JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---This petition relates to the election of the respondent No. 1 to the Maharashtra Legislative Council from the "Dhule Local Authority Constituency" held in the month of December, 1997. Suffice it would be to narrate that the voting was scheduled on 29th December, 1997 and the result was declared on 31st December, 1997. Alongwith the present petitioner, the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 were the contesting candidates in the said election. The respondent No. 1 is declared elected in that election. It is this election of the respondent No. 1 which is the subject matter of challenge in this present election petition. 2. The core point for decision in the election petition is regarding the disqualification of the respondent No. 1 from contesting the election under section 9-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act" for the purposes of brevity). The petitioner's contention is that on the date of submission of nomination paper by the respondent No. 1 as also on the date of voting the respondent No. 1 was having a subsisting contract with the Government for transportation of foodgrains, oil, pulses, salt, tea and other articles of essential commodities through his business of transportation which he was running in the name and style "New Ram Road Lines, Nandurbar". This contract was in pursuance of the notice dated July 3rd, 1997, issued by the District Collector, Dhule, under the authority from the Food and Civil Supplies Department of the Government of Maharashtra. In view of this, according to the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 was disqualified to contest the aforesaid election. 3. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to certain dates for the purpose of Present election petition and particularly for the point under consideration. The election petition was filed on 13th February, 1998. When the election petition came before the Court on 17th June, 1998 an order was passed by the Court to issue summons to the respondent for filing written statement and for settlement of the issues which was made returnable on July 10th, 1998. The respondent No. 2 was duly served. However, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could not be served as they were said to be out of station at that time. The respondent No. 2 was duly served. However, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could not be served as they were said to be out of station at that time. The information to that effect was received by the registry of this Court at 12-15 p.m. on 10th July, 1998. Though the summons could not served on the respondents Nos. 1 and 3, however, return of copies of notices were yet awaited. Hence an order came to be passed "Await Report" and the matter was directed to be placed on 4th August, 1998. Since the notices were returned, which were sent through the Court as well as through registered post acknowledgement due and since the remark of the postal department was there as "not claimed returned to the sender", the petitioner was directed to serve the unserved respondents under the provisions of Order 5, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter was directed to be placed before the Court on 25th August, 1998. 4. The matter was taken up on 27th August, 1998 before the Court on which date Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Advocate appeared for the respondent No. 1 by filing his power (Vakalatnama) at Exhibit 5. Shri Dixit pointed out that since the copy of the election petition was not received by his client i.e. the respondent No. 1, he requested for the supply of the copy of the election petition. The office was directed to supply the copy of the election petition which was sent by registered post acknowledgement due earlier and which was received back in the office as unserved. The necessary acknowledgement was directed to be taken from the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 in token of having received the copy of the election petition. 5. On 27th August, 1998 itself an application at Exhibit 7 came to be filed by Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, seeking extention of time to file written statement which was granted and the matter was fixed on 23rd March, 1998. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3, though were served, remained absent on 27th August, 1998. On 27th August, 1998 itself an application at Exhibit 7 came to be filed by Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, seeking extention of time to file written statement which was granted and the matter was fixed on 23rd March, 1998. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3, though were served, remained absent on 27th August, 1998. On 23rd September, 1998, an application at Exhibit 8 came to be filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 by way of preliminary objections of seeking dismissal of the election petition for non-compliance of the provisions of sections 83 and 85 of the Act. Along with the above-said application, another application at Exhibit 9 was filed by the respondent No. 1 for extension of time to file written statement. Since on 23rd September, 1998 the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 again remained absent and as there was no appearance on their behalf, an order came to be passed to proceed against them without written statement. For filing the written statement, time was granted to the respondent No. 1 till 7th October, 1998. The application at Exhibit 8 was ordered to be considered on the next day i.e. 7th October, 1998. On 7th October, 1998, an application at Exhibit 11 came to be filed by the respondent No. 1 producing the copy of the election petition which was received by him from the petitioner, pointing out certain defects therein by way of additional grounds for dismissal of the election petition at the threshold and therefore, requesting the Court to keep it in safe custody. The extension of time to file written statement was also asked and by way of last chance, it was granted till 12th November, 1998. The matter was also directed to be fixed on 12th November, 1998 for consideration of the application at Exhibit 8 i.e. preliminary points raised by the respondent No. 1. 6. The petitioner moved an application on 16th October 1998 for inspection of the copy of the election petition which was produced by the respondent No. 1 and which was requested to be kept in a sealed cover. The said permission was granted to the petitioner and he was directed to take inspection on 2nd April, 1998 between 16.00 and 17.00 hours and the respondents were also allowed to remain present when the petitioner was to take inspection. The said permission was granted to the petitioner and he was directed to take inspection on 2nd April, 1998 between 16.00 and 17.00 hours and the respondents were also allowed to remain present when the petitioner was to take inspection. However, taking into consideration the prayers in the matter, the request of the respondent No. 1 to extend time to file written statement was considered and the respondent No. 1 was directed to file his written statement in any case on or before 30th November, 1998, on which date the written statement came to be filed by the respondent No. 1, which is at Exhibit 15 on the record. The parties were directed to give draft issues and were also directed to produce documents on the next date. The matter was fixed for hearing on preliminary issues if so framed and the case was adjourned to 15th February, 1999. 7. The issues were framed vide Exhibit 21 and the matter was heard on the point as to whether issues Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 should be treated as preliminary issues or not. After hearing the parties on the point this Court by the order dated 10th March, 1999, vide Exhibit 26, held that the issues Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 were to be treated as preliminary issues and hence, the matter was fixed for hearing on preliminary issues on 9th April, 1999. 8. Issue Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 are as under:--- (6) Does the respondent No. 1 prove that the Election Petition filed by the petitioner is not signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 and, if not, is Election Petition No. 2/1998 liable to be dismissed for non-compliance of the provisions of sections 81 and 83 in accordance with the provisions of section 86 of the Representation of People Act, 1951? (7) Whether does the respondent No. 1 prove that the copy of the petition received by him through the Court does not comply with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951? (7) Whether does the respondent No. 1 prove that the copy of the petition received by him through the Court does not comply with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951? (8) Does the respondent No. 1 prove that the copy of the petition received by him in accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules also needs the same compliance as is contemplated under section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951? (9) What is the effect of non-compliance of the provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the Represenation of People Act, 1951? 9. Shri B.D. Joshi alongwith Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Advocates for the respondent No. 1 vehemently argued that the verification as is seen from the copy of the election petition which was supplied to the respondent No. 1 did not indicate the name of the officer who had administered the oath to the petitioner. He pointed out that the concise statement, which is to be filed in accordance with the provisions of section 83 of the Act came to be filed on 16th February 1998 i.e. beyond the period of limitation. He also argued that the verification as is seen from the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 2 indicates that it was not done in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations applicable in that matter, including the provisions of section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Joshi pointed out that there are very many defects in the copy of the election petition received by the respondent No. 1 as regards the signatures on the copies of the annexures attached to the petition. According to him at many places it is not signed as "true copy" on those annexures and the verification alongwith the annexures. According to him, on the basis of such defects mentioned hereinabove, there was every apprehension in the mind of the respondent No. 1 as regards the election petition having not been sworn or verified properly and even as regards "true copy" which were not signed at some places. Shri Joshi pointed out that there are some documents which are verified but they do not bear the signatures of the petitioner as "true copy". Shri Joshi pointed out that there are some documents which are verified but they do not bear the signatures of the petitioner as "true copy". It is seen that on certain documents the signatures of the petitioner as "true copy" are there but on certain pages there is no remark as "true copy" and signed in token thereof. Shri Joshi also raised an objection that the election petition was not presented personally by the petitioner. Shri Joshi further argued that the record does not indicate that the date on which the petition was presented in the Court on 13th February 1998 the number of copies as are required to be supplied in accordance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act were not supplied. According to him, the copies might have been supplied subsequently. Shri Joshi further argued that the authority of the officer before whom the verification was made or who administered the oath can be seen clearly from the naked eyes that it was either by the Section Officer or by the Assistant Registrar as the stamp or seal clearly shows the same. He further argued that the exact name and designation of the officer cannot be seen from the copy supplied to the respondent No. 1 correctly because simply initials are made by the officer concerned and the initials which are either of the Additional Registrar or the Section Officer or the Assistant Registrar cannot be read clearly from the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1. He, therefore, argued that the very presentation of the petition by the petitioner could be said to be defective. 10. In view of the above objections, Shri Joshi argued that the provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the Act are not strictly complied with by the petitioner and hence, the election petition deserves to be dismissed on this point at the threshold. 11. Shri B.D. Joshi, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, invited attention of this Court to the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act and argued that the said provision is mandatory and not directory. Compliance thereof is a sine qua non for entertaining the election petition. Failure in that compliance, according to Shri Joshi, must result in dismissal of the election petition. Compliance thereof is a sine qua non for entertaining the election petition. Failure in that compliance, according to Shri Joshi, must result in dismissal of the election petition. He urged that omission of the name and designation of the officer concerned before whom the verification or affirmation was done in the copy of the election petition given to the respondent No. 1, would amount to non-compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. He argued that if the law directs that a particular thing is to be done in a particular manner then it must be done only in that manner unless exception is permissible or can be carved out through the help of the Act or law governing the case. Shri Joshi further argued that the concise statement of material facts which is annexed to the copy of the election petition which is served on the respondent No. 1 appears to have been filed and annexed to the election petition on 16th February 1998 and this clearly means that on the date on which the election petition was presented i.e. on 13th February 1998, the copy of the concise statement was not there alongwith another annexure on page 31 of the election petition. This clearly means, according to Shri Joshi, that certain defects which were there in the election petition were removed by the petitioner after expiry of prescribed period of limitation of 45 days which ultimately results into non-presentation of correct election petition on 13th February 1998. According to him, the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed even on that ground. 12. Although Shri Joshi further argued that though the annexures along with the election petition are verified, however, some of the pages are not signed as 'true copy' at many places. To show the very many defects in the copy of the election petition, Shri Joshi has invited attention of this Court to page 8 of the copy of the election petition served on the respondent No. 1. He argued that the verification is not in consonance with what is contemplated by law. He further referred to the other pages i.e. 10, 12, 14, 17 and 19 and pointed out the defects as regards verification therein and shortcomings of the signatures in token of same being 'true copy' of those annexures with the petition. He argued that the verification is not in consonance with what is contemplated by law. He further referred to the other pages i.e. 10, 12, 14, 17 and 19 and pointed out the defects as regards verification therein and shortcomings of the signatures in token of same being 'true copy' of those annexures with the petition. According to him the verification on all those pages is not in compliance with the provisions of Order 6, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shri Joshi invited attention of this Court to pages 27 to 29 i.e. concise statement filed in the election petition. Here also he raised same objections as regards the stamp and seal of the officer as also the signature of the officer concerned. Shri Joshi says that it is not possible to understand from the copy as to whether the initials are either of the Additional Registrar or the Assistant Registrar or Section Officer. Shri Joshi, therefore, argued that very many defects which are glaring and which can be seen even by naked eyes definitely amount to non-compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act and hence, non-compliance of that section is bound to result into dismissal of the election petition on those grounds. 13. Shri B.D. Joshi also invited attention of this Court to page Nos. 8, 21, 23, 25 and 30 of the copy of election petition served on the respondent No. 1 and pointed out the same are not attested by the petitioner under his own signatures as 'true copy'. These pages are in addition to the pages mentioned above i.e. pages 10, 12, 14, 17 and 19. A strong objection is raised by Shri Joshi on the basis of the concise statement pointing out that the said concise statement is neither verified nor signed by the petition. Shri Joshi argued that the Additional Registrar of the High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, is not a competent authority to administer oath or get the document verified in his presence and he, therefore argued that it is not a verification in the eye of law. 14. Shri Joshi further argued that the copy which was said to be affixed on the door of the house of the respondent No. 1 which was sent through the bailiff was not received by him at any point of time. 14. Shri Joshi further argued that the copy which was said to be affixed on the door of the house of the respondent No. 1 which was sent through the bailiff was not received by him at any point of time. He argued that the only copy of the election petition which was received by the respondent No. 1 was the copy which was ordered to be given to him in this Court and it was a copy which was returned back to the office of the High Court which was earlier sent by registered post acknowledgement due. The sum and substance of the argument of Shri Joshi is that the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1 was defective one and same has definitely caused prejudice to the respondent No. 1 in raising his defence properly. He further argued that the petition could not be said to have been tendered in the Court strictly in accordance with law and very many shortcomings in the same are bound to entail into dismissal of the election petition. 15. In support of his contention, Shri B.D. Joshi argued that Rule 28 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in accordance with the provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, states that where no specific provision is made in the Act, the Code or the Rules, the Rules of the Bombay High Court on the Original Side in their application to the suits will apply mutatis mutandis or as the Judge may direct. As per Rule 4 of the said Rules, so far as this Bench is concerned, the presentation of the appeal before the Additional Registrar of this Bench or to such other officer, if any, ordered from time to time. However, so far as authorisation to make verification or giving oath is concerned, there is no specific provision made except Rule 28 which is as under:--- "Rule 28. Where no specific provisions is made in the Act, the Code or the above rules, the Rules of the Bombay High Court (on the Original Side) 1980 in their application to suits will apply mutatis mutandis or as the Judge may direct." In view of this Rule 28, we have to read the provisions of Rules and Forms of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay on Original Side. Rule 44 of these Rules provides for verification of the plaint and the officer before whom it is to be verified. Rule 44 is as under:--- "Rule 44. Plaint to be verified and before whom---All plaints shall be verified, within the local jurisdiction, before one of the Officers of the Court appointed in that behalf and elsewhere in India before the officer indicated by the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 139. The verification shall be in Form No. 3." Rule 196 of the Original Side Rules deals with the officer before whom the affidavit is to be sworn in. As per this rule, affidavit shall, if sworn within the Greater Bombay, be sworn before an officer referred to Rule in 197 and if elsewhere in India before the persons mentioned in section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 197 of the above-said Rules gives the list of the officers appointed to administer oath under the rules. However, the list of 18 officers shown in this Rule 197 does not include either the Additional Registrar or Assistant Registrar or Section Officer of the Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad. 16. In view of the above, the only remedy open is to go to the provisions of section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the subject of oath on affidavit and the person who shall administer the same. Section 139 of the Code is as under:--- "(a) .......... (aa) ........... (b) any officer or other person whom the High Court may appoint in this behalf, or (c) any officer appointed by any other Court which the State Government has generally or specially empowered in this behalf may administer the oath to the deponent." From the above-said provision of section 139 of the Code it is now clear that any officer or other person to whom a reference is made above has to be so appointed for that purpose or in that behalf by the High Court. This clearly means that there has to be a specific appointment or authorisation in the name of that officer by his designation such as either the Additional Registrar or Assistant Registrar or Section Officer, as the case may be. 17. This clearly means that there has to be a specific appointment or authorisation in the name of that officer by his designation such as either the Additional Registrar or Assistant Registrar or Section Officer, as the case may be. 17. In view of this, the question that is to be seen is as to whether is there any such authorisation produced in the name of the Additional Registrar of this Bench of High Court. No such authorisation is produced by the petitioner. In view of this, the question is as to what is the weightage to be given to the arguments of Shri B.D. Joshi on this point. If no such authorisation is there, then will it have to be held that the Additional Registrar was not competent to administer oath. 18. As against the above-said arguments of Shri B.D. Joshi, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, Shri R.G. Karmarkar, learned Advocate for the petitioner, argued that the petition was presented by the petitioner personally and he invited attention of this Court to the remark made on the very first page of the original election petition before the Court. No doubt, it bears an endorsement as regards presentation of the election petition personally and the initials of the officer concerned are there. In view of this, there does not remain any substance in the objections of the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 on this point. 19. So far as the authority of the Additional Registrar or any other officer in that behalf pertaining to the affidavit or verification is concerned, according to Shri R.G. Karmarkar, the Additional Registrar of the Aurangabad Bench of the High Court of Bombay is authorised to give oath or to verify and for this purpose he invited attention of this Court to Rule 15 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:--- "Provided that in respect of pleadings to be filed in the Bombay City Civil Court such verification shall, within the local jurisdiction of the Court, be made before one Court empowered to administer oath, and elsewhere, before any officer mentioned in section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". From this proviso it is clear that if the verification of the pleadings is to be made in a case to be filed in the Bombay City Civil Court same shall be made within the local jurisdiction of the Court before one of the officers of the said Court empowered to administer oath and elsewhere before any officer mentioned in section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Even reading of this provision makes it clear that a reference has to be made only to section 139 of the Code to which a reference is already made in the previous paragraphs of this judgment. No such authorisation has been placed before the High Court by the petitioner to show that the Additional Registrar was specially authorised to administer oath under section 139 of the Code so far as the election petition is concerned. 20. Shri R.G. Karmarkar further referred to Rule 9 of the Chapter III of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules pointing out that the Registrar, Additional Registrar, Deputy Registrar or the Assistant Registrar or Special Officer or Additional Special Officer, Section Officer and Senior Superintendent may administer oaths and solemn affirmation to the deponents making an affidavit. According to him, these rules are applicable mutatis mutandis to all the applications other than memoranda of appeals which may be presented to the Court and the term "appellant" includes "applicant" and the terms "respondent" includes "opponent". This is what has been so said in Rule 10 of the above Rules. He argued that he "Registrar" includes the "Additional Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrar or Special Officer or Additional Special Officer". This, he argued on the basis of Rule 12 of the Appellate Side Rules. Shri Karmarkar, therefore, suggested that as per the Appellate Side Rules, the Additional Registrar or even for that purpose Assistant Registrar can also be said to be a competent officer to administer oath. 21. This, he argued on the basis of Rule 12 of the Appellate Side Rules. Shri Karmarkar, therefore, suggested that as per the Appellate Side Rules, the Additional Registrar or even for that purpose Assistant Registrar can also be said to be a competent officer to administer oath. 21. The question, however, that needs consideration is as to whether can this Rule 9 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules be made applicable to the present election petition which has to be dealt with strictly in accordance with the Rules framed by the High Court in regard to the election petitions under the Representation of People Act, 1951 and in the absence of any provision therein making aforesaid rule applicable to election petition, whether above Rule 9 can be stretched for application under the Original Side Rules of the Bombay High Court. 22. Now, looking at this matter seriously, there definitely appears a missing link so far as regards issuance of authorisation in the name of the Additional Registrars of the Benches by the High Court is concerned. However, that by itself would not make the Additional Registrars of the Benches of the Bombay High Court incompetent to administer oath or get the verification done. Chapter III in Part II of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules deals with the procedure and practice as regards affidavits. Rule 2 thereof specifically talks about entitling of the affidavits relating to the proceedings in the High Court. It reads as under:--- "2. Entitling of affidavits relating to the proceeding pending in the High Court. An affidavit relating to a proceeding in this Court shall be entitled " In the matter of (state the proceedings and its number)" and shall set out the names and descriptions of the parties." Rule 3 is about the entitling of the affidavits in respect of the cause not in the High Court. It reads as under:--- "3. Entitling of affidavits in respect of cause not in the High Court---If there be no cause in the Court, the affidavit shall be entitled "In the matter of ..........". In view of this, it is clear that the officer authorised by the High Court has to see that the affidavits are done as per the rules before him. However, the question would be as to whether can these Appellate Side Rules be brought into operation for the Original Side Rules. In view of this, it is clear that the officer authorised by the High Court has to see that the affidavits are done as per the rules before him. However, the question would be as to whether can these Appellate Side Rules be brought into operation for the Original Side Rules. The election petition before the High Court is said to be an Original-Side work and the Judges at the Benches, who are dealing with the election petitions can be said to be doing Original-Side work at Benches as those cases are specially assigned to those Judges. Generally, at the Benches of Aurangabad, Nagpur and Goa there is no Original-Side Bench except such specially assigned work of election petitions and that appears to be the reason as to why the name of the Additional Registrar or any other officer in that behalf authorised by the High Court does not appear in Rule 197 of the Original Side Rules. That does not mean that if such an affidavit is done before the Additional Registrar of the High Court, that would be totally illegal. For reaching to the conclusion, I have to take the help of the Oaths Act, 1969. Section 3 of the said Act is about the power to administer oaths. Sub-section (2) of section 3 is as under:--- "3. Power to administer Oaths--- (1) ......... (a) ........... (b) ........... (2) Without prejudice to the powers conferred by sub-section (1) or by any other law for the time being in force, any Court, Judge or Magistrate or person may administer oaths and affirmations for the purpose of affidavits, be empowered in this behalf-- (a) by the High Court, in respect of affidavits for the purpose of Judicial proceedings, or (b) .........." In view of the above specific provision of Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Oaths Act, this Court finds no difficulty to hold that the Additional Registrar has exercised the powers to administer the oath in pursuance of this particular section and if it is presumed to have been done under this provision then it cannot be said that either the Additional Registrar was incompetent to administer oath or the verification or that the oath so administered by him is illegal. In fact, this short coming can be conveniently overcome by the High Court by issuing necessary notification in pursuance of section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Rules 196 and 197 of the Original Side Rules. This Court, therefore, would not find it difficult to hold that the Additional Registrar working at the Benches of the Bombay High Court are competent to administer oath in the election petitions. 23. A similar view is already taken by this Court in the matter of (Pratap Banger v. Ashok Deshmukh)1, in Election Petition No. 3 of 1992 decided on February 10, 1992, as regards the authority of an Associate of this Court. It is held in the aforesaid decision that an officer of this Court, who has been authorised by the High Court to administer oath is an Oath Commissioner under the Indian Oaths Act and therefore, in that case, one Mrs. Bangale, who was Associate of the High Court, was held competent to administer oath/verification/affirmation made in the election petition. 24. I can also conveniently take the advantage of the observation of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 436 in the matter of (Kamalnarayan Sharma v. Dwarkaprasad Misra and others)2, wherein the affidavit was done before the Clerk of the District Court who had described himself to be an officer for administering oath on affidavits and the affidavit made before him was held to be by a competent person in accordance with the provisions of Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. 25. As regards another point of supply of copies Shri Karmarkar argued that since there was no objection raised by the Registry of this Court regarding the number of copies of the election petition to be supplied, the presumption is that the copies were so supplied as are required under law. He further argued that though there were certain objections raised by the office, there was no objection raised by the Registry regarding number of copies to be supplied alongwith the election petition. This Court finds no difficulty in accepting the arguments of Shri Karmarkar and hence, there does not appear to be any substance in the objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 26. This Court finds no difficulty in accepting the arguments of Shri Karmarkar and hence, there does not appear to be any substance in the objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 26. Shri R.G. Karmarkar further argued that on 13th February 1998 the petition was filed in the Court and though the documents in the nature of concise statement and memo of address which are at pages 27 to 30 were filed on 16th February, 1998, that would not mean that the petition was presented on 16th February, 1998. Shri Karmarkar further argued that according to him, there was no necessity to file concise statement. However, by way of abundant caution he filed the same on 16th December 1998. There cannot be any dispute at all that both these documents were filed on 16th February 1998 as both the documents bear the date at 16th February 1998. This clearly means that in any case those documents were not filed alongwith the election petition on 13th February 1998 when the election petition was filed. 27. If accepting the arguments of Shri Karmarkar that the documents were filed in view of the objections raised by the office, that was not so permissible as the period for filing an election petition had already lapsed and therefore, an irresistible conclusion has to be drawn that the filing of the documents even of concise statement and memo of address at pages 27 to 30 has been definitely without the permission of the Court and hence, in contravention of provisions of section 81(3) of the Act, as it was beyond the period of limitation. 28. It is also pertinent to note that the concise statement as also the memo of address do not bear the verification nor do they bear the signatures of the petitioner indicating it to be a true copy, though at the end of the concise statement the petitioner appears to have signed. That cannot be read that, that signature is in token of a true copy of the document. Even the verification is also missing from this document and even same is the case as regards memo of address at page 30. 29. This Court is of the view that if according to Shri R.G. Karmarkar, there was no necessity to file concise statement then he should not have filed the same in the Court. Even the verification is also missing from this document and even same is the case as regards memo of address at page 30. 29. This Court is of the view that if according to Shri R.G. Karmarkar, there was no necessity to file concise statement then he should not have filed the same in the Court. But once the petitioner has taken the risk of filing the same then in that case said document will have to be totally in compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. If that is not so, then it has to meet the fate as contemplated under section 86 of the Act for such defects. That cannot be said to be a curable as the question of granting permission to get those documents verified now did not arise nor was any such permission sought for. 30. Shri R.G. Karmarkar, however, laid much stress on the point that the copy which is supplied to the respondent No. 1 is a copy which was returned unserved through registered post acknowledgement due. However, according to Shri Karmarkar, another copy which was affixed on the door of the house of the respondent No. 1 has not been produced by the respondent No. 1, and therefore, according to Shri Karmarkar unless and until that copy is produced and tallied with the original till then it would not be appropriate to say that the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1 is defective. This Court is not in a position to accept this argument of Shri Karmarkar for the simple reason that it cannot be disputed now that whatsoever copy was served on the respondent No. 1 was a copy sent by registered post. Respondent No. 1 is supposed to read and proceed on the basis of copy supplied and served on him. It is presumed that whatsoever copy or copies of the election petition is or are served they have to be strictly in total compliance of the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. Respondent No. 1 is supposed to read and proceed on the basis of copy supplied and served on him. It is presumed that whatsoever copy or copies of the election petition is or are served they have to be strictly in total compliance of the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. Merely because the respondent No. 1 has not produced or has not said anything about that copy which was affixed on the door of the house of the respondent No. 1 that would not give any concession to the petitioner to say that the other copy which was affixed on the door of the house of the respondent No. 1 was complying with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. As pointed out earlier in this judgement the respondent No. 1 has already stated that the copy which was affixed on the door of his house was never received by him. We cannot lose sight of the fact that even if both the copies would have been served on the respondent No. 1, if one out of two copies is found to be defective, it was sufficient for the respondent No. 1 to raise the objection as regards incorrectness of the said copy or shortcomings in the same in terms of section 81(3) of the Act and the respondent No. 1 is entitled to take benefit of one such defective copy of the election petition. In view of this, this Court would not find any substance in the arguments of Shri Karmarkar. 31. Shri R.G. Karmarkar faintly tried to argue that there was no necessity either of verification or affidavit in respect of the concise statement by saying that the petition does not contain allegations as regards corrupt practices in any manner and according to him, there was no necessity to get the said document either verified or sworn in accordance with the provisions of section 83 of the Act. This Court is not in a position to accept this argument of Shri Karmarkar for the reasons already stated while dealing with this point earlier. 32. This Court is not in a position to accept this argument of Shri Karmarkar for the reasons already stated while dealing with this point earlier. 32. Shri Karmarkar while replying the arguments of Shri B.D. Joshi learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 as regards defects on various pages to which a reference is made above, made an attempt to show that the defects which are pointed out on various pages referred to in earlier portion of this judgment are not fatal defects. He further argued that is was not at all necessary for him to file all the documents at pages to which a reference is made and particularly at Exhibits A to H alongwith the election petition and hence, according to him, it was not even at all necessary to sign it first and them further sign it in token of it being a true copy of the documents filed alongwith the petition. He further argued that it was not necessary even to sign the verification as true copy. He further argued that assuming for the sake of arguments that there exists such defects same could not be said to have caused any prejudice to the respondent No. 1. For this purpose, he further stated that the prejudice said to have been caused to the respondent No. 1 has not been made clear by the respondent No. 1. 33. The question is when the documents are filed and annexed to the election petition and when the petitioner is relying on those documents for all practical purposes to prove his case, can the petitioner claim that those documents were not at all necessary and therefore, compliance in according with section 81(3) of the Act in respect of those documents was not necessary. This argument of Shri R.G. Karmarkar is much hard to digest. The petitioner cannot take liberty by saying that whatsoever documents he had filed were not necessary to be filed and therefore, it was not necessary to comply with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. The fact remains that once having taken the risk of filing the documents including that of the concise statement and memo of address, each and every document would definitely require strict compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) and section 83 of the Act. The fact remains that once having taken the risk of filing the documents including that of the concise statement and memo of address, each and every document would definitely require strict compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) and section 83 of the Act. The question as regards prejudice need not be considered so much in details in such a case. Suffice it is to say that those documents would not create a picture before the eyes of the respondent No. 1 as regards truthfulness and correctness of the election petition. If there is a weapon in the nature of section 81(3) of the Act in the armoury of the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 1 cannot be said to be wrong if he properly uses the same against the petitioner. In the circumstances, the arguments of Shri Karmarkar on this point that if at all there were any defects same were curable, cannot be accepted nor can it be said that such defects are not fatal. 34. Shri B.D., Joshi, relying on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1185 in the matter of (Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram others)3, argued that an election petition cannot be equated with the plaint in a civil suit. According to him, the provisions of section 81(3) are pre-emptory provision and non-compliance with the same will entail into dismissal of the election petition. Shri Joshi also relied on the decision in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 303 in the matter of (Sharif-ud Din v. Abdu Gani Lone)4, and argued that the requirement that the copy of the election petition for service on the respondent must be attested by the petitioner and it is a mandatory requirement and non-compliance thereof results into the dismissal of this election petition. No doubt, the above said decision is under the J. and K. Representation of People Act (4 of 1957). Shri Joshi argued that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act has to be done in a particular manner and also lays down the consequences therefor, then in the case of failure, such consequences must follow. The sum and substance of the arguments is that such a provision has to be treated as mandatory. 35. Shri Joshi argued that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act has to be done in a particular manner and also lays down the consequences therefor, then in the case of failure, such consequences must follow. The sum and substance of the arguments is that such a provision has to be treated as mandatory. 35. Relying on the decision in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 956 in the matter of (Rajendra Singh v. Usha Rani and others)5, Shri Joshi argued that the supply of the incorrect copy of the election petition to the respondent No. 1 must result in dismissal of the election petition. In the abovesaid case, it is held that non-compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act has to result into dismissal of the petition on that count. To reinforce his arguments Shri Joshi also relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 276 in the matter of (Ved Prakash Gaur v. Sukharam and others)6. In the case cited above, photostat copies of the petition were supplied without requisite attestation and in that case the petition was held liable to be dismissed since the copies were not properly attested under his own signatures by the petitioner, to be true copy. 36. In A.I.R. 1980 Bom. 60 in the case of (Baban Yadav v. Abdul Quadri)7, this Court has taken a view that if the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent does not contain the name or date or signature and the verification/attestation of the concerned officer, it is held to be not a true copy of the original election petition and as such there is non-compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act and the petition is held liable to be dismissed. The same is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in A.I.R. 1998 Cal. 162 in the matter of (Sharif Hossain v. Kalimudin)8. 37. Keeping in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 796 in the matter of (Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil)9, it is clear that section 86 of the Act empowers the High Court to dismiss an election petition at the threshold if it does not comply with the provisions of section 81 of the Act or section 83 or section 117 of the Act. 38. 38. At the out-set, as pointed out earlier, the copy of the election petition, supplied to the respondent No. 1 definitely at certain places does not bear the date, verification as well as the name and designation of the officer. It is also seen that on very many pages of the copy, there is no endorsement made by the petitioner as true copy and has also not signed and attested the same as true copy at some places. It is seen that some pages are signed but do not bear the necessary endorsement of it being a true copy. While on some pages, they are either not signed or even the endorsement "true copy" is not made. The question would be whether these defects could be said to be formal, clerical and typographical defects and are to be neglected or whether they are to be taken as a serious drawback in the presentation of the election petition inviting its dismissal. The mandatory provision is, that the copy cannot be supplied to the respondent No. 1 unless it is signed and attested by the petitioner as true copy. In such a case, the defects, no doubt, will have to be looked at seriously. Looked at these defects from another angle, it is not merely that the prejudice should be caused to the respondent No. 1 strictly on the merits of the case but if because of certain defects or shortcomings in the copy of the election petition if some right is vested or created in the respondent No. 1 to ask for the relief under section 86 of the Act by way of dismissal of the election petition, then in that case the defects or the shortcoming will have to be looked at from that specific angle. If the petition does not comply with the provisions of the Act, that is bound to create a right in the respondent No. 1 to request the Court to dismiss the election petition on that count. 39. At the cost of repetition this Court has to point out that the stamp or seal, wherever it is used on the copy of the election petition, appears to be that, of section Officer/Assistant Registrar. However, surprisingly both the parties argued that the election petition has been verified before the Additional Registrar. 39. At the cost of repetition this Court has to point out that the stamp or seal, wherever it is used on the copy of the election petition, appears to be that, of section Officer/Assistant Registrar. However, surprisingly both the parties argued that the election petition has been verified before the Additional Registrar. In view of this, there is every possibility for creation of doubt in the mind of the respondent No. 1 as regards the exact authority before whom the petition is said to have been affirmed of the documents have been affirmed or verified. Even with naked eyes it can be seen that the stamp used for verification of the documents is that of Section Officer/Assistant Registrar. This is definitely bound to mislead the respondent No. 1. Apart from the question as to whether the Additional Registrar was competent enough to administer oath or to get the documents verified before him, the point still remains as to who was the officer who administered the oath to the petitioner or who got the documents verified. The Court cannot look at this matter lightly nor can the Court lose sight of the fact that the respondent No. 1 is not supposed to know the signature or initials of all the officers so as to understand as to who is the officer before whom he signed and verified. In view of this, this Court is of the firm opinion that the presentation of the election petition definitely suggests a deformity therein with all gravity inviting the consequences to be followed under section 86 of the Act. 40. One additional aspect to be noted in the present petition is that from the original election petition it is seen that the stamp of the Additional Registrar is used on all pages of the original petition till page 7 thereof. It is also seen that the stamp is used and signatures are on both the sides of the election petition. However, the stamp on page 8 of the original election petition is not of the Additional Registrar but it is of Section Officer/Assistant Registrar. It is also seen that the stamp is used and signatures are on both the sides of the election petition. However, the stamp on page 8 of the original election petition is not of the Additional Registrar but it is of Section Officer/Assistant Registrar. However, so far as the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1 is concerned, on pages 1 to 7 it is clear that it nowhere bears the stamp of the Additional Registrar so as to make the respondent No. 1 to understand that it is signed by the Additional Registrar. Naturally, the respondent No. 1 would not be wrong if he draws an inference that it is a signature of the section Officer/Assistant Registrar. This definitely, in the opinion of this Court, would amount to misleading the respondent No. 1. Page 8 of the copy of election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1 is not even marked as true copy. Same is the case as regards page 16 which is not signed as true copy. A bare signature of the petitioner on that page is not enough to suggest that it is signed in token of it being a true copy. A reference to pages 27 to 29 is already made. Page 30 does not even bear the endorsement as true copy and is not even signed. In the opinion of this Court, these defects cannot be brushed aside lightly. 41. Shri R.G. Karmarkar argued that the defects which are pointed out could not be said to be fatal to the election petition nor could be said to have caused any prejudice to the respondent No. 1. He further argued that if there are any defects or shortcomings, same are curable and the election petition cannot be dismissed on that count. In support of his contentions, he relied on the decision reported in 1999(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)71 : 1999 A.I.R. S.C.W. 338 in the matter of (Anil R. Deshmukh v. Onkar N. Wagh and others)10. However, after going through the said judgment it is seen that when the matter had come up for hearing before the Court, by that time the defects were cured and their Lordships of the Supreme Court had specifically observed that in the facts and circumstances of that case, there was no doubt sufficient compliance of section 81(3) read with section 81(1)(c) of the Act. However, that is not the case in the present matter. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the judgment cited above cannot be said to be applicable to the facts of the present case. 42. Shri R.G. Karmarkar further faintly argued that the present matter cannot be equated with the case wherein corrupt practices are alleged in which case strict compliance with the provisions of section 81 and section 83 of the Act is to be made. Expanding his arguments, he further argued that in the present case no corrupt practices are alleged and hence, according to him, the petitioner cannot be meted out with such a harsh consequence of dismissal of his petition. This Court is of the view that any decision in the election petition under the Representation of People Act, 1951, has a direct effect on the rights of the parties concerned therewith and hence, they are to be equitably read and seen both for the petitioner as well as the respondent. In the case in hand, therefore, if the defects are so glaring that they compel this Court to take a view that the respondent cannot be compelled unnecessarily to contest the election petition which is worth to be dismissed at the threshold. 43. Shri R.G. Karmarkar has relied on the decisions in 1995(1) Bom.C.R. 322 : 1994 A.I.R. S.C.W. 2028 in the matter of (Mohan Rawale v. Damodhar Tatyaba)11. However, after having gone through the facts of the said case it is apparent that the principles laid down therein cannot be made applicable to the present case. 44. Section 83 of the Act specifically provides that any schedule or annexure to the election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the election petition. The defects which are pointed out and which are curable as argued by Shri Karmarkar, will have to be cured first and such curing of the defects cannot be said to be now permissible, particularly when the respondent No. 1 was already served with the defective copy of the election petition. Permitting the petitioner to cure the defects is now beyond imagination. In fact, to avoid such consequences a provision of section 81(3) of the Act is already made to make the petitioner aware that he has to be thoroughly diligent in presenting the correct election petition at the first instance itself. Permitting the petitioner to cure the defects is now beyond imagination. In fact, to avoid such consequences a provision of section 81(3) of the Act is already made to make the petitioner aware that he has to be thoroughly diligent in presenting the correct election petition at the first instance itself. This Court is, therefore, of the firm opinion that now the defects which are pointed out in the present case cannot be said to be curable defects at this stage and the arguments of Shri Karmarkar cannot be accepted. 45. Shri B.D. Joshi invited my attention to three decisions reported in (1) 1997(2) Mh.L.J. 509 in the matter of (V.R. Ghasalkar v. Sunit)12, (2) 1997(1) All.Mh.L.R. 116 in the matter of (Anant Waman Tare v. A.R. Antulay)13, and (3) 1996 All.Mh.L.R. in the matter of (Jagannath S. Rahane v. Manisha M. Nimkar)14,. On the basis of these judgments it is argued by Shri B.D. Joshi that these defects either in the verification or the affidavit are definitely fatal and the petition deserves to be dismissed on that count. 46. Shri Joshi rightly argued that assuming for the sake of arguments that there were certain mistakes which could be attributed to the working of the office, taking into consideration his arguments as to the use of the stamps and signatures of the officer concerned even to the extent of permitting the petitioner to add or amend pages 27 to 30, that by itself would not be sufficient to say that the petitioner was not at fault. Ultimately, according to Shri Joshi, it is not easy to say that the election petition cannot be dismissed under section 86 of the Act at the threshold on account of the omission on the part of the Registry of the High Court to point out the same as per its procedure cannot be countenanced. The lapse on the part of the Registry is not an insurance to deny to the returned candidate the plea that the attestation of the affidavit and its verification to be a true copy is an integral part of pleadings of the election petition. Shri Joshi for this purpose relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1691 in the matter of (Dr. (Smt.) Shipra v. Shantilal and others)15. Shri Joshi for this purpose relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1691 in the matter of (Dr. (Smt.) Shipra v. Shantilal and others)15. On the basis of paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment he argued that the present election petition deserves dismissal at the threshold. 47. Shri Karmarkar, no doubt, brought to my notice the decision reported in 1999 A.I.R. S.C.W. 382 in the matter of (H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda)16. It is a decision wherein there was defect in the affidavit itself. The matter related to the corrupt practices. In a case of corrupt practices, affidavit in accordance with the law is a must. The Court held that the defect in the affidavit was curable one. This clearly means there were no defects so far as compliance of section 81 of the Act was concerned. The defect in the affidavit was, therefore, held to be curable and not fatal. However, in the case in hand, there is no question of defect in the affidavit itself but there are definitely shortcomings in the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of which the respondent No. 1 was supposed to proceed in the matter. Hence, the defects in the copy of the present election petition since was the basis for raising an objection by the respondent No. 1, are to be looked at from a different angle. To clarify, it would be necessary to say that if law requires an affidavit to be filed alongwith the petition or particularly in the case of allegation of corrupt practice, non-filing thereof would be fatal but if it is filed and there is some defect in that affidavit then that can be said to be a curable defect. This difference definitely will have to be kept in mind while deciding the present matter. 48. There is another angle which this Court has to look into. Whenever a copy is received by the respondent he takes it to be the true copy in every respect of the original election petition which is presented by the petitioner in the Court. He is not supposed to go to the Court to find out whether the copy of the election petition received by him is identical in every respect with that of the original election petition. He is not supposed to go to the Court to find out whether the copy of the election petition received by him is identical in every respect with that of the original election petition. If per se he finds certain defects keeping in view the provisions of law, then he is justified in raising those objections. In the instant case, Shri B.D. Joshi pointed out that on the copy of the respondent No. 1 the stamp used by the office is of the Section Officer/Assistant Registrar and at the time of arguments it was further pointed out by him that on most of the pages on the original election petition, there is a stamp of Additional Registrar, which is not borne on the copy of the election petition received by the respondent No. 1. Now the question, according to Shri Joshi, is that when the stamp and signature of the Additional Registrar is there on the original election petition, same should find place with the initials of the Additional Registrar and not of the Section Officer/Assistant Registrar. Shri Joshi is right in arguing that his client was not supposed to know that it is the very Additional Registrar who has made initials though the stamp is of the Section Officer/Assistant Registrar. In the view of this Court, no doubt, this is in contravention of the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act and therefore, this Court has to look at the same with all seriousness therein. 49. In the decision reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 956 in the matter of Rajendra Singh v. Smt. Usha Rani and others, it is observed that a perusal of section 81(3) of the Act gives an impression that they do not contemplate filing of an incorrect election petition at all and if the election petitioner disregards the mandate contained in section 81(3) of the Act by filing incorrect copy he runs the risk of election petition being dismissed at the threshold under section 86 of the Act. It is not part of the duty of the respondent No. 1 to wade through the entire record in order to find out as to which of the copies is correct. It is not part of the duty of the respondent No. 1 to wade through the entire record in order to find out as to which of the copies is correct. If the copy of the respondent is found to be incorrect one as not tallying with the original election petition, then it amounts to non-compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act, sufficient to ential dismissal of the election petition. It is also observed in the aforesaid decision that the mandate contained in section 81(3) of the Act cannot be equated with section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which makes the omissions curable irregularities. No such concept can be imported into election law because the object of law is that the electoral process could not be set at naught and the elected candidate should not be thrown out unless the grounds mentioned in the Act are clearly and fully proved. 50. In view of what has been observed above, this Court has to answer issue No. 6 as follows :- (a) The respondent No. 1 has failed to prove that the election petition filed by the petitioner is not signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. However, so far as the copy of the election petition served on the respondent No. 1 is concerned, it is not strictly in compliance with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act and hence, the election petition deserves to be dismissed on that count. (b) Issue No. 7 has been completely proved by the respondent No. 1 by specifically pointing out that the election petition does not comply with the provisions of section 81(3) of the Act. Hence, Issue No. 7 is answered in the affirmative. (c) So far as Issue No. 8 is concerned, the respondent No. 1 has proved that the copy of the election petition received by him in accordance with Rule 10 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules also needs the same compliance as is contemplated under section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. (c) So far as Issue No. 8 is concerned, the respondent No. 1 has proved that the copy of the election petition received by him in accordance with Rule 10 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules also needs the same compliance as is contemplated under section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. (d) Hence, Issue No. 9 has to be answered to the effect that because of non-compliance of the provisions of sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, the election petition deserves to be dismissed on the preliminary issues with costs. 51. In the result, the election petition is dismissed with costs. 52. The Additional Registrar at Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court is directed to forthwith comply with the provisions of section 103 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Election petition dismissed. -----