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2000 DIGILAW 249 (PNJ)

Raj Kumar Sharma v. Rattan Devi Through Her Lrs.

2000-03-02

V.S.AGGARWAL

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Judgment V.S.Aggarwal, J. 1. The present revision petition has been filed by Raj Kumar Sharma (hereinafter described as "the petitioner") directed against the judgment of the learned Appellate Authority, Jalandhar, dated 11.9.1982. By virtue of the impugned judgment, the learned Appellate Authority had set aside the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Nawanshahar, dated 23.1.1980. An order of eviction was passed against the petitioner with respect to the suit premises. 2. The relevant facts are that respondent Smt. Rattan Devi, now represented by her legal representatives, had filed a petition for eviction against petitioner Raj Kumar Sharma. The sole ground which requires consideration is as to if the petitioner-tenant had ceased to occupy the premises for a period of four months before the filing of the petition or not. It was asserted that the petitioner had gone abroad and had ceased to occupy the shop without any reasonable cause for a period of eight months. The shop has remained closed continuously since then. 3. The petition for eviction on the said ground had been contested. The claim set up was that the shop in question had never remained closed. It is being run by one Krishan Lal who is the agent of the petitioner and by his father. 4. The learned Rent Controller had framed the issues and recorded the evidence. With respect to the main controversy, the learned Rent Controller had returned the finding that the respondent-landlord had failed to show that the property in question is not in occupation of the petitioner-tenant continuously for a period of four months before filing of the petition. Accordingly, it was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent had preferred an appeal. The learned Appellate Authority had set aside the findings of the learned Rent Controller and on the contrary held that it is abundantly clear from the evidence on the record that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the premises for a period of four months before filing of the petition. An order of eviction followed. Hence, the present revision petition. 6. It is a finding of fact that has been arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority on perusal of evidence that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the property for a period of four months before the filing of the petition without reasonable cause. An order of eviction followed. Hence, the present revision petition. 6. It is a finding of fact that has been arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority on perusal of evidence that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the property for a period of four months before the filing of the petition without reasonable cause. When the finding is based on evidence, indeed, this Court will not interfere unless it is shown that the findings so arrived at are erroneous, absurd or without basis. 7. Though certain decisions were cited at the bar, they have little impact on the merits of the matter. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr., 1972 Rent Control Reporter 85, the tenant of the shop had gone abroad and his sons continued to do business in the shop. The plea of the landlord was that the tenant has not been in occupation of the shop for a continuous period of four months and, therefore, the ground of eviction must be taken to be available. It was held that where the premises are hot in actual use either by the tenant or by someone on his behalf, the said ground of eviction will be attracted. Mere absence of the tenant from the suit premises will not arm the landlord to seek eviction. This proposition has not been controverted and almost identical was the view point of this Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v. Surinder Kumar, 1975 Rent Control Reporter 567. This Court once again held that the expression "ceases to occupy" means that the premises had been left unattended. 8. The question that immediately arises for consideration is as to whether it can be inferred that there was any other person in occupation of the property from where it could be said that the tenant has ceased to occupy the property in question. 9. The petitioner had pleaded that the business in the shop is being run by Krishan Lal, his agent, and the father of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the shop was never locked except on holidays. In other words, it had not been disputed that the petitioner had gone abroad. During the course of evidence, it transpired that the father of the petitioner was above 70 years of age. According to the petitioner, the shop was never locked except on holidays. In other words, it had not been disputed that the petitioner had gone abroad. During the course of evidence, it transpired that the father of the petitioner was above 70 years of age. He has a weak eye sight and he could only sit on the shop and cannot transact any business. The father of the petitioner never appeared as a witness even to depose that he had conducted any business or that he sits and works at the shop. In the absence of any evidence that the father of the petitioner has conducted any business, the said contention must be rejected. Krishan Lal, who is described as agent by the petitioner, appeared as a witness. But on the contrary, he stated that he makes a visit to the shop and actually does not carry on business therein. There was no bill produced so as to show that any business had ever been transacted from the said shop. In these circumstances, what is being alleged, therefore, has not been totally proved. 10. A plea was offered that petitioners two sons were sitting on the shop and conducting the business. However, during the course of evidence, it has transpired that they were students of 9th and 10th class and were not in a position to run the business. Thus, it was inferred that it has not been established that the petitioner was carrying on any business in the shop in question. No accounts were produced to show that the business, in fact, was conducted. In that view of the fact, the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority cannot be interfered and it cannot be termed that the learned Appellate Authority had arrived at erroneous finding. 11. For these reasons, the revision petition, must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is granted three months time to vacate the premises.