ORDER: The defendants in O.S.No.7876 of 1986 on the file of the Fifth Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras, are the revision petitioners. The respondent herein, who is the plaintiff in the suit, has filed the suit for recovery of possession of the land site forming part of the premises bearing Municipal Door No.199, Broadway, renamed as Prakasam Salai, George Town, Madras-600108, excluding the south west corner portion of two rooms etc. bounded on the north by Door No.200 now owned by M.S.A. Mohamed Ali, south by Door No.198, east by Pophams Broadway and west by Meera Labbai Sreet, comprised in R.S.No.2344 situate within the sub-registration district of Sowcarpet and the registration district of North Madras. 2. The ownership of the property is not disputed. The revision petitioners claim that they are entitled to claim the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1922 as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The allegations of this in the plaint are as under: Originally the first revision petitioner was the sole proprietary concern of late Rajarathinam, and the tenant of the entire property covered by Door No.199 excluding the south western small portion tenanted by the late Ommer Jaffer. The plaintiff had been employed abroad for over seven years and during his absence there were legal proceedings between the co-owners of the property and the first revision petitioner, in which it was held that it was only the tenant of the land owning the superstructure therein. After the plaintiff became the full owner, he caused a notice to be issued to the first revision petitioner/ first defendant being unaware of the death of the said Rajarathinam and the then owners of the business. There was a reply from an Advocate dated 23.9.1985 stating that the sole proprietary concern of Lease and Company had become a partnership and that defendants 2 and 3/revision petitioners 2 and 3 were its partners. To find out as to whether defendants 2 and 3 in their capacity as partners of first defendant company were the tenants under the general law which permitted sub-letting unless prohibited in writing or the tenants under the Act, the plaintiff caused a quit-cum-demand notice dated 26.6.1986 issued to them calling upon them to say whether they were the transferees of the first defendant business inter vivos or by virtue of legal inheritance. The notice by way of abundant caution as per the requirements of the Act also offered compensation for the superstructure marking a copy of the letter to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras. The defendants by their reply through counsel dated 1.7.1986 did not provide with clear particulars. In these circumstances, the defendants are tenants of the plaintiffs under general law at sufferance holding out under the will of the plaintiff after the termination of the tenancy with effect from the end of September, 1986 in respect of the said land site on a monthly rent of Rs.30. Since the defendants failed to comply with the quite notice dated 26.6.1986, the plaintiff has been compelled to file the present suit for the reliefs already mentioned. 3. The defendants have filed their written statement to the following effect: The particulars in paragraph 5 of the plaint are clear to the effect that the tenancy is of the land only and that the superstructure belongs to the defendants, the tenancy having commenced long before 1940. The plaintiff’s predecessor in title one Moosalima Bi filed the suit O.S.No.2672 of 1960 before the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, in which it came to be decided that the tenancy was in respect of the land and it was held by T.Dorairajan and Sumithra and others as members of the joint family. The decision in the said suit is binding on the plaintiff and will operate as res judicata on the question whether the predecessor in title was T.Dorairajan among others. In a decree dated 31.7.1962 passed in O.S.No.884 of 1956 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, the tenancy together with superstructure on the land was allotted to T.Dorairajan. That suit was between Dorairajan and the heirs of Dorairajan’s brother Rajarathinam. As per the decree, Dorairajan was the tenant under the plaintiff’s predecessor. Dorairajan held in 1967 and the tenancy right and the ownership of the superstructure devolved on his widow Andalammal, who by her last Will and Testament dated 14.12.1982 bequeathed the property to the defendants. The defendants have thus become entitled to the tenancy right. In paragraph 6 of the plaint the plaintiff has accepted the tenancy in favour of the defendants. The contention raised in the plaint as regards general tenancy and special tenancy is meaningless. The defendants have thus become entitled to the tenancy right. In paragraph 6 of the plaint the plaintiff has accepted the tenancy in favour of the defendants. The contention raised in the plaint as regards general tenancy and special tenancy is meaningless. The tenancy being in respect of the vacant land and the superstructure having been constructed long before the coming into force of the Act as amended by Tamil Nadu Act XIX of 1955, only the Act will apply and not the general law. The tenants are entitled to purchase the site under Sec.9 of the Act. An application has also been filed for the said purpose. All necessary informations required by the plaintiff had been furnished in the reply notice. The defendants are tenants and they are entitled to purchase the suit property. The quite notice dated 26.6.1986 is not valid in law. It does not satisfy the requirement of Sec.11 of the Act. There is also not proper notice of termination of tenancy as contemplated under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. In the suit the defendants filed I.A.No.4625 of 1987 under Sec.9 of the Act for an order directing the plaintiff/ landlord to sell the suit land to the defendants and the allegations in the affidavit in support of the application are as under: The defendants are the tenants in respect of the land described in the schedule to the plaint. Even the plaintiff has stated in paragraph 6 of the plaint that the defendants are tenants at sufferance under the plaintiff. The plaintiff has based the suit on tenancy of the land. The tenancy only stood in the name of Rajarathinam, not in his individual capacity, but for the benefit of the joint family consisting of Rajarathinam and his brother Dorairajan and the ownership of Dorairajan and his tenancy in respect of the suit land came to be affirmed in a decree dated 29.11.1962 in O.S.No.2672 of 1960. After the life time of Dorairajan the property devolved on his wife Andalammal whose legal heirs are the defendants. They are the tenants. On notification from the plaintiff the tenancy has been duly attorned in his favour. The plaintiff has accepted all the arrears of rent and the current rent and there are not arrears. After the life time of Dorairajan the property devolved on his wife Andalammal whose legal heirs are the defendants. They are the tenants. On notification from the plaintiff the tenancy has been duly attorned in his favour. The plaintiff has accepted all the arrears of rent and the current rent and there are not arrears. The superstructure itself had been constructed before 1940 in the hope and belief that the tenant should not be evicted from the land on his paying rent regularly. In these circumstances, they are entitled to the rights under Secs.3 and 9 of the Act. The area of the land is 1337 sq.ft. The whole area is built up and put to use by the defendants. The whole area is the minimum extent required for a reasonable, proper and convenient enjoyment of the tenants. They have already offered to purchase the land at a price being the average market value of the land in the three years preceding the date of filing of the suit. 5. A very detailed counter has been filed by the plaintiff to the application and the relevant portions of the counter are as under: To the exploratory legal notice dated 20.8.1985 to the first defendant, a reply was caused to be sent on 23.9.1985 by defendants 2 and 3 claiming themselves to be the partners of the first defendant erstwhile proprietary business of late Rajarathinam. The most important point as to how they were related to Rajarathinam was not disclosed and unless they were his legal heirs on physical possession of the tenanted land, they would not be entitled to the benefits of the Act. The Act originally gave benefit to derivative title holders of the superstructure and the tenancy of the land. However, the position as on the date of the filing of the suit is that only the lawful tenant and his legal heirs, who are in physical occupation of the tenanted land, are entitled to the benefits of the Act. There was a second legal notice issued on 26.6.1986 to all the three defendants, in which it was pointed out that it did not matter whether the tenancy was in the name of the business or its proprietor or proprietors. But Lease & Co. was the proprietary concern of late Rajarathinam. There was a second legal notice issued on 26.6.1986 to all the three defendants, in which it was pointed out that it did not matter whether the tenancy was in the name of the business or its proprietor or proprietors. But Lease & Co. was the proprietary concern of late Rajarathinam. It was he who was the tenant and how defendants 2 and 3 claimed to be the heirs of the deceased to enable him to treat them as tenants or not under the Act was not known. The doubts raised in the notice were not clarified in the reply dated 1.7.1986 and thereafter the suit came to be filed after the expiry of the notice period. The reservation with regard to the claims of defendants 2 and 3 was reiterated and only the first defendant was admitted as the lawful tenant. They had been impleaded in the suit as parties out of caution so that any decree that may be passed would be binding on them. Even in the present affidavit in support of the petition under Sec.9, no explanation is forthcoming as to how defendants 2 and 3 became tenants and the factual relationship between them and late Rajarathinam. Unless their claim to tenancy is established, the suit would be under general law in which the first defendant would be a tenant at sufferance. Rajarathinam and Dorairajan are Indian Christians and so stated in the plaint, but not denied in the affidavit of the second defendant or elsewhere. The principle and status of a Hindu joint family cannot be invoked by Christians. Again, internal allotment of a statutory tenancy in a family arrangement cannot bind the lessor. It is also not admitted that Dorairajan was acknowledged as the tenant in O.S.No.2672 of 1960. The legal heirs of Rajarathinam would be the widow and his children and not his brother and his widow Andalammal died and it is not stated as to how many children they had. Defendants 2 and 3 desperately hide relevant facts and they are to strictly prove their claims and divulge all the facts without which they cannot clothe with the title of lessees. It is also false and mischievous to suggest that the tenancy was duly attorned in favour of the plaintiff and he accepted them as tenants. Whatever payment was made was received without prejudice to his rights. It is also false and mischievous to suggest that the tenancy was duly attorned in favour of the plaintiff and he accepted them as tenants. Whatever payment was made was received without prejudice to his rights. Again, the petition is barred by limitation not having been filed within 30 days of receipt of summons, the date of receipt of summons not being disclosed. It is also admitted that the land area is 1,337 sq. ft. and that it is fully built up and defendants 2 and 3 are entitled to claim benefits under the Act and purchase the suit land as per the provisions of the Act. They have also to establish apart from other things that they are the partners of the first defendant firm and that the partnership has been registered with the Registrar of Firms under Sec.69 of the Partnership Act without which the application will not be entertainable and it has to be summarily rejected. 6. The learned Fifth Assistant City Civil Judge took up Sec.9 application and framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the defendants are entitled to purchase the property? If so what is the area in the schedule property they can so purchase? and (2) What are the reliefs they are entitled to? 7. On the side of the defendants, the second and the third defendants were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.P-1 to P-18 marked. On his side the plaintiff examined himself as R.W.1 and marked Exs.R-1 to R-3. and (2) What are the reliefs they are entitled to? 7. On the side of the defendants, the second and the third defendants were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.P-1 to P-18 marked. On his side the plaintiff examined himself as R.W.1 and marked Exs.R-1 to R-3. The learned Judge found that Andalammal died on 12.2.1983, that the Will marked as Ex.P-7, which gave rights in the partnership business and the tenancy right in the site, could come into effect only after her life time, that as per Ex.P-8, the first defendant firm had been registered on 21.1.1983 showing the second and the third defendants as partners and therefore there was serious doubt as to how the second defendant and her brother’s wife Unnamalaiammal could have been partners of the firm and the oral evidence of the second defendant as P.W.1 was not true, that neither Dorairajan nor Andalammal had made anybody as his/her heirs as per law, that though they had stated in the affidavit that they were the heirs of Andalammal, they had not substantiated the same with acceptable oral and documentary evidence and that they were not heirs of Andalammal and therefore they could not claim the benefits of Sec.9 of the Act. Even otherwise, assuming that Andalammal assigned her interest in the partnership and the site in favour of defendants 2 and 3 as the assignment had come into effect after 12.11.1955, the cut off date under the Act, they could not claim any right. 8. The defendants filed appeal C.M.A.No.134 of 1997 to the Fourth Additional City Civil Judge, Madras, who concurred with the conclusion reached by the First Court, confirmed the order of dismissal and dismissed the appeal. In the course of his judgment, the learned Appellate Judge found that a reading of Ex.P-8 showed that one Unnamalaiammal also resided in the suit property, that the said Unnamalaiammal had not been made a party and her non-inclusion seriously affected the maintainability of the petition overlooking that Unnamalaiammal was already dead. The learned Judge also found that the first defendant firm having been registered on 21.1.1983 even before the death of Andalammal under whose will the defendants claimed rights, it cast serious doubt on the constitution of the firm. 9. The civil revision petition has been filed against the order in the civil miscellaneous appeal. The learned Judge also found that the first defendant firm having been registered on 21.1.1983 even before the death of Andalammal under whose will the defendants claimed rights, it cast serious doubt on the constitution of the firm. 9. The civil revision petition has been filed against the order in the civil miscellaneous appeal. The contention of Mr.Raghavan, learned counsel for the revision petitioners, is two fold: (1) The defendants are tenants, so recognised by the landlord himself and Sec.9 of the Act will apply and they will be entitled to the benefits. (2) They are legatees under the Will and Andalammal and therefore they are heirs of Andalammal who can claim the benefits of the Act. 10. We will dispose of the second contention first. It is admitted that the plaintiff/respondent is not the owner of the superstructure. It belonged to Rajarathinam and Dorairajan. Dorairajan’s widow Andalammal got it. She executed the Will under which defendants 2 and 3 claimed rights. What kind of right does not tenant get under the Act? 11. In S.M.Transports (P) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamigal Mutt, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 864: (1964)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 146: (1946)1 S.C.J. 530, the Supreme Court had to consider the statutory validity of the amendment Act XIII of 1960 under Arts.19(1)(f) and 31(1). After holding that Art.19 applies to both concrete as well as abstract rights of property examining the question whether a tenant of non-residential building in Thanjavur acquired a right of property under the Principal Act before it amendment in 1960 and whether he was deprived of that right or otherwise restricted in the enjoyment thereof by the amending Act, it was observed as follows: "The question that falls to be considered is whether the second right, namely, the right of a tenant to apply to the Court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed by it, under Sec.9 of the Principal Act is a right to property. The law of India does not recognise equitable estates. No authority has been cited in support of the contention that a statutory right to purchase land is, or confers, an interest or a right in property. The law of India does not recognise equitable estates. No authority has been cited in support of the contention that a statutory right to purchase land is, or confers, an interest or a right in property. The fact that the right is created not by contract but by a statute cannot make a difference in the content or the incidents of the right that depends upon the nature and the scope the right conferred. The right conferred is a right to purchase land. If such a right conferred under a contract is not a right of property, the fact that such a rights stems from a statute cannot obviously expand its content or make it any the less a non-proprietary right. In our view, a statutory right to apply for the purchase of land is not a right of property." 12. In Natesan Mudaliar v. S.B.K.P.K. Bhojana Matam, (1966)1 M.L.J. 130 Natesan, J., observed as follows: "It cannot be said that the tenant has acquired any vested right in the matter. The tenant had no right under the common law to purchase the land at any price. Under the common law as well as under the Transfer of Property Act, the only right of a tenant who had put up the structure on leasehold land taken on terminable lease is only to remove the structure at the time of delivery of possession on the termination of the lease. The right to exercise an option of purchase of the land is given to the tenant only under the Act. It is a privilege conferred on him by the Act." 13. In Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma, (1968)2 M.L.J. 83 , Ismail, J. (as the learned Judge then was) observed that: "the right of the tenant was an inchoate right to apply for purchasing the landlord’s interest under Sec.9 and that right would become a completed right only when an application has been made under Sec.9 within the time prescribed by law." 14. In Kuppa Bai v. Rajagopalan Nadar and another, (1969)2 M.L.J. 541 , Natesan, J. again observed as follows: "The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act is intended to give protection to tenants who have put up construction on the lease land and evidently the Legislature does not want the tenant to profit on a privilege granted to him in violation of the rights of the landlord. Though under the Transfer of Property Act a lessee has a right to transfer his interest, still such unilateral transfer cannot put an end to his contractual obligations and cease to be a tenant. A lease is essentially based on a contract and unless the lessor is a party to the assignment, there can only be privity of estate between the lessor and the assignee and there could be no privity of contract. Mere notice of assignment by the lessee or assignee, unless assented to by the lessor, does not by itself put an end to the original tenancy or create a contractual tenancy between a lessor and the assignee. The right given to a tenant under Sec.9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act is only a contingent right which could be exercised by adopting the prescribed procedure under the Act, only when the landlord commences an action in ejectment. Hence, the right cannot be construed as a vested right, indefeasible by subsequent amendments of the statute. Mere option given to a person to acquire a right, which he may or may not exercise, cannot be construed as a right accrued or privilege secured. It is an inchoate doubly contingent right. As long as the landlord does not seek to evict him, even an opportunity to exercise the option for the purchase cannot and does not arise.“ 15. In M.Varadaraja Pillai v. Salem Municipal Council, 85 L.W. 760, it has been held by a Bench of this Court that,”the tenant’s right under the Act is not property.“ 16. In P.S.Balakrishnamaraja & others v. S.K.Alagar Raja and others, (1994)1 M.L.J. 574 : (1994)1 L.W. 582 a Bench of this Court struck down Sec.9(1)(a)(ii) of the Act introduced by Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1973 which gave a right to the tenant even in the absence of any suit or proceedings for eviction enabling him to apply to the Court for a direction to the landlord to sell the land to him. The Bench observed as follows: ”When the object of the main Act is to give protection against eviction and the object of the Amendment Act is to make that protection available to persons who have suffered decrees or orders by reason of the Proviso to Sec.12 of the Act, there is no doubt that the provision found in Sec.9(1)(a)(ii) introduced by the Amendment has no relation to the said objects and it travels far beyond the same. There is no nexus between the said objects and the provision introduced by the Amendment. The question of protection against conviction would arise only on the termination of the contractual relationship and institution of a proceeding for eviction. When the tenant does not face any such threat and the landlord is willing to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant, and he has no intention to evict the tenant so long as the latter pays the fair rent, the provision enabling the tenant to compel the landlord to sell the land to him is arbitrary and unreasonable. The provision is equally violative of Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India. Art.19(1)(f) declares the fundamental right of the landlord to hold property.... That fundamental right to hold property is sought to be interfered with by a statutory right to purchase property conferred on the tenant. Such a right cannot be allowed to take precedence over the fundamental right of the landlord to hold property. It must be noted that the right conferred by the new provision, introduced by the Amendment is not one arising after the termination of the contractual relationship or on the filing of a proceeding for ejectment. Hence, it cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the landlord’s fundamental rights within the meaning of Art.19(9) of the Constitution of India. It will be a case of deprivation of the landlord of his right to hold property without any justification therefor. The Amendment is not a law which will fall under Art.31(2) of the Constitution. 17. Thus the right the tenant can claim under Sec.9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is only a statutory right and not a vested right. Only when the landlord files the suit in ejectment, Sec.9 application can be filed. It is an inchoate doubly contingent right. 18. 17. Thus the right the tenant can claim under Sec.9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is only a statutory right and not a vested right. Only when the landlord files the suit in ejectment, Sec.9 application can be filed. It is an inchoate doubly contingent right. 18. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that an assignee will be an heir and therefore defendants 2 and 3 are entitled to claim the benefits of Sec.9 of the Act. 19. It is now necessary to refer to the various amendments that have taken place with respect to the Act. The legislative changes in the definition of tenant under Sec.2(4) of the Act can be given in a tabular form as made available by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners: The Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1922. ----- Legislative Changes in the Definition of "Tenant". Sec.2(4) ----- I. As it stood originally: "Tenant means tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, and every other person deriving title from him and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy." II. As Amended in 1968 by Act XIV of 1960: Tenant in relation to any land: (i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied and (ii) includes. (a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, and (b) the heir of any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub tenant or his heirs. III. As amended in 1973 by Act XIV of 1973: Tenant in relation to any land: (i) means a person liable to play rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied and (ii) includes, (a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. (b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.1 and who or any of his predecessors-in-interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building notwithstanding that: (i) such person was not entitled to the rights under this Act by reason of the proviso to Sec.12 of the Act as it stood before the date of publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972) or (ii) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to Sec.12 of this Act as it stood before the date of publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972), disentitled such person from claiming the right under this Act and (c) the heirs of any such person as is referred to in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii) (a) or (ii) (b) but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs. 20. In the original Act persons deriving title included assignees. This was sought to be obliterated by the 1960 Amendment Act 14 of 1960. The assignees went out of the reckoning. As pointed out by Natesan, J. in Kuppa Bai’s case, (1969)2 M.L.J. 541 : "This new definition of the term ‘tenant’ has excluded from the definition of tenant a person deriving title from a tenant. Under the new definition heirs of the tenant are specifically mentioned as tenants, but not a sub-tenant and his heirs. While the prior definition included every other person deriving title from a tenant, the amplitude of the provision taking in both heirs of a tenant and assignees from him, the new definition specifically includes only the heirs of a tenant. The significance of omission of an assignee from a tenant in the new definition cannot be overlooked. The Act came in to give protection to tenants who had constructed building on land leased in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay fair rent for the land. The mischief that was intended to be remedied by the Act was primarily to protect such tenants. The Act came in to give protection to tenants who had constructed building on land leased in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay fair rent for the land. The mischief that was intended to be remedied by the Act was primarily to protect such tenants. Apparently, the Legislature felt that the privilege granted was being misused by speculators and so decided to continue the benefit of the Act to tenants proper and tenants who entered on land under tenancy agreement express or implied and continued on the land after expiration of the tenancy and heirs of such tenants. Evidently, the Legislature does not want a tenant to profit on a privilege granted, in violation of the fundamental rights of the owner of the land and at his expense; the Legislature would limit it to the equity and needs of the tenant." 21. In Natesan Naicker and others v. Vedagiri, (1975)1 M.L.J. 801, Gokulakrishnan, J. (as the learned Judge than was) observed that, "the right to purchase the land under Sec.9 of the Act cannot be assigned in law." 22. In Y.Abdul Mallik and another v. St.Francis Xavier’s Church represented by its Parish Priest Fr. Joseph Sandanam, (1975)2 M.L.J. 204 , Ramaswami, J. (as the learned Judge than was) after referring to the substituted definition of a tenant by Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1960, observed as follows: "Though an assignee is now given protection under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, it is not all assignee that will get the protection, but only those assignees of lands and buildings who get the assignment prior to 12th September, 1955 and continued in possession thereafter; they alone will be entitled to the benefit of the protection under the amended definition of the term ‘tenant’. 23. The same learned Judge in Ramiah Nattar v. Jambakkathamma and others, 1977 T.L.N.J. 157, dealing with the question as to whether the words ‘heirs of such person’ in Sec.2(aa) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 would include a testamentary heir, held that, "a transferee or a legatee of the tenancy rights also inherits the same with all incidents of inheritability and transferability." 24. This new point is distinguished by Kader, J. (as the learned Judge then was) in Hamsa Patel and others v. S.Balakrishnan and another, (1989)1 M.L.J. 57 , in the following terms: The learned Judge has followed the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Gulzara Singh v. Smt.Tej Kaur, A.I.R. 1961 Pun. 288. That is a decision rendered under Sec.22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956. The appellant therein contended that he was not bound to maintain the respondent, Tej Kaur, although she was the dependant of the deceased on the ground that the appellant got the estate of the deceased under a Will and not by inheritance and cannot, therefore, be considered to be his heir within the scope of Sec.22(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. After extracting Sec.22 of the said Act, the learned Judge observed as follows: "The policy behind Sec.22 of the Act is that the estate of the deceased is liable for the maintenance of the dependants of the deceased and this is made abundantly clear in Clause (2) of Sec.22 where it is laid down that the dependant shall be entitled subject to the provisions of this Act to maintenance from those who take the estate. The words "those who take the estate" includes not only heirs but also legatees. In the light of the predominent idea or general purpose of the enactment the learned Judge held that the word ‘heir’ in Clause (1) in Sec.22 includes a legatee. ...This decision cannot therefore be held to be laying down a general rule that ‘heirs’ includes legatees. The decision of V.Ramaswami, J. in Ramiah Nattar v. Jambagathamal and others, 1977 T.L.N.J. 157 referred to above, holding that the expression ‘heir’ incudes a legatee must be confined to the provisions of the Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act with which the learned Judge was dealing and cannot be extended to the provisions of the City Tenants’ Protection Act, especially because of the amendment introduced by the Act 13 of 1960 in the definition of ‘tenant’ excluding an assignee from the original tenant from the purview of that definition." 25. The various amendments and the effect of those amendments are dealt with in Varadaraja Pillai v. H.Girdharidas, 1975 T.L.N.J. 189, by a Bench of this Court consisting of Chief Justice Veeraswami and Justice Natarajan (as the learned Judge than was): "The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 applied only to tenancies prior to February 21, 1955. The preamble to the Act, as it originally stood, stated its object that it was necessary to give protection to tenants who in municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras had constructed buildings on other’s lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for the land." The 1960 Amendment Act XIV of 1960 as already noticed, excluded from the definition of tenant s person deriving title from a tenant under the new definition brought in by 1960 Amendment. Heirs of the tenant are specifically mentioned as tenants, but not a sub-tenant and his heirs. While the original definition includes every other person deriving title from a tenant, the amplitude of the provision taking in both heirs of a tenant. The Amending Act 4 of 1972 substituted the preamble by a new one. It dropped the word ‘hope’ and purported to give protection against eviction to tenants, who in municipal towns and adjoining areas in this State have constructed buildings on other’s lands so long as they pay a fair rent for the land. This substitution was to take effect retrospectively as if that was the one always in existence. Sec.3 of the Amending Act dropped the proviso to Sec.12 of the main Act with similar retrospective effect. On July 27, 1973 the Amending Act 24 of 1973 came into operation. This Act made important provisions enlarging the definition of tenant giving him a fresh right to apply for an order against the landlord to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the Court and on an application of the tenant enabling the Court which passed the decree or order against him to review or reopen its earlier judgment. Sec.2 expanded the definition of a tenant. Sec.2 expanded the definition of a tenant. It took within its ambit that a person who was a tenant who had erected any building on the demised land and continued in actual possession of the land and building, notwithstanding that he by reason of the proviso to Sec.12 before the repeal, would not have been entitled to the rights under the Act, or that there is a decree or order for declaration or for possession, or similar relief based on the said proviso before its repeal. Such a tenant also will include his heirs. Such a tenant has been given by Sec.3 a fresh right to apply within the time specified to the Court having jurisdiction for a direction to the landlord to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed by the Court and such a remedy is available to him irrespective of whether or not, a suit or a proceeding for ejectment has been instituted. Sec.3 of the Amending Act of 1973 also by introducing a new Sub-sec.(3-A) to Sec.9 gives a further right to the tenant to apply to the Court which passed the decree or order against him based on the proviso to Sec.12, to have it reopened or reviewed and ask for an order that he is entitled to the rights under the Act and ask for an order that he is entitled to the rights under the Act and consequential directions necessary as if the Amending Act was in force at that time at which such decree or order was passed. One more thing the Amending Act of 1973 did was to provide that Secs.3 and 4 of the Amending Act of 1972 shall not apply to any case only where the landlord had before the date of the commencement of that Act been delivered actual physical possession of the land and building by the tenant. One more thing the Amending Act of 1973 did was to provide that Secs.3 and 4 of the Amending Act of 1972 shall not apply to any case only where the landlord had before the date of the commencement of that Act been delivered actual physical possession of the land and building by the tenant. As per the extended definition of a tenant under Sec.2 of the Amending Act 24 of 1973, in order that a person may come within the extended definition of a tenant, he must be a person liable to pay rent in respect of the land which the tenancy relates under tenancy agreement express or implied and (2) such person continues in possession of the land even after the determination of the tenancy agreement or (1) he must be a person who was a tenant which means that determination of the tenancy does not matter (2) he should have been a tenant under a tenancy agreement to which the Act was applicable, (3) he or his predecessor in interest had erected any building on the land and (4) he continues in actual physical possession of the land and building. If these requisites are satisfied by anyone, he will be a tenant within the extended definition of the expression and this will be so notwithstanding the fact that such person was not entitled to the rights under the Act by reason of the proviso to Sec.12, as it stood before its repeal, or that a decree for declaration or a decree or order for possession had been made against such person on the ground of the proviso to Sec.12 before its repeal which disentitled him from claiming rights under the Act. In our opinion, the requirement under Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) or (b) as to continuance in possession of the land or continuance in actual physical possession of the land and building has to be satisfied not only as on the date the Amending Act 24 of 1973 came into force and on the date of the application for sale, but also subsequently until an order is made under Sec.9 and the same as well the provisions of that Section are fully worked out. Such a requirement is necessary. Such a requirement is necessary. Clauses (2) and (3) of Sec.9 as a matter of fact, imply that the tenant continues in possession of the lands to be dealt with as contemplated therein even after the stage of fixing the price and payment thereof, even in the context of application under Sec.9(1)(a)(ii)." 26. Kader, J. in Hamsa Patel’s case, (1989)1 M.L.J. 57 has held that: "a bequest is akin to an assignment only that it take effect on the death of the testator and to hold that ‘heirs’ includes legatees would be defeating the very purpose of the amendment introduced by Act XIII of 1960. Sec.9 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act is expropriatory in character, for it makes a deep inroad into the fundamental right of an owner and the expression ‘tenant’ has, therefore, to be strictly construed. In my view, there is no scope for interpreting the term ‘heirs’ as including legatees so as to enlarge the definition of ‘tenants’ in the City Tenants’ Protection Act." 27. Mr.Raghavan further contended that it was not necessary for the learned Judge in the context of that case to decide the question as to whether the legatee under a Will is an assignee and would not be an heir. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naresh v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1 and in particular paragraph 16. In paragraph 16 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: ”As this Court has frequently emphasised, in dealing with Constitutional matters, it is necessary that the decision of the Court should be confined to the narrow points which a particular proceeding raises before it. Often enough, in dealing with the very narrow point raised by a writ petition wider arguments are urged before the Court, but the Court should always be careful not to cover ground which is strictly not relevant for the purpose of deciding the petition before it. Obiter observations and discussion of problems not directly involved in any proceeding should be avoided by Courts in dealing with all matters brought before them, but this requirement becomes almost compulsory when the Court is dealing with constitutional matters." 28. No doubt, what the learned counsel submits is correct. May be it was not necessary for Kader, J. in that mater to decide as to whether a legatee under a Will was an heir. No doubt, what the learned counsel submits is correct. May be it was not necessary for Kader, J. in that mater to decide as to whether a legatee under a Will was an heir. But, I have absolutely no hesitation in holding that a legatee under a Will is an assignee and the legislature wanted to guard against misuse of the protection and benefits under the Act by strangers, who had absolutely nothing to do with the tenant and his family. A legatee under a Will is an assignee and an assignee of the leasehold interest of the original tenant cannot by reason of the mere assignment claim the benefits under the Act. He has to further prove that there was an agreement of tenancy between him and the landlord and that the landlord recognised the assignee and received rent from him. This takes us to the next question as to whether defendants 2 and 3 have been recognised by the landlord as his tenants. 29. On the first question I hold that after the 1973 Amendment assignee from a tenant is also a tenant and entitled to protection only if there was an agreement express or implied between him and the landlord. Unfortunately, the matter had not been projected in this angle before the lower Courts. The parties have exchanged notices and have raised pleadings, but what the Courts below have done was to doubt the bona fides of the claim of the defendants on the ground that the partnership set up by them was before the Will attributed to Andalammal. To that extent, it was a sort of anachronism. 30. Upto the stage of Andalammal there is no dispute. The superstructure admittedly on his own showing does not belong to the plaintiff. On the death of Dorairajan his wife Andalammal became entitled to the tenancy rights and the superstructure and also rights in partnership. But then the question is whether there has been proper consideration of this aspect, viz., the tenants had been recognised as tenants whether there was an agreement express or implied between them and the landlord. 31. According to Mr.Raghavan, defendants 2 and 3 have been recognised as heirs of Andalammal by the landlord. In support of his contention, he relies on Exs.R-1, R-2 and R-3. 31. According to Mr.Raghavan, defendants 2 and 3 have been recognised as heirs of Andalammal by the landlord. In support of his contention, he relies on Exs.R-1, R-2 and R-3. In Ex.R-3 dated 20.8.1985 the plaintiff addresses a letter through his lawyer to the first defendant stating that it is his tenant in respect of the premises in question on a monthly rental of Rs.30, that it had not paid any rents for over five years in spite of repeated requests and demands, that it had taken undue advantages of the internal differences between the co-owners which has since been set at rest and also because the plaintiff had been an absentee landlord employed in Saudi Arabia, that it has also sublet major portion of the properties to others without the previous written consent of the then co-owners or the plaintiff after his exclusive ownership and thereby contravened the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, that it had committed wilful default in the payment of rents for the said period and therefore liable to be evicted on both the grounds. 32. Mr.Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the landlord, draws the attention of this Court to the fact that this notice would clearly show that the landlord had not admitted that the superstructure belonged to the defendants. The landlord had sought to invoke only Act 18 of 1960. If the matter had stopped with that, I can very well appreciate the arguments of Mr.Thiagarajan. This notice Ex.R-3 provoked a reply on behalf of defendants 2 and 3 as partners of the first defendant, on 23.9.1985 under Ex.R-2 stating that the superstructure on the site did not belong to the plaintiff was a fact established before a Court of Law, that the tenancy was in respect of land only, that the notice had mistakenly mentioned the first defendant as the tenant as in fact defendants 2 and 3, who are the partners of the first defendant, were the tenants. The reply further stated that defendants 2 and 3 were only tenants in respect of land and they were the owners of the superstructure which had been put up about 40 years prior to the date of the reply and the entire extent of the land was being utilised for the purpose of the business in respect of which the lease of land was taken and that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would have no application to their tenancy, that they had never committed default much less wilful default and that they will be entitled to the benefit of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act. 33. Then there was a notice dated 25.6.1986, which was not marked before the Courts below. In that notice, the plaintiff’s Counsel sought clarification as to how defendants 2 and 3 could claim to be the legal heirs of Rajarathinam who was the sole proprietor of the first defendant firm. The notice further stated that in the previous proceedings which recognised the rights of the tenant under the Act also recognised the joint ownership of the previous owners and that there was no rent paid because the previous owners claimed it as the rent for the land and the superstructure and the tenant claimed it as only the rent for the land. The disputes between the co-owners were taken advantage of by tenants by not paying the rents, but it was set at rest by a partition among them and the first defendant was put on notice about the partition. The notice further stated that even assuming without admitting that defendants 2 and 3 were legal heirs of the deceased tenant and without prejudice to the plaintiff’s rights and subject to proof of the claim by defendants 2 and 3 they had to pay arrears of rent for three years at the rate admitted by them at Rs.30 per month amounting to Rs.1,080 within three days from the receipt of the notice if they wished to avoid enforcement of payment thereon through legal courses and that the superstructure was old and in a very bad condition and was valued at Rs.500 and the said amount was offered as per the provisions of the Act and would be remitted soon after the willingness to receive was intimated. The tenancy was purported to be terminated at the end of September, 1986 requiring the defendants to quit and deliver vacant possession on the expiry of the last day of September, 1986. To this a reply under Ex.R-1 was sent on behalf of the defendants 1.7.1986. This reply asserted that the superstructure belonged to the defendants, that the rent was for land only, that the offer to purchase the superstructure was not accepted and that the value of the superstructure as given in the notice was not correct. There was a cheque for Rs.1,080 enclosed to this reply notice. From the notice dated 25.6.1986 Mr.Raghavan, learned counsel for the revision petitioners wants the Court to infer that there had been recognition of the tenancy of the defendants by the plaintiff. As stated already, this notice had not been marked before the Courts below and in my view, some explanation may be there from the plaintiff regarding the contents of the notice. 34. Mr.Thiagarajan, learned counsel for the plaintiff/ respondent submitted that there is absolutely no material attorning the tenancy by the defendants and that recognition and assent are two different concepts. The dichotomy is always to be recognised. The defendants have to positively prove that they are tenants under an agreement express or implied. The learned counsel further submitted that at the most they could be tenants at sufferance and they cannot claim benefits under the Act. 35. The learned counsel relied on the following judgments: (1) Vadapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthy and others, I.L.R. 31 Mad. 163; (2) Badrilal v. Municipal Corporation of Indore, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 508 and (3) Hamsa Patel and others v. S.Balakrishnan and another, (1997)3 L.W. 769 . 36. In the last of the decisions, which arose out of the decision of Kader, J. (as the learned Judge then was) reported in (1989)1 M.L.J. 57 , a Bench of this Court affirmed the decree of the learned single Judge for possession though the question relating to the validity or otherwise of the Will subject matter in the suit was left open. The Bench held that, "the benefit of the Act cannot be claimed by a tenant who fails to prove physical possession as possession is sine quo non for the tenant seeking to purchase the property under Sec.9." According to the learned counsel, the defendants in the instant case have not proved their possession of the property and that too as tenants. 37. In Vadapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthy and others, I.L.R. 31 Mad. 163, it has been held that, "a tenant holding over after the expiry of his term becomes a tenant on sufference and the landlord’s assent alone will suffice to convert such a tenancy into a tenancy from year to year or from month to month according to the nature of the original case. The provisions of Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act indicate the rule which is prima facie applicable in cases not coming under the Act." The Bench has further held that, "the representatives of a tenant on sufference are however mere trespassers and the lessor cannot, by his assent alone, convert such representatives into tenants without their concurrence." 38. The learned counsel Mr.Thiagarajan relies on this decision more to make good the allegations in paragraph 6 of the plaint that the defendants are tenants of the plaintiff under the General Law at sufference holding out under the Will of the plaintiff after the termination of the tenancy with effect from the end of September, 1986 in respect of the said land site. According to the learned Counsel, tenants at sufference cannot claim the benefits of the Act. I do not wish to express any opinion on this in view of that is to follow. 39. In Badrilal v. Municipal Corporation of Indore, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 508, it has been held that, "a person who is lawfully in occupation of the premises does not become trespasser and if he does not become a tenant holding over he would be a tenant by sufference." In that case reference was made to the decisions in Kai Khushroo Bazonjee Capadia v. Bal Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden, A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 124 and Bhawanji Lakhamshi v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 819 and the following passage from the latter decision was extracted: "The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufference. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The latter is a tenant at sufference in English law and the former a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of possession after the determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy. What the Section contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the lessee or sub-lessee remaining in possession of the property after his term was over and on the other side there must be a definite consent to the continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. In A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 124, the Federal Court had occasion to consider the question of the nature of the tenancy created under Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mukherjea, J. speaking for the majority said that the tenancy which is created by the ‘holding over’ of a lessee or under-lessee is a new tenancy in law even though many of the terms of the old lease might continue in it, by implication and that to bring a new tenancy into existence, there must be a bilateral Act." The point stressed is that the assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it. 40. This is a matter for further investigation. As already pointed out, the Courts below have not approached the matter from this angle at all. They had merely gone by the fact that the partnership had come into existence even before Andalammal died and there was something hanky-panky about the whole thing. 41. 40. This is a matter for further investigation. As already pointed out, the Courts below have not approached the matter from this angle at all. They had merely gone by the fact that the partnership had come into existence even before Andalammal died and there was something hanky-panky about the whole thing. 41. In T.R.P.Raja Sekara Bhoopathy v. Navaneethammal and others, 92 L. W. 259, Ramaprasada Rao, C. J. dealing with a case under the Tamil Nadu City Tenant’s Protection Act held that, "the inclusion of predecessor in interest and successor in interest in the definition of ‘tenant’ would not mean that the tenant, who had parted with physical and actual possession, should be entitled to the benefit under the City Tenant’s Protection Act." In the course of the said judgment the learned Chief Justice observed as follows: "On a fair reading of Sec.2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act, it is clear that physical and actual possession of the land and building by a tenant is a sine quo non to project the benefits or statutory entitlement under the Act. It that were not the intendment of this piece of legislation, then the very foundation of its objective would be lost, and at the same time it would be a travesty to hold that it is only the original tenant of the vacant site, who put up the superstructure, who would be entitled to the benefits of the Act and that his heirs, though they may be persons who can be described as tenants would not be entitled to such benefits even though they have parted with possession. Therefore, the primordial requirement for a tenant to claim the benefits under the Act is that he should be in actual physical possession of such land and building" The learned Judge in that case remanded the matter for consideration afresh. 42. On the first question I hold that defendants 2 and 3 cannot claim the benefits of Sec.9 as legatees under the Will of Andalammal. 43. 42. On the first question I hold that defendants 2 and 3 cannot claim the benefits of Sec.9 as legatees under the Will of Andalammal. 43. The civil revision petition will stand allowed and the matter is remitted to the first Court, viz., the Fifth Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras, for consideration afresh in the light of the second point raised in the case whether there has been recognition and assent or whether defendants 2 and 3 can claim to be tenants, whether there was an agreement of tenancy between them and the landlord recognised them as tenants and received rent from them. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the stay petition C.M.P.No.10514 of 1998 is closed. 44. The trial Court will have to decide the question after affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce necessary evidence oral and documentary to substantiate their respective cases. The trial Court will have to complete the enquiry strictly within a period of six months from today.