JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ.—Admitted. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, along with Mr. Neeraj Gupta and Mr. Ajit Jaswal, Advocates, appear and waive service of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, all the matters have been taken up together for final hearing. 2. All these petitions have been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for quashing and setting aside an interim order passed by the Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Kandaghat, District Solan in Civil Suit No. 15-S/l of 2000 and Civil Suit Nos. 22-S/l of 2000, 23-S/l of 2000 and 24-S/l of 2000, passed on May 23, 2000, and continued from time to time. 3. To appreciate the controversy raised in the present petitions, relevant facts of the first petition being CMPMO No. 25 of 2000 may now be stated. 4. The respondent herein, Him Khadi Gramodyog Ashram, Solan, (who will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff) filed Civil Suit No. 15-S/l of 2000 for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction in the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge, Solan, on May 18, 2000, against the petitioners, (who will hereinafter be referred to as the defendants). It was the case of the plaintiff that it is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 having its head office at Mission House, Solan. The plaintiff participated in the process of tender No. ST-4/RC-12130302/091999/Chain Link (Large)/99-2000/24. It was opened on June 15, 1999. It was for supply of Galvanized Steel Chain Link Fence Fabric. The bid of the plaintiff was accepted and it was granted work order on September 21, 1999, valid for a period of one year from September 19, 1999 to September 18, 2000. According to the plaintiff, it had performed its part of the contract to the satisfaction of the authority. It was, however, alleged in the plaint that without issuing notice and affording opportunity of hearing, on May 3, 2000, unilaterally an amendment/cancellation was made in one of the clauses of the agreement by the defendants. The said action was, therefore, violative of principles of natural justice and fair play as also it was unlawful and illegal. It was, however, alleged in the plaint that without issuing notice and affording opportunity of hearing, on May 3, 2000, unilaterally an amendment/cancellation was made in one of the clauses of the agreement by the defendants. The said action was, therefore, violative of principles of natural justice and fair play as also it was unlawful and illegal. The plaintiff was, therefore, constrained to approach the Court by filing suits for declaration that the contract entered into between the parties was valid up to September 18, 2000, and no unilateral modification and/or cancellation without hearing the plaintiff could have been made by the defendants and thus the action was illegal and unlawful. Permanent prohibitory injunction was also sought. It was stated that if such injunction would not be granted, irreparable less and injury would be caused. It was stated that cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff on May 3, 2000, when modification/cancellation was made unilaterally by the defendants in the contract clause. It was stated that since the plaintiff was performing its part of the contract at Solan and modification/cancellation of term of contract was received at Solan, the cause of action can be said to have occurred within the jurisdiction of Solan Court, and hence, Solan Court had jurisdiction. It was stated that there was no time left to issue statutory notice, as required under sub-section (1) of Section 80 of the Code. Hence, a separate application was mado under sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the Act to dispense with the said requirement It was, therefore, prayed that the defendants may be permanently restrained from implementing, executing and/or giving effect to the modification/cancellation of term sought to be effected on May 3, 2000. 5. The suit was filed on May 18, 2000. Along with the plaint, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code was also made for interim injunction. It was, inter alia, stated that if interim injunction will not be granted, irreparable injury and loss would be caused to the plaintiff. It was, therefore, prayed that during the pendency and further orders, interim injunction, as prayed for, deserved to be granted in favour of the plaintiff. 6. On May 23, 2000, the matter appeared on the Board. On behalf of defendant No. 2, Mr. Asnani appeared in person. It was, therefore, prayed that during the pendency and further orders, interim injunction, as prayed for, deserved to be granted in favour of the plaintiff. 6. On May 23, 2000, the matter appeared on the Board. On behalf of defendant No. 2, Mr. Asnani appeared in person. On his behalf as well as on behalf of defendant No. 1, he sought time for filing written statement, which was allowed and the matter was adjourned to June 23, 2000. On May 23, 2000 itself, ad-interim relief was granted. The said order reads as under : "23.5.2000 Present: As stated above. I have heard the parties on the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and 151 CPC and have perused the material on the file particularly rate contract dated 21.9.1999 and amendment dated 3.5.2000. Since the basic contract cannot be amended unilaterally and the record shows that applicant has got a prima facie case in his favour and the balance of convenience also lies in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss in case the respondents are not directed to maintain status quo qua the operation of the amendment dated 3.5.2000. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby directed to maintain status quo qua the rate contract dated 21.9.1999 and not to enforce the amendment dated 3.5.2000 unilaterally till the next date of hearing. To come up for reply on 23.6.2000." On June 23, 2000, a reply was filed on behalf of the defendants raising preliminary objection as also objections on merits. It was, inter alia, contended that issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the Code was mandatory. Since the case was not covered by sub-section (2) of Section 80, the suit was not maintainable. It was also contended that in view of sub-clause (3) of clause 20 of the "General Terms and Conditions" governing the rate contract and instructions to direct demanding officers and Consignees issued by the defendants, the Court at Kandaghat had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Moreover, the contract was issued from New Delhi and as such a Court situated in Delhi alone had jurisdiction. The suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. It was also stated that according to the plaintiff itself, the investment was more than Rs. 5 lacs and thus, the Court of Sub-Judge at Kandaghat has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit nor the Court fee of Rs. The suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. It was also stated that according to the plaintiff itself, the investment was more than Rs. 5 lacs and thus, the Court of Sub-Judge at Kandaghat has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit nor the Court fee of Rs. 32.50 paisa (Rs. 19.50 + Rs. 13.00) affixed on the plaint was adequate and proper. On merits, it was submitted that the action taken by the defendants could not be said to hp contrary to law. 7. The matter was adjourned to July 6, 2000, and interim relief which was granted was ordered to continue. On July 6, 2000, another application was filed by the defendants under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") making prayer to refer the parties to arbitration as in the contract, there was an arbitration clause being Clause No. 24. It was stated that the Court which was a judicial authority under Section 8 of the Act might refer the matter to Arbitrator. 8. The matter was again adjourned to July 25, 2000. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that even thereafter the matter was adjourned from time to time and even today i.e. on September 7, 2000, interim relief is continued. 9. According to the defendants, since Kandaghat Court had neither territorial jurisdiction, nor pecuniary jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction as to subject matter of the suit, no injunction could have been granted by the Court. The defendants, therefore, approached this Court on August 5, 2000, by filing four petitions for quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the Sub Judge, Kandaghat. The matters were placed for admission hearing on August 21, 2000. Notices were issued to the plaintiff and were made returnable on August 25, 2000. Dasti notice was also permitted. On August 25, 2000, the learned Counsel Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and prayed for time. I passed the following order: "25.8.2000 Present : Mr. K. S. Patyal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Y. Paul, for the petitioners. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Adv. With Mr. Ajit Jaswal, Advocate for the respondent. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. A. Jaswal, appears on behalf of the respondent and states that the respondent is served yesterday, that is, on August 24, 2000. He, therefore, prays for time. Mr. Y. Paul, for the petitioners. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Adv. With Mr. Ajit Jaswal, Advocate for the respondent. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. A. Jaswal, appears on behalf of the respondent and states that the respondent is served yesterday, that is, on August 24, 2000. He, therefore, prays for time. Mr. K.S. Patyal, learned Senior Counsel states that though the trial Court has no jurisdiction in the matter, interim relief was granted and continued from time to time. He further stated that the matter was on Board on August 22, 2000, but it was adjourned to September 7, 2000 on the ground that the Steno was not available, as informed by the party and earlier also, that was the ground for adjournment. In the facts and circumstances of the case and without expressing any opinion one way or the other finally, in my opinion, the matter deserves immediate attention. Since the respondent is served only yesterday, in the larger interests of justice, I grant time up to August 31, 2000". On August 31, 2000, again at the request of learned Counsel for the plaintiff, time was granted up to today and that is how the matters are on Board. 10. I have heard Mr. K.S. Patyal, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel with Mr. Y. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Counsel with Mr. Neeraj Gupta and Mr. Ajit Jaswal, Advocates, for the respondents. 11. Mr. Patyal, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, mainly raised three contentions. Firstly, he submitted that in view of arbitration clause No. 24, no court could have entertained the suit. The parties could only approach the Arbitrator. Secondly, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff could have approached the Court, Section 9 of the Act could not have been invoked by the plaintiff inasmuch as a Court of Sub Judge cannot be said to be a "court" as defined in the Act. Alternatively, Mr. Patyal submitted that even if the Court of Sub Judge, Kandaghat, could have power and jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 9 of the Act, when an application was made by the defendants under Section 8 of the Act to refer the parties to arbitration, it was obligatory on his part to pass such order and he could not have continued interim relief thereafter. Thirdly, he submitted that in any case, the court of Sub Judge at Kandaghat had no jurisdiction in view of clause 20 of the General terms and conditions of the order only a court at Delhi had jurisdiction. 12. Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Court. He contended that though it was stated in the plaint that the suit was for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction read with Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, obviously, there was an error on the part of the plaintiff in referring to that provision. Section 9 does not provide for filing of a substantive suit. It is merely an "interim measure" to be taken by the Court either before or during arbitral proceedings. Section 8 of the Act, therefore, had no application. He also urged that when a grievance was made by the plaintiff, which was of a civil nature, it was perfectly within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain a suit and to make an interim order. Regarding pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court at Kandaghat, it was submitted that the amount in question of tender contract was immaterial. The suit was based on correct valuation and proper Court fee was paid. In the light of the grievance voiced and relief claimed, the question will be decided by the Court. Regarding territorial jurisdiction, the learned Senior Counsel urged that two courts, a Court at Delhi as well as Court at Kandaghat have jurisdiction. But when a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Kandaghat, District Solan, it cannot be contended by the defendants that the said Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The counsel also submitted that it was the case of the plaintiff that its attention was never invited to Clause 20 of the General terms and conditions of the contract. But even otherwise, the point will be decided by the Court after hearing the parties, and at this stage it is premature to raise such contention by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution. On all these grounds, he submitted that the petitions deserve to be dismissed. 13. But even otherwise, the point will be decided by the Court after hearing the parties, and at this stage it is premature to raise such contention by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution. On all these grounds, he submitted that the petitions deserve to be dismissed. 13. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Subordinate Judge ought not to have granted interim injunction. Looking to the material on record, it appears that a contract was entered into between the parties. There are General terms and conditions governing the contract. Ordinarily, when such contract is entered into between the parties, it would not be proper to hold that the parties were not aware of such terms and conditions. Now, Clause 24 specifically refers to an arbitration. It states that whenever any question, dispute or difference will arise between the parties, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of an officer in the Ministry of Law appointed to be the Arbitrator by the Director General of Supplies and Disposals. It also provides the procedure and giving of award by the Arbitrator. When such a clause is there, ordinarily, the Court will, before making interim order, consider the same. 14. It is also pertinent to note that in Civil Suits, the plaintiff has sought declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction. After the cause title of the parties, the plaintiff had stated in the plaint itself that the suits were for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction read with Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Section 9 enables a Court to take "interim measure of protection" in respect of certain matters specified in Clauses (a) to (e) of Clause (ii). Thus, Section 9 empowers certain interim measures by Court during the pendency of arbitral proceedings by the Court. Section 9 enables a Court to take "interim measure of protection" in respect of certain matters specified in Clauses (a) to (e) of Clause (ii). Thus, Section 9 empowers certain interim measures by Court during the pendency of arbitral proceedings by the Court. Now, the expression Court is defined in Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2: "(e) "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes." Conjoint reading of Section 9 and Section 2(1) (e) makes it abundantly clear that a "Court" referred to in Section 9 which can make an interim measure of protection is a Court which is a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District. In this connection, my attention was also invited by Mr. Patyal, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, to Section 9 of the Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976. It states that the Court of the District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court or "Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district". Thus, a Court, as contemplated by Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District. It is an admitted fact that a Court of Sub Judge, Kandaghat, is not a District Court and hence, it cannot be said to be a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District covered by Section 2(1 )(e) of the Act and hence, it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 9 of the Act. 15. In my opinion, the grievance of the defendants is also well founded that when an application under Section 8 of the Act was made by the defendants that the matter should be referred to the arbitrators, the Sub Judge, Kandaghat, ought to have passed an appropriate order thereon. It is pertinent to note that Section 8 of the Act speaks of "judicial authority" and not a "Court". The said Section provides the judicial authority before which an action is brought to refer the parties to arbitration. 16. It is pertinent to note that Section 8 of the Act speaks of "judicial authority" and not a "Court". The said Section provides the judicial authority before which an action is brought to refer the parties to arbitration. 16. As stated above, an application under Section 8 was filed on July 5, 2000. It was also contended that the suit itself was not maintainable in view of arbitration clause. When the attention of the Court was invited, in my opinion, it was incumbent on the part of the Court to pass an appropriate order considering the relevant provisions of Sections 8 and 9. 17. It was contended by Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, that when an application was made before the Court of Sub-Judge, Kandaghat, it was tacitly conceded by the defendants that it was a Court under Section 9 of the Act and now it is not open to the defendants to contend that only District Court had jurisdiction and the suit instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of Sub Judge, Kandaghat, was without jurisdiction. 18. I am afraid, I cannot uphold the said contention of Mr. Gupta in view of different phraseology used in the above two Sections. Section 9 speaks of Court whereas Section 8 of judicial authority. Reading Section 9, there is no doubt in my mind that an application for interim measure can be made by a party either before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced only to a "Court" i.e. the Court of Principal Civil jurisdiction. But it may happen that a party may approach any "judicial authority" and hence, a provision has been made in Section 8 so as to enable the opposite party to approach such judicial authority inviting attention of the authority that the matter requires to be referred to Arbitrator in view of an arbitration agreement between the parties and whenever such an application is made to a judicial authority before which an action is brought, it has to consider the said application and pass appropriate order. The contention of the defendants was prima facie correct that the Sub Judge at Kandaghat cannot be said to be a "Court" under Section 9 of the Act and hence, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The contention of the defendants was prima facie correct that the Sub Judge at Kandaghat cannot be said to be a "Court" under Section 9 of the Act and hence, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Since the suit was instituted in that Court, it was a "judicial authority" under Section 8 and hence, an application to refer the matter to Arbitrator under Section 8 was well founded and an action ought to have been taken by that authority. But it was not done and even today the matter is pending before the Court of Sub Judge, Kandaghat. 19. Even on third ground, in my opinion, the contention raised by the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel is prima facie well founded. In the terms and conditions of the agreement, Clause 20 relates to "Laws governing the contract". Sub-clauses (2) and (3) which are material and may be quoted: "(2) Irrespective of the place of delivery, the place of performance or place of payment under the contract, the contract shall be deemed to have been made at the place from which the acceptance of tender has been issued. (3) Jurisdiction of Courts— The courts of the place from where the acceptance of tender has been issued shall alone have jurisdiction to decide any dispute arising out of or in respect of the contract." From the above two sub-clauses, it is clear that the contract "shall be deemed to have been made at the place from which the acceptance of the tender has been issued" and that in case of any dispute arising out of or in respect of the contract, the place from where the acceptance of the tender has been issued shall "alone" have jurisdiction to decide. 20. It may be true that when the plaintiff was informed about the modification and/or cancellation of a term or condition at Solan or that it had to perform its part of the contract at Solan, a part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction at Kandaghat. Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel is, therefore, right in submitting that there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. But then it also cannot be gainsaid that contract was accepted at Delhi and hence, a competent Court is at Delhi and it has also territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 21. Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel is, therefore, right in submitting that there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. But then it also cannot be gainsaid that contract was accepted at Delhi and hence, a competent Court is at Delhi and it has also territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 21. Now, it is settled law that if a Court has no jurisdiction, parties by consent cannot confer jurisdiction on that Court. Likewise, if a Court has jurisdiction, by consent, the said Court cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. But when two or more Courts have jurisdiction and there is an agreement between the parties that in case of dispute between the parties, the aggrieved party can approach one of such Courts as agreed to between the parties, the agreement cannot be said to be opposed to public policy and, therefore, unforceable, In Hakam Singh v. M/s, Gammon (India) Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 740, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that where two or more competent Courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit consequent upon a part of cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such Courts, to try the dispute, which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be legal, valid and enforceable. Such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague nor hit by Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. 22. The principle laid down in Hakam Singh was followed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in several cases. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by referring to all of them. I may, however, refer to one more decision in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A.P, Agencies, Salem, AIR 1989 SC 1239. In that case, an agreement was entered into between the parties, one from Tamil Nadu and another from Gujarat. Clause 11 of the agreement provided as under : "Any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction." A dispute arose between the parties and suit was filed by the plaintiff in the Court of Subordinate Judge at Salem (Tamil Nadu). It was contended on behalf of the defendant that in view of Clause 11 of the agreement, Salem Court had no jurisdiction and the suit ought to have been filed only in a competent Court at Kaira (Gujarat). 23. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that in view of Clause 11 of the agreement, Salem Court had no jurisdiction and the suit ought to have been filed only in a competent Court at Kaira (Gujarat). 23. Upholding the contention and observing that the suit could have been filed only in Kaira (Gujarat), the Supreme Court, after referring to several decisions, observed thus : "20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird and Co., AIR 1979 Mad 16, where the terms and conditions attached to the quotation contained an arbitration clause provided that: "any order placed against this quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcutta and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us", it was held that it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it did not mean to confer an exclusive jurisdiction on the Court at Calcutta, and when a part of the cause of action had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably deduced that where such an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like alone, only, exclusive, and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed." From the above two paragraphs, it is clear that some times an ouster clause may provide that a contract "shall be deemed to have been made" at a particular place. In their Lordships opinion, such clause would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute arising out of that contract. 24. In the instant case, sub-clause (2) of Clause 20 extracted hereinabove states that "the contract shall be deemed to have been made at the place from which the acceptance of tender has been issued" i.e. at Delhi. 25. The Supreme Court also observed that when an ouster Clause is express, clear, explicit or unambiguous and uses the words like alone, only, exclusive, and the like, there may not be any difficulty. But even in the absence of such clear expressions, in appropriate cases, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one is the exclusion of another) can be applied. In ABC Laminart, an expression "only", "alone", "exclusive", etc. was not used. The Clause provided that "any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction", and yet the Court held that the suit could have been filed only in Kaira Court. 26. In the instant case, apart from invoking the maxim expression of one is the exclusion of another, unambiguous expression alone was used in sub-clause (3) of Clause 20. In my opinion, therefore, the case is squarely covered by A.B.C. Laminart. On that ground also, prima facie, the Court of Sub Judge, Kandaghat> could not have entertained the suit. 27. My attention was, no doubt, invited by Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, to other decisions including the decisions in Isaqmahmad Habibi Ji v. The United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Hyderabad, AIR 1978 Gujarat 46; Rajasthan Golden Transport Co v. United India Fire and General Insurance Co. 27. My attention was, no doubt, invited by Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, to other decisions including the decisions in Isaqmahmad Habibi Ji v. The United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Hyderabad, AIR 1978 Gujarat 46; Rajasthan Golden Transport Co v. United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad and another, AIR 1980 Gujarat 184; Renown Biscuit Co., Bombay v. Kamalanathan, AIR 1980 Madras 28; M/s. Road Transport Corporation and others v. M/s, Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. and others, AIR 1981 Bombay 299; M/s. Pattnaik Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Kalinga Iron Works and another, AIR 1984 Orissa 182; The Paradeep Port Trust v. M/s. Hindusthan Mercantile Transport Corporation and another, AIR 1985 Orissa 106; State of Rajasthan v. Gujarat State Construction Corporation Ltd. Gandhinagar, AIR 1988 Gujarat 73 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Associated Transport Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and another, AIR 1988 Kerala 36. 28. The principle laid down in the above cases has not been disputed by the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel and obviously it cannot be said that a Court within whose jurisdiction a part of cause of action has arisen has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The relevant question is that when two or more Courts have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed that in case of dispute, they will invoke jurisdiction of a particular court, such agreement as held in Hakam Singh and reiterated from time to time, is in consonance with law and can be enforced. It is, therefore, obligatory on the part of the aggrieved party to approach that Court which has been agreed between the parties. 29. In the instant case, it is not even disputed by the plaintiff that the contract was accepted at Delhi and hence, Delhi Court has territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, prima facie, it was competent Court at Delhi before which the proceedings could have been initiated. 30. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, in my opinion, the learned Sub Judge ought not to have granted interim relief. With a view to see that an application for interim injunction is finally decided, though I was satisfied that interim relief could not have been granted, on August 21, 2000, I issued only notice making it returnable on August 25, 2000. The matters were then adjourned to August 31, 2000, and then again on September 7, 2000, i.e. today. With a view to see that an application for interim injunction is finally decided, though I was satisfied that interim relief could not have been granted, on August 21, 2000, I issued only notice making it returnable on August 25, 2000. The matters were then adjourned to August 31, 2000, and then again on September 7, 2000, i.e. today. But even today, a statement was made at the Bar that the learned Sub Judge has continued interim relief which was granted as early as on May 23, 2000. Mr. Gupta stated that the matter is already heard and the judgment is likely to be pronounced today. But in view of the fact that interim relief was granted before more than three months and that the contract which was entered into between the parties on September 19, 1999, for a period of one year is likely to be over within a few days i.e. up to September 18, 2000, in my considered view, now interim relief should no more be continued. Hence, interim relief granted by the learned Sub Judge, Kandaghat, is hereby vacated. 31. Since the suit is pending before the Sub Judge, Kandaghat, I may state that whatever observations made by me hereinabove are merely prima facie in nature and as and when the question of jurisdiction of Court will be argued, the same will be decided by the Court on its own merits without being influenced in any manner by the observations made hereinabove. The petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the cases, there will be no order as to costs. Copy of the judgment shall be kept by the Registry in each matter. Petitions allowed.