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2000 DIGILAW 250 (PAT)

Rijhan Nag v. State Of Bihar

2000-02-14

M.Y.EQBAL

body2000
Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner seeks issuance of appropriate writ directing the respondents to consider her case in the matter of settlement of 4 katha of land of MS Plot No. 886, Ward No. 4 at Purlia Road, Ranchi. 2. The petitioners case is that she was the owner of portion of plot No. 58 Khata No. 65 of Mouja Chouri, P.S. Kanke, District Ranchi. The Public Works Department, in order to make construction of Potpoto Bridge on Ranchi-Kanke road wanted to acquire 6 decimals of portion of the aforementioned plot No. 58, approached the petitioner for the said purpose. It was represented that if the respondents are allowed to take possession of the land belonging to the petitioner for construction of the aforesaid bridge instead of making payment of compensation, the petitioner will be alleged in exchange of her land an area of 28.71 sf at Purlia Road within the Ranchi Municipal Corporation. It is contended that the petitioner agreed to offer the land over which the Bridge was constructed. After the said acquisition, the petitioner made an application before the Circle Officer, Town Anchal, Ranchi for settlement of the aforesaid land instead of claiming compensation. The application was processed by the Circle Officer vide Settlement Case No. 5/R8/85-86 and a report to that effect was submitted by the Superintending Engineer of P.W.D. for giving the land to the petitioner in exchange of the petitioners land. Accordingly, a proposal for settlement of land was recommended and forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner but in spite of several representations the Deputy Commissioner did not consider the representation nor passed any order. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated, inter alia, that the case of the petitioner for settlement of the aforementioned land was considered by the respondents and after due verification the settlement application of the petitioner has been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner on 28.1.2000. It is further stated that the land of the petitioner bearing Plot No. 58 was acquired by P.W.D. and an award for compensation to the petitioner has already been declared. It is stated that neither the land is suitable for settlement nor the petitioner comes under the category of suitable class for land settlement as she is the seniormost officer of the Education Department and comes under the higher income group. 4. It is stated that neither the land is suitable for settlement nor the petitioner comes under the category of suitable class for land settlement as she is the seniormost officer of the Education Department and comes under the higher income group. 4. I have heard Mr. V. Shivnath, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned J.C. to G.P. 2. 5. Mr. Shivnath assailed the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner as being illegal and wholly witHout jurisdiction. learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner on the basis of representation made by the State and in particular the P.W.D., altered her position by giving the land to the State Government without praying any compensation in terms of money, the respondent-State is bound by the promissory estoppel and cannot deny petitioners legitimate right and rehabilitation. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the petitioner was offered a sum of Rs. 12,000.00 as price of the land which the petitioner refused to accept and claimed equal area of the land which was accepted by P.W.D., Road Department and in that view of the matter, the respondents are bound to settle the land in favour of the petitioner. I do not find much force in the submission of the learned Counsel. At the very outset, it may be mentioned here that the petitioner sought a relief in this writ application in ; terms of order directing the respondent-Deputy Commissioner to consider the case of the petitioner with regard to settlement of land. From perusal of the counter-affidavit, it appears that the claim of the petitioner was considered by the Deputy Commissioner and the same was rejected. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner or the Collector ever agreed to settle the land in question in exchange of the land alleged to have been acquired for construction of Bridge. Even assuming that in lieu of acquisition of aportion of land belonging to the petitioner situated at village Kanke and of the officer of P.W.D. agreed to give some land in the heart of the down near Purlia Road, Ranchi, such promise cannot and shall not be binding either on the State or on the Collector and the Deputy Commissioner. Even assuming that in lieu of acquisition of aportion of land belonging to the petitioner situated at village Kanke and of the officer of P.W.D. agreed to give some land in the heart of the down near Purlia Road, Ranchi, such promise cannot and shall not be binding either on the State or on the Collector and the Deputy Commissioner. As amatter of fact the P.W.D. or Road Construction Department or any officer of those department have no authority under the law to accept the offer of the petitioner or agree to settle the land as per the choice of the petitioner. Admittedly, the land for which the petitioner applied for settlement does not belong to Road Construction Department or P.W.D. It is also not disputed by the petitioner that she does not come under the category of suitable class for land settlement. Admittedly, she is the seniormost officer of the Education Department and comes under the category of higher income group. In my opinion, therefore, the submission of Mr. Shivnath that the respondents are bound by promissory estoppel is wholly misconceived. 6. It is wellsettled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to enforce a promise contrary to law. Even assuming that some promise was made by the officer of P.W.D. or Road Construction Department for settlement of land in lieu of acquisition of land of the petitioner then such promise is contrary to law because the officer of such department has no authority under the law to make any promise for settlement of land belonging to the State of Bihar or the Municipal Corporation. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari V/s. State of U.P. and Anr. -- . 7. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari V/s. State of U.P. and Anr. -- . 7. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. -- , while considering the applicability of promissory estoppel against the State or its instrumentalities, have observed: It is now wellsettled by a series of decisions of this Court that the State authorities as well as its limbs like the Board covered by the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution of India being treated as "State" within the meaning of the said article, can be made subject to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel in cases where because of their representation the party claiming estoppel has changed its position and if such an estoppel does not fly in the face of any statutory prohibition, absence of power and authority of the promisor and is otherwise not opposed to public interest, and also when equity in favour of the promisee does not outweigh equity in favour of the promisor entitling the latter to legally get out of the promise. 8. As noticed above, it has been categorically stated in the counteraffidavit that the application for settlement of land made by the petitioner was found and recorded as Kaisr-e-Hind-Rasta and on verification it was further found that the land is not fit for settlement. Counsel for the petitioner failed to brought my notice any law or the authority of the Road Construction Department to make promise for settlement of the aforesaid land in favour of the petitioner. 9. Having regard to the entire facts facts and circumstances of the case and law discussed hereinabove, I am of the opinion that the claim of the petitioner for settlement of the land cannot be sustained in law. No relief, therefore, can be granted to the petitioner in this writ application, which is accordingly dismissed.