S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the ex-police constable in the service of the Railway protection Force. In this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the validity of the proceedings of the first Respondent No. E/ xp. 227/153/91/94 (D. O. 66 of 1992) dated 1-4-1992, removing the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure, and also the order of the second respondent (Force order No. 25 of 1998) dated 20-2-1998 affirming the above order of the first respondent. ( 2 ) THE background facts of the case be stated briefly as under: The petitioner while serving as Police Constable in the railway Protection Force was served with charge-sheet dated 24-9-1991 under rule 153 of the Railway Protection Force rules, 1987 (for short the Rules ) and the same was received by the petitioner on 29-9-1991. The charge-sheet reads as under: criminal case to his superior officers as required under Rule 247. " ( 3 ) THE first respondent who is the disicplianry authority under the Rules appointed one Sri S. F. Basha, IPF/ryp WS as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer fixed the enquiry on 28-10-1991. The petitioner did not appear before the Enquiry officer on 28-10-1991. The enquiry was adjourned to 4-11-1991. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was arrested on 29-10-1991 in criminal No. 38 of 1991 dated 14-6-1991 registered under Sections 147, 148, 302 IPC at the Rural Police Station, Markapur, prakasam District. The Enquiry Officer adjourned the enquiry on 4-11-1991 to 16-11-1991. Since the petitioner was in judicial custody on 4-11-1991 and 16-11-1991, he could not attend the enquiry on those two days. In those circumstances, the first respondent passed the Proceeding no. E/xp. 227/153/91/94 dated 1-4-1992 dispensing with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner and passed the final order removing the petitioner from service with immediate effect as a disciplinary measure. By the same proceeding dated 1-4-1992, the first respondent directed that the absence period of the petitioner "from 26-6-1991 to 15-9-1991 and suspension/absence period from 16-9-1991 to the date of issue of the order is treated as leave without pay". ( 4 ) THE petitioner was tried in SC no. By the same proceeding dated 1-4-1992, the first respondent directed that the absence period of the petitioner "from 26-6-1991 to 15-9-1991 and suspension/absence period from 16-9-1991 to the date of issue of the order is treated as leave without pay". ( 4 ) THE petitioner was tried in SC no. 209 of 1993 on the file of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur for alleged commission of offences under sections 147, 148 and 302 of Indian Penal code and the learned Additional Sessions judge by his judgment and order dated 23-5-1997 acquitted the petitioner honourably from the charge. The State did not prefer any appeal against the acquittal order. In other words, the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in sc No. 209 of 1993 dated 23-5-1997 has become final. Thereafterwards, the petitioner submitted a petition styled as mercy petition on 30-6-1997 to the second respondent requesting the latter to set aside the order made by the first respondent-disciplinary authority and to reinstate him into service. The said mercy petition of the petitioner was treated as a revision petition by the second respondent and the same was rejected by the proceedings of the second respondent E/p. 227/mercy petition/ 997-24 dated 20-2-1998. Hence, this writ petition assailing the validity of the proceedings of the first Respondent No. E/ xp. 227/153/91/94 (D. O. No. 66 of 1992) dated 1-4-1992 and the proceedings of the second respondent (Force Order No. 25 of 1998) dated 20-2-1998. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned proceedings would contend that there was absolutely no justification for the first respondent- disciplinary authority to dispense with the departmental enquiry. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would also contend that the first respondent-disciplinary authority having regularised the absence of the petitioner from 26-6-1991 to 15-9-1991 and suspension/absence from 16-9-1991 to 1-4-1992 as leave without pay ought not to have treated the absence of the petitioner during the said period from 26-6-1991 to 15-9-1991 as unauthorised absence and ought not to have inflicted the penalty treating it as a misconduct. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned standing Counsel for the respondent authorities would contend that the petitioner was at liberty on 28-10-1991 the day on which the enquiry was fixed by the Enquiry officer and the petitioner for no good reasons absented himself. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned standing Counsel for the respondent authorities would contend that the petitioner was at liberty on 28-10-1991 the day on which the enquiry was fixed by the Enquiry officer and the petitioner for no good reasons absented himself. Further, though the enquiry Officer adjourned the enquiry proceedings from 28-11-1991 to 4-11-1991 and again from 4-11-1991 to 16-11-1991, the petitioner could not be present because of his detention. Under those circumstances the first respondent was justified in invoking the power granted to him in clause (ii) or rule 161 of the Rules. ( 7 ) SHOULD it be noted at the threshold that the normal procedure for removal of an employee in the Railway Protection Force is that before any order of removal from service can be passed, the employee concerned must be given notice and enquiry must be held on charges supplied to the employee concerned it terms of Conduct and CCA Regulations. However, Rule 161 contemplates a special procedure in certain cases envisaged therein. Rule 161 of railway Protection Force Rules reads as under:"notwithstanding anything contained anywhere in these Rules (i) where any punishment is imposed on an enrolled member of the Force on the-ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the authority competent to impose the punishment is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry in the manner provided in these Rules; (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest of security of State and the maintenance of integrity in the force, it is not expedient to hold any inquiry in the manner provided in these Rules; the authority competent to impose the punishment may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit". ( 8 ) IT is admitted position that the first respondent dispensed with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner by virtue of the power granted to him under clause (ii) of Rule 161. ( 8 ) IT is admitted position that the first respondent dispensed with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner by virtue of the power granted to him under clause (ii) of Rule 161. By virtue of this power the first respondent (the Competent Authority) is competent to impose punishment without holding a regular departmental enquiry envisaged under the rules if he is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded by him in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in the Rules. No doubt, in the instant case, in the impugned order dated 1-4-1992 the first respondent has recorded his satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided under the Rules. The first respondent has also stated the reasons for arriving at the above satisfaction. The two reasons on the basis of which the first respondent has recorded his satisfaction are the following: 1. The last message received from IPF/ gnt on 20-3-1992 revealed that the petitioner/delinquent is still under judicial remand; the DAR case is already delayed on account of this and it is not known as to how long he would contained to be in the jail. 2. The petitioner is involved in serious criminal case and, therefore, his services are not desirable in the interest of Railway administration. ( 9 ) IN the premise of the two reasons recorded by the first respondent in the impugned order, the question whether it could be said that the first respondent was justified in exercising the discretionary power granted to him under clause (ii) of rule 161 of the Rules arises for consideration. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in Jaswant singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385 , dealt with the nature of the satisfaction to be recorded by the disciplinary authority while dispensing with the departmental enquiry against an employee governed by article 311 (2) proviso. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in Jaswant singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385 , dealt with the nature of the satisfaction to be recorded by the disciplinary authority while dispensing with the departmental enquiry against an employee governed by article 311 (2) proviso. The Supreme Court handed down the opinion that the decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority and when the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. Undoubtedly, the power granted to the first respondent to dispense with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner under clause (ii) of Rule 161 has to be grounded on subjective satisfaction, but at the same time, that subjective satisfaction, in turn, should be based on objective facts and considerations, and it cannot be rested on fanciful or farcical or extraneous considerations or materials. ( 11 ) WHAT is required under Rule 16 (ii) is that the disciplinary authority must satisfy himself about the practicability or otherwise of holding an enquiry. It is trite to take that the concept practicability is different from " expediency referred to in clause (iii) of Rule 161 of the Rules. A careful reading of the proviso to Article 311 (2) also shows that distinction between practicability and expediency has to be maintained. in taking this view, I am fortified by the judgment of the Division bench of the Kerala High Court in Union of india v. Subrahmanian, 1985 (1) SLR 238. The two grounds stated by the first respondent-disciplinary authority, in my considered opinion, are not germane to the decision-making under clause (ii) of rule 161 of the Rules. It is not that by the time the impugned order was made by the disciplinary authority on 1-4-1992 enormous time factor had intervened and that the first respondent had a reasonable ground to think that the petitioner would not be available for holding departmental enquiry against him in the proximate future. As pointed out supra, the petitioner was arrested only on 29-10-1991 whereas the disciplinary authority passed the order, removing the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure, on 1-4-1992. As pointed out supra, the petitioner was arrested only on 29-10-1991 whereas the disciplinary authority passed the order, removing the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure, on 1-4-1992. The second reason stated in the impugned order of the first respondent that the services of the petitioner are not desirable in the interest of railway Administration, in my considered opinion, is also totally irrelevant for decision- making under clause (ii) of Rule 161. Therefore, I hold that the impugned action of the first respondent in dispensing with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner is totally unjustified and illegal and violative of clause (ii) of Rule 161 of the Rules. ( 12 ) THE impugned order is also vitiated on account of another serious flaw. By the impugned order, the first respondent has regularised the absence of the petitioner from 26-6-1991 to 15-9-1991 and again from 16-9-1991 to 1-4-1992 and treated his absence as leave without pay . If that is the admitted fact-situation, the situation is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh, 1998 (8) Supreme 128 . the ratio in the above pronouncement of the supreme Court is that if the employer- disciplinary authority regularises the alleged unauthorised absence of an employee as leave without pay, the charge of unauthorised absence from duty does not survive. In that case, the respondent who was a police constable in Punjab was dismissed from service after regular departmental enquiry on the charge of unauthorised absence from duty. This order was challenged by the respondent in a suit in the civil Court and the same was decreed and the order of dismissal was set aside as it was found by the trial Court that the defendants having themselves regularised and treated the period of respondent s absence from duty as the period of leave without pay could not legally say he was guilty of misconduct for unauthorised absence from duty. This view taken by the trial Court is affirmed to be right view by the Supreme Court as could be seen from its observations in paragraph 4 of the judgment. The resultant position is that the charge of unauthorised absence between 26-6-1991 and 15-9-1991 does not survive in view of the fact that the petitioner s absence during the said period was regularised by the first respondent himself as leave without pay . The resultant position is that the charge of unauthorised absence between 26-6-1991 and 15-9-1991 does not survive in view of the fact that the petitioner s absence during the said period was regularised by the first respondent himself as leave without pay . The second respondent-revisional authority has too committed the same mistake in passing the impugned order dated 20-2-1998. ( 13 ) IN the result, writ petition is allowed and the impugned proceedings are quashed. A direction shall issue to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith with all benefits, pecuniary or otherwise, available to him from the date of his dismissal, and to pay pecuniary benefits to the petitioner within a period of four months from today. However, this order shall not come in the way of the respondents, if they are so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with the second, charge relating to the failure of the petitioner to intimate his involvement in the criminal case i. e. , Crime no. 38 of 1991 dated 14-6-1991 under sections 147, 148, 302 IPC of Rural Police station, Markapur, Prakasam District. The parties shall bear their own cost in this writ petition.