JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.— This petition is filed by the petitioner for an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside an order dated 23rd July, 1998 passed in O.A. No. 133/1991 by the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. 2. The case of the petitioner was that he joined the services with the H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation ("Corporation’ for short) on 2nd September, 1981. He was in charge of Sales Depot. On 2nd September, 1986, certain allegations were levelled against the petitioner which included financial irregularities as well as misappropriation of money. Inquiry was ordered to be instituted. The Inquiry Officer found the allegations proved and submitted his report on 28th April, 1988, holding the charges levelled against the petitioner established. On 2nd January, 1990, the petitioner was imposed a penalty of removal from service. An appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order was also dismissed on 22nd September, 1990. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the Tribunal and as stated above, the Tribunal also dismissed his petition. 3. At the time of hearing of the petition, two contentions were raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Firstly, no report of the Inquiry Officer was supplied to the petitioner. Secondly, no opportunity on quantum of punishment was afforded to him. 4. It was submitted that after the completion of inquiry, when the Inquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty and observed that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved, it was incumbent on his part to supply copy of the report of the Inquiry. In this connection, reliance was placed on certain decisions of the Honble Supreme Court including a decision in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 1. In Mohd: Ramzan Khan, the Honble Supreme Court held that it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority, if it is not inquiring authority, to supply a copy of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer so as to enable the delinquent to have his say in the matter. If such a report is not supplied to the delinquent, the action taken in pursuance of the said report, would be illegal, contrary to law and liable to be set aside. 5. If such a report is not supplied to the delinquent, the action taken in pursuance of the said report, would be illegal, contrary to law and liable to be set aside. 5. In this connection, however, it may be necessary to point out that in para 17 of the reported decision, the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:— "17. There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Forty-secortd Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion the judgments in the different High Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. We have not been shown any decision of a co-ordinate or a larger bench of this Court taking this view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two Judge Bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground." (Emphasis supplied) 6. Mohd. Ramzan Khan was decided by the Supreme Court on November 22, 1990. From the observations emphasised hereinabove, it is clear that Mohd. Ramzan Khan has "prospective operation" and no punishment imposed earlier to that decision was open to question on the ground that report of the Inquiry Officer was not supplied to the delinquent. It is an admitted fact that in the instant case, inquiry was completed in 1988 and order of removal was passed on the petitioner on 2nd January, 1990, i.e. prior to the date Mohd. Ramzan Khan was decided. Even appeal was dismissed in September, 1990 and hence, the point pressed in service relying on Mohd. Ramzan Khan would not help the petitioner. 7. The next contention which was raised by the learned Counsel was that second opportunity on quantum of punishment was not given to the petitioner and he was not called upon to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service. Obviously, the learned Counsel relies on the unamended provisions under Article 311 of the Constitution prior to 42nd Amendment. Obviously, the learned Counsel relies on the unamended provisions under Article 311 of the Constitution prior to 42nd Amendment. As held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1416), after the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, the second opportunity is no more available to a delinquent and once the delinquent is found guilty, an appropriate punishment can be imposed on him. 8. In the light of the amendment in the Constitution, even the relevant rule i.e. Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was also amended herein it has been specifically stated in sub-rule (4) of Rule 15 that if the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion, that any major penalty specified in Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and "it shall not be necessary to give the said Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty to be imposed. 9. Since the point is finally concluded in Tulsiram Patel and in view of the amendment in the Central Civil Services Rules, the second ground also does not help the petitioner. 10. So far as quantum of punishment is concerned, even otherwise also, in our opinion, it does not deserve interference in exercise of powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The allegations levelled against the petitioner related to financial irregularities and misappropriation of amount and if the disciplinary authority was of the view that the person deserved to be removed from service and appeal was dismissed and if the Tribunal did not think it fit to interfere with the same, it cannot be said that there is error apparent on the face of the record which is required to be corrected or interfered with in exercise of our extra ordinary/ supervisory jurisdiction. We, therefore, see no merit and substance in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.