JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 23rd April, 1996 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Beed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 311/1985 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 7th October, 1985 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ashti in Regular Civil Suit No. 23/1976, the appellant/original plaintiff challenges the same by way of this Second Appeal, before this Court. 2. The facts leading to the present Appeal, in short, can be narrated as under :--- The appellant/original plaintiff, in the above-mentioned civil suit, stated that she happened to be the owner of the suit property in pursuance of the Will executed by Krishnabai in her favour. Krishnabai herself had initiated the present suit on 20th March, 1976 praying that she be declared the owner of the property in question, to which a reference is made in paragraph 1 of the plaint as also in the prayer clause. She has further sought for declaration that the alienation of the property whatsoever was made by the defendants be declared to be not binding on her. It would be necessary to mention at this stage itself that during the pendency of the above-said civil suit, Krishnabai expired and hence the name of Subhalaxmi, the present appellant/plaintiff who claims the property through the Will executed by Krishnabai, was substituted. 3. To understand the facts of the case, it would be necessary to make a reference to the relations inter se of the parties. Shubhalaxmi happened to be the daughter-in-law of the real brother of Krishnabai. One Jagannathrao was the husband of Krishnabai. Ganeshrao was the brother of Jagannathrao. There is no dispute that both these brothers expired long back. Jagannathrao and Krishnabai, had no issue. Ganeshrao also died issueless. The suit lands and other lands to which a reference is made in the suit, situated at village Deolali, happened to be the joint family property of Jagannathrao and Ganeshrao and their father. It is not disputed that Jagannathrao expired some time in the year 1900 and Ganeshrao expired some time in the year 1920. The suit property as mentioned above, happened to be the joint family property. After the death of Jagannathrao naturally, the property was enjoyed jointly by Ganeshrao and Ganeshrao's sister-in-law i.e. Krishnabai. However after the death of Ganeshrao, the wife of Ganeshrao, adopted Ramdas as her son. 4. The suit property as mentioned above, happened to be the joint family property. After the death of Jagannathrao naturally, the property was enjoyed jointly by Ganeshrao and Ganeshrao's sister-in-law i.e. Krishnabai. However after the death of Ganeshrao, the wife of Ganeshrao, adopted Ramdas as her son. 4. Regular Civil Suit No. 53/1/1333 fasli (approximately in the year 1924) was filed by Ramdas against his aunt Krishnabai for declaration about his adoption as also for possession of the lands. However, the said suit was decreed and the matter had gone in appeal before the District Court at the instance of Krishnabai. However, there also the judgment of the Court below was maintained. That Appeal number was 987/4/1334 fasli (i.e. approximately in the year 1925). However the judgment of the trial Court was maintained in that Appeal at Beed and hence the Second Appeal was carried before the Appellate Court, to which a reference is made as Adalat Subah, Aurangabad which was registered as Appeal No. 22/3/1334 fasli (i.e. approximately in the year 1925 again). However in this appeal, the parties had arrived at a compromise. The compromise Deed before the Court is dated 26th December, 1926 A.D. In accordance with this compromise, the parties had agreed that the suit lands mentioned therein, to which a reference is made in the plaint, was to remain in possession of Krishnabai towards her maintenance till her life time; whereafter the respondent-Ramdas was to become the owner of that property. A decree came to be passed in pursuance of this compromise on 26-12-1926 in the appeal. It is clear from the terms of the compromise that the lands were to remain in possession of Krishnabai in pursuance of her right to get maintained from the property. Krishnabai expired on 20-4-1976 (It appears that the date has been wrongly shown as 10-6-1976 in the judgment of the trial Court). This clearly means that in the year 1956, Krishnabai was very much in possession of the suit property having the said alleged limited interest of maintenance. However, in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, according to her, she became an absolute owner of the suit property on the basis of which she claimed a declaration accordingly and further that whatsoever the alienation was made by Ramdas out of the property referred to above, was in no way binding on her. This relief was required to be sought because certain lands were in cultivation of different persons as tenants from Ramdas and in spite of Krishnabai having become an absolute owner, defendant-Ramdas had executed the sale deed of certain portions of the property to some persons of Kharakwadi. She further alleged that defendant Ramdas had even admitted obstruction on 1-3-1976 in the possession of Krishnabai. This is what promoted and compelled her to initiate the present suit. 5. On 13th September, 1973, Krishnabai had executed a Will in favour of Shubalaxmi, i.e. the wife of her nephew. Application made at the instance of Shubhalaxmi for substituting her name in place of Krishnabai was allowed. However it was subject to the Will-deed having been proved and valid in her favour. 6. The above-said civil suit filed by Krishnabai i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 23/70 was contested by the original defendant by filing his written statement. The suit was resisted on all counts. However, so far as regards the relationship between the parties was concerned, it was not disputed. Surprisingly it was denied by the defendant that Krishnabai was the legal heir of Jagannathrao. According to the defendant after the death of Jagannathrao all the property devolved on Ganeshrao i.e. the brother of Jagannathrao and after the death of Ganeshrao, wife of Ganeshrao i.e. Ambikabai, enjoyed the property as a limited owner as heir of Ganeshrao. This is that Ambikabai who adopted Ramdas as her son after the death of Ganeshrao. 7. According to the defendant since after the death of Ganeshrao, Ambikabai had a limited interest, the defendant Ramdas, according to him, had become the full owner of the property and, therefore, he filed a suit for declaration and possession in which ultimately at the stage of Second Appeal, a compromise was entered into, to which a reference is already made above. 8. In the present suit, however, it is the defence taken by Ramdas, the original defendant, that by no stretch of imagination, Krishnabai could acquire ownership in respect of the properties to which a reference is made in the Compromise-Decree between the parties. He, therefore, specifically argued that the case of Krishnabai could not be said to have been covered by sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He, therefore, specifically argued that the case of Krishnabai could not be said to have been covered by sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to him, the case at the most could be said to have been covered by sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act and hence, according to the defendant. Krishnabai had no authority whatsoever to bequeath the property by Will in favour of Shubhalaxmi. He further argued that the persons who were cultivating certain portion of the land as tenants, but were the tenants of Ramdas, the defendant and he, therefore, stated that the tenants were necessary parties to the suit. So far as regards the transaction of Sale of Survey No. 61/AA/2 was concerned, Ramdas admitted the same to have been so executed. On the basis of the above-said pleadings of the parties, necessary evidence is led by them in support of their cases and after having heard the parties and after having appreciated the evidence, the learned Judge of the trial Court reached to the conclusion that the original plaintiff-Krishnabai was entitled for declaration sought for as regards her ownership in respect of the suit properties and naturally Shubhalaxmi was entitled for the declaration as an owner in pursuance of the Will, however subject to the production of a probate of that Will. This judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ashti is dated 7th October, 1985. 9. Having been disappointed by the judgment of the learned Judge of the trial Court, the original defendant Ramdas filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 311/1985 before the lower Appellate Court and the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Beed who dealt with the appeal, by his judgment and decree dated April 23rd, 1996, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit on all counts. This judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court is under challenge in this Second Appeal, at the instance of the original plaintiff. 10. This Second Appeal is heard at length. Shri S.C. Deshmukh with Shri R.M. Borde, Counsel is heard for the appellant and Shri M.D. Joshi with Shri V.S. Bedre, is heard for the respondents. 11. 10. This Second Appeal is heard at length. Shri S.C. Deshmukh with Shri R.M. Borde, Counsel is heard for the appellant and Shri M.D. Joshi with Shri V.S. Bedre, is heard for the respondents. 11. Before adverting to the arguments of the learned Advocates, this Court feel it appropriate to mention that the learned Judge of the trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, in his well-reasoned order, reached to the conclusion that the case of original plaintiff-Krishnabai was governed by the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and that she had become the absolute owner on the day coming into force of section 14 of the said Act. She, therefore, had definitely become the full owner in every respect and could have bequeathed the property, as is done in the instant matter by Will dated 13-9-1973. Reversing this finding, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court observed that as per Clause (3) of the compromise to which a reference is made above, Krishnabai was to have a limited interest in the property as she was actually given possession of the lands mentioned in the compromise strictly for her maintenance only. However, according to the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, she had no right to sale or mortgage the lands or mango tress etc., which were standing on the suit properties. According to the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, after the death of Kirshnabai, the property was to be owned as a full owner by Ramdas, the original defendant, and was entitled for possession. As per one of the terms in the compromise, if the compromise was not given an effect to or if it was not so acted upon, the parties were given liberty to get the same executed through the Court. It means that the compromise was to be enforced through the Court if not otherwise enforced. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court observed that the property was to remain in the name of the original defendant throughout the life of Krishnabai and she was to have a limited interest in the property only as regards her maintenance. It means that the compromise was to be enforced through the Court if not otherwise enforced. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court observed that the property was to remain in the name of the original defendant throughout the life of Krishnabai and she was to have a limited interest in the property only as regards her maintenance. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, therefore, reached to the conclusion that since prior to 1926, Krishnabai as female Hindu had no right to inherit any immovable property from her husband, she was not so entitled to inherit. However, in view of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, she is only given a right of maintenance, and she, at the most, could be said to be entitled for that much maintenance. The learned Judge further reached to the conclusion that the area in which the properties are situated and the parties were residing happened to be the area of erstwhile Hyderabad State wherein even rights which are conferred by the Act of 1937 were not there in the cases of Hindu widow. It came to be recognised for the first time in the year 1953. On the basis of this reasoning and the observation, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, concluded that by no stretch of imagination, the plaintiff had any right in the suit properties at the time the compromise was entered into and therefore, according to the learned Judge the right which is created in the original plaintiff was for the first time created in pursuance of the document of the compromise with certain restriction thereon and, therefore, the case of the original plaintiff, was governed by sub-section (2) of section 14 of the said Act, and not by sub-section (1) of that section 14. The approach of the learned Judge, therefore, drove him to the conclusion of holding that the plaintiff had limited rights in the properties in question under section 14(2) of the Act. The learned Judge, therefore, reached to the conclusion that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge of the trial Court were not correct and he, therefore, set aside the same, further holding that the plaintiff was not entitled for the declaration which she had asked for. 12. The learned Judge, therefore, reached to the conclusion that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge of the trial Court were not correct and he, therefore, set aside the same, further holding that the plaintiff was not entitled for the declaration which she had asked for. 12. Shri S.C. Deshmukh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/original plaintiff, scathingly assailed the order passed by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, arguing that the whole approach of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was totally erroneous. According to him, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court did not appreciate the facts of the case so as to correctly apply the provisions of law i.e. sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. According to Shri Deshmukh, though initially the lady could not be said to have been entitled to the share in the properties, however, she had definitely a right to have get maintained on that property which happened to be a joint family property of Jagannathrao and Ganeshrao. According to Shri Deshmukh, even though assuming for the sake of arguments, that Ramdas was rightly adopted by Ambikabai even, in that case, if the property devolved on Ramdas after the death of Ganeshrao (in view of the adoption itself), after the death of Ganeshrao, even in that case, Krishnabai could not be said to have lost her right of having a lien on that properties so far as regards her maintenance was concerned and according to Shri Deshmukh by the compromise this right has been given a due recognition and no separate right is created by that document. By the said document at the most the property could be said to have been identified, on which, she could lay her claim for maintenance. According to Shri Deshmukh, therefore, since Krishnabai happened to be in possession of the properties in question in pursuance of the document of compromise, by itself, would not divest of her right to hold the property as an absolute owner thereof, after coming into force of section 14 of the Act. On the other hand, according to Shri Deshmukh the day on which section 14 came into operation, Krishnabai became the absolute owner of the property which was in her possession though for a limited purpose of her maintenance as referred to in the compromise-deed. On the other hand, according to Shri Deshmukh the day on which section 14 came into operation, Krishnabai became the absolute owner of the property which was in her possession though for a limited purpose of her maintenance as referred to in the compromise-deed. Shri Deshmukh, further, argued that in pursuance of the provisions of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, though she had derived a limited interest of maintenance in the property that would not by itself curtail her right to become the full owner if she was in possession of the property on the day section 14 of the Succession Act came into force. In support of his contention Shri Deshmukh, brought to the notice of this Court a decision reported in (V. Tulasamma v. V. Shesha Reddy)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944. In the opinion of this Court the citation is so apt for the purposes of the present case that the present case can be said to have been fully covered by the ratio of this judgment in every respect. In the case cited supra two points were there for consideration before the Court. First whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before 1956 Act came into force in lieu of maintenance, whether it could fall within the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 or sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. The second question was whether a Hindu widow had a right to property in lieu of her maintenance, and if such a right was conferred on her subsequently by way of amendment, would it amount to a mere recognition of her pre-existing right or had an effect of conferment of new title so as to bring the case within the compass of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. While dealing with this point, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the compromise on the basis of which the property was allotted to Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance was virtually a mere recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre-existing right and, therefore, the case of Tulasamma was definitely beyond the scope of sub-section (2) of section 14 which necessarily made the case to fall squarely well within the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. Needless to mention, read with the explanation (1) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, observed that in that case the appellant Tulasamma, had acquired an absolute interest when she was in possession of the property at the time when the 1956 Act came into force. Not only this but if at all there were any restrictions placed under the alleged compromise, were to be ignored for all purposes. These observations squarely cover the present Appeal. In that case, the appellant-Tulasamma, had claimed maintenance out of joint family properties which was then in the hands of the respondents, who happened to be the brother of the deceased husband of Tulasamma. However in execution the parties had arrived at a compromise wherein certain properties were allotted to the share of Tulasamma for her maintenance and giving her limited interest in that property. In view of this, it had become necessary for the Supreme Court to consider in that case, the nature of the right which a Hindu widow had/has to be maintained out of the joint family estate. It was, no doubt, well-settled that a widow is/was entitled to maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate irrespective of whether that estate was in the hands of a male issue or in the hands of her coparceners. The joint family estate in which her deceased husband had a share, the widow was entitled for her maintenance on that property and she had a right to be maintained out of the joint family properties. While dealing with that matter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have taken into consideration various earlier decisions and virtually the point in this respect can be said to have been settled once for all. While dealing with that matter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have taken into consideration various earlier decisions and virtually the point in this respect can be said to have been settled once for all. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further, traced back to the history of the rights of a Hindu widow as regards her maintenance and also referred to the observations from Yajnavalkya as well as by Manu the right of a Hindu widow in a property for getting herself maintained has been recognised and, therefore, any document by which such a right is subsequently created is not a right which is being created for the first time or it is not a right which could be said to have been accrued for the first time but it is nothing but the recognition of that right which was already there in Hindu widow. Their Lordships, therefore, having deliberated on the subject at length and taking into consideration the various judgments on the point, settled the complicity of the matter as it had evoked wide diversities of judicial opinion which till then existed. 13. Applying the principles laid down in the above-said case, this Court is of the opinion that the job has been made very easy by the Supreme Court of all the courts who are required to deal with this point off and on. 14. In the matter in hand today, if the facts are seen, they are mostly identical. Jagannathrao and Ganeshrao were real brothers. Plaintiff-Krishnabai happened to be the widow of Jagannathrao. Jagannathrao died issueless. Ganeshrao had left his widow Ambikabai. Ganeshrao died issueless. However after the death of Ganeshrao, Ambikabai adopted Ramdas, who happened to be the present original defendant/respondents in this Court. Ramdas claimed the property as an owner through civil suit to which a reference is already made. In that suit, ultimately, at the appellate stage, compromise was arrived at; that compromise is on the record before this Court which is at Exh. 4(1). After having gone through the contents of that document of compromise there hardly remains any doubt that by that compromise the property was to be enjoyed for her maintenance by Krishnabai till her lifetime and her rights to alienate the property in any manner were restricted and after her death the property was to go back to Ramdas. 4(1). After having gone through the contents of that document of compromise there hardly remains any doubt that by that compromise the property was to be enjoyed for her maintenance by Krishnabai till her lifetime and her rights to alienate the property in any manner were restricted and after her death the property was to go back to Ramdas. Unfortunately for Ramdas, Krishnabai survived for a considerable long time after coming into force of the Act of 1956 and it is this period of 1956 which makes the whole change in the matter. The day on which section 14(1) and section 14(2) came into force so far as regards possession of Krishnabai was concerned, she definitely acquired the absolute ownership of the property without any restrictions to which otherwise there was a reference in the compromise deed. Supreme Court, in the case of Tulasamma referred to above, has specifically given a direction that such a restriction has to be totally ignored. In the instant case also since a right of maintenance was already there which only was recognised by the document on the record in the nature of compromise and through which an identification of the property was made, the right which is created in the widow under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act, would not by any stretch of imagination be curtailed or abrogated on the basis of the interpretation of that document. 15. Shri M.D. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, argued that after the death of Ganeshrao when Ambikabai adopted Ramdas, the property devolved totally on Ramdas and Ramdas became the absolute owner of the properties whatsoever was there. The moment the property devolved on Ramdas, according to Shri. Joshi, Krishnabai had no interest whatsoever in that property, more so because according to Shri Joshi, neither by law by which Krishnabai was governed while in Hyderabad State nor thereafter by the Act, 1973, Krishnabai could derive any right, title or interest in that property. Shri. Joshi, therefore, argued that it is just by way of gratis, Ramdas gave certain property to Krishnabai for maintenance, during her lifetime. According to Mr. Joshi, therefore, it was for the first time on the basis of the compromise a right of maintenance is given to Krishnabai on the property which according to Shri Joshi belongs to Ramdas only. Shri. Joshi, therefore, argued that it is just by way of gratis, Ramdas gave certain property to Krishnabai for maintenance, during her lifetime. According to Mr. Joshi, therefore, it was for the first time on the basis of the compromise a right of maintenance is given to Krishnabai on the property which according to Shri Joshi belongs to Ramdas only. The argument of Shri Joshi, no doubt, is interesting one. However it failed to appeal the Court and this Court is not ready to accept this argument of Shri Joshi for the very simple reason that, as stated earlier, right of Hindu widow to get maintained from the joint family property has been recognised from the days of Yajnavalkya as also from the days of Manu. If those rights are known they are simply being recognised through the document of compromise by which the lady's right to get maintained through that property, has been recognised on a particular identified property. In view of this, it cannot be said that the document of compromise has for the first time created a right of maintenance in that lady from the joint family property. 16. Necessary reference will have to be made to one more aspect in this matter. It is not disputed by both the parties that at no point of time there was a partition between Jagannathrao and Ganeshrao, the rights of both the ladies i.e. Ambikabai as well as Krishnabai to enjoy the property for their maintenance could not be denied by anyone. Adoption of Ramdas by Ambikabai during her widowhood would not change this right or the position in any manner. Ramdas though acquired a status of a natural son after adoption in this family could not have divested the lady of her right to have maintenance from the property which Ramdas otherwise acquired or derived from Ganeshrao and share of Jagannathrao by that time was not marked and divided in the property, and therefore, the character of the property in the hands of Ramdas remained to be that of joint family property. In view of this, it was impossible for Ramdas through the instrument of compromise deed to divest Krishnabai of her right in the property to get maintained. In view of this, it was impossible for Ramdas through the instrument of compromise deed to divest Krishnabai of her right in the property to get maintained. The moment this right could be said to be existing while the property was in the hands of Krishnabai at the time of coming into force of the Act, 1956 this right definitely got itself converted into an absolute right in Krishnabai to hold that property and not a limited right only for her maintenance. In view of this it cannot be said that Krishnabai had no right to alienate the property the way in which she wanted after coming into force of 1956 Act. 17. This Court can very well rely on certain observations of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in 1999(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)504 in the matter of (Vaijnath and others v. Guruma and others)2. In this case, it is observed by the Supreme Court that section (1) of section 3 of Hindu Women's Rights to Properties Act, 1937 was made applicable to Hyderabad State by section 3 of Hyderabad. (Application of Central Acts) Act, 1952. In this right of a Hindu widow to hold the property was earlier limited to other properties but not to immovable property. However the right of a Hindu widow even to hold immovable property also has been recognised and this immovable property also includes agricultural lands. 18. After having gone through the judgment cited by Shri Joshi i.e. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1099 in the case of (State of Rajasthan v. Fateh Chand and another)3, this Court is of the opinion that the decision is in no way applicable to the present case as the facts are also very different wherein a widow who had willed out the property had taken possession of the suit property and wherein she was held to be trespasser, could not be held to be a owner of that property. Shri Joshi, brought one more judgment to the notice of this Court i.e. 1995(2) Bom.C.R. 24 in the matter of (Gumpha v. Jaibai)4. Shri Joshi, brought one more judgment to the notice of this Court i.e. 1995(2) Bom.C.R. 24 in the matter of (Gumpha v. Jaibai)4. In that case, a female Hindu had acquired possession of the property after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act and that too in accordance with the Will executed by her husband whereby the husband had created a limited interest in the wife to hold the property till her lifetime and thereafter the property was to devolve on her daughter. The rights of the wife to dispose of the property in any manner were, no doubt, restricted in the Will. In view of this specific clause in the Will, Their Lordships have observed that if a female Hindu acquires possession after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and that possession was traceable to an instrument or a document described under section 14(2) of the Act, then she could not get higher right than what is stipulated in the document itself. However, so far as regards the principles laid down in the case of Tulasamma (cited supra) is in no way shaken by the decision in the matter of Gumpha v. Jaibai. The situation obtained in both the cases are different. Even otherwise the decision in the case of Tulasamma is by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court and will have to be followed. 19. In view of this, in the opinion of this Court, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was definitely in error in reversing the well-reasoned and well concluded order passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court. In the circumstances, the second appeal deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the trial Court needs to be restored and the same is so restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Second appeal allowed. -----