Judgment :- 1. Tenant in R.C.O.P. 132 of 1991 on the file of XVI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras is the revision Petitioner in both the petitions. 2. Landlady filed eviction petition under Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the following allegations: Scheduled premises is northern portion in first floor of the house, ground and premises bearing No. 85, Perambur Barracks Road, Vepery, Madras. Petitioner herein is the tenant of that portion of the building on a monthly rent of Rs. 604/-. According to landlady, she is living in the nothern portion in the ground floor of the premises. Landlady has got two daughters who are married. Husband of elder daughter Dil Shah Begum is doing business at Periamet, Madras. On her request, southern portion of first floor was allowed to be occupied by her and she is in possession of that portion. Husband of the other daughter, Shahnaz Anwar is employed as Development Officer at Hindustan Teleprinters, Guindy, Madras, and they are living in a rented building. Rented premises is very inconvenient for their occupation and they want scheduled premises for their occupation. Scheduled premises consist of four rooms and a hall and the same will be convenient for petitioner/landlady and members of her family consisting of six members. Since petitioner is living on the northern portion of ground floor consisting of two rooms and varandah, she cannot accommodate her daughter in that portion due to lack of space. Petitioner has got other married daughters and they also often visit petitioner. Petitioners son Shahul Hameed is also to be married in the near future. Under these circumstances, landlady seeks eviction of tenant for her additional accommodation., 3. Claim for additional accommodation was seriously opposed by petitioner herein. According to him, the claim is without any bona fides. It is also alleged that landlady was not satisfied with the rent paid and she moved an application for fixation of fair rent and that is how rent was enhanced to Rs. 604/-. It is further averred that the middle portion of ground floor which is always residential portion was in the occupation of landlady, about two years back. The middle portion is fairly a big portion. The same has been let out for non-residential purpose to an Agency of soft drinks receiving huge amount of advance and they are also paying handsome rent. The middle portion is fairly a big portion. The same has been let out for non-residential purpose to an Agency of soft drinks receiving huge amount of advance and they are also paying handsome rent. Conduct of landlady is also questioned by the tenant. I do not want to further extract the counter statement except to state that tenant all along challenged that the claim is not bona fide and landlady did not require scheduled premises for additional accommodation. 4. As per order dated 23.9.1993, Rent Controller ordered eviction holding that the claim of landlady is bona fide. For the said purpose, Rent Controller relied on the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 and Exs.P1 to P9. It could be seen from the progress diary that these witnesses were not cross-examined and learned counsel for tenant also did not make any attempt to cross-examine those witnesses. It could also be seen that sufficient opportunity was given to tenant to cross-examine the witnesses and the same was not availed by tenant. On the materials placed before Rent Controller, it held that the claim is bona fide and tenant was directed to hand over possession of the scheduled premises within a period of one month. 5. The matter was taken in appeal in R.C.A. 1210 of 1993 on the file of Appellate Authority. Before Appellate Authority, an application was filed in M.P. 741 of 1996 seeking permission to cross-examine the witnesses. Appellate Authority confirmed the finding of Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. Appellate Authority further held that there is no necessity to remand the matter since sufficient opportunity was given to tenant to cross-examine the witnesses and he did not avail that opportunity. Even though tenant alleged that he was in hospital and could not be present when the case was taken up for trial, Appellate Authority did not believe the case of tenant and rejected M.P. 741 of 1996. Against the rejection of M.P. 741 of 1996, C.R.P. 3230 of 1996 is preferred and against the dismissal of eviction petition, C.R.P. 3229 of 1996 is preferred. 6. I heard the learned counsel on both sides. Both the authorities below held that the claim of landlady is bona fide and the space occupied by her is not sufficient to satisfy her requirements. Evidence of PWs. 6. I heard the learned counsel on both sides. Both the authorities below held that the claim of landlady is bona fide and the space occupied by her is not sufficient to satisfy her requirements. Evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 were believed by Rent Controller and on reappreciation by Appellate Authority, he did not find any reason to deviate from that reasonings. 7. Even though revision petitioner contended that he was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to invalidate the documentary evidence, I do not think that I am justified in setting aside the Judgment only for that reason. From the progress diary, it is clear that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and he did not avail the same. When authorities below have taken a view that the attempt of petitioner is only to drag on the proceedings and when that finding is based on materials, I do not think that I will be justified in interfering in that finding in these revisions. But that by itself is not going to conclude the matter. 8. I have already said that the application of landlady is for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. Law is well settled that for eviction of a tenant, where Rent Control Act applies, unless Court satisfies that there are grounds of eviction and only when all the statutory conditions are satisfied, order of eviction could be passed. 9. Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, a subjective proviso which says that in the case of an application under clause (c), Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. Even if the tenant is ex parte , authorities below are bound to enter a finding regarding relative hardships. Unfortunately, Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority have not entered any finding on relative hardships. 10. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (1999) 6 S.C.C. 604 (Davis v. Sebastian), a case coming under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, their Lordships considered a similar provision under that Act. Unfortunately, Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority have not entered any finding on relative hardships. 10. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (1999) 6 S.C.C. 604 (Davis v. Sebastian), a case coming under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, their Lordships considered a similar provision under that Act. In that case, though Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority entered a finding against tenant even in respect of relative hardships, when the matter was taken up before the Honourable High Court, there was no finding regarding relative hardships. In paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Judgment, their Lordships held that since High Court has not given a finding on relative hardships, order is liable to be set aside and the matter was remitted back. Relevant portions of the Judgment read thus, “16. Now, the germane aspect which remains to be adverted to is the requirement of the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11, namely comparitive hardship to the tenant. The learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority held against the Appellant on this aspect. The High Court did not consider this aspect in the view it had taken of Section 11(8) of the Act. 17. For all the above reasons, we arc of the opinion that even after holding that bona fide requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation for personal use is established, the relief under sub-section (8) of Section 11 cannot be granted to him without recording a finding under the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act in favour of the landlord. Since, the High Court did not consider this aspect, we are of the opinion that the matter has to go back to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light of this judgment. The judgment and order of the Division Bench under appeal is, therefore, set aside and the case is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law”. 11. In (1991) supp (2) S.C.C. 675 (Kishanlal Laxminarayan Karava v. Shalinibai) also their Lordships held that before passing order of eviction, the question as to relative hardship will have to be considered and only on the basis of that finding any final order could be passed on the eviction petition. 12. 11. In (1991) supp (2) S.C.C. 675 (Kishanlal Laxminarayan Karava v. Shalinibai) also their Lordships held that before passing order of eviction, the question as to relative hardship will have to be considered and only on the basis of that finding any final order could be passed on the eviction petition. 12. In 1974 (II) M.L.J. 256 = 87 L.W. 609 (Loganatha Naicker v. Balasundaram Mudaliar) Justice Ramaprasada Rao (as he then was) in para 3 of the Judgment held thus, “. . . . The crucial aspect, therefore, which according to me could be characterised as a special incident in matters arising under Section 10(3)(c), is that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The special prescription is not to be considered as otiose or as an irrelevant appendage in the statute. It has been specially provided for so as to avoid unnecessary hard ship to the tenant, as in the case under consideration, the landlord is only seeking additional accommodation in the same premises, whether for residential or non-residential purposes. Therefore, it becomes absolutely imperative for the authorities, in cases arising under Section (3)(c) of the Act, to give a specific finding whether the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as the statute contemplates in regard to the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c).” (emphasis supplied). 13. A similar view was taken by Justice Mishra (as he then was) in the decision reported in 1993 (1) L.W. 331 (Nagavairavasundaram v. S. Bageerathan & another), in a case of similar provision under Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 14. In view of the settled legal position, I am constrained to set aside the order of the eviction passed by the authorities below. 15. For the above reasons, I confirm the finding of authorities below that the building is bona fide required by landlady as additional accommodation. The question as to relative hardship will have to be decided and for the said purpose, the matter is remitted back to Appellate Authority. Parties will be given reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence on this question alone, i.e., comparative hardship. The question as to relative hardship will have to be decided and for the said purpose, the matter is remitted back to Appellate Authority. Parties will be given reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence on this question alone, i.e., comparative hardship. Being an old case, Appellate Authority is directed to dispose of the matter and enter a finding on this issue alone, on or before Court closes for Summer Vacation 2000. The question as to whether lanndlady is entitled to get eviction will depend on the finding of comparative hardship and final orders will be passed by Appellate Authority within the time granted. 16. The revision petitions are disposed of as above. No costs. The parties will appear before the Appellate Authority on 7.4.2000.