of the shops they are in occupation, in terms of the order of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.1991 to 1994 of 1991 connected with Writ Petition (Civil) No.400 of 1986, dated 24. 1991. 9. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent/Municipality, citing an order passed by a single Judge of this Court in M.Palanisamy and others v. The Sriramapuram Town Panchayat through its Executive Officer, Sriramapuram, Dindigul M.Palanisamy and others v. The Sriramapuram Town Panchayat through its Executive Officer, Sriramapuram, Dindigul M.Palanisamy and others v. The Sriramapuram Town Panchayat through its Executive Officer, Sriramapuram, Dindigul , (1998)2 C.T.C. 683 would contend that a similar relief sought for by the writ petitioners in the above matter against the Sriramapuram Town Panchayat, Dindigul District, thereby claiming to renew the lease, accepting the rent at the enhanced rate of 15% over and above that of the previous year, when in 1998, the said Panchayat proposed to lease out the shops in public auction based on a resolution dated 24. 1997, the learned Single Judge of this Court declined to grant the said relief further opining that the rights of the parties are governed by the lease agreement entered into between them. 1997, the learned Single Judge of this Court declined to grant the said relief further opining that the rights of the parties are governed by the lease agreement entered into between them. Following many decisions of this Court made in many writ petitions in the recent past and heavily relying upon the Order of the Apex Court delivered in Sales Tax Officer and another v. M/s.Shree Durga Mills and another Sales Tax Officer and another v. M/s.Shree Durga Mills and another Sales Tax Officer and another v. M/s.Shree Durga Mills and another , (1997)1 Supreme 418 which has been cited by Shivappa, J., as he then was, while disposing of a batch of cases in W.P.Nos.2428 to 2431 and 3872 of 1987, dated 4. 1998, the learned single Judge of this Court would ultimately dismiss the said writ petition. 10. It is relevant to extract what is held by the learned Judge (Shivappa, J.) in the writ petitions cited supra following the decision of the Apex Court in the said case, which runs as follows: ”The court will not interfere with any action taken by the Government in public interest. Public interest must override any consideration of private loss or gain. This jurisdiction is meant to preserve the right and not to create a right where the petitioners have no semblance of any right to see renewal. Where the properties were put to augment more income for the benefit of the public, I do not think that the petitioners are entitled to any relief form this Court. Auction of plots is policy decision of the authority to enable the new persons to enter into the business and to discourage the monopoly of the old and established method of earning more income, resorting to sub-leases of public property. Auction of plots is policy decision of the authority to enable the new persons to enter into the business and to discourage the monopoly of the old and established method of earning more income, resorting to sub-leases of public property. In such a situation, where the local authority, after due publication adopted the fairest means of disposal of its property by way of lease through public auction and gives an opportunity to everyone to make a bid, cannot be found fault with and if at all, the petitioners thought that they are likely to be affected or affected by auction and causing dislocation of their business, nothing prevented them to participate in the auction and claim the shops, instead, they cannot cling on to a non-existing right and resort to litigation, prevent the local authority from augmenting more income from its property, earning better revenue for the public good. “ 11. The pith and substance of the above judgment would run quite contrary to the decision of the Apex Court made in Civil Appeal Nos.1991 to 1994 of 1991 connected with Writ Petition (Civil) No.400 of 1986, dated 24. 1991. No doubt, the third respondent/municipality with the fervent hope that it could augment more income, which could be utilised for the benefit of the public, is trying to lease out the shops owned by it in public auction, in which event, the present petitioners, who are in occupation of those respective shops are also at liberty to participate. If they are really interested in getting their lease renewed, they could bid the highest and be successful in such perfect competition rather than as aspiring to enjoy the property on payment of rent at a slight enhancement of 15% than that of the previous term/year. Only in such realisation and reposing faith in the public interest, the Apex Court has favoured the public auction and to give an opportunity to every one to make a bid, which could not be considered to affect the petitioners, since nothing prevents them from participating in the auction and claim the shops instead of clinging on to a non-existing right and resort to litigation thus preventing the local authority from augumenting more income from its property. 12. 12. For all the reasons above mentioned and the judgment cited, the petitioners cannot take it for granted that in permitting the appellants in the said civil appeals by the Supreme Court, they could continue for ever to hold the premises on lease forgetting that the Municipal authorities are at liberty to bring these properties for auction every now and then within such powers granted by law and hence the order made by the third respondent/municipality could in no way be construed either against the principles of natural justice or opposed to any law so as to grant the relief sought for by the petitioners in the writ petitions. There is absolutely no patent errors of law or perversity in approach of the third respondent/municipality in passing of the impugned order directing the petitioners to vacate the premises concerned, so as to let out those premises along with others in the public auction, in order to augument income for the municipality in the public interest in which event, the petitioners are also at liberty to participate in such auction. Hence, the interference of this Court sought for into the impugned orders cannot be complied with. In result, both the above writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P.Nos.20660 of 1992 and 20662 of 1992 are also dismissed.