JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—The present appeal is filed against the decree passed by District Judge, Solan, on June 9, 1992, in Civil Suit No. 37-S/l of 1990/87. The learned District Judge by the said decree, partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and directed the defendants to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000 jointly and severally with proportionate costs as damages. 2. The appellants were the original defendants whereas the respondents were the original plaintiffs before the trial Court. They will be referred to as plaintiffs and defendants in this judgment also. 3. The plaintiffs instituted the above suit for recovery of Rs. 1,00,000 individually and jointly from the defendants towards damages for their defamation. Their case in the plaint was that plaintiff No. 1 is a limited company, duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. It has its registered office at Jubbar, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan. It deals in manufacturing process of watches. Plaintiff No. 2 G. S. Purewal is the Managing Director of plaintiff No. 1. It was asserted by the plaintiffs that in the last one decade, the Company had brought radical changes in watch technology and due to such innovation, it had earned wide acclaim and acceptance all over the country. Plaintiff No. 2 was awarded "a man of the year’ award in 1986 by "Trade Post", most widely read journal in the industries. Because of such activities of the plaintiff it had acquired good reputation throughout the country. The investment of the Company was about nine crores. An elected Workers Committee used to look-after all grievances of workers. 4. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the defendants nourished a grudge against the plaintiffs as there were good and cordial relations between the Management and the workers. The defendants, therefore, tried to instigate the workers of the Company to create labour problems in the factory of the plaintiffs. They attempted to instal a Trade Union by inducting outsiders. It was averred by the plaintiffs that on September 24, 1987, a gate meeting was held by the defendants. It was addressed by all the defendants. Active part was however, played by defendant No. 1, President of self-styled Union known as "Purewal Employees Union". They attempted to instal a Trade Union by inducting outsiders. It was averred by the plaintiffs that on September 24, 1987, a gate meeting was held by the defendants. It was addressed by all the defendants. Active part was however, played by defendant No. 1, President of self-styled Union known as "Purewal Employees Union". In that meeting, defendant No. 1 used defamatory words describing the company as committing several illegalities and taking away money to abroad depriving employees of their legitimate dues as also by not paying taxes. A second gate meeting was also held on October 6, 1987, wherein the defendants displayed and distributed a pamphlet containing derogatory and defamatory language against the plaintiffs. Such pamphlets were displayed in the entire locality and neighbouring villages. They were sent to various suppliers, distributors, dealers, banks and other financial institutions all over India. In the said pamphlet, the plaintiffs were described as thieves who were not paying adequate taxes and draining black money to Swiss Banks. It was also alleged that it was highly deplorable that the workers by their sweat and blood were earning profits for the company but they were not paid even minimum wages by their employer. There was collusion between the company and Government and due to such illegal and unholy understanding between the two, management had ignored all labour legislations. A call was, therefore, given for unity so that the labourers can fight against management. 5. According to the plaintiffs, due to defamatory language used at the gate meetings as also remarks made in the pamphlet, the reputation of the company was adversely affected which had also caused substantial loss to its business. The allegations levelled against the plaintiffs company were false to the knowledge of the defendants and, hence, the defendants were liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000. 6. The defendants resisted the suit. As observed in the judgment, initially, in spite of service of summons to defendants, they failed to appear. They were, accordingly, ordered to be proceeded against ex parte on December 30, 1987. On May 19, 1988, however, Mr. R.L. Kaushal, Advocate, put in his appearance for all of them. An application for setting aside ex parte order was filed on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 9. The said application was allowed on June 23, 1988. They were, accordingly, ordered to be proceeded against ex parte on December 30, 1987. On May 19, 1988, however, Mr. R.L. Kaushal, Advocate, put in his appearance for all of them. An application for setting aside ex parte order was filed on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 9. The said application was allowed on June 23, 1988. A written statement was also filed on the same day but it was not signed by the defendants. It was signed by .Mr. R.L. Kaushal, Advocate, and verified by defendant No. 10, A.K. Sharma. 7. In the written statement, allegations levelled by the plaintiffs in the plaint were controverted. It was averred that plaintiffs were not paying even minimum wages to the workers in accordance with law and there was exploitation of employees by the plaintiffs. It was stated that the defendants never made any defamatory statement or circulated any poster with a view to defame the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, as legitimate dues of the workers were not paid, they were living a miserable life. It was asserted that defendants and other workers were acting within industrial laws and trade union activities. Plaintiff No, 2 with prejudicial attitude wanted the defendants to stop trade union activities by interfering with their fundamental rights. It was, therefore, contended that the defendants were not liable to pay any damages and a false suit was filed against them which was liable to be dismissed. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were framed by the trial court : 1. Whether the defendants uttered the defamatory words, as alleged in para 8 of the plaint, and thus injured the reputation of the plaintiffs? OPP 2. Whether the poster Annexure-B was published and displayed by the defendants? OPP 3. If issue Nos. 1 and 2 are proved in affirmative, is plaintiff entitled to damages, as claimed? OPP C 4. Relief. 8. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, the trial Court held that it was proved by the plaintiffs that the defendants uttered defamatory words which caused injury to reputation of the plaintiffs. It also held that it was proved by the plaintiffs that a pamphlet in question was published and displayed by the defendants. In view of findings on issue Nos. It also held that it was proved by the plaintiffs that a pamphlet in question was published and displayed by the defendants. In view of findings on issue Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages to the extent of Rs. 10,000. The suit was accordingly decreed in part. 9. It is the said decree which is challenged by the appellants-defendants in the present appeal. 10. We have heard Mr. Ravi Bakshi, learned Counsel for the appellants, and Mr. Kapil Dev Sood, along with Ms. Sunita Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents. 11. Mr. Bakshi, for the appellants raised various contentions. He submitted that the trial Court committed an error of fact and of law in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. He contended that no case was made out by the plaintiffs and they were not entitled to any damages. The trial Court also erred in observing that written statement filed by the defendants was not proper and in accordance with law and denial in written statement could not be considered to be express, specific and explicit. It was alternatively urged that even if there was some procedural defect in signing or verifying the written statement, at the most it was technical in nature and when an application was made to allow written statement to be amended by signing and verifying by all defendants, it ought to have been granted and the defendants should have been permitted to comply with necessary formalities. An order rejecting an amendment application was contrary to law. It was submitted that immediately after rejection of the amendment application, the suit was disposed of and decree was passed on June 9, 1992, which has resulted in great prejudice to the defendants. 12. On merits, the counsel contended that no case was made out by the plaintiffs against the defendants. Neither it was proved by the plaintiffs that defamatory language was used in the first gate meeting dated September 24, 1987, nor a pamphlet was displayed and distributed in the second gate meeting dated October 6, 1987. Since none of the incidents was established by the plaintiffs, neither the plaintiffs were entitled to claim nor the defendants liable to pay damages. 13. Since none of the incidents was established by the plaintiffs, neither the plaintiffs were entitled to claim nor the defendants liable to pay damages. 13. In the alternative, it was contended by the counsel that even if it is assumed that in the gate meeting of September 24, 1987, speeches were delivered by the defendants, or a pamphlet was displayed and distributed at the gate meeting of October 6, 1987, the defendants cannot be held liable for defamation inasmuch as the said actions were taken in good faith by them with a view to protect and safeguard larger interests of labourers and workmen who were, admittedly, not paid their legitimate dues. The case, therefore, cannot be said to fall within the mischief of defamation, for which they have to pay damages. Thus, the trial Court has committed an error of fact and of law in passing the decree against the defendants, which deserves to be set aside. 14. Mr. Sood with Ms. Sunita Sharma, on the other hand, supported the decree passed by the trial Court. He submitted that so called written statement filed by the defendants was not in accordance with Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There was no proper signing and verification of the written statement and, hence, it was rightly not considered by the trial Court. He also stated that an application for amendment of written statement filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code was rejected by the trial Court on May 30, 1992. No revision petition, however, was filed against the said order and the order thus became final. Now it is not open to the defendants to contend that the order dated May 30, 1992, was illegal or contrary to law. In view of that order there was no illegality on the part of the trial Court in ignoring the written statement. 15. On merits, Mr. Sood submitted that, on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, the trial Court recorded a finding that it was proved by the plaintiffs that there was a gate meeting on September 24, 1987, wherein certain defamatory words were spoken by the defendants. Similarly’ there was another gate meeting on October 6, 1987, and a pamphlet was displayed and distributed. Similarly’ there was another gate meeting on October 6, 1987, and a pamphlet was displayed and distributed. The counsel submitted that considering the verbal language used in the first gate meeting as also reading the language in the pamphlet displayed and distributed in the second gate meeting, it was clear that the language was perse defamatory. The trail court was, therefore, wholly right and totally justified in holding the defendants liable and in awarding damages to the plaintiffs. 16. Mr. Sood submitted that though the amount awarded by the trial Court was not as per the prayer of the plaintiffs, the grievance of the plaintiffs was ventilated and there is no reason to interfere with the decree. He, therefore, submitted that there is no substance in the appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. 17. First, let us consider the question whether the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants can be said to be in accordance with the law and whether signing and verification of pleadings was proper and if it was not so, whether an amendment sought on behalf of the defendants to sign and verify written statement could have been refused. 18. Now, according to the trial Court, allegations in the plaint were not denied by the defendants by filing proper written statement. In this connection, it may be stated that the trial Court has observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment that the allegations relating to use of defamatory and derogatory words and publication of pamphlet containing defamatory imputations were made in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the plaint. Then referring to Rule 5 of Order VIII of the Code, the trial Court observed that denial of those allegations were not specific in the written statement and by necessary implication, therefore, those allegations were deemed to have been admitted. 19. In paragraph 8 of the plaint, the case of the plaintiffs was that defendants nursed a grudge on account of cordial relations between the plaintiff-management and the workers of the factory. Therefore, by inducting outsiders into the union, some interested elements and defendants conspired to defame the management. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, a gate meeting was held on September 24, 1987. In that meeting, the defendants took active part. Defendant No. 1 as the President of self styled union accused the management and plaintiff No. 2 of doing various illegal acts. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, a gate meeting was held on September 24, 1987. In that meeting, the defendants took active part. Defendant No. 1 as the President of self styled union accused the management and plaintiff No. 2 of doing various illegal acts. It was stated that all the words used by the speakers in the said meeting were such that they could not be reproduced but some of the words uttered by the defendants were reproduced in paragraph 8. The words used in the said meeting were clearly defamatory in nature and it brought down the image of the plaintiffs in the estimate of the gathering as also public at large. Similarly, in paragraph 14, it was the allegation of the plaintiffs that in another gate meeting of October 6, 1987, the defendants displayed and distributed a pamphlet containing defamatory remarks against the plaintiffs. The pamphlet was entirely indicative of hatteredness and contempt against the management and it caused irreparable damage to them. A copy of said poster was annexed as Annexure B to the plaint. 20. A written statement was filed by the defendants on Jyne 20, 1988. The first sentence of para 8 reads as under: "That the contents of para 8 of the plaint are specifically denied, false and wrong." It was then stated that the workers of defendants were acting within the definite periphery of industrial laws and trade union rights. The defendants had right to induct any person outsider in their union under the Trade Union Act and the plaintiffs, were not concerned with it. It was alleged that the attitude of plaintiff No. 3 towards the defendants was biased and he. wanted trade union activities of the defendants to be stopped but the union and its leaders were successful in organising strikes for about two months. The plaintiffs were in the habit of making vague allegations against the defendants, but the defendants were enjoying their fundamental rights as well as trade union rights and they would fully respect the rights and reputation of the plaintiffs also. 21. Similarly, in paragraph 14 of the written statement, it was stated as under:— "That the contents of para 14 of the plaint are totally false and wrong hence denied specifically." 22. 21. Similarly, in paragraph 14 of the written statement, it was stated as under:— "That the contents of para 14 of the plaint are totally false and wrong hence denied specifically." 22. A complaint was also made that a copy of Annexure ‘B had never been supplied to the defendants nor-they were concerned with Annexure B Annexure B thus was totally false and wrong. A demand was also made that the copy of Annexure B should be supplied to the defendants. 23. In paragraphs 12 and 16 of the written statement, it was further stated by the defendants that the plaintiffs were exploiting the workers. There was labour unrest due to adamant attitude of the plaintiffs in not implementing labour laws. According to the defendants, a demand to implement labour laws would not amount to defamation. It was also asserted that the defendants were totally innocent and knew nothing about the accusation made by the plaintiffs against them. In the light of the denial of averments made by the plaintiffs in the plaint and non-supply of Annexure B to the plaint, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the allegations levelled by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the plaint were not refuted by the defendants. It is true as laid down in Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order VIII of the Code that denial of averments and allegations in the plaint by the defendants should be express, specific and unequivocal and not general, vague or evasive. But in the instant case, reading the written statement in its entirety, it is clear that it was the case of the defendants that the allegations in the plaint were false, frivolous and unfounded and they were specifically denied. 24. Regarding allegations in paragraph 8 (which related to first gate meeting dated September 24, 1987), the case of the defendants was that the workers were exercising their legitimate rights under various labour legislations. It was also alleged that the attitude of plaintiff No. 2 towards defendants was biased and he wanted the defendants to stop enjoying their trade union and fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution. It was also averred that the plaintiffs were habitual in making such vague allegations against the defendants. 25. It was also alleged that the attitude of plaintiff No. 2 towards defendants was biased and he wanted the defendants to stop enjoying their trade union and fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution. It was also averred that the plaintiffs were habitual in making such vague allegations against the defendants. 25. Regarding allegations in paragraph 14 of the plaint, (which related to second gate meeting dated October 6, 1987, and publication and distribution of pamphlet), it was the case of the defendants that they had not been supplied a copy of Annexure. B pamphlet alleged to have been published and displayed by the defendants. A demand was, therefore, made to supply a copy thereof. But it was specifically stated that Annexure B was "totally false and wrong". 26. The trial Court, therefore, was not right in holding that there was no specific denial by the defendants of the allegations and averments made in paras 8 and 14 of the plaint in the written statement. 27. It is also necessary to bear in mind that it is well recognised that in India and particularly in Mofussil area, pleadings are loosely drafted. Such pleadings, hence, should be construed liberally. A hypertechnical view should not be adopted in interpreting procedural matters. "All rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision", as observed by the Supreme Court in Raj Narain v. Smt Indira Gandhi, AIR 1972 SC 1302. An action at law cannot be equated to a game of chess. The provisions of law are not mere formulae to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking, there lies a juristic principle. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain that principle and implement it. The provisions of the Code, therefore, must be interpreted so as to subserve the cause of justice and not to thwart it. Non compliance of each and every procedural aspect would not vitiate the trial and would not deprive the court from doing justice to the parties, if such breach can be corrected without any injury to the other side. "After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck its end product of technicalities" (Vide : State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 SC 1177, 1179). 28. "After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck its end product of technicalities" (Vide : State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 SC 1177, 1179). 28. In Madan Gopal v. Mam Raj, AIR 1976 SC 461, also, it was observed by the Apex Court that pleadings are loosely drafted and the Courts should not scrutinise them with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claims being defeated on trivial grounds. It is, therefore, absolutely clear to keep in mind the substance and not the form of pleadings. 29. The following instructive and off-quoted observations of Bose, J. in the leading case of Sangrarn Singh v. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425, should always be kept in mind in considering, interpreting and applying a procedural law : "A Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up Too technical a construction of procedural law, therefore, must be guarded against, (provided always that justice is done to both sides), lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice will be used to frustrate it." 30. Bearing in mind, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above mentioned decisions, in our considered opinion, in the instant case, there was denial by the defendants in their written statement of averments made and allegations levelled by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the plaint. It was, therefore, not correct to state that the allegations were not denied, and hence, they were deemed to have been admitted. 31. Then, according to the trial Court, the written statement could not be said to be in accordance with law as it was neither properly signed nor legally verified. Now, it is true that under the Code every pleading must be signed by a party and his pleader (if any). It is equally true that where a party pleading is by reason of absence or for any other good cause unable to sign the pleading, it can be signed by any person duly authorised by him. Now, it is true that under the Code every pleading must be signed by a party and his pleader (if any). It is equally true that where a party pleading is by reason of absence or for any other good cause unable to sign the pleading, it can be signed by any person duly authorised by him. It also cannot be gainsaid that every pleading must be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person acquainted with the facts of the case. 32. It was, therefore, necessary that the written statement ought to have been signed by all the defendants. There is no dispute that the written statement was not signed by all. Similarly, it was also not verified by all the defendants. The written statement was signed only by an Advocate of the defendants. Likewise, it was verified only by one defendant Mr. A.K. Sharma defendant No. 10. Such pleading (written statement), therefore, could not be said to be in accordance with Order VI of the Code. But it also cannot be forgotten that an application for amendment of the written statement was filed on behalf of the defendants under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, which was rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated May 30, 1992 observing that there was no proper written statement on behalf of the defendants. 33. Mr. Sood, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, submitted that no proceedings had been taken by the defendants against the said order. Hence, that order became final. But it must be remembered that after the rejection of the application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 on May 30, 1992, the trial Court finally disposed of the suit on June 9, 1992 and being aggrieved by the decree passed, the defendants preferred a substantive appeal in this Court. A grievance is made by the defendants in the appeal that the trial Court has erred in rejecting the said application and it ought to have, granted the amendment permitting to amend the written statement by allowing all the defendants to sign and verify the pleading and ought to have decided the matter on merits on the basis of the averments made and denial contained in the written statement. 34. 34. In our opinion, the trial Court ought to have granted the prayer of permitting the written statement to be amended. By not permitting to do so, the trial Court, in our considered opinion, has taken a hyper technical view, which cannot be said to be in accordance with law. We are further of the opinion that though the order dated May 30, 1992, was not challenged by the defendants at that stage, it is open to them to challenge the legality of the said order in a substantive appeal under Section 96 of the Code (Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). 35. Let us now consider the merits of the case. It has been observed by the trial Court in the judgment that apart from the fact that there was no specific denial by the defendants in their written statement of the averments made in the plaint, even on the basis of evidence, it was proved that two meetings were held by the defendants, one on September 24, 1987 and another on October 6, 1987, and defamatory language was used and publication of offending poster was displayed. 36. Now, to prove gate meetings dated September 24, 1987 and October 6, 1987, the plaintiffs have examined certain witnesses. 37. PW 3 Harpreet Singh, Deputy Production Manager had stated that in the end of 1987, seine workers of the factory started agitation and organised gate meetings. He stated that at those gate meetings, the defendants called plaintiffs by bad names by using abusive and filthy language and by making all sorts of allegations. The production of the plaintiff company also suffered to the extent of about 30 to 40 per cent. He also stated that the allegations made in the pamphlet as Ex. PI, were false. In cross-examination, he stated that he could not say whether amount of overtime and bonus was paid to the workers. He, however, admitted that the matter was pending before the Labour Court regarding payment of arrears/bonus. 38. PW4 Sudeep Jhanji, Assistant Manager Production, also stated that gate meetings were held by the workers and a pamphlet was distributed. From his evidence, it becomes clear that an agitation was going on in 1987. Due to distribution of pamphlet production was reduced. He, however, admitted that the matter was pending before the Labour Court regarding payment of arrears/bonus. 38. PW4 Sudeep Jhanji, Assistant Manager Production, also stated that gate meetings were held by the workers and a pamphlet was distributed. From his evidence, it becomes clear that an agitation was going on in 1987. Due to distribution of pamphlet production was reduced. PW5 D.P. Pardhan, Administrative Supervisor deposed about holding of gate meetings and distribution of pamphlet by the defendants and also decline of goodwill of the company because of the activities of the defendants. Similar was the version of PW-6 Rattan Singh, Senior Personnel Officer. The witness further stated that he had seen the pamphlet in the hands of defendants at the gate meeting, which the defendants pasted around the factory premises as well as on the Highway leading to Chandigarh and Shimla. According to him, production of the company was badly affected and many dealers demanded refund of security deposits. In cross-examination, however, he admitted. The management was not affected by distribution of Ex P-l with regard to the reputation of the management”. 39. Then there was main evidence of G.S Purewal, plaintiff No.7, Managing Director of plaintiff No. 1. He stated that the factory was established in 1977 with the initial investment of Rs. one crore. The paid up capital was Rs.57 lacs in 1987. There were 750 workers with the capital of Rs. 2.5 crores. According to him, machinery was imported with 60 per cent foreign investment. He admitted that factory was running in losses since 1977. In 1987, an agitation started with the result that the production was reduced, gate meetings were held and the plaintiffs were described as thieves and pamphlets were published, displayed and distributed. They were sent to Financial Institutions, Government Offices and other merchants. The business of the company was adversely affected and there was demand of withdrawal of security deposits. Regarding gate meetings, he stated that he was told such meetings. There was heavy loss to the plaintiffs on account of defamatory statements and pamphlets by the defendants. 40. In cross-examination, PW 7 admitted that a charter of demand was submitted by the workers before they went on strike. He also admitted that wages and bonus were paid regularly upto 1986. He stated that he had visited foreign countries, many-a-time for purchase of raw-materials. 40. In cross-examination, PW 7 admitted that a charter of demand was submitted by the workers before they went on strike. He also admitted that wages and bonus were paid regularly upto 1986. He stated that he had visited foreign countries, many-a-time for purchase of raw-materials. He also admitted that things had been improved subsequently. 41. PW 1 Smt. Ravinder Prabha has stated that pamphlet Ex P-l was published in her press. She, however, admitted that she could not say as to who had come to get it published. PW 2 N.C. Gupta, Deputy Manager, Accounts stated that an amount of Rs. 1 lac as overtime allowance for the year 1986-87 was due and was not paid till the date of his deposition. In the same way, Rs. 5 lacs bonus also could not be paid by the company. 42. This is in short, the evidence of the plaintiffs. 43. On behalf of the defence, DW 1 Yash Pal Sharma, defendant No. 1 was examined. He was the President of M/s. Purewal Employees Union. According to him, union started in 1987. Before that, there was a Works Committee and plaintiff No. 2 Mr. Purewal was the Chairperson. The Union was formed in 1987 with a view to implement labour laws. He alleged that the workers were not paid minimum wages, bonus and other benefits, to which they were entitled. The plaintiffs were not implementing labour laws. Prior to proceeding on strike, several meetings were held by the union with the management, but they could not yield any result. Regarding gate meetings and publication of pamphlet, he stated that he did not know how to deliver speech and speeches were not delivered by the defendants. In all speeches, only parliamentary language was used. He then stated that as a man, plaintiff No. 2 was good but as an employer, he was bad pay master. He also made grievance that genuine demands of the workers were not accepted and labour laws were flouted. He alleged that two per cent wages were deducted by the management towards contribution of construction of a school, which was inaugurated by the then Chief Minister of the State. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge whether plaintiff No. 2 took away any amount to Switzerland. 44. DW-2 Krishan Dutt had stated that he was General Secretary of the Union. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge whether plaintiff No. 2 took away any amount to Switzerland. 44. DW-2 Krishan Dutt had stated that he was General Secretary of the Union. He had no knowledge whether any pamphlet was published nor he could say who got it published. He also joined DW 1 Sharma in saying that as a person plaintiff No. 2 was good but not a good employer. 45. DW-3 H.R. Sharma and DW-4 Jia Lal have stated that wages were not paid to workers and overtime dues -were outstanding to the extent of Rs. 4 lacs. Ex. D/1 award of the Labour Court has also been produced on record. 46. From the pleadings of the parties and leading of evidence, the case of the plaintiffs is that two gate meetings were organised by the defendants, on September 24, 1987 and October 6, 1987, respectively. Now, so far as holding of the first meeting dated September 24, 1987 is concerned, the factum of holding such meeting was not seriously disputed by the defendants though the facts stated in para 8 of the plaint were denied. But the allegation of the plaintiffs was that the said meeting was attended by the defendants, it was addressed by them and serious allegations were made and defamatory speeches were delivered against the plaintiffs by the defendants. 47. Now, as far as speeches said to have been delivered by the defendants are concerned, there is a word against word. PW7 does not claim any personal knowledge regarding speeches delivered and language used at the first meeting. But through the evidence of PW 6 Rattan Singh, Senior Personnel Officer, certain documents were brought on record including Ex. PW 6-A and Ex. PW 6 B. Ex. PW 6 A is a communication, dated October 12, 1987 by Mr. Garewal, Senior Personnel Manager, to Police Thana, Kasauli. Ex. PW 6 B is a report relating to a meeting held on September 24, 1987. It was stated therein as to who attended the meeting and the speeches delivered by the speakers. The names of the defendants, however, do not find in Ex. PW 6 B. At one place, it was mentioned that K.A. Dutta addressed the meeting. Defendant No. 3 is Krishan Dutt. It was stated therein as to who attended the meeting and the speeches delivered by the speakers. The names of the defendants, however, do not find in Ex. PW 6 B. At one place, it was mentioned that K.A. Dutta addressed the meeting. Defendant No. 3 is Krishan Dutt. But even if K.A. Dutta is Krishan Dutt (defendant No. 3), it was alleged in the report that he had stated that the workers would fight for their rights. No words attributed to the defendants in para 8 of the plaint were attributed to him which were derogatory and defamatory in nature. There is no reference whatsoever to other defendants. 48. Thus, from the report Ex. PW 6 B, which is contemporaneous, it can be said that a meeting was held after 5-10 p.m. outside the factory gate on September 24, 1987, which was attended by union leaders as also leaders of Local Communist Party. The speeches delivered have been mentioned. It was stated that about nine persons participated in the said meeting, but most of them were other than defendants. It is, therefore, very difficult to come to the conclusion that the defendants or any of them participated in the said meeting effectively and made defamatory statements against the plaintiffs or any of them. Hence, in our opinion, on the basis of the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the defendants were liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs for delivering defamatory speeches or making derogatory remarks at the first meeting on September 24, 1987. 49. Regarding second meeting and publication, distribution and circulation of a pamphlet, the only fact, which could be said to have been proved was that the pamphlet in question Ex. PI was published in the press of PW-1 Smt. Ravinder Prabha. But in view of specific admission by her that she could not say as to who had come to get it published, it cannot be said to have been established that it was got published by any of the defendants. So far as defendants are concerned, they had specifically denied having published or distributed such pamphlet. They had also made grievance that a copy of Annexure Ex. PI was not annexed with the plaint and was not made available to the defendants. 50. So far as defendants are concerned, they had specifically denied having published or distributed such pamphlet. They had also made grievance that a copy of Annexure Ex. PI was not annexed with the plaint and was not made available to the defendants. 50. But even, otherwise, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have made out a case to claim damages on account of defamatory statement oral or written by the defendants or any of them. Even if it is assumed that some statements were made by the defendants at the first meeting of September 24, 1987 or a pamphlet was published, displayed and distributed at the second gate meeting dated October 6, 1987, the circumstances under which the actions were taken cannot be overlooked and ignored. 51. From the material on record, it was proved that the factory was established in 1977 with 60 per cent foreign investment. Machinery was imported from foreign market. Plaintiff No. 2 frequently used to visit foreign countries. The management was running in losses since many years. The workers were not paid minimum wages, over time allowance, bonus and other benefits. The said fact was not only narrated by defence witnesses, but even admitted by the witnesses of the plaintiffs. The defendants had to approach competent Labour Court and proceedings were culminated in their favour in an award. Even prior to proceeding on strike, a charter of demands was submitted on their behalf, but there was failure on the part of the management in paying legitimate dues to the employees. Two important defence witnesses, namely Yash Pal Sharma and Krishan Dutt have specifically stated that as a person plaintiff No. 2 was good but as an employer, he was bad. If in the light of all those grievances and surrounding circumstances, the actions of the defendants are considered, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the same were taken with a view to defame the plaintiffs. On the contrary, they were initiated by the defendants with a view to protect their rights and to safeguard the interests of workers at large. 52. Now, the Union is a registered union and that fact is admitted even by the witnesses of the plaintiffs including plaintiff No. 2, Managing Director. On the contrary, they were initiated by the defendants with a view to protect their rights and to safeguard the interests of workers at large. 52. Now, the Union is a registered union and that fact is admitted even by the witnesses of the plaintiffs including plaintiff No. 2, Managing Director. Defendant No. 1 was the President of the union, defendant No. 2 was Vice President, defendant No. 3 was Secretary of the Union, defendant No. 4 was press secretary and defendant No. 10 was Secretary of Centre of Indian Trade Unions. Other defendants were employees of plaintiff No. 1. 53. In our considered opinion, in such cases, in the larger interest of employees and trade union activities, in the light of labour laws and fundamental rights enshrined in Part-Ill of the Constitution, the actions of the defendants cannot be said to be contrary to law or otherwise unlawful. They, therefore, cannot be held to be liable to pay damages to plaintiff No. 1 company nor to plaintiff No. 2 Managing Director of plaintiff No. 1. Hence, even on merits, we are of the view that the trial Court was not right in passing the decree against the defendants. 54. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The decree passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.