Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 240 (KER)

Central Bureau of Investigation v. Antony Varghese

2000-04-13

K.A.MOHAMMED SHAFI

body2000
Judgment :- K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J. This M.C. is filed by the C.B.I. - complainant to set aside the order dated 30.6.1999 in Crl. M.P. No. 914/99 passed by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha granting anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent. 2. The petitioner has registered a case in No. RC 12(A)/99 under Ss.120B, 420, 468,471 and 511 r/w 4201.P.C. and S.13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act originally against accused Nos.1 and 2 on 23.6.1999. Subsequently during the course of investigation accused Nos. 3 and 4 were implicated by filing reports to the court on 14.9.99 and 18.9.99 respectively. By filing a report dated 23.9.99 the 5th accused, the 1st respondent herein is also implicated in the crime. The 1st respondent herein filed Crl. M.P. 914/99 before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha seeking anticipatory bail and the Sessions Court granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner by order dated 30.6.1999. Subsequently the petitioner filed Crl. M.P.1778/99 before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha under S.439(2) of the Cr. PC. on 30.11.99 to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent. The Sessions Court dismissed that application by order dated 13.12.99. Hence the petitioner has preferred the above petition before this Court. 3. The case was registered by the petitioner alleging that the accused entered into a criminal conspiracy with others to cheat the State Bank of Travancore, Aroor Branch and accordingly the 2nd accused opened a current account on 4.6.99 in the fictitious name 'Alfa Enterprises' at State Bank of Travancore, Aroor as introduced by the 5th accused and on the same day accused Nos. 2 and 5 together presented a forged cheque dated 4.6.99 for Rs. 34,11,000/- drawn by one Philomina Charitable Trust on State Bank of India, Mangalore in favour of M/s. Alfa Enterprises. The 1st accused after making necessary entries in the records of the Bank returned the cheque with the covering schedule to the 2nd accused at the instance of the 5th accused for presenting the same at the Mangalore Bank for getting it collected instead of following the usual procedure of sending the cheque and the covering schedule by post for collection. The 2nd accused took the cheque and sent a forged realisation advice by Courier to State Bank of Travancore, Aroor as if it was sent from S.B.I.., Mangalore, which was received by the S.B.T., Aroor on 11.6.99. The 2nd accused took the cheque and sent a forged realisation advice by Courier to State Bank of Travancore, Aroor as if it was sent from S.B.I.., Mangalore, which was received by the S.B.T., Aroor on 11.6.99. Immediately the proceeds were credited to the account of M/s. Alfa Enterprises and on 11.6.99 itself the amount was withdrawn by the 2nd accused in-the presence of the 5th accused and the amount v/as taken by the employees of the 5th accused. Another cheque for Rs. 63 lakhs drawn by Philomina Charitable Trust on S.B.I., Mangalore in favour of Alfa Enterprises was presented on 11.6.99 itself at S.B.T., Aroor by accused Nos. 2 and 5. The 1st accused after getting the necessary entries made in the records of the Bank, returned the cheque to the 2nd accused at the instance of the 5th accused for presenting the same at Mangalore Bank for getting it collected instead of following the usual procedure of sending by post. The 2nd accused took the cheque and other documents with him and sent a forged realisation advice by Courier to S.B.T., Aroor as if it was sent from S.B.I., Mangalore, which was received by the S.B.T., Aroor on 17.6.99. As the Manager of the S.B.T., Aroor found some irregularities in getting the realisation advice, he contacted S.B.I., Mangalore and it was revealed that there was no account in the name of Philomina Charitable Trust at S.B.I., Mangalore and therefore, the said amount of Rs. 63 lakhs was not credited to the current account of M/s. Alfa Enterprises. 4. According to the petitioner, on getting information they have registered the above crime against accused Nos.1 and 2 and subsequently during the course of investigation as the involvement of accused 3 to 5 along with some unidentified persons was revealed, accused 3 to 5 were arrayed as accused subsequently. It is further contended by the petitioner that subsequently it was revealed that the 5th accused, 1st respondent herein had moved before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha and obtained anticipatory bail in the above case, by Annexure -1 order dated 30.6.99 in Crl. M.P. 914/99. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent obtained anticipatory bail on 30.6.99 within seven days of registering the crime on 23.6.99 and the information given by the petitioner to the District Govt. M.P. 914/99. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent obtained anticipatory bail on 30.6.99 within seven days of registering the crime on 23.6.99 and the information given by the petitioner to the District Govt. Pleader and Public Prosecutor, Alappuzha was only with regard to the facts of the case as on that date. But the subsequent investigation revealed the complicity of the 1st respondent in the offence with more and more details and evidence. It is also contended by the petitioner that the investigation revealed that the 1st respondent herein introduced the 2nd accused to open the account in the name of Alfa Enterprises and M/s. Alfa Enterprises is a fictitious firm and the letter-head, rubber stamp etc. of that fictitious firm were fabricated by the employees of the 1st respondent at his instance. It is further stated that the identity of the other unidentified persons in the crime and their complicity can be ascertained only by proper interrogation of the 1st respondent who is the king-pin of the entire crime. All these facts can be brought out in evidence only after proper interrogation of the 1st respondent and so long as the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent is in force, he cannot be subjected to sustained interrogation. The petitioner has further contended that all these facts could not be placed before the Sessions Court at the time of granting anticipatory bail since the investigation was only in the preliminary stage at that time. Therefore, the petitioner contended that it is absolutely essential to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent in this case as per Annexure -1 order. 5. The 1st respondent vehemently opposed the above application by filing a counter-affidavit. He contended that apart from the allegation that he introduced the 2nd accused to the Bank for opening an account, there is absolutely nothing to connect him with the crime alleged in this case. He has also contended that apart from the fact that he has borrowed Rs. 15 lakhs by executing a promissory note in favour of the 2nd accused, he is in no way connected with the crime. According to him, the Sessions Court, Alappuzha after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case granted him anticipatory bail on certain conditions as per Annexure -1 order and Crl. 15 lakhs by executing a promissory note in favour of the 2nd accused, he is in no way connected with the crime. According to him, the Sessions Court, Alappuzha after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case granted him anticipatory bail on certain conditions as per Annexure -1 order and Crl. M.P. No. 1778/99 filed by the petitioner on 30.11.99 seeking to cancel the bail is dismissed by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha by order dated 13.12.99 after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions raised by the parties. It is also contended that after the anticipatory bail was granted the 1st respondent was interrogated by the petitioner on 17 occasions during the period from 7.7.99 to 23.2.2000 and on all occasions he appeared before the investigating officer for interrogation and therefore, there is absolutely no need for custodial interrogation of the 1st respondent. It is also submitted that the 1st respondent had made available six members of his staff to assist the investigation and he has been co-operating in the investigation all along. It is also contended that the employees of the 1st respondent were also interrogated and accused 2 to 4 were arrested and subsequently enlarged on bail. According to him, there is absolutely no need to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to him and he is prepared to appear before the investigating officer for further interrogation and abide by any further condition that may be imposed against him. 6. The only point for consideration is whether there are sufficient grounds to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha on 30.6.99. 7. The petitioner has contended that since there is a Special Court established in Ernakulam exclusively for the trial of the cases investigated by the C.B.I with jurisdiction to the entire State of Kerala, the Sessions Court, Alappuzha has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in this case. According to the counsel for the petitioner since the Special Court in Ernakulam is designated under S.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, that Special Court alone has got jurisdiction to grant bail in this case. In support of this contention the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in j. Jayalalitha v. U.O.I. (AIR 1999 SC 1912). According to the counsel for the petitioner since the Special Court in Ernakulam is designated under S.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, that Special Court alone has got jurisdiction to grant bail in this case. In support of this contention the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in j. Jayalalitha v. U.O.I. (AIR 1999 SC 1912). The above decision of the Supreme Court deals with the jurisdiction of the Special Court to try the cases investigated by the C-B-L and the competency of the Sessions Court to grant bail in cases registered by the C.B.I is not considered in that judgment. Therefore, the above decision is of no help to the petitioner. 8. In the decision in Mathew v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 942) a single judge of this Court has observed as follows: "If thus there are two courts of concurrent jurisdiction empowered to grant anticipatory bail, - the court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed, and the court within whose territory the person is sought to be arrested - conflict of decision has to be avoided and inherent limitation is thus implicit in the exercise of this jurisdiction under S.438. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court or Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed will ensure beyond the territorial limits of that court as the arrest sought to be made is with reference to that specific crime or offence and the police can pursue the offender beyond its jurisdiction to enforce the arrest." 9. In the decision in Madhusoodan v. Supdt. of Police (1992(2) KLT 83) a Division Bench of this Court has affirmed the above judgment of the single judge by observing as follows: "We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the reasoning of Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. in C.I. Mathew v. Govt. (1984KLT942)that the court with in whose jurisdiction the person apprehends arrest has power to grant the order under S.438 of the Code." 10. There is no dispute that the 1st respondent herein apprehends arrest within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, Alappuzha since he is the resident and conducting business at Aroor in Alappuzha District. Therefore, it is clear that the Sessions Court, Alappuzha has got jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent under S.438 of the Cr. There is no dispute that the 1st respondent herein apprehends arrest within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, Alappuzha since he is the resident and conducting business at Aroor in Alappuzha District. Therefore, it is clear that the Sessions Court, Alappuzha has got jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent under S.438 of the Cr. P.C. Therefore, this contention raised by the petitioner assailing the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, Alappuzha has to be rejected. 11. The contention of the petitioner that no notice is given to the petitioner in Crl. M.P. 914/99 filed by the 1st respondent before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha seeking anticipatory bail and notice was given only to the Public Prosecutor, Alappuzha, is also not sustainable. It is clear from the contention raised by the petitioner before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha and before this Court in the above M.C. that the petitioner was party in Crl. M.P. 914/99 and notice was given to the Public Prosecutor, Alappuzha for the petitioner herein, who contacted the Superintendent of C.B.I., Kochi and the Superintendent of Police had furnished information regarding the facts in the case to the Public Prosecutor, Alappuzha. Due to the mere fact that the petitioner has got their own counsel and no notice is given to that counsel specifically in the case, is not at all a consideration in this case since admittedly notice was given to the Public Prosecutor and he was instructed by the petitioner. 12. The petitioner has contended that the above crime was registered by the petitioner against accused Nos.1 and 2 on 23.6.99 and the 1st respondent herein moved the Sessions Court, Alappuzha in Crl. M.P. 914/99 immediately thereafter while the investigation was at embryonic stage and that petition was heard by the Sessions Court on 29.6.99. The necessary facts and circumstances and the materials collected against the 1st respondent during the course of investigation could not be placed before the court at that time. The petitioner has also contended that the complicity of the 1st respondent and the gravity of his involvement could be revealed only during the investigation after 30.6.99 and therefore, several materials and evidence collected against the 1st respondent could not be placed before the Sessions Court while the Sessions Court passed the order granting anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent on 30.6.99. 13. 13. A perusal of the C.D. in this case made available to me reveals that the case was originally registered against accused 1 and 2. Subsequently accused Nos. 3 and 4 were implicated by filing reports before the court on 14.9.99 and 18.9.99 respectively and the 5th accused, the 1st respondent herein was implicated in the case only on 23.9.99 by filing a report before the court. It is clear from the C.D. that on 29.6.99 when the learned Sessions Judge heard the application filed by the 1st respondent seeking anticipatory bail, the relevant evidence materials available now against the 1st respondent were not available with the petitioner since those materials were collected only during the course of investigation subsequent to 30.6.99, the date of the order passed by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha granting anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent. 14. The counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the petitioner was aware of the allegation made against the 1st respondent regarding his involvement in the crime even at the time the F.I.R. was registered since the Manager of the State Bank of Travancore, Aroor Branch had made written complaint before the petitioner with all details and the petitioner without registering crime on the basis of the complaint, has chosen to register the F.I.R. in this case against two accused persons initially and it is only long thereafter the 1st respondent is implicated in this case. He has also submitted that even though anticipatory bail was granted by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha to the 1st respondent on 30.6.99 and the 1st respondent was arrayed as accused in this case 23.9.99, the petitioner filed Crl. M.P.1778/99 before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha seeking to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent only on 30.11.99. Therefore, the long and undue delay in filing the petition to cancel the anticipatory bail itself establishes that there is no sufficient ground to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent in this case. M.P.1778/99 before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha seeking to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent only on 30.11.99. Therefore, the long and undue delay in filing the petition to cancel the anticipatory bail itself establishes that there is no sufficient ground to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent in this case. But the petitioner has contended that it is only after implicating the 1st respondent in this case and collecting sufficient evidence materials against him, the petitioner could realise the gravity of the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent and its adverse effect on the investigation in this case and .immediately on realisation pf the very serious impact and adverse effect on the investigation, the petitioner moved the Sessions Court to cancel the anticipatory bail on 30.11.1999 and therefore, the delay in filing the application to cancel the anticipatory bail in this case is not at all material and the Sessions Court, Alappuzha is not at all justified in finding the delay in preferring the petition to cancel the anticipatory bail as a ground to dismiss the application. 15. On going through the C.D. in this case I find the explanation offered by the petitioner regarding the delay in filing the application to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent, is justified. Therefore, the delay in filing the application to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent in this case cannot be a ground to dismiss the application. 16. The petitioner has contended that the 1st respondent has played a major role in the offence involved in this case. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent introduced the 2nd accused to open the current account in the State Bank of Travancore, Aroor in the name of M/s. Alfa Enterprises, which is a fictitious firm, that at the instance of the 1st respondent his employees had fabricated the letter-heads, rubber stamp etc. for that fictitious firm and that some other unidentified persons are also involved in this case. Therefore, according to the petitioner, in order to identify those persons and to ascertain their complicity with the crime proper interrogation of the 1st respondent is absolutely essential and it will not be possible to subject the 1st respondent to sustained interrogation while on bail. Therefore, for a proper and detailed interrogation of the 1st respondent, he should be interrogated in custody. 17. Therefore, for a proper and detailed interrogation of the 1st respondent, he should be interrogated in custody. 17. But the 1st respondent has contended that after he obtained anticipatory bail, he has been co-operating with the investigation in this case and he has allotted large number of his employees to assist the petitioner in the investigation and apart from questioning the 1st respondent 17 times during the period from 7.7.99 to 23.2.2000, the petitioner has questioned the employees of the 1st respondent and even conducted search of his premises. According to him, on no occasion he failed to appear before the investigating officer for interrogation when he was summoned and he is prepared to appear before the investigating officer at any time, if called for interrogation. Therefore, he contended that there is absolutely no necessity to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to him and to take him into custody for interrogation in this case. 18. In the decision in Chellappan v. State of Kerala (1987(1) K.L.T. 435) a single judge of this Court has observed as follows: "5. In Superintendent of Police v. Vijayaraghavan & Others (1984 KLT 47) this Court followed Sanjay Gandhi's case and pointed out that ordinarily the High Court will not exercise its discretion to interfere with the bail granted by Sessions Judge in favour of the accused and where cancellation of bail is sought in an application, the prosecution has to prove its allegation by preponderance of probabilities. This court also observed that cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if by reason of supervening circumstance it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial." 19. In the decision in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1993 SC 1) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Once the order of release is by fiction of law an order passed under S.437(1) or (2) of 439(1) it follows as a natural consequence that the said order can be cancelled under sub-s.(5) of S.437 or sub-s.(2)of S.439 on considerations relevant for cancellation of an order the reunder. As stated in Reghubir Singh's case (AIR 1987 SC 149) the grounds for cancellation under Ss.437(5) and 439(2) are identical, namely, bail granted under S.437(1) or (2) or 439(1) can be cancelled where (i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, (ii) interferes with the course of investigation (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It must also be remembered that rejection of bail stands on one footing but cancellation of bail is a harsh order because it interferes with the liberty of the individual and hence it must not be lightly resorted to." In the same judgment it is further observed as follows: "For cancellation of the bail after filing of the charge-sheet the factum of dismissal of the bail on the earlier occasion is not relevant. But during investigation some strong prima facie evidence and gravity and magnitude of the crime or the manner in which the crime was committed and other attending circumstances may be relevant as prima facie grounds to have a fresh look to cancel the bail. The grounds for cancellation of the bail in Chapter XXXIII are, dehors the merits in the matter, namely, necessity due to the conduct of the accused and abuse of liberty i.e. obstruction of the smooth investigation or suborning witnesses or attempting to tamper the evidence, threatening the witnesses with dire consequences or making or attempting to remove himself beyond the reach of the Court to hamper the smooth trial, etc. are independent of the merits in the matter." 20. are independent of the merits in the matter." 20. In the decision in Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1987 SC 737) the Supreme Court though did not cancel the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court to the accused as the matter had become in fructuous in a case of unnatural death of daughter-in-law in her father-in-law's house, observed as follows: "We are of the opinion that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to release the accused on anticipatory bail in disregard of the magnitude and seriousness of the matter." 21. In the decision in Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria (AIR 1998 SC 696) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: 11. We have no doubt that the Division Bench of the High Court has gone ostensibly wrong in passing the impugned order. When we perused the files concerning the allegations against the respondent (which the Directorate had made available to us) we strongly feel that any further loss of time would further impair the effectiveness of the inquiry and/or investigation into those allegations. Considering the nature/ seriousness of the allegations as well as largness of the amount involved we have no doubt that the order granted by the City Sessions Judge should not remain alive. We are, therefore, constrained to stretch the arms of the residual powers of this court to deal with the said order also." 22. In the decision in K.K. Jerath v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (AIR 1998 SC 1934) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "We may only state in considering a petition for grant of bail necessarily if public interest requires detention of citizen in custody for purpose of investigation could be considered and rejected as otherwise there could be hurdles in the investigation even resulting in tampering of evidence. This very aspect has been borne in mind by the High court. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we do not think there is any good reason to interfere with the order made by the High Court in refusing bail at this stage of the proceedings." In the above case special leave application filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the High Court dismissing the application for grant of bail, though interim bail was granted earlier on the same petition, is dismissed by the Supreme Court. 23. 23. It is clear from the ratio in the above decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court that in appropriate cases bail and anticipatory bail can be refused to the accused and bail once granted can be cancelled subsequently, if facts and circumstances of the case warranted cancellation of bail in the interests of the effective administration of justice. It is clear from a perusal of the C.D. in this case made available to me that when the 1st respondent moved for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha the investigation in this case was at the preliminary stage and only subsequently the incriminating materials against the 1st respondent were collected and he was arrayed as 5th accused in this case by filing report dated 23.9.1999. But it is true that the petitioner did not think it necessary to move for cancellation of anticipatory bail immediately on implication of the 1st respondent in this case and Crl. M.P. No. 1778/99 was filed by the Petitioner before the Sessions Court, Alappuzha only on 30.11.99. Considering the nature and circumstances of the case, the manner in which cheating and attempt to cheat is committed in this case and also the fact that the entire amount of Rs. 34,11,000/- of the first cheque presented before the S.B.T., Aroor is received by the employees of the 1st respondent and also the further facts unearthed during the course of investigation as revealed from the CD. in this case, the contention of the petitioner that the 1st respondent is the prima accused and kingpin in this case, is of much force. The contention of the 1st respondent that he has paid back the amount received by him to the Bank and the fact that the 1st respondent has obtained the amount by executing a pro-note in favour of the 2nd accused, are very important circumstances which go against the conspiracy alleged against the 1st respondent, is not tenable. 24. The mere refund of the amount received by the 1st respondent from the Bank after the commission of offence of cheating will not absolve the accused from his liability for cheating. 24. The mere refund of the amount received by the 1st respondent from the Bank after the commission of offence of cheating will not absolve the accused from his liability for cheating. Likewise the fact that a pro-note executed by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd accused is seized by the police on search of the house of 2nd accused also will not absolve the liability of the 1st respondent, if in fact he is involved in the conspiracy and cheating or attempt to cheat alleged in this case. 25. It is true that the considerations for denial or rejection of bail at the early stage of the investigation and cancellation of bail already granted to the accused are entirely different. In order to cancel the bail already granted, there should be grave supervening circumstances not conducive for a fair and proper investigation and trial in the case, if the accused is permitted to enjoy the freedom and privilege granted to him by the bail or anticipatory bail granted to him. 26. Considering the nature and gravity of the allegations made against the 1st respondent with regard to the conspiracy and its perpetration by cheating the bank and the gravity of the offence and its repercussions in the society, the facts that the 1st respondent was questioned by the petitioner several times after he was granted anticipatory bail and he has co-operated with the investigation in this case, are not at all sufficient to permit the 1st respondent to enjoy the order granting anticipatory bail, while considering the various factors brought out during the course of investigation against him, as seen from the case diary in this case. From a careful and anxious consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials available on record, it is clear that continuance of anticipatory bail granted to the petitioner will certainly cause hurdles in the investigation and even tampering with the evidence. 27. The contention of the 1st respondent that for the offence committed by the 1st accused who is not arrested so far, the investigating agency is attempting to make the 1st respondent liable after long lapse of five months of the registration of the case and grant of anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent cannot be considered at this stage. 27. The contention of the 1st respondent that for the offence committed by the 1st accused who is not arrested so far, the investigating agency is attempting to make the 1st respondent liable after long lapse of five months of the registration of the case and grant of anticipatory bail to the 1st respondent cannot be considered at this stage. The fact that the 1st accused is involved in this case and the investigating agency has not arrested him so far or does not consider it necessary to arrest him even though grave offence is alleged against him, is of no help to the 1st respondent, considering the allegations made against him in this case. 28. Under the circumstances and on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that even though anticipatory bail was granted to the 1st respondent on 30.6.1999 and there is in fact, delay in filing the application to cancel the anticipatory bail, this is an appropriate case wherein the anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent should be cancelled since the continuance of anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent will cause grave prejudice and hurdles to the proper investigation in this case. Hence this Crl. M.C. is allowed and anticipatory bail granted to the 1st respondent is cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the investigating officer forthwith.