ORDER: C.R.P.No.2898 of 1998 is filed by landlord and the same arises from R.C.O.P.No.262 of 1986. C.R.P.No.2198 of 1998 is filed by tenant and the same arises from R.C.O.P.No.272 of 1988. For the sake of convenience, parties will be referred to as "landlord" and "tenant’. 2. Both the eviction petitions were filed by same landlord against same tenant. R.C.O.P.No.262 of 1986 was filed by landlord claiming eviction on the ground that the building requires immediate demolition and reconstruction and also for the reason that after demolition, building is required for the occupation of landlord’s son for his business requirement and to augment income. 3. R.C.O.P.No.272 of 1988 was filed by landlord on the allegation that the tenant has sublet the building and is also making use of the building for the purposes other than for which the building was let out. 4. In both these petitions, the case of the parties could be summarised thus: It is the case of landlord that the scheduled building was let out to tenant on his agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.50. According to him, the building is very old and requires immediate demolition and reconstruction. Landlord has also submitted plan to Municipality for approval and approval has also been obtained Landlord got financial capacity to put up new construction and the construction is also necessary to augment his income. Landlord also wants to provide employment to his unemployed son to carry on business in the proposed construction and wanted to stand on his own legs. Landlord is not in possession of any other non-residential building. 5. It is also averred by landlord in R.C.O.P.No.272 of 1988 that the building was given to tenant only to run a guilt shop but he has received information that he is running synthetic diamond sale. Even after serious search made by landlord, he could not identify the person is whose name the building was sub-let and landlord is not in a position to make him as party to the petition. It is also averred that tenant has sub-let the building to a person who is doing synthetic diamond business for a sum of Rs.250. It is said that since the building is allowed to be used for the purposes other than to which it was let out, there is change of user and on this ground also tenant is liable to be evicted. 6. It is said that since the building is allowed to be used for the purposes other than to which it was let out, there is change of user and on this ground also tenant is liable to be evicted. 6. In the counter statement filed by tenant in both the eviction petitions he denied having sub-let the building and also alleged that there is no change of user. According to him, he wanted to do business in synthetic diamond also and he had applied for licence and the same could not be obtained. Building is still under his control and there is no sub-lease. It is also contended that there is no change of user. Regarding the claim for eviction for demolition and reconstruction, it is contended that landlord has not satisfied the statutory requirements and the claim is not bona fide. The claim that the building is required for the business of his son after demolition and reconstruction was also disputed by tenant. 7. Both these petitions were clubbed together and evidence was taken in R.C.O.P.No.262 of 1986 from which C.R.P.No.2898 of 1998 arises. On the side of landlord Exs.P-1 to P-14 were marked and on the side of tenant Exs.R-1 to R-7 were marked Commissioner’s report is marked as Ex.C-1. Enclosures in the Commissioner’s report were marked as Exs.C-2 and C-3. Oral evidence consist of P.Ws.1 and 2 and R.Ws.1 and 2. 8. After evaluating entire evidence, trial court held that landlord has not proved his claim for eviction on the ground that the building requires demolition and reconstruction nor it is bona fidely required by landlord’s son. It is also found that there is no change of user. But, at the same time, Rent Controller held that landlord has proved that the tenant has sub-let the building and the same is unauthorised. Eviction was ordered on that ground. 9. Landlord filed R.C.A.No.83 of 1994 and tenant filed R.C.A.No.81 of 1994 on the file of Rent Control Appellate Authority/Principal Sub Court, Tiruchirapalli, Both these appeals were decided by a common judgment dated 18.6.1998 whereby appellate authority dismissed both the appeals. 10. It is against the concurrent findings of authorities below both the landlord and tenant preferred these revision petitions under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 11. 10. It is against the concurrent findings of authorities below both the landlord and tenant preferred these revision petitions under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 11. I will first consider the limits of this Court while exercising powers under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act. 12. In C.Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan, (2000)1 S.C.C. 451 , their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court in para.11 of the judgment held that the question of wilful default to pay or tender rent to a landlord by a tenant is a mixed question of law and fact. Where the findings recorded by the Appellate authority are illegal, erroneous or perverse, the High Curt, having regard to the ambit of its revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Act, will be well within its jurisdiction in reversing the findings impugned before it and recording its own findings. 13. In Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai, (1999)1 S.C.C. 133 , their Lordships considered this question under Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act, where it is held that revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appellate powers and in para.8, their Lordships held thus: “The appellation given to the section makes it unmistakably clear that the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means. It is a power of supervision. It is well-nigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the” Legality, regularity and propriety “ of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely-worded frame of the section may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in the enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction. In a recent decision, we had occasion to consider the scope of revisional jurisdiction under certain rent control enactments vide: Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998)8 S.C.C. 119 : J.T. (1998)7 S.C. 297. Reference was then made to a decision wherein similar words used under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 were considered (Vide: Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980)4 S.C.C. 259. A two-Judge Bench has observed therein (at S.C.C. p.262, para. Ltd., (1998)8 S.C.C. 119 : J.T. (1998)7 S.C. 297. Reference was then made to a decision wherein similar words used under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 were considered (Vide: Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980)4 S.C.C. 259. A two-Judge Bench has observed therein (at S.C.C. p.262, para. 3) that:”despite the wide language employed in Sec.25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority“. After adverting to it we have stated in Sarla Ahuja: ”(T)he High Court in the present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. “ 14. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 , a case coming under Delhi Rent Control Act, in para.11 of the judgment after extracting Sec.25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, their Lordships held thus: ”The phraseology of the provision as reproduced herein before provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the legislature in drafting Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the Subordinate Court having committed one of the three errors, namely, (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the Proviso to Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is “for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law”. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25-B(8) is not so limited as is under Sec.115, C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an appellate court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25-B(8) is not so limited as is under Sec.115, C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an appellate court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of “Whether it is according to law”. For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the controller “not according to Law” calling for an interference under the Proviso to Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.25-B of the Act. A judgment leading to a miscarriage of justice is not a judgment according to law. (See: Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998)8 S.C.C. 119 : J.T. (1998)7 S.C. 297 and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999)1 S.C.C. 141 .“ 15. Under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court considered this question in the decision reported in T.Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari, (1999)7 S.C.C. 275 . In para.5 of the judgment, it is held thus: ”So far as the second submission is concerned, the language employed in Sec.25 of the Act, which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, is very vide under Sec.25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. The words, “to satisfy itself” employed in Sec.25 of the Act no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. The words, “to satisfy itself” employed in Sec.25 of the Act no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. ... “ [Italics supplied] 16. In Ubaiba v. Damodraan, (1999)5 S.C.C. 645 , a case coming under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, their Lordships held that even though the scope of revision is wider than Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships further held that revisional court will not be entitled to reappreciate evidence and substitute its findings in the place of conclusion of the appellate authority. 17. On the basis of these settled legal position, I will consider how far the decision of the authorities below requires interference in these revision petitions. 18. I will first take into consideration the allegation regarding unauthorised sub-Letting by tenant. 19. In Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998)3 S.C.C. 1 , their Lordships considered how to prove the sub-tenancy. In para.4 of the judgment, their Lordships have held thus: ”Sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. It is the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or n kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub-let. “ [Italics supplied] 20. In Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C.Sharma, (1988)1 S.C.C. 70 , their Lordships held that to prove subletting there must be parting of legal possession. Their Lordships further went on and said that parting to legal possession means, possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. Their Lordships emphasised that in our opinion, is the matter of fact. 21. Their Lordships further went on and said that parting to legal possession means, possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. Their Lordships emphasised that in our opinion, is the matter of fact. 21. In Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, (1989)3 S.C.C. 56 , in para.16, their Lordships have held thus: ”In this, there was no assignment, sub-letting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C.Sharma, (1988)1 S.C.C. 70 , where it was held that to constitute a sub-letting, there must be a parting of legal possession, i.e., possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others and whether in a particular case there was sub-letting was substantially a question of fact. In that case, a reference was made at page 77 of the report to the Treatise of a Landlord and Tenant, 6th Edn., at page 323, for the proposition that the mere act of letting other persons into possession by the tenant, and permitting them to use the premises for their own purposes, is not, so long as he retains the legal possession himself, a breach of convenant. In paragraph 17 of the report, it was observed that parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. In the last mentioned case, the observations of the Madras High Court in Gundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rangiah, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 182: (1952)1 M.L.J. 652 , were approved by this Court in which the legal position in Jackson v. Simons, (1923)1 Ch.D. 373: 128 L.T. 572: 39 T.L.R. 147, were relied upon. The Madras High Court had also relied on a judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in Chaplin v. Smith, (1926)1 K.B. 198: 95 L.J. K.B. 49: 134 L.T. 393 at 411 of the report where it was said: “He did not assign, nor did he underlet. He was constantly on the premises himself and kept the key of them. He did business of his own as well as business of the company. In my view he allowed the company to use the premises while he himself remained in possession of them.” This position was also accepted in Vishwanath v. Chaman Lal, A.I.R. 1975 Del. He was constantly on the premises himself and kept the key of them. He did business of his own as well as business of the company. In my view he allowed the company to use the premises while he himself remained in possession of them.” This position was also accepted in Vishwanath v. Chaman Lal, A.I.R. 1975 Del. 117: 1975 Rent C.J. 514, wherein it was observed that parting with possession is under-stood as parting with legal possession by one in favour of the other by giving him an exclusive possession to the ouster of the grantor. If the grantor had retained legal possession with him it was not a case of parting with possession. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Madras Bangalore Transport Co. (West) v. Inder Singh, (1986)3 S.C.C. 62 , wherein the observations of the Delhi High Court had been approved. The concept of parting with possession in private contracts between the landlord and tenant was also known in India and it means parting with legal possession to the exclusion of the grantor himself..." [Italics supplied] 22. In Rajbir Kaur v. S.Chokesiri and Co., (1989)1 S.C.C. 19 , it was held that if exclusive possession is established, and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, as in the present case, it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licences are in their very nature, cladestine arrangements between the tenant and subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of subletting and establishing facts and contentions which support the party’s case is one the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion viz the landlord. It at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. The burden of making good a case of subletting and establishing facts and contentions which support the party’s case is one the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion viz the landlord. It at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. 23. The law is well settled that in the case of sub-lease, it is a concealed transaction between tenant and the sub-lessee. Landlord can prove sub-lease only from circumstances. If the transaction be within the special knowledge of tenant and sub-lesseee, if certain circumstances are proved by landlord, from which an inference could be drawn that there is a probability that tenant might have sub-let the building, it is for tenant to show that those circumstances are not true to hold that he has unauthorisedly sub-let. 24. It is true that it is for landlord to prove the case of unauthorised sub-lease. Law is also well settled that landlord has to prove that third party is in exclusive possession of the building. If that is proved, taking into consideration the normal course of human conduct that the person who is allowed to be in exclusive possession is occupying the building for consideration. It has been so held in Nihal Chand Rameshwar Dass v. Vinod Rastogi, (1994)4 S.C.C. 325 , wherein their Lordships followed the case of Rajbir Kar v. S.Chokesiri and Co., (1989)1 S.C.C. 19 . 25. If the explanation offered by the tenant is not satisfactory, or there is improbability in his explanation on the basis of the evidence adduced by landlord, court will be justified in holding that there is unauthorised sub-lease. Whether third party is in exclusive possession also could be proved by circumstances. If the business that is carried on in the building is such that without possession the same cannot be carried an inference is possible that third party is in exclusive possession. It is also could be informed when the tenant fails to prove that he continues to have control over the building and not conducting business in the premises. From the above law. It is also could be informed when the tenant fails to prove that he continues to have control over the building and not conducting business in the premises. From the above law. let us consider the evidence in this case. 26. It is not disputed by tenant that the building was let out to his father and on his death by revision petitioner for the purpose of doing business in gilt. Tenant has to prove that he continues to run gilt shop. If there is no evidence to show that he not running the business and some other business is being conducted, that is also a relevant piece of evidence to be taken into consideration. In this case, definite case of landlord is that the building was let out only to run gilt shop. But as on date, the business that is conducted is synthetic diamond sale. In the explanation offered by tenant he, said that there is no change of user and to augment his income, he wanted to start business in synthetic diamond and even printed cards and envelopes. He could not obtain licence so far. He wanted to do business in synthetic diamond under the name and style “Fullmoon Diamonds”. But he has not sublet the building and still he is doing business in gilt shop in the scheduled premises. In this case, landlord has also stated that even though he made enquiries as to the person who is doing business in synthetic diamond, he could not get the name of the person and landlord only said that the building was sublet to a person whose details are not available. 27. Immediately, after filing eviction petition a Commissioner was deputed to make a local inspection. At the time Commissioner visited the property, a person by name Abdul Rasheed was sitting in the Kallapetti (cash counter). Commissioner questioned the status of Abdul Rasheed and the reason for his presence in the premises. Abdul Rasheed informed the Commissioner that he is working under the tenant. At the time of inspection, tenant was also not present in the premises and he waited for a few minutes and made his presence known before the Commissioner. Commissioner further stated that the person who occupied the kallapetti gave instructions to tenant to open his iron locker and other boxes. At the time of inspection, tenant was also not present in the premises and he waited for a few minutes and made his presence known before the Commissioner. Commissioner further stated that the person who occupied the kallapetti gave instructions to tenant to open his iron locker and other boxes. The articles necessary for running the imitation diamond business were shown only by the person seated in the Kallapetti. The details which Commissioner noted are, name board of the shop with address - ‘Full Moon Diamonds“, 352, Big Bazaar Street, Tiruchirapalli-8’. (ii) in front of the shop in the platform (pavement) there is also another name Board under the name and style” Rasheed Gilt Shop’. Commissioner also found that licence for gilt shop was lastly renewed only on 10.2.1967 and the order of renewal is only upto 1967. He further found from the records in the building a certificate to carry on business as goldsmith issued by Ministry of Finance, Gold Control Administration. He also found one cardboard box containing synthetic imitation diamond stones without any shining or glitter. That cardboard box contained inscriptions viz., ‘2 kg. Ruby No.75, 3350 ct. Full Bouies’. It is further stated ‘Indoswiss Synthetic Gem Manufacturing Co Ltd., Mettupalyam PIN-641 301, South India. It is a box with seal, just opened, Along with the same, there is also a price list (Printed list) for synthetic imitation diamonds. There was also balance and weights, and some bills dating from 7.8.1988 for purchase of materials to run the diamond shop. Another important document which Commissioner could not and produce before Rent Controller was a letter dated 7.8.1988 from one Zubane Mohammed, No.25, Judge Jambulingam Street, Madras to the Check Post Officer, Tamil Nadu. In that letter, Zubane Mohammed informed the Check Post Officer about the change of address. This letter was initialled by the Commissioner at the time of inspection and the same was produced before court. 28. I have stated earlier that the bills that are verified by Commissioner are dating from 7.8.1988 for the purchase of materials to run the Synthetic Diamond Shop. These are the circumstances on the basis of which court will have to infer whether there is sub-letting or not. I will summarise the circumstances; (a) Tenant is not having renewal for running the gilt shop. These are the circumstances on the basis of which court will have to infer whether there is sub-letting or not. I will summarise the circumstances; (a) Tenant is not having renewal for running the gilt shop. (b) There is name board at the top of the shop and also another board on the pavements/platform in the name of the tenant. (c) The cash box was being controlled by one Abdul Rasheed and it was under this instructions, tenant opened the iron locker and other boxes and it was Abdul Rasheed explained imitation diamond business to the Commissioner. (d) There is a letter dated 7.8.1988 from one Zubane Mohammed intimating the change of his business address from Madras to Tiruchirapalli in the Scheduled Building. (e) For running Diamond shop, the bills are dating from 7.8.1988 and the letter of Zubane Mohammed is also of the same date. (f) In the counter statement tenant says that he could not obtain licence for running synthetic Diamond business and therefore he is continuing gilt shop. (g) A price list for doing business in synthetic Diamond was also found in the premises. (h) There is absolutely no record to show that tenant in fact applied for getting licence for doing business in imitation diamond. (i) There is also no evidence to show that tenant was doing business in gilt during the time when eviction petition was filed and accounts are also not produced before the court. With this background, let me consider the evidence of tenant in this case. 29. Tenant was asked about the cardboard box which contained inscription ‘Ruby No.75-2kg. 3350 ct. Full Bodies" and also the address ‘Indo-Swiss Synthetic Gem Manufacturing Co Ltd., Mettupalayam. Tenant pleaded ignorance. Regarding Cash counter it was admitted by tenant that it was taken from Madras and also admitted that it was not purchased by him. He also admitted that the cash box belonged to one Zubane Mohammed. In this connection letter dated 7.8.1988 from Zubane Mohammed wherein he has stated that he has changed his business form Madras to Tiruchirapalli and the address given by him as No.352, Big Bazaar Street, Tiruchirapalli, assumes importance. Tenant was also asked about the change of address of Zubane Mohammed. Tenant admitted that all the movables belongs to Zubane Mohammed was taken from Madras to Tiruchirapalli and there is also accounts to substantiate the same. Tenant was also asked about the change of address of Zubane Mohammed. Tenant admitted that all the movables belongs to Zubane Mohammed was taken from Madras to Tiruchirapalli and there is also accounts to substantiate the same. It is also admitted by tenant that it was he who took all the movables which was sent by Zubane Mohammed. Rent Controller has also stated in his order in the last portion of Para 17, after making reference to the letter of Zubane Mohammed thus, It was this Zubane Mohammed who shifted his business from Madras to Tiruchirapalli. 30. I have already stated that when Commissioner visited the property, he has noted the presence of Abdul Rasheed. Even though tenant had a case that Abdul Rasheed is an employee, there is nothing on record to show that he was employed by him. Abdul Rasheed is admittedly is not a relative of tenant and when Commissioner visited the property, it was Rasheed gave directions and he was in control of the cash counter. If in fact tenant is doing business in artificial diamond as well as in gilt, there is no necessity for two name boards. It is admitted by tenant himself that he has not obtained licence and therefore he was compelled to continue gilt business. But that is belied by the presence of price list which is taken by Commissioner from the scheduled premises. If only gilt business is being done, there is no necessity of price is of synthetic Diamond. When tenant says that he is not doing business in artificial diamond and circumstances believe that statement, an inference will have to be drawn that the business in artificial diamond is being done in the premises by a person other than tenant. Zubane Mohammed has shifted his business from Madras to Tiruchirapalli and the cash box also belong to him is admitted. Tenant is not in a position to explain the details of various items that is found by Commissioner. Under these circumstances, an inference is possible that the business in artificial diamond is being conducted only by Zubane Mohammed through Abdul Rasheed, named above, Merely because tenant made his presence known when Commissioner visited the property, that will not show that he continues in possession of the scheduled premises. Under these circumstances, an inference is possible that the business in artificial diamond is being conducted only by Zubane Mohammed through Abdul Rasheed, named above, Merely because tenant made his presence known when Commissioner visited the property, that will not show that he continues in possession of the scheduled premises. If tenant was continuing gilt business, he could have produced documents to show that he is continuing the business in the scheduled premises. Licence was never renewed after 1967. 31. If an inference could be drawn that some other person is doing business in Synthetic Diamond, further question arises for consideration is where that person needs exclusive possession for the business. Even the direction given by Abdul Rasheed at the time when Commissioner Abdul Rasheed at the time when Commissioner visited the property seems to be artificial. If Abdul Rasheed is an employee of tenant, he would not have given directions to his employer. From the Commissioner’s report it could be seen that various items of movables are kept in the shop, cash box is available, an iron locker, raw materials, for manufacturing imitation diamonds person also will have to deal with various customers. Such a business cannot be done without the person having actual control over the building. Tenant also has not proved that he is having control over the building on the date when Commissioner visited the property. Abdul Rasheed alone was present and it was only after Commissioner visited the property on intimation by Abdul Rasheed tenant made his presence known before the Commissioner. From these circumstances, I feel that the inference drawn by Rent Controller that third person is doing business and he is in actual control of the shop. I do think that the inference drawn by Rent Controller is not reasonable taking into consideration the probabilities of the case. The said view was also upheld by the appellate authority. Once it is found that third person is doing business and that business requires control over the building, it could be inferred that third persons in in exclusive possession of the building. Naturally it is for the tenant to prove the circumstances under which third person came to the shop and doing business therein. Explanation offered by tenant that he alone is doing business is belied by the circumstances. Naturally it is for the tenant to prove the circumstances under which third person came to the shop and doing business therein. Explanation offered by tenant that he alone is doing business is belied by the circumstances. If that be so, court can also infer that third person is doing business in the scheduled premises for monetary consideration. 32. In the recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Resham Singh v. Raghbir Singh, (1999)7 S.C.C. 263 , their Lordships held in para.5 that the question of sub-letting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. 33. Tenant has no case that Zubane Mohammed is a relative and he has not explained the reason why Zubane Mohammed has shifted his business to the scheduled building. A change of address denotes that addressee is to have permanent address in the scheduled building and that too not under the care of tenant. From this circumstances, it is clear that landlord has proved that there was transfer of possession though landlord is not in a position to name the sub-tenant at the time of initiating proceeding, subsequently during evidence it is clear that there is a transfer in favour of Zubane Mohammed and Rasheed is really agent or employee of Zubane Mohammed. The decision of authorities below can never be said as illegal, improper or irregular while considering entire evidence an inference could be drawn from the proved facts. 34. Taking into consideration the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.25 of the Act. I am of the view that no ground is made out for interference on the finding that tenant has unauthorisedly sublet the building. 35. The further question arises for consideration is whether landlord is entitled to get eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction and also change of user. Regarding change of user, the allegation is not that the tenant is making use of the building for other purposes. The allegation is that the person who has been inducted is doing business under the name and style "Full Moon Diamonds’ and that is the change of user. Regarding change of user, the allegation is not that the tenant is making use of the building for other purposes. The allegation is that the person who has been inducted is doing business under the name and style "Full Moon Diamonds’ and that is the change of user. Once it is found that tenant has sublet the building and it is sub-tenant who is doing business, there is no question of ordering eviction on the ground of change of user. 36. Regarding the question of claim for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction both the authorities below have held that the claim of landlord is not bona fide. Though landlord got financial capacity to put up construction, it has come out in evidence that scheduled premises is only small one and under the same roof, there are other buildings also which landlord do not want to demolish and reconstruct. The remaining portions are also in the possession of other tenants against whom eviction is not claimed nor landlord has case that those tenants agreed to surrender vacant possession. Under these circumstances, I do not think that I will be justified in interfering in the concurrent findings that the claim of landlord is not bona fide. 37. In the result, both the revision petitions are dismissed and order of eviction passed by Rent Controller as confirmed by appellate authority ordering eviction on the ground of unauthorised ordering eviction on the ground of unauthorised subletting is confirmed. No costs. C.M.P.No.10987 of 1998 is also dismissed.