JUDGMENT - R.J. KOCHAR, J.:---The petitioner claim to be a hotel of reputation in the city of Kolhapur and carry on the business of providing lodging and boarding services to the public at large including the tourists who visit the city. They have a complement of about 64 employees in different categories and the respondent No. 1 was one of such 64 employees, who was dismissed from employment by the petitioner on a very serious charge of bringing prostitute/call girl in the hotel premises to be provided to a passenger who was occupying the room in the hotel on 20th February 1983/21st February 1983. The time of the entry of the call girl in the hotel with the respondents is also crucial as it was at 00.45 minutes past midnight. At some place the call girl is described as a prostitute and as lady at some other places. It is on record that the passenger customer and the call girl both were found in the room No. 35 of the hotel and both were caught by the watchman. The watchman informed the receptionist and both of them appeared to have given a knock at the midnight hour on the door of the room occupied by the passenger. Accordingly when the door was opened the customer and call girl were found in the room by the receptionist and the watchman. Having been caught red handed in such a situation both of them left the hotel premises and ran away and could not be caught by the watchman. The respondent No. 1, the delinquent workman and his companion Shri Gawade both appeared to have taken part in this joint venture. When they could not get the call girl and the passenger who had disappeared they came back to the receptionist and tendered their oral apologies about the whole incident. 2.On 26th February 1983, the petitioners served two separate charge sheets on the first respondent as well as his companion Shri Gawade for the act of misconduct committed by them and their explanation was sought for. Shri Gawde instead of tendering explanation, tendered his resignation and left the employment of the petitioner with immediate effect on the ground that he was leaving the job for his domestic reasons. Shri Gawde instead of tendering explanation, tendered his resignation and left the employment of the petitioner with immediate effect on the ground that he was leaving the job for his domestic reasons. It appears that in view of his resignation which is on record of the present petition no further necessary for the petitioners as regards Shri Gawde is concerned. The first respondent delinquent workman submitted his written explanation on 6th March 1983 denying the charges levelled against him. Since his explanation was found unsatisfactory, the petitioner hold a domestic enquiry against him to give him further opportunity of hearing in the matter. It appears that the petitioners management had examined in all three witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, i.e. Mr. Kale, the receptionist, Mr. Patil, the watchman and Mr. Nath the Manager. It further appears from the record that the Manager, Nath had held a preliminary investigation on the next day of the incident and had recorded the statements of the aforesaid Shri Kale and Patil respectively. These statements of both the witnesses were produced in the enquiry and both the aforesaid witnesses were examined in the enquiry and were also offered for cross examination of the respondent, delinquent workman who was represented by his representative, an office bearer of his union, Shri Waidande. The evidence of the receptionist and the watchman was on the record of the Enquiry Officer and the same was tested by cross examination on behalf of the delinquent workman. Both of them had proved their earlier statements. It is also on record that the receptionist had deposed in the enquiry that the respondent delinquent workman as well as his companion Shri Gawde both had tendered an oral apology to the receptionist but they refused to give the same in writing. I need not repeat that the receptionist was cross examined on behalf of the delinquent workman. But it appears that nothing could be elicited in the cross examination. On the basis of the material on record, the Enquiry Officer found the delinquent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him and on the basis of such report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner passed an order of dismissal of the respondent delinquent workman from the employment on 3rd May 1983. On the basis of the material on record, the Enquiry Officer found the delinquent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him and on the basis of such report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner passed an order of dismissal of the respondent delinquent workman from the employment on 3rd May 1983. 3.Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the first respondent workman raised an industrial dispute challenging the propriety and legality of the order of dismissal, and prayed for an award of reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. The said industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After receiving the pleadings and documents from both the parties, the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court framed a preliminary point in respect of legality and validity of the enquiry and answered the same in favour of the petitioner by his order dated 20th May 1985, holding that the domestic enquiry conducted by the petitioner was legal and proper and fixed the matter for hearing on other points. The Labour Court categorically held that there was no vitiating defect in the conduct of the enquiry. He also positively held that mere omission to examine the alleged customer/passenger in the enquiry will not by itself vitiate the enquiry. It further appears from the final award of the Labour Court that the learned Presiding Officer had succeeded his predecessor's recast issues and answered against the petitioner. It was held by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court that charges levelled against the respondent workman were not proved, and therefore, his dismissal order was illegal, improper and unjust. He has also held in favour of the workman that he was victimised and therefore, he was entitled to get the relief of reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service and accordingly he gave his impugned award on 17th August 1992 declaring the dismissal of the workman as illegal, improper and by way of victimisation and by setting aside the same he granted consequential reliefs of reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. It is this final award which is under challenge before me in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4.I have heard both the learned Advocates for the respective parties. It is this final award which is under challenge before me in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4.I have heard both the learned Advocates for the respective parties. I have also carefully gone through the proceedings and the precedents of the Supreme Court as well as this Court cited by both the Advocates. The learned Labour Court has no doubt in its mind about the alleged incident having taken place in the premises of the petitioner and the involvement of the first respondent as well as Shri Gawade. While observing in para 23 of the award the learned Labour Court has stated "as discussed earlier, Gawade was also equally responsible for the alleged act but he was shown a favour while the second party was shown the door. The management could not explain this discrimination between Gawade and second party workman." According to learned trial Judge, the respondent workman was victimised as no action against the companion Shri Gawade was taken. The learned Judge has treated this omission on the part of the petitioner to be an act of favouritism and also an act of victimisation towards respondent No. 1, workman. Apart from this there was no other ground or reason or material before the learned Judge to hold the petitioner's management guilty of victimisation. I fail to understand the logic and reasoning given by the learned trial Judge that omission to take any action against Shri Gawade by itself would amount to an act of victimisation of the other workman i.e. the respondent No. 1 herein. There was sufficient and good reason for the management not to take any action against Shri Gawade as it got rid of him in view of his resignation on 1st March 1983. If the workman leaves the employment voluntarily in such circumstances it is not necessary to chase him down till he is dismissed from employment. It is always found to be pragmatic, practical in such matters as otherwise the petitioner will have to involve itself in two sets of litigation. By acting prudently and wisely it has avoided atleast one litigation in the Court of law. This act on the part of the petitioner management cannot be termed as an act of victimisation. It is always found to be pragmatic, practical in such matters as otherwise the petitioner will have to involve itself in two sets of litigation. By acting prudently and wisely it has avoided atleast one litigation in the Court of law. This act on the part of the petitioner management cannot be termed as an act of victimisation. There is nothing on record to show that the management had any illwill against the respondent workman, to have fixed him alone. Apart from vaguely averring that he was an active trade union worker, there was absolutely no material to support the case of victimisation. The learned Judge has committed grave error of fact as well as serious error of law in concluding that the petitioner had victimised the respondent workman in the given facts and circumstances on record. I, therefore, quash and set aside this finding of the Labour Court on the point of victimisation. 5.As far as on the merits of the charges, the Labour Court has recorded a finding that there was no evidence before the Enquiry Officer, who has found the respondent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him. To be precise, the Labour Court has specifically held that the evidence on record of the enquiry was not sufficient to hold the respondent guilty of the charges and, therefore, the order of dismissal was illegal and improper. He has also held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse as the evidence before him was "not at all sufficient" to bring home the guilt of the second party workman. In the entire award the Labour Court has found that there was lack of sufficient evidence to justify the action of dismissal of the respondent workman. It is significant to note that the learned Judge did accept the difficulty of the management to examine the passenger and the call girl in the enquiry. It is curious to read the next sentence in the award that the name of the call girl atleast should have been ascertained and since no such effort was made the evidence of the receptionist and the watchman was held not to be trustworthy. He has also found their evidence not trust worthy on other flimsy grounds, and frivolous discrepancies. It is curious to read the next sentence in the award that the name of the call girl atleast should have been ascertained and since no such effort was made the evidence of the receptionist and the watchman was held not to be trustworthy. He has also found their evidence not trust worthy on other flimsy grounds, and frivolous discrepancies. Apart from using the word suspicion against the witnesses, there is no real material on which the learned Judge based his conclusion about, suspicion and suspicious circumstances to discard the evidence of the witnesses, who were examined in the enquiry. It appears from the entire award of the learned Judge that he has treated this matter more of a criminal trial than the adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. According to me the award of the Labour Court is totally illegal and perverse and is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgments. I cannot agree with the findings of the Labour Court that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer were perverse and not based on evidence. I also do not agree with the findings of the Labour Court that there was no sufficient evidence in the enquiry to hold the respondent workman to be guilty of the charges levelled against him. According to me, there was enough material before the Enquiry Officer to find the respondent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him. This is not a case of even "some material" in the enquiry but according to me, this is a case where there is "sufficient and enough material" before the Enquiry Officer to find the respondent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him. I fail to understand what other material would have made it sufficient to meet the requirements of the Labour Court. The watchman on duty who had caught the couple in the room in the midnight was examined and he was also offered for cross examination. His earlier statement recorded on the next date was also produced before the Enquiry Officer and he has withstood the cross examination by the representative of the workman. The second witness examined in the enquiry was the receptionist who was also present on the spot and he had corroborated sufficiently the evidence of the watchman. His earlier statement recorded on the next date was also produced before the Enquiry Officer and he has withstood the cross examination by the representative of the workman. The second witness examined in the enquiry was the receptionist who was also present on the spot and he had corroborated sufficiently the evidence of the watchman. His earlier statement in the preliminary enquiry recorded on the very next date of the event also formed part of the enquiry. He was also subjected to cross examination. The manager was also examination in the enquiry and he was subjected to cross examined. The receptionist had stated in his evidence that both the workmen had apologised and sought mercy. In the face of this material, I fail to agree with the findings of the Labour Court that there was no sufficient material to crucify the respondent workman. I repeat that the domestic enquiry as also the adjudication before the Labour Court are not to be treated as criminal trials where guilt must be established to the hilt. In the departmental or domestic proceedings some material to indicate the guilt of the charge-sheeted or delinquent workman is sufficient. In my opinion, in the present case, the petitioner has adduced more than sufficient evidence in the enquiry to bring home the guilt of the respondent workman. 6.In the aforesaid circumstances, I quash and set aside the impugned award of the Labour Court. 7.Before parting with this order, I must also cite the judgments which are cited by Shri Bukhari in support of his case. i) F.L.R. 1977(34) S.C. 264 (State of Haryana v. Ratan Singh)1, wherein the three Judges Bench presided over by Justice Shri Krishna Iyer has clearly held that "in the domestic enquiries some evidence is enough". I cannot do better than but to reproduce the apt observations of the learned Judge. "It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by Counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous material or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The "residuum" rule to which Counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such right requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." The second judgment on which Shri Bukhari relied upon is A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 673 in the case of (J.D. Jain v. The Management of State Bank of India and other)2, by three Judges Bench headed by Justice Tulzapurkar. The summary of the judgment is given in the headnote of the minutes which is reproduced below. The summary of the judgment is given in the headnote of the minutes which is reproduced below. I have myself checked from the body of the judgment that the summary is correct. "The Tribunal has committed an error in holding that the findings of the domestic enquiry was based on "hearsay" evidence. The law is well-settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry. The word "hearsay" is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. For the purpose of a departmental enquiry, complaint, certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence, is enough. What the Bank sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that the complainant had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the four witnesses against his advice. On the complaint, the evidence of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been made by the complainant in their presence and hearing; it is therefore, not hearsay. No rule of law enjoins that a complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the tribunal." 8.The third judgment on which Shri Bukhari ewlied is again a judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by a Division Bench, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1277 in the case of (Nand Kishore Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others)3. The Division Bench in para 18 of the judgment has clearly held as under :--- "Disciplinary proceedings before domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character, therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charges against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries." Following the aforesaid three judgments, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the present is not the case of absence of any evidence or material on record of the enquiry. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries." Following the aforesaid three judgments, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the present is not the case of absence of any evidence or material on record of the enquiry. According to me, there was more than sufficient evidence to find the respondent workman guilty of the charges levelled against him and according to me he was rightly dismissed from (sic by) employer. 9.I, therefore, find that there is absolutely no substance in the contention on behalf of the respondent workman that there was no sufficient evidence to indict him and punish him by way of dismissal and that he was victimised. There is also no allegation or any whisper by the respondent workman as to why he was involved or implicated falsely by the receptionist and the watchman by concocting such a unusual story against him. Nor is there any reason for the employer to create such an occasion to victimise him. There is no plea or evidence of any enemity between the witnesses and the workman. Even the plea of victimisation is confined to the fact that the other workman Gawade, was allowed to go unpunished. I do not think that this fact can be termed as an act of victimisation or discrimination. The respondent workman denied the charges and contested the matter and did not choose to resign while the other workman gave his resignation and left quietly. According to me, a very serious charge has been sufficiently proved before the domestic enquiry which is held to be fair and proper and there was sufficient evidence on record to come to a conclusion that the respondent was guilty of the charges levelled against him. According to me, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are legal and proper and there is absolutely no infirmity in the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. I, therefore, do not find any fault with the order of dismissal and according to me, the respondent workman has been rightly dismissed from employment. I, therefore, make rule absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a) with no order as to costs. I, therefore, do not find any fault with the order of dismissal and according to me, the respondent workman has been rightly dismissed from employment. I, therefore, make rule absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a) with no order as to costs. 10.It appears that pursuant to an order dated 18th January 1994 passed at the time of admission of this petition, the petitioners were required to deposit an amount of backwages and the petitioners have deposited a sum of Rs. 79,353/- by a cheque. The said amount is lying with Labour Court at Kolhapur. The petitioners are at liberty to withdraw the said amount with accrued interest thereon, if any. If the respondent workman had withdrawn any amount on furnishing security as per the order of this Court passed on 11th November 1994, the petitioners are entitled to encash the security as furnished by the respondent workman. 11.With these directions the petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly. All concerned to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of the Court. Petition allowed.