JUDGMENT 1. :- The instant writ petition has been filed, challenging the legality and validity of the orders dated 16.12.99 and 29.12.99, passed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for a direction to respondents Nos. 1 to 3, to release the illegally held due payments to the petitioner, lying with respondent No.3, with a further direction to implement the decision dated 9.4.99. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 3. The learn@H Additional Advocate General, Mr. Rafiq, appearing on behalf of the answering respondents, raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of the present writ petition. It is urged by the learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioner-company has got efficacious alternative remedy of initiating arbitration proceedings. It is submitted that the present dispute is arising out of a contract, which was executed between the petitioner-company on one hand, and the Government of Rajasthan, on the other, to manufacture and supply of seven different sizes of new and unused corrugated polyvinyl chloride (PVC) drain pipe in Kota. In a nut-shell, it is contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that since in the present case, there is arbitration agreement between the parties, therefore, the petitioner can initiate arbitration proceedings, as stipulated in the contract, executed between them on 30.10.92, whereof, clause 3.14 reads thus : "If any dispute and/or difference shall at any time arise between the parties to this agreement, such disputes shall be referred to arbitration by two arbitrators; one to be appointed by each party. The venue of arbitration shall be at Kota (Rajasthan) only. Legal proceedings, if any, arising out of tender/contract shall be lodged in courts situated in Kota, Rajasthan." 4. It is next contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that in the present writ petition, intricate disputed questions of fact are involved, which cannot be gone into under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner-company has filed the present writ petition on 13.1.2000, which was entered at Inward No.384, on 13.1.2000, wherein, in paragraph 27, a statement has been made by it that it has not filed any such case either in this Court or in any other court. This fact has been supported by the petitioner-company by filing an affidavit of Sunil Prakash Sahu, son of V.N. Sahu, who described himself as Director of the petitioner-company. This fact has been supported by the petitioner-company by filing an affidavit of Sunil Prakash Sahu, son of V.N. Sahu, who described himself as Director of the petitioner-company. The aforesaid averment, made in the writ petition, supported by affidavit, tantamounts to concealment of material fact from this Court, as the petitioner-company has already filed a civil suit in the court of Sixth Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, which was filed on 7.1.2000. A true-copy of the notice, received in the aforesaid suit and a copy of plaint are filed along with the reply and marked whereof as Anexure-A/1 to the reply. 5. Replying to the aforesaid preliminary objections raised by the learned Additional Advocate General, Mrs. Nivedita Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-company, vehemently urged before me that where the petitioner-company claims itself to be aggrieved by the action of a public body or authority with plea that the action is unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or unjust, in such a situation, the petitioner-company is entitled to a hearing of its petition on merits and the respondents cannot be allowed to take the preliminary objections, as they are taking in the present writ petition. In support of her aforesaid contention, she placed reliance on a decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited and another Vs. The Ulhas Nagar Municipal Council and another, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1021 and another decision rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 . 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. In my considered opinion, if the petitioner makes a claim before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court is prima facie satisfied that the claim putforth by the petitioner cannot be appropriately tried in a petition invoking extraordinary jurisdiction, this Court may decline to entertain the petition. For the reasons given hereinbelow, I decline to issue a prerogative writ in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 7. Indisputably, in the present case, the dispute centres round a contract entered into between the petitioner-company and the answering respondents on 30.10.92, wherein clause 3.14 specifically provides for appointment of two arbitrators; one to be appointed by each party. 7. Indisputably, in the present case, the dispute centres round a contract entered into between the petitioner-company and the answering respondents on 30.10.92, wherein clause 3.14 specifically provides for appointment of two arbitrators; one to be appointed by each party. The venue of arbitration is fixed to be at Kota (Rajasthan) only. It is further evident from the aforesaid clause that legal proceedings, if any, arising out of tender/ contract, shall be lodged in courts situated in Kota, Rajasthan. The answering respondents have filed a detailed return, denying the averments made in the writ petition and taking preliminary objections mentioned hereinabove but, for the reasons best known to the petitioner-company, no rejoinder has been filed, controverting the facts averred in the reply filed by answering respondents. 8. I am of the view that where there is arbitration agreement between the parties in a contract breach of such contract by anyone of them can be enforced before arbitrators under the Arbitration Act. I am also of the view that only breach of statutory contract can be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But, breach of other than statutory contracts between private parties and State where there is arbitration agreement between them, cannot be enforced by filing a writ petition because such disputes, relating to breach of contract cannot be appropriately tried in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I have no hesitation to hold that in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner-company has no legal justification to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, because breach of contract dated 30.10.1992 where there is arbitration agreement between the parties cannot be appropriately tried in writ jurisdiction. In the present case the petitioner company has efficacious alternative remedy to initiate arbitration proceedings under Arbitration Act. 9. The next contention, raised by the learned Additional Advocate General, is to the effect that the petitioner-company has already filed a civil suit in the court of Sixth Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, on 7.1.2000, therefore, after filing the aforesaid suit for the same cause of action, the petitioner-company has no legal justification to invoke the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court, relating to disputed questions of fact. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, this issue can be appropriately decided only either in civil suit or by arbitrators. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, this issue can be appropriately decided only either in civil suit or by arbitrators. Since the petitioner-company has already filed the aforesaid civil suit, therefore, it is precluded to file the present petition. In support of his aforesaid contention, he, placed reliance on the decision rendered by Supreme Court, in case of State Bank of India and others Vs. State Bank of India Canteen Employees' Union and others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 74 and another decision rendered by Supreme Court in case of Sweetamber Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti and another Vs. Alleged Committee of Management Sri R.J.I. College, Agra and others, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 11 . 10. I am of the view that there is substance in the aforesaid argument of the learned Additional Advocate General. It is held that since the petitioner-company-has already filed a civil suit, therefore, after filing a civil suit, it has no legal justification to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is now settled principle of law that disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. 11. The bottom-line argument of the learned Additional Advocate General, before me, is that in the present case, Shri Sunil Prakash Sahu, son of V.N. Sahu, claiming himself as a Director of the petitioner-company, has filed a false affidavit, concealing the material facts from this Court to the effect that a civil suit in respect to the same cause of action, was pending in the court of Sixth Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, when the present writ petition was filed. 12. As regards tampering with the record of judicial proceedings and filing a false affidavit in courts of law, I am constrained to observe that such tendencies of causing obstruction to due course of -administration of justice are gaining grounds in present days, which deserve to be deprecated. It is true that such false affidavit leading to material concealment undermines and obstructs free flow of unsoiled stream of justice and aims at striking a blow in a writ petition, where, normally, petitions are decided on basis of affidavits of the parties, with implicit faith, whatever are averred in the affidavits, in the counter-affidavits and in the rejoinder-affidavits, in a writ petition. Judicial restraint does not permit me to observe more than this that the stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and no one can be permitted to take liberties of filing false affidavit, misleading the Court to obtain undue advantage. 13. The second limb of the aforesaid argument of the learned Additional Advocate General, is to the effect that since the petitioner-company is guilty of material concealment from this Court, in not disclosing the pendency of the civil suit in the court of Sixth Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, therefore, the present writ petition can be dismissed on this ground alone. I am objectively satisfied that the petitioner-company was under legal obligation to disclose the aforesaid significant and important fact in its writ petition and non-disclosure of the aforesaid material facts debars it to invoke the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court. The equitable relief contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be granted only to those petitioners, who invoke equitable jurisdiction of this court with clean hands. To my mind, a prerogative equitable writ cannot be issued in favour of a person, who has not approached to this Court with clean hands. The petitioner-company has not approached to this Court with clean hands, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 14. The decisions cited by Mrs. Nivedita Sharma, appearing on behalf of petitioner-company i.e. Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others (supra) and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited and another (supra), in support of her contention that the grievance put forth by the petitioner-company can be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-company, are distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed on the ground of alternative efficacious remedy, available to the petitioner-company.Petition Dismissed. *******