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2000 DIGILAW 252 (HP)

UTPAL DASS v. STATE OF H. P.

2000-09-15

A.L.VAIDYA, AVTAR SINGH, NARINDER SINGH THAKUR

body2000
JUDGMENT ORDER : Justice A.L. VAIDYA. J (Retd.), CHAIRMAN :- The present original Application was taken - up for final disposal on August 17, 2000 before the Division Bench. Certain points of reference have been made for the decision of the Full Bench by the Division Bench. The order dated August 17, 2000 passed by the Division Bench is reproduced here-under:- “OA-1647/91 17-8-2000 Present : Sh. K.D. Shreedhar, Advocate for the applicant. Sh. Rajinder Dogra, Advocate vice Shri J.R. Thakur, Advocate for respondent No. 2 Sh. Dalip Sharma, Advocate for respondent No. 3 Argument partly heard During the course of arguments it has been brought to the notice of the Tribunal that the State Government has issued a Notification dated August 5, 2000 under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 rescinding the earlier notification issued on August 29, 1986 under Sub section (2) of section 15 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985. The Learned counsel for the parties have submitted that before the matter is heard on merits some important questions of law have arisen after the issuance of latest notification by the State Government as referred to above and it would be in the interest of Justice that the said propositions of law at first instance are referred to the decision of full Bench inasmuch as keeping in view of the importance of the matter involved. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the following points of reference are made for the decision of the full bench :- (i) Whether the State Government has got power under sub section (2) of section 15 of Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 read with Section 21 of General clauses Act 1897 to issue notification rescinding the earlier notification dated August 29, 1986 with immediate effect in public interest : (ii) If point of reference No. 1 is decided in affirmative what would be the effect of notification issued on August 5, 2000 as referred to above to the pending cases covered under the earlier Notification issued by the State Government under Sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 on August 29, 1986. List before the Full Bench on August 31, 2000. ‘Dasti copy’ Sd/- (A.L. Vaidya, J (Retd.) Chairman Sd/- (V.K. Bhatnagar) Member (A) August 17, 2000 2. List before the Full Bench on August 31, 2000. ‘Dasti copy’ Sd/- (A.L. Vaidya, J (Retd.) Chairman Sd/- (V.K. Bhatnagar) Member (A) August 17, 2000 2. Before the aforesaid points of reference are taken-up for decision, two Notifications issued by the State Government are reproduced here-under : Authorised English text of this Govt. No. per (AP-II) – B (19)-11/86 dated 29-8-86 as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the constitution of India Notification In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985), the State Government hereby specifies the 1st day of September, 1986 as the date on and from which provisions of Sub-section (3) of section 156 of the said Act shall apply to the local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government. Sd/- (P.K. Matto) Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh. No. Per (A-II) –B (19)- 11/86 Dt. 29.8.1986 (Authoritative English Text of this Department Notification No. per (AP-II) B(19)- dated 5-8-2000 as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the constitution of India) Government of Himachal Pradesh Department of Personnel (A-II) Notification In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985), read with Section 21 of General clauses Act, 1897, (Act No. 10 of 1897), the Governor of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to rescind this Government Notification No. per (AP-II)B(19)-11/86 dated 29.8.1986 with immediate effect in public interest. By order A.K Goswami Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh." 3. In order to understand the purpose of earlier Notification issued by the State Government under Section 15(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act (here-in-after to be called as an Act), the provisions of Section 15(2) and Section 15(3) of the Act for the sake of convenience are referred here-in-below : "15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals:- (2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations (or societies) controlled or owned by the State Government. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals:- (2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations (or societies) controlled or owned by the State Government. Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of local or other authorities or Corporations (or societies). 3. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or Corporation (or society) all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court in relation to - (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation (or Society); and (b) all service matters concerning a person (other than a person referred to in clause (b) of sub-Section (i) of this Section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation (or society) and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs." 4. The present Original Application has been preferred against the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation & Ors which has been tried by this Tribunal on the strength of Notification issued under Section 15 (2) of the Act on August 29, 1986. The later Notification of August 15, 2000 has rescinded the earlier Notification with immediate effect and this Notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897. The later Notification of August 15, 2000 has rescinded the earlier Notification with immediate effect and this Notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897. The State Governments version with respect to the Notification is that henceforth the State Administrative Tribunal was ceased to exercise the jurisdiction as was being earlier done on the basis of earlier Notification and consequence of that would be that the State Administrative Tribunal will dismiss the applications pending before it for want of jurisdiction and return the cases to the applicants for presentation in the Court of competent jurisdiction. 5. It is in the aforesaid background that the points as detailed above have been referred for the decision of the Full Bench. 6. At the very outset, a preliminary point has been raised as to whether this Tribunal is empowered to scrutinise the validity of the Notification issued on August 5, 2000 in view of AIR 1997 SCC 1125 re: L Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors. The learned counsel who have submitted their arguments have referred para-93 of the aforesaid reported case. Para-93 runs as under:- "Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions of the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory Provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme court which nave, under but constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. 7. On the basis of Sub-section 3 and 4 referred to above, the enforcement of the Act in relation to the Central Administrative Tribunal and to the proposed State Administrative Tribunal have been left to the Centre Government. Thus, the conferment of power on the Central Government under Sub Sections 3 and 4 above, by parliament for determining when the provisions of an Act shall come into force amounts to conditional legislation. The provisions of Sections 35 and Section 36 of the Act which give power to the Government to make rules are provisions relating to delegated legislation. Thus, conditional legislation is permissible whereby the legislature has entrusted to the Government discretionary power to select time or place to enforce a law. 8. The provisions of Sections 35 and Section 36 of the Act which give power to the Government to make rules are provisions relating to delegated legislation. Thus, conditional legislation is permissible whereby the legislature has entrusted to the Government discretionary power to select time or place to enforce a law. 8. In the aforesaid background, the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act are in the form of conditional legislation. At this stage, a querry was put to the learned counsel who were arguing the petition whether the Central Government is empowered to withdraw the Notification under Section 1(3) of the Act.? The central Government issued Notification under Section 1 Sub-Section 3 of the Act and thereby appointed the first day of July, 1985 as the date on which the provisions of the Act so far as they related, the Central Administrative Tribunal came into force. Now, the question arises as the query was put whether this Notification issued, by the Central Government on the basis of which the Act came into force with respect to Central Administrative Tribunal Act on first day of July, 1985 can be legally with drawn by the centre Government under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act? All the Lawyers who submitted their arguments were unanimous with the answer in the negative. According to them, the power given to the centre Government under Section 1 sub Section 3 is to be exercised only once and there is nothing in the Act itself to empower the Centre Government for withdrawing that Notification; issued under Section 1 of Sub Section 3 by the Centre Government. It has been argued that in case, such a power vests in the Central Government that would make the entire Act a defunct one in a way impliedly making the operation of the Act un-enforceable. 9. On the aforesaid plea, it has been contended that Section 15 (2) of the Act nowhere empowered the State Government to withdraw the Notification issued earlier. It has further been submitted that the power once exercised by the State Government under Section 15 (2) of the Act stood exhausted and the State Government then left with no power to cancel, rescind or modifying the earlier Notification. As explained above, the provisions of Section 15 (2) of the Act nowhere empowers the State Government to issue the Later Notification withdrawing the earlier one with immediate effect. As explained above, the provisions of Section 15 (2) of the Act nowhere empowers the State Government to issue the Later Notification withdrawing the earlier one with immediate effect. It is Section 21 of the General Clauses Act which is being relied upon in support of Governments action. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act runs as under :- "21. Power to issue to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications orders, rules or bye-laws. Where, by any central Act or Regulation a power to issue notification, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued." 10. The aforesaid provisions of General clauses Act is not at all of universal application. In so far as the subordinate legislation is concerned whereby exact authority has been empowered to frame rules etc. in accordance with the provisions of the statutory applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can definitely be made use of. But so far as the conditional legislation is concerned, more so, the case of present nature, the applicability of Section 21 is not called for especially when Section 15 (2) of the Act gives onetime power to the State to act accordingly which discretion has already been exercised and that discretion cannot be withdrawn. AIR 1976 SC 714 re: Lachmi Narain Vs. Union of India & Ors can safely be referred at this stage. Para No. 81 of the aforesaid judgment runs as under:- "81. Nor could the Respondents derive any authority or validity from Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, for the notifications withdrawing the exemptions. The source from which the power to amend the Second Schedule, comes is Sec. 6 (2) of the Bengal Act and not Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Sec. 21, as pointed out by this court in Gopi Chand V. Delhi Administration, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 87 = (AIR 1959 SC 609) embodies only a rule of construction and the nature and extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification. Sec. 21, as pointed out by this court in Gopi Chand V. Delhi Administration, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 87 = (AIR 1959 SC 609) embodies only a rule of construction and the nature and extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification. The power, therefore, had to be exercised within the limits circumscribed by Section 6 (2) and for the purpose for which it was conferred." This AIR 1976 SC 714 has referred AIR 1951 SC 332 where the matter has been discussed in detail. 11. In AIR 1981 (MP) 121 re: Thakur Vishweshwarsharan Singh Vs. STA Tribunal, Gwalior and ors, it has been held that once a section of some amending Act is brought into force by issue of a Notification under some Section of the Act, the power under that section and to that extent is exhausted and the Government has then no power under the same provision of the Act as been brought into force. The power of repeal of law which is a legislative power cannot be delegated. We have no hesitation in holding that the rule of construction enunciated by S. 21 of the General Clauses Act in so far as it refers to the power of rescinding or cancelling the original order cannot be invoked in respect of the provisions of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act." Paras 21 and 22 of AIR 1966 Calcutta 371 re: M/s Shellac Industries Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen are very much relevant which are reproduced hereunder :- "21 -It will be noticed that the State does not come into the picture once a reference is made until the Tribunal submits its award to the appropriate Government except when S 8 and 33 B come into play. Sections 8 and 33-B impliedly suggest that there are no other grounds for intervention by the State during the progress of the reference. Therefore, in the intervening period from the time of the commencement of the reference til the making of the award, the tribunal proceeds with the reference without in dereference and direction from the State. Sections 8 and 33-B impliedly suggest that there are no other grounds for intervention by the State during the progress of the reference. Therefore, in the intervening period from the time of the commencement of the reference til the making of the award, the tribunal proceeds with the reference without in dereference and direction from the State. 22 - Therefore, in my opinion, there is no room even by implication for the application of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act in the Scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." In AIR 1964 Assam 51 re: Management of Assame Railway and Trading C. Ltd. Margherita Vs. Ram Labhaya Presiding officer, Industrial Tribunal, Assam Guhati and Ors. it has been held that the Industrial Disputes Act does not confer any power on the appropriate Government to cancel or supersede a reference made under Section 10 (1) nor can such power be claimed by implication on the strength of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. 12. In AIR 1991 SC 2160 re: H.C. Suman and Anr. Vs. Rehabilition Ministry Employees Co-op House Building Society Ltd. New Delhi and Ors, it has been held that whereunder an earlier notification or order passed under Section 88 of Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, some persons acquired rights enforceable in law, the right so created cannot be taken away by a subsequent order or notification rescinding the earlier order or notification. In this behalf para-33 of the judgment is very much relevant which runs as under:- "The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It cannot be disputed that as a consequence of the quasi-judicial order of the Lt. Governor dated 19th August 1985 and the notification dated 27th October, 1987 a substantive right was created in favour of the 26 persons whose names had been mentioned in List B of the affidavit by Shri S.C. Saxena filed in the High Court. The challenge to that notification had already failed before the High Court and the matter was sub judice before this Court in special leave petition giving rise to this civil appeal when the notification dated 29th August, 1990 was issued. The notification dated 27th October, 1987 had specifically been issued under Section 88 of the Act. The challenge to that notification had already failed before the High Court and the matter was sub judice before this Court in special leave petition giving rise to this civil appeal when the notification dated 29th August, 1990 was issued. The notification dated 27th October, 1987 had specifically been issued under Section 88 of the Act. Even though the subsequent notification dated 29th August, 1990 does not disclose the source of the power under which it had been issued, learned counsel for the appellants traced its source to Section 88 itself read with the power to add to, amend, very or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye laws contained in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In State of Kerala V.K.B. Madhavan Pillai (1988) 4 SCC 669: (AIR 1989 SC 49), it was held by the High Court that if in pursuance of an earlier order passed by the Government some person acquires a right enforceable in law, the said right cannot be taken away by a subsequent order under general power of rescindment available to the Government under the General Clauses Act and that the said power of rescindment had to be determined in the light of the subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the statute. The view taken by the High Court was upheld by this Court in paragraph 27 of the report. The notification dated 29th August, 1990 would, therefore, be invalid on this ground also, in view of the foregoing discussion, the civil appeal deserves to be dismissed." 13. 1976 LAB I.C. 1317 re: ‘A’ Ahad Vs. Union of India and Ors. is very also much relevant to appreciate the proposition in hand. It has been held in this precedent that the effect of a transfer under Section 12-A of the Food Corporation Act is that the employee concerned ceases to be an employee of the Central Government and becomes an employee of the Food Corporation of India. No link whatsoever of such a transferred employee is left with his parent Department. Further, it has been held that the Notification of transfer issued cannot be modified or rescinded on the basis of Section 21 of General Clauses Act. Para-6 of the aforesaid ruling is very much relevant wherein the proposition in detail has been discussed. No link whatsoever of such a transferred employee is left with his parent Department. Further, it has been held that the Notification of transfer issued cannot be modified or rescinded on the basis of Section 21 of General Clauses Act. Para-6 of the aforesaid ruling is very much relevant wherein the proposition in detail has been discussed. The crux of the discussion is as under:- "Such being the clear purport and import the transfer once effected under Section 12-A is final and complete and is irrevocable. Such legislative provisions could not be set at naught by application of rule of construction as embodied in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Section 21 which embodies a rule of construction, is by no means one of universal application. It depends upon the intent, purposes and Scope of a particular legislation in relation to which an action taken is sought to be modified or amended by application of section 21 case law discussed.” 14. The matter regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal from local or other Authorities or Corporation or Societies was examined in consultation with the Law Department. The Law Department has opined that it is within the competency of the State Government to extend and exclude the jurisdiction of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal in respect of any service of these institutions with giving reasons and justification in doing so with the prior approval of the Council of Ministers. The Law Department has further opined that with the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the H.P. Administrative Tribunal over the cases pertaining to the service matters of the employees of these organisations, the jurisdiction of the Honble High Court and other courts will be invoked automatically and the position prevailing prior to the issuance of notification dated 29.8.86 will be restored. On cessation of jurisdiction the State Administrative Tribunal will dismiss the applications pending before it for want of jurisdiction and return the cases to the applicants for presentation in the court of competent jurisdiction. The detailed opinions tendered by the Law Department are annexure at A” and B." Annexure A and b referred to above are the legal opinions rendeted by the Law Department. It has been made the base of the aforesaid memorandum. 15. The statistics given in the Cabinet memorandum as referred to above appear to be not reflecting the correct picture. The detailed opinions tendered by the Law Department are annexure at A” and B." Annexure A and b referred to above are the legal opinions rendeted by the Law Department. It has been made the base of the aforesaid memorandum. 15. The statistics given in the Cabinet memorandum as referred to above appear to be not reflecting the correct picture. After physical verification, the pendency of all types of cases have been found on 31.7.2000, to be 17506 cases which included main and Misc. etc. The number of cases pertaining to the Corporations and others pending on 31.7.2000 are Main cases 3063 and there were other miscellaneous and other cases numbering about 1000. These total number of cases pertaining to Corporations and others are included in 17506 cases pending on 31.7.2000. 16. The H.P. Administrative Tribunal came into being on September 1, 1986. At that time only one Bench was functioning. Keeping in view the pendency, the State Government created another bench in February 1989 and at present there are two benches functioning in the Tribunal consisting of two Judicial and two Administrative Members. 17. There is no doubt that pendency at present appears to be a little on higher side. There are so many reasons for the same. It may be pointed out that inspite of the fact that sufficient number of cases haven been disposed of. This large pendency remains due to the fact that the institution of cases have increased manifold and also due to the fact that the two Benches have not been in full strength for a longer period. At this stage, it may be referred here that the second Bench was created in February, 1989 and at that time, the total pendency of all types of cases in the Tribunal was about 2000 cases. That means for 2000 cases, two Benches were created. Now, one can imagine when the pendency happens to be 17506 of all types, how many Bench are required. This aspect has been considered by the State Government and probably on that account third Bench was required to be opened. But due to financial constraits, it has not been so done as has been mentioned in the Cabinet Memorandum. It may again be pointed out at this stage with respect to the speed of disposal and the number of disposal done by the Tribunal. 18. But due to financial constraits, it has not been so done as has been mentioned in the Cabinet Memorandum. It may again be pointed out at this stage with respect to the speed of disposal and the number of disposal done by the Tribunal. 18. It has been ascertained from the record that uptil July 31, 2000, 73, 976 cases of all types which included transfer applications transferred from the Honble High Court coupled with Original applications, M. As, Contempt Pets., Rev. Pets etc. were instituted out of these till July 31, 2000, 56470 cases have been finally disposed of meaning thereby, 76.303% of the total institution has been cleared of. 19. As pointed out above, the second Bench was created on February 13, 1989. Again, from the information supplied by the Office, till August, 2000, II years and six months have passed when the extra Bench was created or the two Benches had started functioning. Out of these II years and six months, the two Benches in full strength functioned for four years and eight months only and for six years and 10 month, Benches functioned in truncated from. Many a time, only one Division Bench functioned and for another time, the three members functioned. This aspect also has to be taken note of while assessing the disposal of the Tribunal. 20. It may not be out of place to mention here that the daily disposal of the cases by the tribunal at the first instance was about four to five cases per working day which steadily increased to 29.8 cases per working day by passing of each year. This 29.8 cases per day disposal was in the year 1998 and reached in the year 1999, 38.2 cases per day which cannot be said to be lass on any account whatsoever keeping in view the conditions under which the Tribunal has been functioning. Thus, to take out about 4500 all types of cases pertaining to Corporations etc. from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will not make any difference whatsoever and in that view of the matter also, the purpose for withdrawing the earlier Notification will not be served at all. Again, the main purpose of withdrawing the Notification as ventilated from the Cabinet Memorandum was of two folds. from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will not make any difference whatsoever and in that view of the matter also, the purpose for withdrawing the earlier Notification will not be served at all. Again, the main purpose of withdrawing the Notification as ventilated from the Cabinet Memorandum was of two folds. Firstly, the cases pending in the Tribunal coming under Section 15(2) of the Act would be dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction and secondly these petitions have to be returned to the applicants to be presented before the appropriate forum. Legally both these two purposes cannot be made of on the basis of the withdrawal of the Notification. 21. The so called 4500 cases pending in the Tribunal on the basis of the law have to be tried by the Tribunal itself even if the -Notification withdrawing the earlier Notification is held to be valid, It has been rightly conceded by the learned Additional Advocates General that in case later Notification withdrawing the earlier Notification is held to be legal, in that event also its applicability would be prospective and not retrospective, meaning thereby pending cases will remain with the Tribunal and the Tribunal shall continue to exercise its jurisdiction to those cases. Moreover, under the law in case forum has lost jurisdiction to try some pending cases on that account the case cannot be dismissed at all. No provision in this behalf has been brought before the Tribunal and secondly there is again no provision under the Act that such type of cases were the Tribunal ceases to exercise jurisdiction, those cases have to be returned back to the applicants to be presented before the appropriate forum. The State government appears to have been mis-led in this regard. The provisions of C.P.C. regarding the return of plaint where civil court has got no jurisdiction does not apply so far as the present proceedings before the present Tribunal are concerned. 22. It may be referred here that the present Act came into force on July 1, 1985 when the Central Government issued the notification. The Act was of prospective nature. There were many pending cases before the civil courts, High Court and other forum which type of cases henceforth have to be tried by the tribunal. 22. It may be referred here that the present Act came into force on July 1, 1985 when the Central Government issued the notification. The Act was of prospective nature. There were many pending cases before the civil courts, High Court and other forum which type of cases henceforth have to be tried by the tribunal. The legislature in order to bring all those pending cases within the preview of the Act enacted Section 29 of the Act also on the basis of which the cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the date of the establishment of the Tribunal stood transferred to the concerned Tribunal. The only idea was that all types of cases coming under the purview of the Act whether pending or going to be instituted come under the one forum. In case Section 29 was not enacted, the cases pending before another forum prior to the establishment of the Tribunal would have remained there. The legislature as such was wise enough to provide Section 29 in order to carry on successfully to achieve the aims and objects of the Act. 23. What has happened in the present case? The State by withdrawing the earlier notification wants to infer the applicability of this notification to be of retrospective effect which is not within the ambit of Section 21 of General Clauses Act. Whatsoever, the State is trying to do by passing executive notification, can be so done by means of legislature enactments. In the present case the Parliament in its legislative power is competent enough to repeal the entire or any provisions of the Act which included even Section 15(2) of the Act. Thus, the purpose given in the Cabinet memorandum are not legally available to the State and though as discussed above cannot be achieved in accordance with law. In that view of the matter, the later notification with drawing the earlier notification with immediate effect shall have no legal binding force whatsoever. The learned Additional Advocate General by replying to the arguments addressed on behalf of the applicant made two-fold submissions:- (i) Notification issued by the State Government withdrawing the earlier one was a valid one as the State Government could act in that manner under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The learned Additional Advocate General by replying to the arguments addressed on behalf of the applicant made two-fold submissions:- (i) Notification issued by the State Government withdrawing the earlier one was a valid one as the State Government could act in that manner under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. (ii) It has been conceded that the operation of the later notification is prospective in nature meaning thereby the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall remain there for the pending cases. In order to find support to the aforesaid submissions the learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon certain case laws as under:- (i) AIR 1980 SC 1992 "M/s Kasturi Lal Vs. The State of J&K and another. (ii) 1995 (6) SCC 515 Sher Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others" (iii) 1997 (7) SCC 463" Union of India and another Vs. G. Ganayutham" (iv) 1997 (9) SCC 495 ‘Krishan Kakkanth Vs. Government of Kerala and others. (v) 1998 (2) Shimla Law Cases 508 Amar Singh and others Vs. State of H.P. Mothers. (vi) 1980 SLJ 77 K.R. Raghvan and other Vs. Union of India and others. 24. The aforesaid law cited in a way will not be helpful to the cases of the State as argued by the learned Additional Advocate General. The propositions decided in the aforesaid cases are in a way not relevant to the facts of to present case. More so, the aforesaid cited cases nowhere support the arguments of the learned counsel that State has got ample power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to withdraw the earlier notification. 25. The case law cited above deal with the reasonableness of the Governments action which may not be very much relevant to dispose of the proposition as to whether the State Government is empowered under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to withdraw the earlier notification issued under Section 15(2) of the Act. The reasonableness can be looked into in case at the first instance it is held that the State Government has been authorised to act under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Moreso, in case of present nature. The learned Additional Advocate General has further tried to find support in the interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act in the following reported cases:- (i) 1953 SCC 95 ‘The Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vrs. Moreso, in case of present nature. The learned Additional Advocate General has further tried to find support in the interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act in the following reported cases:- (i) 1953 SCC 95 ‘The Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vrs. Gutta Mills Workers Union 26. It has been held in this case that the State Government has not the power to extend the time for making an award ex-post-facto i.e. after the time limit originally fixed, thereafter, has expired. It has further been held that Section 14, U.P. General Clauses Act does not in terms or by necessary implications give any such power of extension of time nor can any support be derived from Section 21 of that Act to validate the award passed after the expiry of the time original fixed though the order giving extension ex facie purports to modify the original order fixing the time limits. 27. The aforesaid citation again is not helpful to the case of the applicant having been covered under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. In this behalf the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the aforesaid ruling has been cited with the sole purpose that Section 21 if made applicable would be of prospective nature and not of retrospective. Well, that principle has already been conceded by the learned Additional Advocate General. AIR 1954 Rajasthan 274 re: Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal Jaipur and Ors. 28. Again this ruling also does not help the State in-as-much-as it has been held therein that an order of amendment under Section 21 cannot operate retrospectively though it may operate prospectively. This ruling also does not help the State that Section 21 has empowered the State to issue later notification withdrawing the earlier notification. AIR 1959 Punjab 389- Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Ltd. Vs. industrial Tribunal, Patiala and ors: 29. In this ruling it has been held that the life of the Tribunal had come to an end of February 12, 1956, the notification of 29.2.1956 could not infuse fresh life in the Tribunal w.e.f. February 13, 1956. It has further been held that there were no amendment or modification of the previous notification of August 13, 1955 within the meaning of Section 21 with retrospective effect and the notification of February 29, 1956 could operate only prospectively. AIR 1977 Delhi 184 - Mohd Swallehin Vs. It has further been held that there were no amendment or modification of the previous notification of August 13, 1955 within the meaning of Section 21 with retrospective effect and the notification of February 29, 1956 could operate only prospectively. AIR 1977 Delhi 184 - Mohd Swallehin Vs. Governor Delhi & Ors. Again this is a case where Section 21 of the General Clauses Act gives power to the Government to issue or to rescind the notification which can have effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette. This power does not include a power to rescind the notification with retrospective effect. 30. In the aforesaid cited case, the retrospective application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out. So far as the present case is concerned, the main point in issue is whether the State Government has any power to use Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for withdrawing earlier Notification, to the effect ruling is silent. It has only been held that any Notification issued under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act will not be of retrospective nature. AIR 1967 SC 1419 re: Manujendra Dutt Vs. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and Ors., again does not deal with the proposition in hand. 31. Thus, the aforesaid case laws cited by the learned Additional Advocate General does not at all help the submissions put forth by the learned counsel in that particular behalf that under the present circumstances, the State Government is empowered to make use of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to withdraw the earlier notification. At this stage, it may be observed as argued that the Cabinet Memorandum, the copy of which supplied to the Tribunal does not contain the financial implications in carrying out the order proposed to be passed for withdrawing the earlier Notification. One can visualise, prima-facie what would be the financial implications as has been submitted. 32. As per State version all the cases coming under Section 15(2) have to be dismissed, meaning thereby, the lawyers fee has to be borne out by the party concerned. In the said 4500 pending cases, in 400 case State is a Party and the learned counsel on dismissal of those applications has to be paid fee. The learned counsel appearing for the Corporations etc. have to be paid fee after dismissal of the petition. In the said 4500 pending cases, in 400 case State is a Party and the learned counsel on dismissal of those applications has to be paid fee. The learned counsel appearing for the Corporations etc. have to be paid fee after dismissal of the petition. Apart from these, applicants have to engage lawyers for conducting their respective cases whether after return they have to be submitted before Honble High Court or before any Civil Court having Jurisdiction for the same. 33. On the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, which would be a fall out of the application of the later notification cannot be ignored. The parties shall be put to great inconvenience in approaching different Forums. That aspect appears to have escaped the notice of the State Government while considering the Cabinet Memorandum. 34. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, later notification shall have no legal entity whatsoever and can safely be ignored. To sum up the grounds for ignoring this Notification are as under:- (i) The power of the State Government under Section 15(2) of the Act is one time power only which can be exercised. The power once exercised stands exhausted. It does not include the power to withdraw the earlier exercise made in this behalf. (ii) The provision of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act nowhere empowers the State Govt. in the present case in issuing the later notification especially when by doing so the Scheme of the Act is rendered repugnant and the scope and object of the Act stands frustrated. This power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be made use of in order to comply with the aim and object of the Act. In the present case, all types of cases including coming under Section 15 (2) of the Act have to be tried in one common Forum and not by various Forums as was done be fore coming into force of the Act which object is frustrated in case the later notification is permitted to be complied with as has been the intention of the State Government. (iii) Section 15(2) of the Act when it was made applicable by the earlier notification has granted and created certain rights in favour of the employees coming under Section 15(2) of the Act. (iii) Section 15(2) of the Act when it was made applicable by the earlier notification has granted and created certain rights in favour of the employees coming under Section 15(2) of the Act. Those rights created cannot be taken away by an executive Notification as has been done in the present case. (iv) The power so exercised by the State Govt. cannot be so done under the Scheme of the Act administratively, it is for the legislature which in the present case is the Parliament to amend, repeal, modify or rescind any provision of the Act. This legislative power can be invoked by the Parliament in this behalf. 35. Thus, in view of the detailed discussion having been made hereinabove, we come to the sole conclusion that the State Government has got no power under Section 15 (2) of the Administrative Tribunal Act : 1985 read with Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 to issue notification rescinding the earlier notification dated August 29, 1986 with immediate effect in the public interest. This point No. (i) is accordingly decided. (ii) In view of the decision of point No. (i) as referred to above, the decision for this point is rendered in fructuous. Otherwise also, the learned Additional Advocate General has rightly conceded that there would not be any effect to the pending cases covered under the earlier notification issued by the State Government under Section 15 (2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act on August 29, 1986 and the Tribunals shall have the jurisdiction to dispose of those cases. Otherwise various authorities in this behalf have been placed on record by the learned Additional Advocate General as referred under Point No. (i) above. 36. Both the points referred to this Full Bench stand answered accordingly. We may record our appreciation and thanks to the learned counsel for the parties and of course to the learned Advocates who have helped us in a very effective manner to come to the aforesaid conclusions.